CourtListener 10700397•People v. Munoz CA2/7
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Filed 10/10/25 P. v. Munoz CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B341710
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24WCCF00405)
v.
RUBEN LUIS MUNOZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, David C. Brougham, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Andy Miri and Andy Miri for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, Shezad H. Thakor, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Ruben Luis Munoz appeals from the judgment after a jury
convicted him on three counts of assault with a deadly weapon
and one misdemeanor count of illegally using tear gas. Munoz
argues the trial court erred in granting his motion under Faretta
v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta) to represent himself.
We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Munoz Attacks a Family Acquaintance and Several
Family Members
Munoz and his mother Norma Munoz (Norma) lived on one
side of a converted garage; Munoz’s grandmother lived on the
other side. A wall separated the two units. Norma’s sister
Mercedes Munoz (Mercedes) and Mercedes’s son Jesse Munoz
(Jesse) lived in the main residence on the property.
One afternoon in 2024 Thomas Nessman, an acquaintance
of the Munoz family, went to the unit Munoz’s grandmother lived
in to repair some holes in the wall. While Nessman was putting
plywood over the holes, the tip of a knife appeared “several times”
in the wall. Nessman and Mercedes (who was also inside the
grandmother’s unit) went to the yard to investigate. Moments
later, Nessman saw Munoz holding a black plastic trash bag,
which Munoz threw at Nessman. Nessman grabbed the bag and
threw it back at Munoz, and Munoz sprayed Nessman in the face
2
with “bear spray.”1 Referring to Munoz, Nessman said, “I’m
going to kill that mother fucker.”
Mercedes, who was standing behind Nessman, felt the
spray on her face, particularly in her eyes, and fell to the ground.
Mercedes testified the spray felt “like a burning.” Munoz pulled
out a pellet gun, and Nessman felt “a bullet whizz[ ] right by” his
ear. Munoz pointed the gun at Jesse, who had come out of the
main house “to try to record what was going on.” Munoz fired
two shots at Jesse, and one of the pellets hit Jesse in the arm.
Los Angeles County Deputy Sheriff Justin Bleau and
several other deputies responded to the scene. The deputies went
into the home and found two cannisters of pepper spray on a shelf
in the living quarters Munoz and Norma occupied. On the desk
in the bedroom the deputies found other cannisters of pepper
spray, along with two unloaded pepper spray round magazines
that someone could use “for a pepper spray gun that would look
like a firearm.” Deputy Bleau explained that, when a person
shoots a pepper spray bullet, the bullet will explode when it
comes in contact with the victim.
One of the deputies observed that Mercedes had multiple
bruises and scratches on the side of her cheek and that Jesse had
one or two bruises on his left forearm. Nessman, who was
“pouring water on his face,” told the deputy that he had just been
sprayed and could not see. The deputy did not see any injuries on
Norma or Munoz. The deputies later recovered a pellet gun in
the backyard.
1 A deputy sheriff later determined the spray was oleoresin
capsicum, “a form of pepper spray.” (See People v. Autterson
(1968) 261 Cal.App.2d 627, 630 [oleoresin capsicum is a “peppery-
type substance”].)
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B. The People Charge Munoz with Crimes, and the Trial
Court Grants His Request To Represent Himself
The People charged Munoz with three counts of assault
with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)),2 and one misdemeanor
count of using tear gas not in self-defense (§ 22810, subd. (g)(1)).3
At the first hearing after his arraignment Munoz confirmed with
the court that he signed a form titled “Advisement and Waiver of
Right to Counsel (Faretta Waiver)”4 and that he put his initials in
“the appropriate boxes” on the form.
Munoz also answered questions from the court about
whether he understood the risks and consequences of
representing himself. The court asked Munoz whether he
understood that he had certain rights (which the court listed);
stated Munoz had been charged with “some serious crimes” that
2 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3 The People charged Norma with one count of assault with
force likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)).
