CourtListener 10687073•People v. Ford CA2/7
Texte intégral
Filed 10/1/25 P. v. Ford CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B339372
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA057218)
v.
GEORGE EDWARD FORD II,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, James D. Otto, Judge. Dismissed.
George Edward Ford II, in pro. per.; Tonja R. Torres, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________
George Edward Ford II appeals from the trial court’s order
denying his motion for recall and resentencing under Penal Code
section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1).1 We appointed counsel to
represent Ford on appeal. After reviewing the record, counsel for
Ford filed a brief pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022)
14 Cal.5th 216 that did not identify any arguable issues. After
independently reviewing the record and the contentions raised in
Ford’s supplemental brief, we have not identified any either. We
dismiss the appeal as taken from a nonappealable order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We described the factual background of this case in Ford’s
direct appeal. (See People v. Ford (Oct. 10, 2006, B184839)
[nonpub. opn.] (Ford).) On May 18, 2003 theater employees
Veasna Penh, Aronald Harper and Boroth Chim were closing the
Pine Square Theater in Long Beach when Ford and his father2
entered the theater armed with guns and demanded money.
Ford pressed a gun against Penh’s back and forced him to open
the theater’s safe. Ford took $8,000 from the safe and left.
On May 27, 2003 Jonathan Hill, manager of the Mann
Theater in Tarzana, was in a back room of the theater when
Ford, armed with a silver “revolver-style six shot,” pushed his
way into the room and demanded Hill open the theater’s safe.
Hill retrieved $2,000 from the theater’s several safes and gave
the money to Ford as directed.
1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code. Ford
sought relief under former section 1170, subdivision (d), which is
now codified (as amended) in section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1).
2 In a separate trial, George Edward Ford, Sr., was convicted
of three counts of robbery in connection with the May 18, 2003
robbery. (See People v. Ford (Jan. 3, 2007, B187948) [nonpub.
opn.].)
2
On June 2, 2003 manager Bryan Quibuyen and assistant
manager Audra Martinez were closing the Marina Pacifica
Theater in Long Beach when Ford and his father rushed into the
manager’s office holding guns. Ford held a gun to the back of
Quibuyen’s head and demanded money. He made Quibuyen and
Martinez bind each other’s hands and legs with duct tape and
then fled with $30,000 in cash.
An amended information charged Ford with one count of
kidnapping to commit robbery (§ 209, subd. (b)(1); count 1); and
four counts of robbery (§ 211, counts 2, 6, 8, and 9). As to all
counts, the information alleged Ford personally used a firearm
within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (b). The
amended information also alleged Ford had suffered six prior
serious or violent felonies under the three strikes law (§ 667,
subds. (b)-(i); 1170.12), which were serious felonies within the
meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1), and he had served six
separate prison terms for prior felony convictions (§ 667.5,
subd. (b).)
On June 24, 2005 a jury convicted Ford of four counts of
robbery and found true the firearm-use enhancement.3 In a
bifurcated proceeding the trial court found all prior conviction
allegations true. (Ford, supra, B184839) The trial court
sentenced Ford to an aggregate state prison term of 95 years-to-
life, consisting of three consecutive 25-years-to-life terms on
counts 2, 6 and 9, a concurrent 25-years-to-life term on count 8;
10 years for the firearm-use enhancement on count 2, and two
five-year enhancements pursuant to section 667,
3 Before trial, the trial court dismissed the kidnapping
charge in the interest of justice. (§ 1385.)
3
subdivision (a)(1). The trial court struck the remaining
enhancement allegations.
On appeal, we modified the judgment to indicate that
“Ford’s third strike sentence, properly calculated, should be for
an aggregate state prison term of 135 years to life: three
consecutive 25 years to life terms on counts 2, 6 and 9; plus
separate 10-year firearm-use enhancements for each of those
counts; and two 5-year serious felony enhancements under
section 667, subdivision (a)(1), on each count; with a concurrent
term of 45 years to life imposed for count 8.” (Ford, supra,
B184839.) As modified, we affirmed.
2. Motion for Recall and Resentencing
On January 5, 2024 a case records manager in the legal
processing unit of the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) wrote a letter to the trial court indicating
that the amended abstract of judgment “may be in error” because
the section 667, subdivision (a), enhancement as to count 8 was
“imposed concurrently.” The letter noted that under section 667,
subdivision (a)(1), “‘a person convicted of a serious felony shall
receive in addition to the sentence imposed . . . a 5-year
enhancement for each prior conviction . . . the term of each
enhancement shall run consecutively.’” The letter further stated,
“Please review your file to determine if a correction is required.
