CourtListener 10703637•People v. Mattingly CA1/5
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Filed 10/14/25 P. v. Mattingly CA1/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A170673
v.
ROGER WAYNE MATTINGLY, (Lake County Super. Ct. No.
Defendant and Appellant. CR969251)
After a disagreement with his neighbor turned violent,
Roger Wayne Mattingly was convicted of assault with a deadly
weapon, simple assault, criminal threats, and drug possession.
In this appeal, he argues that his trial counsel committed
ineffective assistance of counsel by allowing a law enforcement
officer to present improper character testimony, and that there
was insufficient evidence that he possessed a usable amount of a
controlled substance, as required for his drug possession
conviction. In addition, he contends, and the People agree, that
he is entitled to resentencing because aggravating factors that
should have been tried to a jury were tried by the court. (See
People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1078-1086 (Wiley).) We
remand for resentencing but otherwise affirm the judgment.
1
BACKGROUND
A.
Mattingly’s convictions arose from an altercation he had
with his neighbor, Daniel Current, Jr., in 2023. The
confrontation involved a car that Current’s son had purchased
from one of Mattingly’s former roommates while Mattingly was
incarcerated. Mattingly found out after he was released from
prison that his car, a BMW, had been sold, and he maintained
that Current’s son should return the car or compensate him for it.
The day of the altercation, Mattingly was walking by
Current’s house to return a machete that he had sharpened as a
favor for another neighbor. He had the machete tucked under his
arm, and he was also holding a concrete nail gun.
According to Current’s testimony at trial, Current was
returning home with his son from a nearby store. Mattingly was
in front of Current’s house, and Current’s son went into the house
as Current and Mattingly started talking. Mattingly demanded
that Current pay him for the car and then threatened him,
saying, “ ‘I’m going to shoot you.’ ” Current heard a clicking noise
and believed that Mattingly had triggered something that looked
like a pellet gun or nail gun. Current testified that he believed
Mattingly was going to shoot him and feared for his safety. As a
result, Current “attacked” Mattingly by shoving him. The nail
gun fell out of Mattingly’s hand, and Mattingly swung the
machete at Current, who hit Mattingly a few times. Current
realized that he was bleeding and tried to get the machete away
from Mattingly. Mattingly ended up on the ground, and Current
was able to put his foot on Mattingly’s wrist, pinning the machete
to the ground. Current described the machete as approximately
17 inches long.
Current had wounds on the knuckles and thumb of one
hand, as well as on one leg. The sight of the blood made him feel
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like he was going to pass out, so he screamed for his son, who was
in the house.
Current’s son testified that when he heard his father
screaming, he came out of the house and saw Mattingly and
Current on the ground. Mattingly had a blade in his hand and
Current, who was unarmed, was bleeding. Current’s son, also
unarmed, then hit Mattingly on the head two or three times,
using his hands. Mattingly went limp and Current was able to
get away while his son yelled for Current’s girlfriend, who was in
the house, to call the police. Current’s girlfriend did not see the
altercation, but she heard the commotion and called the police.
Current and Mattingly returned to their respective homes.
After the police spoke with Current, his son, and his
girlfriend, they located Mattingly at his house. The police also
found the machete inside his house.
Lake County Deputy Sheriff Demetrius Donaldson recorded
his initial interview with Mattingly using his body worn camera;
the video was played for the jury. As an interrogation tactic,
Donaldson falsely told Mattingly that the altercation was
recorded on a home security camera video that the police had
reviewed. However, at the time of the interview, Donaldson did
not know if such a video existed, and ultimately the police were
unable to recover any video footage of the fight.
According to Mattingly’s account in the body worn camera
video, when he ran into Current, Mattingly commented on a new
BMW that Current had acquired. Current then became “irate.”
Mattingly tried to walk away, but Current hit him repeatedly
from behind. When Donaldson asked him why he swung the
machete at Current, Mattingly asserted, “I was just trying to
defend myself.” Mattingly did not swing the machete “until after
I was attacked and my back to was to him when I got hit.” At
some point Current’s son came over and both he and Current
“pummel[ed]” Mattingly.
3
Although Donaldson claimed during the interview that he
“knew” from the security video that Mattingly started the fight
with Current, Mattingly denied provoking the fight. Mattingly
admitted to having a machete and an empty concrete nail gun
with him, but he said he did not threaten to kill or shoot Current.
