People v. Pham CA3

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Filed 10/3/25 P. v. Pham CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----

THE PEOPLE, C102016

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 02F11038)

v.

LAMSON TRONG PHAM,

Defendant and Appellant.

In 2005, a jury found defendant Lamson Trong Pham guilty of one count of
second degree murder and two counts of attempted murder. Defendant filed a petition in
2022 for resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1172.6.2 After holding an evidentiary

1 Further undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.
2 Effective June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was recodified without
substantive change to section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) Defendant filed his

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hearing, the trial court found defendant guilty of second degree murder and both
attempted murders beyond a reasonable doubt. On appeal, defendant contends the jury
could have originally convicted him under now invalid theories. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant and several codefendants shot across a driveway during a party at
individuals who appeared to be in an opposing gang. T.T. and V.D. were shot and
injured, and Alan Khamphoumy was shot and killed. (People v. Pham (Jan. 22, 2008,
C049751) [nonpub. opn.].)
At trial in 2005, a criminalist for Sacramento County, who the parties stipulated
was an expert in firearms and firearms identification, testified a bullet found during
Khamphoumy’s autopsy came from a Kimber firearm. Defendant testified he used the
Kimber the day of the shooting and had brought it to the party fully loaded with an extra
magazine. Defendant also testified he now knows he was the one who shot the victim
and answered “[y]eah” to the question: “[Y]ou killed Alan Khamph[o]umy with this gun,
right?” V.D. also identified defendant as a person who may have fired first.
The jury found defendant guilty of one count of second degree murder and two
counts of attempted murder, along with several enhancements. The trial court sentenced
defendant to 90 years to life, plus nine years four months.
Defendant filed an appeal, and we affirmed the judgment with a sentence
modification not at issue in this appeal. (People v. Pham, supra, C049751).) In 2019,
defendant filed his first petition for resentencing under what is now section 1172.6; the
trial court denied the petition at the prima facie stage, and we affirmed. (People v. Pham
(Oct. 19, 2021, C092950) [nonpub. opn.].)

petition under former section 1170.95, but we refer to the current section 1172.6
throughout this opinion.

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Defendant filed another petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 in April
2022. The trial court issued an order to show cause and held a hearing. At the hearing,
neither party introduced new evidence and the trial court noted it had reviewed the
transcript from defendant’s trial. The court then invited additional briefing and took the
matter under submission.
The trial court filed a written order denying defendant’s petition on September 30,
2024. The court first found defendant’s act of shooting at the victim was an “act whose
natural consequence was dangerous to life” and “shooting at [Kamphoumy] [was] a
manifestation of [defendant’s] conscious disregard for [Kamphoumy’s] life.” Similarly,
for the attempted murder convictions, the trial court found defendant “intended to kill
both [T.T.] and [V.D.]” based on the evidence defendant fired several rounds towards
them by joining what was “essentially a firing line.” The court was also “not persuaded
by [defendant’s] claim that he acted in self-defense, nor [was] it convinced of any other
legal defense offered by [defendant] to eliminate his culpability.” Thus, the trial court
found “beyond a reasonable doubt that [defendant] is guilty of the murder of
[Kamphoumy] and the attempted murders of [T.T.] and [V.D.],” and denied defendant’s
petition.
Defendant appeals.
DISCUSSION
In 2019, the Legislature amended the murder statutes and eliminated the natural
and probable consequences doctrine as it relates to felony murder. (People v. Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959.) It did this by amending section 188, which defines malice,
and section 189, the felony-murder statute. (Lewis, at p. 959; People v. Curiel (2023)
15 Cal.5th 433, 448-449.) The Legislature also created a procedure in what is now
section 1172.6 that allows those previously convicted of felony murder, murder, or
attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to obtain relief
from their convictions if they could not be convicted of murder under the amended law.

