People v. Victorian CA2/6

CourtListener 10705870Calctapp17 oct. 2025

Texte intégral

Filed 10/17/25 P. v. Victorian CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B335535
(Super. Ct. No. LA097900)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)

v.

JESSICA PAULINE
VICTORIAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

Jessica Pauline Victorian appeals from the judgment after
she pleaded guilty to arson in exchange for probation and credit
for time served. (Pen. Code,1 § 451, subd. (c).) Victorian later
admitted violating probation and was sentenced to two years in
state prison. She contends the trial court abused its discretion
because it did not advise her of a mandatory lifetime arson
registration requirement. We affirm.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In October 2022, customers at Jons Fresh Marketplace
reported smelling smoke coming from the restroom and hearing
someone talking to herself. A security guard unlocked the
restroom door and discovered that Victorian had set fire to the
restroom’s trash can. When the police arrived, they recovered a
cigarette lighter in Victorian’s pocket and arrested her.
Victorian was charged with one count of arson. (§ 451,
subd. (c).) The trial court granted Victorian mental health
diversion (§ 1001.35, subd. (b)). But Victorian failed to appear,
and the court later terminated diversion and reinstated criminal
proceedings. In March 2023, Victorian pleaded no contest to
arson.
As part of her plea, Victorian signed a “Plea Form, with
Explanations and Waiver of Rights—Felony.” Victorian initialed
several boxes, indicating that she understood and agreed with the
form. Several of the boxes are crossed out with an “X,” allegedly
done by Victorian’s attorney. One crossed-out box is a paragraph
entitled “Registration” and states, “I understand that I will be
required to register with the local police agency or sheriff’s
department in the city or county in which I reside as [¶] (1) an
arson offender.” Victorian did not initial this paragraph.
At sentencing, the trial court and the parties discussed
what registration attached to the conviction, if any. The trial
court stated its “understanding [that the conviction is] not
registerable,” and the prosecutor stated she would “double check.”
The trial court then questioned Victorian regarding her
plea. The court asked Victorian whether she reviewed the plea
form “and all the rights and consequences contained in this form”
with her attorney. Victorian responded, “Yes.” The court asked
whether her initials and signature appeared on the plea form.

2
Victorian responded, “Yes.” The court asked whether she
understood: the “rights and consequences that pertain to each
box” she initialed on the plea form; that by signing the plea form,
she was giving up all the rights contained in the form; and that a
no contest plea would be treated the same as a guilty plea, and
Victorian would be convicted upon that plea. Victorian
responded, “Yes.”
The trial court found that Victorian knowingly, willingly,
and voluntarily entered into the no contest plea. It suspended
imposition of sentence and placed Victorian on two years’ formal
probation and sentenced her to 270 days in jail with credit for
time served. Victorian said she understood that she was “going
to prison” if she violated probation.
At the end of the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor stated
she had reviewed section 457.1, which states that “[a] person who
. . . is convicted in any court in this state of arson . . . shall be
required to register, in accordance with the provisions of this
section, for the rest of their life.” (§ 457.1, subd. (b)(2), italics
added.) She said, “it appears that [Victorian] has to register as
an arson offender.” The trial court confirmed this with the
prosecutor, and the following exchange occurred:
“[Prosecutor]: Your honor, I’m looking at Penal Code
section 457.1.
[¶] . . . [¶]
“[Prosecutor]: And it appears that she has to register as an
arson offender.
“The Court: She does? Is that a yes?
“[Prosecutor]: Yes.
“The Court: You’re also ordered to register as an arson
offender.
[¶] . . . [¶]

3
“The Court: All right. Ma’am, do you understand and
accept your terms and conditions of probation?
“[Victorian]: Yes, I do.”
While on probation, Victorian was later arrested on a
misdemeanor charge and her probation was revoked. Victorian
admitted a probation violation for “failure to obey all laws.” The
trial court reinstated probation and conditionally released
Victorian for transport to a residential mental health treatment
facility. Victorian later refused transport to the facility, and the
trial court revoked probation and issued a bench warrant.
At her subsequent probation violation hearing, Victorian
moved to withdraw her plea because she was not advised of a
mandatory lifetime arson registration requirement. Victorian’s
counsel noted the box on the plea form requiring arson
registration “was crossed off by the attorney of record at the
time,” and Victorian “did not put her initials in that box.” It was
only “during the end of the advisement by the court and the
confirmation that [Victorian] had signed and initialed the Tahl2
form . . .the prosecutor . . . advised that it is a registerable case.”
(Italics added.) At the time of her plea, Victorian’s prior counsel
was “surprised that it was an arson related required
registration,” and Victorian “didn’t know and was only advised at
the last minute at the end of her plea.”
The trial court denied Victorian’s motion to withdraw the
plea. Victorian admitted the probation violation and the trial
court sentenced her to two years in state prison.

2 See In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 132, advising trial
courts to obtain an “express waiver on the record” of a criminal
defendant’s waived rights before accepting a guilty plea.