Mattingly denied threatening Current even though Donaldson
claimed his threat was caught on video.
Donaldson accused Mattingly of “telling [him] . . . lies of
what happened.” Donaldson added, “I’ve watched the video and I
know you’re bullshittin’ me.” When Mattingly said, “I’m not lyin’
to ya,” Donaldson responded: “You are bullshittin’ me. You’re
lying to me.” Despite Donaldson’s claims that he knew from the
security video that Mattingly was lying, Mattingly maintained
that he did not threaten Current and that he only used the
machete in self-defense, telling Donaldson “the video footage is
wrong.”
During the interview, Donaldson and Mattingly also
alluded to Mattingly’s prior police contacts. Mattingly explained
to Donaldson that his car was sold while he was incarcerated on
drug-related charges. Donaldson later noted that the two of them
had “talked a bunch in the past,” although Mattingly said he did
not remember Donaldson. And in the course of denying that he
committed a crime against Current, Mattingly commented, “I’ve
been in enough trouble in my past.”
According to Donaldson’s testimony at trial, Mattingly
appeared to be under the influence of methamphetamine or
another stimulant drug at the time he encountered him.
Mattingly had “quite a bit of blood on his left hand,” and he had
dried blood on his head.
In response to a question from the prosecutor about why he
had misrepresented that there was a video, Donaldson testified:
“It's a common -- or it’s a sometimes-used tactic for subjects that
you believe can be lying to you about [an] investigation especially
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when they're off [from] the get-go, you know, making up excuses
to what they're doing and what they have going on.”
Donaldson also testified that when the police searched
Mattingly’s person in connection with his arrest, they found a
glass vial containing a crystalline substance they recognized to be
methamphetamine, along with a glass pipe commonly used to
smoke methamphetamine. A criminalist testified for the
prosecution that the vial contained .350 grams of
methamphetamine.
B.
Based on the altercation with Current, Mattingly was
charged with assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245,
subd. (a)(1); count one); battery resulting in the infliction of
serious bodily injury (id., § 243, subd. (d); count two); criminal
threats which would result in death and great bodily injury (id., §
422, subd. (a); count three); and misdemeanor possession of
methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a); count
four). The information also contained special allegations as to
the first three counts that Mattingly personally inflicted great
bodily injury on the victim (Pen. Code, § 12022.7), and that
Mattingly had seven prior felony convictions that rendered him
ineligible for probation (id., § 1203, subd. (e)(4)).1
In addition, the information alleged several aggravating
factors were applicable for sentencing purposes, including that
Mattingly served a prior prison term; he “was convicted of other
crimes for which consecutive sentences could have been imposed
but for which concurrent sentences are being imposed”; his “prior
convictions as an adult or sustained petitions in juvenile
delinquency proceedings are numerous or of increasing
seriousness”; and his “prior performance on probation, mandatory
supervision, post-release community supervision, or parole was
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
5
unsatisfactory.” (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(7), (b)(2)-
(3), (b)(5).) The alleged aggravating circumstances also included
two factors based on great bodily harm or great violence, and a
factor based on the victim’s particular vulnerability. (See id., rule
4.421(a)(1), (a)(3), (b)(1).)
The jury returned a guilty verdict on counts one, three, and
four. With respect to count two, the jury found Mattingly not
guilty of battery causing great bodily injury, but it found him
guilty of the lesser included offense of simple assault. The jury
found the allegation of great bodily injury untrue.
The trial court concluded that it followed from the jury’s
verdict that the aggravating circumstances based on great bodily
injury or great violence were not present. In addition, the
prosecution agreed not to pursue the aggravating factor based on
the victim’s vulnerability. The trial court concluded that the
remaining aggravating factors were properly tried by the court,
and not by the jury.
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel argued that
although Mattingly had a lengthy criminal record, “his record
very rarely, if ever, extends [to] the areas of violence. A majority
of his past related to property crimes, burglary, and so on, and
possession charges as relates to his addiction to
methamphetamine.” Defense counsel also noted Mattingly’s
struggles with abuse as a child and with depression, describing
him as someone who has “always existed on the edges” of society.