4 Munoz placed his initials in the boxes on the form next to
advisements about his constitutional rights; warnings about the
dangers and disadvantages of representing himself; a notice he
was giving up the opportunity to have an experienced
professional attorney assist him in defending against the charges
against him and, if convicted, in presenting any posttrial motions
or sentencing options to the court; and an admonition that, by
choosing to represent himself, he would be acting against the
advice and recommendation of the court. Munoz wrote “20” in
the space for his age and “hs dipLomA” in the space for the
highest educational level attained. Munoz was 21 years old at
the time of the trial.
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were “considered strikes”; advised Munoz that he had the right to
an attorney; and stated that, if Munoz wanted an attorney to
represent him again, an attorney could represent him, but that it
would “be very difficult” for a newly appointed attorney “to come
up to speed” on the case and that it would be difficult for the
attorney to be able to represent him “successfully.” The court
also asked Munoz if he understood he could “not abuse” the right
to represent himself, which meant he could not “misbehave or
cause any disruptions in the court.” Munoz answered “Yes” to
each of the court’s questions. The court found Munoz was
“literate,” “fully informed” of his right to counsel, and “mentally
capable” of representing himself. The court also found Munoz
fully understood “the implications of waiving [his] right to be
represented by counsel” and “voluntarily and rationally” waived
that right. The court asked Munoz if he was prepared to proceed
with the preliminary hearing, and Munoz said, “Yes.”
C. The Jury Convicts Munoz, and the Court Places Him
on Formal Probation
Munoz represented himself at all stages of the trial, and
the jury found him guilty on all charges. The trial court
suspended imposition of sentence and placed Munoz on formal
probation for three years on various terms and conditions.
Munoz timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Munoz argues “the trial court erred by allowing [him] to
represent himself” (capitalization omitted), though he does not
really explain how the court erred. Munoz does not argue that he
5
lacked the competence to knowingly or voluntarily waive his
right to counsel or that he was not competent to represent
himself at trial. But Munoz quotes language from two cases,
Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806 and Indiana v. Edwards (2008)
554 U.S. 164, that suggests he may be making these arguments.
To the extent Munoz argues that he lacked the competence to
knowingly or voluntarily waive his right to counsel or that he was
not competent to represent himself, neither argument has merit.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“The United States Supreme Court has made clear that a
criminal defendant has a federal constitutional right to represent
himself if he voluntarily and intelligently so chooses.
[Citation.] A trial court must grant a defendant’s request for self-
representation if the request is made within a reasonable time
prior to the commencement of trial, is unequivocal, and is made
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.” (People v. Wright
(2021) 12 Cal.5th 419, 435-436; see Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at
pp. 835-836; People v. Best (2020) 49 CalApp.5th 747, 756.) “The
requirements for a valid waiver of the right to counsel are (1) a
determination that the accused is competent to waive the right,
i.e., he or she has the mental capacity to understand the nature
and object of the proceedings against him or her; and (2) a finding
that the waiver is knowing and voluntary, i.e., the accused
understands the significance and consequences of the decision
and makes it without coercion.” (People v. Koontz (2002)
27 Cal.4th 1041, 1069-1070; accord, People v. Morelos (2022)
13 Cal.5th 722, 735; People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 205;
Best, at p. 756.)
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“‘The focus of a competency inquiry is the defendant’s
mental capacity; the question is whether he has the ability to
understand the proceedings. [Citation.] The purpose of the
“knowing and voluntary” inquiry, by contrast, is to determine
whether the defendant actually does understand the significance
and consequences of a particular decision and whether the
decision is uncoerced.’” (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701,
733; accord, People v. Best, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 759;
People v. Silfa (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1323.) The
determination whether the defendant is competent to waive his
or her right to counsel “must be made . . . under the same test
that applies to competence to stand trial, that is, the defendant
must have a ‘“sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” and . . .
“a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings
against him.”’” (People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 513; see
Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389, 396, 399; People v.
Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668, 695; Welch, at p. 732.)