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(Curiel, at p. 449; accord, Lewis, at p. 957.) Subsequently, the Legislature codified
aspects of the Lewis decision and clarified the burden of proof and procedure at the
evidentiary hearing stage of the proceedings. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551.)
Here, we are concerned with the evidentiary hearing that occurs after the trial
court has determined a defendant set forth a prima facie case for relief. (§ 1172.6,
subds. (a), (c), (d); People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708-709.) At that hearing,
the prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant is
guilty of murder or attempted murder under the amended law. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
Both parties may, but are not required to, present “new or additional evidence to meet
their respective burdens.” (Ibid.; see People v. Njoku (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 27, 43-46.)
Moreover, “the court may consider evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or
trial that is admissible under current law, including witness testimony, stipulated
evidence, and matters judicially noticed.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) If the court finds
beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant is guilty of murder or attempted murder under a
theory that remains valid after the amendments to sections 188 and 189, the petition is
denied. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) “While the superior court acts as an independent fact
finder in determining whether the [prosecution] ha[s] met [its] burden, on appeal, the
reviewing court applies the substantial evidence standard to the superior court’s
findings.” (People v. Vargas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 951.)
Defendant states he is “not argu[ing] that the evidence is legally insufficient to
support conviction on a perpetrator theory. [¶] Instead, [defendant] argues that this jury
was unlikely to have accepted [the expert’s] testimony as establishing that the bullet
found in [Khamphoumy’s] clothing was fired from the Kimber .45[-caliber]. On that
basis, it is unlikely that the jury convicted [defendant] as the murder perpetrator.”
Defendant also contends, “The jury would not have given any weight to [defendant’s]
admissions because they merely accepted and repeated the opinion of the criminalist,
which, to the best of the jury’s knowledge, lacked foundation.” As for the attempted

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murder convictions, defendant argues the jury was given a “kill zone” instruction that
permitted the jury to convict defendant of attempted murder based on imputed malice.
These contentions are not relevant to the resolution of defendant’s appeal. To be
eligible for relief under section 1172.6, defendant “could not presently be convicted of
murder or attempted murder because of changes to [s]ection 188 or 189 made effective
January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3), italics added.) “ ‘[I]t is the [trial] court’s
responsibility to act as independent fact finder and determine whether the evidence
establishes a petitioner would be guilty.’ ” (People v. Cody (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 87,
110, italics added.) Whether the jury could have theoretically convicted defendant in
2005 under a now invalid theory of murder and attempted murder does not aid us in
determining whether the trial court erred in denying resentencing when it found beyond a
reasonable doubt defendant is still guilty of murder and attempted murder under current
law. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) A trial court may be prohibited under the collateral
estoppel doctrine from making findings inconsistent with the jury’s original findings.
(See People v. Arnold (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 376, 387.) But defendant makes no claim
the trial court’s finding here necessarily conflicted with the jury’s findings in 2005.
The only relevant argument defendant makes in attacking the trial court’s
conclusion is on reply when he asserts that a substantial evidence review is the incorrect
standard, asserting, “[A] deferential review is not appropriate in this situation, where the
appellate court reviews findings based on documentary evidence.” Courts, including this
one, have uniformly rejected this argument and affirmed substantial evidence review is
appropriate for a trial court’s order denying a section 1172.6 petition after an evidentiary
hearing. (See People v. Njoku, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 43 [rejecting the argument an
independent judgment review is appropriate for a § 1172.6 evidentiary hearing];
People v. Underwood (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 303, 313-314 [“appellate courts that have
considered this argument have uniformly rejected it, and we agree with their analysis”].)

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Ultimately, defendant does not present argument on how the trial court’s finding
lacked substantial evidence. Defendant therefore has not established the trial court erred
in denying his petition after finding beyond a reasonable doubt defendant is guilty of
second degree murder and attempted murder under current law.
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.

/s/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.

We concur:

/s/
RENNER, J.

/s/
WISEMAN, J.*

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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