Despite his challenges, trial counsel argued, Mattingly had “tried
to better himself,” as he went through prison and obtained an
associate’s degree.
With respect to aggravating factors, the trial court found
that Mattingly had a “history of violence” and “numerous prior
felony convictions . . . over the years” and his prior probation
performance was “very poor.” The court found no mitigating
circumstances. The court then sentenced Mattingly to the upper
6
term of four years for count one, with shorter sentences on the
remaining counts to run concurrently, resulting in an aggregate
sentence of four years in prison.
DISCUSSION
A.
Mattingly argues that his trial counsel was ineffective
because he failed to object when Deputy Sheriff Donaldson
suggested that he was a liar and Current was truthful. On the
present record, Mattingly is unable to establish that his attorney
provided ineffective assistance.
Mattingly must show that his attorney’s performance was
deficient and that the error prejudiced his defense, depriving him
of a fair trial. (See Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668,
687.) Ineffective assistance of counsel claims rarely succeed on
direct appeal because the appellate record seldom reflects trial
counsel’s reasoning for an action or omission. (See People v.
Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 198 (Mickel).) In a direct appeal, the
defendant must point to “affirmative evidence that counsel had
‘ “ ‘no rational tactical purpose’ ” ’ ” for the challenged action or
omission. (Ibid.) Mattingly is unable to meet this burden on the
record here.
1.
Donaldson provided the challenged testimony in response
to a jury question about his decision to lie to Mattingly about the
existence of a security video of the altercation. A juror posed the
following question for Donaldson: “Since you are con[s]idered
innocent [until proven guilty,] why did you lie about the
[machete] attack to Mattingly[?] [¶] Why did you take
[Current’s] side of the story and [not] treat [Mattingly] in the
same way[?]”
7
Based on this juror question, the prosecutor questioned
Donaldson as follows: “Why did you lie to the defendant when you
questioned him? Why did you tell him about that video?”
Donaldson answered, “So I had previous law enforcement
contacts with the defendant. I was familiar with his attitude,
familiar with his behavior. We've been out there for some I
would almost describe them as crazy calls sometimes with him,
didn't result in anything else. However, I kind of knew what to
expect coming into interview him. So when you go to interview a
suspect[,] interview anyone related to a crime, you kind of pick a
tactic to interview them with. That's the one I chose to go with. I
didn't feel like he was going to be truthful with me from the getgo
[sic] about his statements, you know, just based on his -- based on
him being in his house and hiding instead of him calling 911.
And then my previous encounters with him, I didn't think he was
going to be truthful with me; so I chose that tactic.”
The prosecutor then asked Donaldson, “did you use a
similar tactic when you interviewed Mr. Current[?]” Donaldson
answered, “I did not, no” because “[t]here w[ere] multiple
witnesses there providing me with a very similar statement or
basically the same chain of events that happened during the
incident. And we didn't have a truthful basis that I was being
provided the truth from that victim based not only by the victim
but the persons involved in that altercation.”
2.
We are unpersuaded by Mattingly’s contention that his
attorney could have had no strategic purpose in declining to
object to Donaldson’s response to the juror question.
First, defense counsel may have been concerned about
offending the jury. Mattingly is correct that lay opinion
testimony on another person’s credibility is inadmissible for the
purpose of establishing credibility. (See People v. Melton (1988)
44 Cal.3d 713, 744; People v. Dryden (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1007,
8
1026 (Dryden).) However, “an officer’s testimony with respect to
whether he believed a witness may be admitted to ‘ “assist[] the
jury in understanding the actions of the police.” ’ ” (Dryden, at p.
1027.) In the circumstances here, where the testimony was
elicited in response to a question from the jury, Mattingly’s
counsel understandably may have been reluctant to object
because the testimony was directly relevant to the jury’s
understanding of Donaldson’s conduct, and objecting could have
caused the jury to believe that the defense was standing in the
way of the jury’s truth-seeking function.
Second, defense counsel may have reasonably believed that
the risk of objecting outweighed any potential benefit in part
because Donaldson’s response to the jury question was largely
duplicative of other evidence that the jury had already heard.