The trial court “‘“is not concerned with the wisdom of [the]
defendant’s decision to represent himself, or with how well he can
do so. The sole relevant question is whether the defendant has
the mental capacity to knowingly waive counsel while realizing
the probable risks and consequences of self-representation.”’”
(People v. Best, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 757; see Faretta,
supra, 422 U.S. at p. 836 [defendant’s “technical legal knowledge
. . . was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of
the right to defend himself”]; People v. Johnson (2012) 53 Cal.4th
519, 531 [“A court may not deny self-representation merely
because it believes the matter could be tried more efficiently, or
even more fairly, with attorneys on both sides.”]; People v. Taylor
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(2009) 47 Cal.4th 850, 866 [“the likelihood or actuality of a poor
performance by a defendant acting in propria persona” does not
“defeat the federal self-representation right”]; People v. Welch,
supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 733 [“the trial court may not ascertain a
defendant’s competence to waive counsel by evaluating the ability
to represent himself or herself”].)
On the issue whether the defendant is competent to
represent himself or herself, the trial court “need not routinely
inquire into the mental competence of a defendant seeking self-
representation. It needs to do so only if it is considering denying
self-representation due to doubts about the defendant’s mental
competence. When a court doubts a defendant’s competence to
stand trial, it ‘shall appoint a psychiatrist or licensed
psychologist, and any other expert the court may deem
appropriate, to examine the defendant.’ [Citation.] Similarly,
when it doubts the defendant’s mental competence for
self-representation, it may order a psychological or psychiatric
examination to inquire into that question.” (People v. Johnson,
supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 530; see People v. Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th
at p. 208 [“when evaluating a Faretta motion,” a trial court need
only inquire into a defendant’s mental competence “where it has
doubts about the defendant’s competence”].)
Thus, “the standard that trial courts considering exercising
their discretion to deny self-representation should apply is simply
whether the defendant suffers from a severe mental illness to the
point where he or she cannot carry out the basic tasks needed to
present the defense without the help of counsel.” (People v.
Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 530; see Indiana v. Edwards,
supra, 554 U.S. at pp. 177-178 [“the Constitution permits States
to insist upon representation by counsel for those competent
8
enough to stand trial . . . but who still suffer from severe mental
illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial
proceedings by themselves”]; People v. Orosco (2022)
82 Cal.App.5th 348, 358-359 [same]; People v. Gardner (2014)
231 Cal.App.4th 945, 956 [same].) “We review a Faretta waiver
de novo, examining the entire record to determine the validity of
a defendant’s waiver.” (People v. Morelos, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 735; accord, People v. Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 205; see
People v. Koontz, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1070 [“we examine
de novo the whole record—not merely the transcript of the
hearing on the Faretta motion itself—to determine the validity of
the defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel”].)
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting Munoz’s
Request To Represent Himself
1. Munoz Was Competent To Waive His Right to
Counsel
“A defendant is presumed competent unless the contrary is
proven by a preponderance of the evidence by the party
contending he or she is incompetent.” (People v. Blacksher (2011)
52 Cal.4th 769, 797; see § 1369, subd. (c)(3); Rodriguez v.
Superior Court (2023) 15 Cal.5th 472, 493; McKneely v. Superior
Court (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1232, 1240.) Munoz does not argue
he was incompetent to stand trial, and nothing in the record
suggests he was. In fact, the trial court found there was no basis
to conduct an inquiry under section 1368.5 Because the standard
5 Section 1368 “‘requires that criminal proceedings be
suspended and competency proceedings be commenced if “a doubt
9
for determining a defendant’s competency to waive counsel is the
same as that for determining the competency to stand trial (see
People v. Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 513), there was no basis
for the trial court to find Munoz lacked competence to waive his
right to counsel.
Indeed, there was ample evidence Munoz had the mental
ability to “comprehend the nature and object of the proceedings.”
(People v. Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 205.) At his arraignment
Munoz responded appropriately to the court’s admonition
regarding the conditions for releasing him on his own
recognizance. During a discussion with the court about the risks
and consequences of self-representation, Munoz’s responses
confirmed he had the ability to understand the nature of the
proceedings, assert his rights, and communicate with the court.