4
DISCUSSION
Victorian contends the trial court abused its discretion
because it did not advise her that she would have to register as
an arson offender for life. Instead, the court informed Victorian
that she only needed to register during the term of her probation.
We agree the trial court erred but conclude the error is harmless
because there is insufficient evidence of prejudice.
“Registration requirements are consequences of qualifying
criminal convictions” and “ ‘ “are based on the assumption that
persons convicted of certain offenses are more likely to repeat the
crimes and that law enforcement’s ability to prevent certain
crimes and its ability to apprehend certain types of criminals will
be improved if these repeat offenders’ whereabouts are
known.” ’ ” (People v. Pinedo (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 608, 615–
616.) Arsonists are subject to the registration requirements
because the Legislature has determined they are “likely to repeat
their offenses.” (Id. at p. 616.)
Before entering a guilty plea, a defendant must be advised
of both the constitutional rights being waived and the direct
consequences of the plea. (Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S.
238, 242–243; In re Tahl, supra, 1 Cal.3d 122, 130; In re Moser
(1993) 6 Cal.4th 342, 351; People v. Walker (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1013,
1020 (Walker); Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592,
605.) The arson registration requirement constitutes a direct
consequence of a guilty plea. (People v. McClellan (1993) 6
Cal.4th 367, 376, fn. 8 (McClellan).) While a trial court must
advise a defendant of any registration requirements, this
requirement is not constitutionally compelled. (People v.
Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1031.) Advisement is “ ‘a
judicially declared rule of criminal procedure.’ ” (Walker, at p.
1022.)

5
We agree the trial court erred by not advising Victorian
that she would have to register as an arsonist for life. “[A]
restrictive lifelong consequence or obligation is a direct
consequence of the plea, and . . . a court must advise of the
lifetime element.” (People v. Zaidi (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1470,
1483 (Zaidi).) But to prevail, Victorian must show she was
prejudiced by the error. (McClellan, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 377–
378 & fn. 8; Zaidi, at pp. 1488–1489; In re Moser, supra, 6
Cal.4th at p. 352.)
To show prejudice, a defendant must show they would not
have entered the plea had the trial court given a proper
advisement. (In re Moser, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 352.) A
defendant’s bare assertion without other support in the record
indicating they would not have pleaded had they been properly
advised is insufficient. (McClellan, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 378;
Walker, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 1022–1023.)
The Attorney General contends Victorian forfeited this
contention because she did not object before entering her plea
and immediate sentencing. (People v. McCullough (2013) 56
Cal.4th 589, 593 [“ ‘Ordinarily, a criminal defendant who does not
challenge an assertedly erroneous ruling of the trial court in that
court has forfeited his or her right to raise the claim on appeal’ ”];
In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [parties are encouraged to
bring errors to the trial court’s attention “so that they may be
corrected”].)
We need not decide whether Victorian forfeited her
contention. Even if she had preserved her claim, Victorian has
not established prejudicial error. Victorian does not contend she
would not have entered her plea had she been aware of the
lifetime registration requirement. To the contrary, Victorian
concedes she does not want to “unwind” her plea; she has already

6
served her two-year term. After she was placed on probation in
March 2023, Victorian was sentenced to prison because she was
arrested and admitted two probation violations. Victorian also
refused mental health diversion and other programming. Based
on this record, Victorian cannot show she would not have entered
her plea had she been correctly advised of the lifetime arson
registration requirement.
Instead, relying on Zaidi, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th 1470,
1489, Victorian contends she can establish prejudice because her
ignorance of the registration requirement “was reasonable in
light of the totality of the circumstances.” But Zaidi is
distinguishable. Zaidi held the defendant was entitled to
withdraw his no contest plea because he was prejudiced by the
trial court’s failure to advise him of the lifetime sex offender
registration requirement. (Id. at p. 1490.) The record supported
defendant’s motion: the trial court never advised the defendant
that the registration was for life; and the defendant declared he
did not understand the proceedings, English was not his first
language, and he would not have entered his plea had he known
the registration requirement was for life. (Id. at pp. 1479–1480,
1490.)
Unlike Zaidi, the record here does not support that
Victorian was prejudiced by the misadvisement. (McClellan,
supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 378 [although defendant alleged he would
have not entered his plea had he been properly advised of sex
registration requirement, there was “nothing in the record on
appeal to support this contention”].) With her plea, Victorian
received probation with credit for time served in lieu of a
potentially longer prison sentence. She also refused diversion
and other treatment programs and later admitted two probation
violations. Moreover, the fact that Victorian did not register

7
indicates the registration requirement was not a substantial
factor in her decision to plead. It was not until after Victorian
violated probation that she raised the issue of not being advised
of the lifetime registration requirement. Because the record does
not indicate Victorian would have declined the credit-for-time
served probation disposition to avoid the lifetime registration
requirement, she cannot establish prejudice.
A “trial court’s omission, at the change of plea hearing, of
advice regarding [a] defendant’s statutory obligation to register”
does “not transform the court’s error into a term of the parties’
plea agreement.” (McClellan, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 379.) And
because “ ‘[a] plea agreement is, in essence, a contract between
the defendant and the prosecutor to which the court consents to
be bound’ ” (People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 701), we will
not modify Victorian’s conviction to a lesser charge under section
1260.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

YEGAN, J.

8
Michael V. Jesic, Judge

Superior Court County of Los Angeles

______________________________

Mary Jo Strnad, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General,
Steven D. Matthews and Rama R. Maline, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude

Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.