For example, Mattingly asserts that Donaldson’s response to the
juror question portrayed him as a liar. But by the time
Donaldson provided the challenged testimony, the jury had
already heard evidence that Donaldson thought Mattingly was
lying—from the initial interview of Mattingly, when Donaldson
repeatedly accused him of lying, and in Donaldson’s unchallenged
testimony explaining that he was using an interrogation tactic
intended for suspects who are expected to lie. Allowing
Donaldson to testify about the basis for his belief that Mattingly
would lie may have enabled the defense to attempt to undercut
his reasoning.
Third, Donaldson’s response to the jury question potentially
mitigated earlier evidence of Mattingly’s police contacts by
clarifying that the prior contacts with Donaldson “didn’t result in
anything else.”
Fourth, Donaldson’s response furthered the defense
strategy, which sought to portray him as having conducted a one-
sided investigation due to his personal bias against Mattingly. In
his closing argument, Mattingly’s attorney relied on Donaldson’s
9
response to the juror question to argue that his investigation and
testimony was tainted by bias. Defense counsel told the jury:
“Remember, we talk about prejudice, prejudice of a witness.
Remember, Deputy Donaldson gets up here and he says, oh,
yeah, I've had plenty of encounters with him before. Prejudice,
bias. That's why Deputy Donaldson led Daniel Current Jr. to say
that he was in fear of his life -- prejudice, bias. I've had
encounters with him before. I know exactly who he is. I know
exactly who this man is. I'm going to string him up for assault
with a deadly weapon.” Mattingly’s attorney then encouraged
the jury to watch the video of Mattingly’s interview, saying: “the
cops show up and start asking him, lying to him, and what does
he do? Does he crumble? Does he fold? Does he give
contradictory statements? Nope. Not at all.” In these
circumstances, we are unable to rule out the possibility that
defense counsel had a strategic basis for declining to object to
Donaldson’s testimony about his belief that Mattingly would not
be truthful.
Mattingly also contends his trial counsel should have
objected to Donaldson’s response to the juror question because it
“bolster[ed] the truthfulness of Current by having a law
enforcement witness vouch for his veracity.” But Donaldson’s
statement that “we didn’t have a truthful basis that I was being
provided the truth from that victim” was cryptic at best, and it
did not intelligibly vouch for Current’s credibility. And although
Donaldson also stated that he had received similar accounts from
multiple witnesses, defense counsel could have reasonably
decided to take issue with that characterization separately,
rather than object and risk making the jury think the defense
was preventing the jury from hearing the whole truth. And
indeed, in closing arguments, defense counsel addressed
Donaldson’s characterization of the witness statements by
arguing to the jury that the other witnesses—Current’s girlfriend
10
and son, who each witnessed only parts of the relevant events—
“didn’t say too much.”
On the record before us, Mattingly has not shown
affirmatively that his trial counsel lacked a rational tactical basis
for declining to object to Donaldson’s response to the juror
question. (See Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 198.) As a result, he
is unable to show that his counsel’s performance was
constitutionally deficient. (See ibid.)
B.
Mattingly next contends that his conviction for possession
of a controlled substance must be reversed due to insufficient
evidence that he had a usable amount of methamphetamine in
his possession. Examining the record for substantial evidence
(People v. Polk (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 340, 348 (Polk)), we
disagree.
A conviction for possession of a controlled substance under
Health and Safety Code section 11377, subdivision (a), requires
possession of “ ‘a quantity usable for consumption or sale.’ ”
(People v. Martin (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1180, 1184.) This rule
“prohibits conviction only when the substance possessed simply
cannot be used, such as when it is a blackened residue or a
useless trace.” (People v. Rubacalba (1993) 6 Cal.4th 62, 66
(Rubacalba).) To prove that the amount is usable for
consumption or sale, the prosecution need not prove that the
quantity is sufficient to produce a narcotic effect. (Ibid.)
Accordingly, the jury here was instructed that a “usable amount
is a quantity that is enough to be used by someone as a controlled
substance. Useless traces or debris are not usable amounts. On
the other hand, a usable amount does not have to be enough in
either amount or strength to affect the user.” (CALCRIM No.
2304.)
11
At trial, Donaldson testified that the police recovered from
Mattingly’s pocket “a clear glass vial which contained a
crystalline substance that we recognized as methamphetamine.”