For example, after Norma answered a question (incorrectly)
about the mental state required for different kinds of crimes, the
following colloquy occurred:
“The Court: Do you know what the difference between a
specific and general intent crime is?
arises in the mind of the judge” regarding the defendant’s
competence [citation] and defense counsel concurs.’” (People v.
Wycoff (2021) 12 Cal.5th 58, 82; see § 1368, subds. (a)-(c).) At a
pretrial hearing the prosecutor expressed a doubt about Munoz’s
competency (after expressing a doubt about Norma’s). The trial
court reviewed the preliminary hearing transcript, referred to the
“strong conspiratorial nature of the questions,” spoke to the
bench officer who presided at the preliminary hearing, and
concluded: “I do not believe that [section] 1368 review is
triggered by what I see.”
10
“Munoz: Like kind of the same thing she [presumably
referring to Norma] just said. Would you like me to say it
too?
“The Court: Yeah, what is it?
“Munoz: Well, general is—
“The Court: Yeah.
“Munoz: General would be in the general area.”
Though Munoz did not answer the question correctly, his
knowledge of criminal law and procedure is irrelevant to whether
he was competent to waive his right to counsel. (See People v.
Best, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 760 [“We recognize that [the
defendant] did not understand such concepts as specific intent
and general intent, but her ignorance of legal procedure and
language is not a basis to deny her the right to self-
representation.”].). Munoz showed he could listen attentively,
think on his feet, and converse rationally with the court. (See
People v. Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 517 [where the
defendant “responded in an appropriate manner to questions
posed to him, fully demonstrating his awareness of the
circumstances he faced and the proceedings against him,” the
record supported the court’s conclusion the defendant “was
competent to waive his right to counsel”]; People v. Silfa, supra,
88 Cal.App.4th at p. 1322 [where “the court found that defendant
was mentally competent and fully informed of his right to
counsel” and “had demonstrated that he was literate and
understood the dangers of self-representation,” “[n]othing more
was required of him in order to exercise his right of self-
representation”]; see also People v. Poplawski (1994)
25 Cal.App.4th 881, 894-895 [trial court erred in revoking the
defendant’s right to represent himself where there was “no
11
evidence to support the conclusion that defendant was mentally
incompetent and thus lacked an understanding of the nature of
the proceedings against him”].)
2. Munoz Was Competent To Represent Himself
Munoz does not argue, and there was no evidence, he
suffered from a mental illness (much less a severe mental illness)
that rendered him incapable of carrying out the basic tasks
needed to present his defense without the help of counsel. Thus,
the court had no duty to inquire into Munoz’s competence to
represent himself. (See People v. Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th at
pp. 208-209, 205 [where the trial court “had little reason to doubt
defendant’s mental competence,” the court did not err in granting
the defendant’s request to represent himself without determining
whether he “was sufficiently competent to conduct his own
defense”]; People v. Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 530 [trial
court needs to inquire into the defendant’s mental competence
only “if it is considering denying self-representation due to doubts
about the defendant’s mental competence”].) In the absence of
evidence Munoz had any kind of severe mental illness, the court
did not err in granting Munoz’s request to represent himself.
(See Indiana v. Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. at pp. 171, 178 [court
may deny a request under Faretta where the defendant’s “severe
mental illness” renders the defendant incapable of conducting
trial proceedings without counsel]; Mickel, at p. 207 [state courts
“may only exercise the discretion to deny self-representation
based on a defendant’s mental state as permitted under
Edwards”]; Johnson, at p. 531 [same]; People v. Orosco, supra,
82 Cal.App.5th at p. 360 [because there was no evidence the
defendant “suffered from any mental illness—let alone a severe
12
one,” denying him the right to represent himself under Edwards
“‘was simply off the table’”].)
The record in fact shows Munoz ably carried out the basic
tasks of representing himself, at times rather well. For example,
at the preliminary hearing Munoz cross-examined Mercedes by
asking her questions to clarify her direct testimony and argued
zealously (albeit unsuccessfully) for the court to allow him to ask
her about a domestic violence restraining order to show she made
inconsistent statements. Munoz cross-examined Jesse with
questions that sought to elicit an admission Jesse intended to use
force against Munoz to protect Mercedes and Nessman during the
altercation. Munoz also adeptly rephrased one of his cross-
examination questions after the court ruled the question called
for hearsay but said it would allow the answer for impeachment.
During the trial Munoz asked the court for guidance on
when the court would allow him to show his exhibits and how he
should play video clips for the jury and, demonstrating his
familiarity with courtroom protocols, asked for permission to
“approach” a witness and “to publish” exhibits to the jury. Munoz
also made timely and, at times, appropriate objections to the
prosecutor’s questions on direct examination of the People’s
witnesses. For example, in the middle of Mercedes’s lengthy
answer to one of the prosecutor’s questions, Munoz objected,
“Narrative,” and the court sustained the objection. When the
prosecutor asked Mercedes, “You got hit in the chest by
somebody, right?” Munoz objected, “Leading.” Munoz cross-
examined Nessman by asking him whether he made certain
statements on the day of the incident that could be construed as
“a death threat” and introduced evidence to impeach Nessman.
Munoz also demonstrated he understood the importance of the
13
record (“I wanted to give the D.A. some evidence. Can I do it on
the record?”) and the high burden of proof the People had to meet
to prove the charges against him “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Overall, Munoz was assertive, articulate, and alert, undermining
any suggestion he did not have the mental capacity to carry out
the basic tasks of defending himself. (See People v. Mickel, supra,
2 Cal.5th at pp. 208-209 [where the defendant filed appropriate
motions, “demonstrated the ability to understand courtroom
proceedings and apply rules of procedure,” and engaged in all
stages of the trial, “the trial court had no reason to doubt
defendant’s skill and ability” “to undertake the basic tasks
necessary to represent himself”].)
Munoz points to his youth (20 or 21 years old), lack of
higher education, and unsuccessful attempts to introduce
evidence of self-defense. Munoz does not cite any authority for
his suggestion the defendant must be a certain age or have a
college degree before the court may allow the defendant to
represent himself or herself. That Munoz did not know how to
more skillfully introduce evidence that he used the pellet gun and
pepper spray in self-defense showed he did not have legal
training, which, as discussed, is not a basis for denying his
request to represent himself. (See People v. Mickel, supra,
2 Cal.5th at p. 206 [The critical question “is not whether a self-
represented defendant meets the standards of an attorney, or
even whether a defendant is capable of conducting an effective
defense. Instead, we have accepted that the cost of recognizing a
criminal defendant’s right to self-representation may result ‘“in
detriment to the defendant, if not outright unfairness.”’”].)
In a supplemental brief Munoz argues that voir dire “was
not transcribed by a reporter” and that this deficiency “should
14
bolster the argument that the bench officer clearly erred by
accepting the self-representation of [Munoz] due to the fact any
competent attorney would have requested and preserved the
bench officer’s remarks, denials, and rejection on the record by
demanding a transcript of the record.” As discussed, however,
the court does not hold the defendant to the standard of an
attorney when ruling on a motion for self-representation.
Munoz unequivocally asserted his right to represent
himself.6 The court admonished him about the risks and
consequences of doing so, and Munoz stated he understood the
court’s warnings. Nothing in the record indicates Munoz suffered
from any kind of severe mental illness. Instead, the record
showed Munoz had the ability to perform the basic tasks of
defending himself through all stages of the trial. The trial court
did not err in granting his request to represent himself.
6 For the first time in his reply brief, Munoz asserts Norma
“forced him” to represent himself. Munoz forfeited this
argument. (See People v. Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 197
[“Ordinarily, we do not consider arguments raised for the first
time in a reply brief.”].) Munoz also does not cite any evidence
Norma coerced or was “pushing” him to waive his right to
counsel.
15
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
SEGAL, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
STONE, J.
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