The prosecution’s criminalist testified that she determined that
the weight of the methamphetamine was .350 grams, which she
deemed a usable amount. On cross-examination, she explained
that what she meant by a usable amount was that she had
“enough sample to conduct an analysis and still have some left
over.” The criminalist added that the tests she performed
consumed about .01 grams of the drug at most. She
acknowledged that she could not opine on “whether someone can
get high based on” the amount of methamphetamine recovered.
On re-direct, the criminalist testified that the amount of
methamphetamine recovered from Mattingly was an amount that
could be manipulated and moved around. In addition to this
witness testimony, the prosecution introduced a photograph of
the vial found in Mattingly’s pocket; the photograph showed a
pipe next to a small, clear glass vial in which a white-colored
substance was visible.
The record here contained substantial evidence that
Mattingly possessed a usable quantity, or more than a “useless
trace” or “residue” of methamphetamine. (Rubacalba, supra, 6
Cal.4th at p. 66.) The amount in question, .350 grams, was
enough to move around and manipulate, and it was a sufficient
quantity for the police to visually recognize the substance as
methamphetamine. Further, the jury was also presented with the
photograph depicting a white substance visible through the glass
of the vial, alongside a pipe commonly used to smoke
methamphetamine. The jury could reasonably infer from this
evidence that Mattingly possessed a usable quantity of
methamphetamine. (Cf. People v. Karmelich (1979) 92
Cal.App.3d 452, 455-456 [holding that evidence that balloons
containing a substance that was at minimum .1 percent heroin,
without more, was sufficient evidence that the substance was of
12
useable quantity because “the presence of heroin itself, not a
mere blackened residue” was detected]). Although the
criminalist did not know whether the amount was sufficient for a
user to “get high,” the prosecution was not required to prove that
the amount would have any effect on a user. (See Rubacalba, at
p. 66.)
C.
Finally, the parties agree, as do we, that Mattingly is
entitled to resentencing because two aggravating circumstances
relied upon by the trial court should have been tried by a jury
rather than the court. Because Mattingly’s entitlement to a jury
trial raises a legal question, our review is de novo. (See People v.
Superior Court (Frezier) (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 652, 659.)
Effective January 1, 2022, section 1170, subdivision (b),
provides that, when a “statute specifies three possible terms, the
court shall, in its sound discretion, order imposition of a sentence
not to exceed the middle term” unless “there are circumstances in
aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of
imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts
underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the
defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at
trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.” (§ 1170, subds.
(b)(1)-(2); see Sen. Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), Stats.
2021, ch. 731, § 1.3, eff. Jan. 1, 2022.) Under section 1170,
subdivision (b)(3), however, the trial court may nonetheless
“consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining
sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without
submitting the prior convictions to a jury.” Relying on section
1170, subdivision (b)(3), the trial court here tried two aggravating
circumstances at issue in this appeal: whether Mattingly’s prior
convictions were numerous or of increasing seriousness, and
whether his performance on probation was unsatisfactory. (See
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2), (b)(5).) At the time of
13
sentencing, our Supreme Court had held that a defendant was
not entitled to a jury trial on these aggravating factors. (See
People v. Towne (2008) 44 Cal.4th 63, 81-82; People v. Black
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 820.)
Recently, however, our Supreme Court overruled those
cases in Wiley, holding that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to
the United States Constitution, as well as section 1170,
subdivision (b), entitle a defendant to a jury trial on the
increasing seriousness of a defendant’s prior convictions and the
defendant’s performance on probation. (See Wiley, supra, 17
Cal.5th at pp. 1078-1086; see also People v. Wright (2025) 113
Cal.App.5th 832, 847-848 (Wright) [holding that a jury must
decide whether a defendant’s past convictions are “ ‘numerous’ ”];
Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821, 834 [“[v]irtually
‘any fact’ that ‘ “increase[s] the prescribed range of penalties to
which a criminal defendant is exposed” ’ must be resolved by a
unanimous jury beyond a reasonable doubt ([unless] freely
admitted. . .)”].) We accept the People’s concession and remand
this case for resentencing.
DISPOSITION
The convictions are affirmed. The sentence is vacated and
the case remanded to the trial court for a full resentencing
hearing in accordance with this opinion. (See Wright, supra, 113
Cal.App.5th at p. 848.)
BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR:
SIMONS, ACTING P.J.
CHOU, J.
P. v. Mattingly (A170673)
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