When notified by the [CDCR] that an illegal sentence exists, the
trial court is entitled to reconsider all sentencing choices, People
v. Hill [(1986)] 185 Cal.App.3d 831.”
On February 8, 2024, before the superior court acted on the
CDCR letter, Ford filed a motion for recall and resentencing,
4
citing sections 1170.14 and 1172.75, subdivision (d)(2) & (3). In
his motion, Ford argued that “because the Department of
Corrections, rather than the Court of Appeal[], notified the trial
court of the illegality in sentence, the [t]rial court has jurisdiction
and is entitled to rethink the entire sentence to achieve its
original presumably unchanged goal.” (Boldface omitted.) After
the motion was assigned to a department, on March 8, 2024 Ford
filed an almost identical motion.
On April 29, 2024 the trial court denied Ford’s motion. The
court explained that Ford “bases his petition on a letter dated
January 5, 2024, from the [CDCR] to the court inquiring whether
the Abstract of Judgment and Minute Order required correction.
No correction is required because the imposition of the Penal
Code section 667A five (5) year priors were properly imposed
consecutively on Counts 2, 6 and 9 pursuant to Penal Code
sections 667 (c)(6) as each was for ‘a separate crime on a different
date.’ Thus, no recall and resentencing is being [made] by this
letter and the court is not accepting the Petitioner’s invitation to
do so. Penal Code section 1172.1 (c).”
Ford timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
We appointed counsel to represent Ford in this appeal.
After reviewing the record, counsel did not identify any arguable
issues and indicated that “[t]his court should determine
4 “Section 1170.1, subdivision (a) governs the calculation and
imposition of a determinate sentence when . . . the defendant has
been convicted of more than one felony.” (People v. Beard (2012)
207 Cal.App.4th 936, 940.)
5
appealability.” On or about June 9, 2025 counsel advised Ford
that she was filing a brief stating she was unable to find any
arguable issues and that Ford could personally submit a letter
brief stating any contentions he wanted the court to consider.
Counsel also sent Ford copies of the opening brief and record on
appeal.
On August 11, 2025 we received a 13-page supplemental
brief from Ford. In his supplemental brief, Ford argues he is
entitled to have his sentence recalled and be resentenced “per
recommendations” by the CDCR in its January 5, 2024 letter.
Ford claims that under applicable case law, “[a] trial court that
imposes a sentence unauthorized by law retains jurisdiction (or
has inherent power) to correct the sentence at any time the error
comes to its attention, even if excursion (sic) of the sentence has
become final and correction requires imposition of a more sever[e]
sentence, provided the error is apparent from the face of the
record.” Ford also notes there have been several changes in the
law since 2018 (Senate Bill Nos. 81, 483, 620 and Assembly Bill
Nos. 1540 and 2483) and these new laws show why his sentence
is illegal.
“The right to appeal is statutory only, and a party may not
appeal a trial court’s judgment, order or ruling unless such is
expressly made appealable by statute.” (People v. Loper (2015)
60 Cal.4th 1155, 1159.) The superior court’s ruling on Ford’s
motion for recall and resentencing under section 1172.1 is not
appealable. As the court explained in People v. Faustinos (2025)
109 Cal.App.5th 687, 696, a “defendant is not entitled to file a
section 1172.1 petition [or] to receive a ruling if he nevertheless
files one. It follows that an appeal from an order acting on his
petition (whether couched as a denial, dismissal, or any other
6
statement that the court is not acting) does not affect the
defendant’s substantial rights. We lack the authority to rule on
the merits of appeals from orders filed in response to a
defendant’s attempt to seek resentencing under section 1172.1.”
(See § 1172.1, subd. (c) [“A defendant is not entitled to file a
petition seeking relief from the court under this section. If a
defendant requests consideration for relief under this section, the
court is not required to respond.”].)
Nor did the trial court have jurisdiction to correct the
judgment in response to the letter from the legal processing unit
of the CDCR. As we recently explained in People v. Singleton
(2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 783, 787, “When a superior court receives
a letter from a case records manager in the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) informing
the court that the abstract of judgment for a defendant ‘may be in
error,’ does the court have jurisdiction to correct the sentence
where the judgment is long since final? . . . . We conclude the
courts in these circumstances lack fundamental jurisdiction to
vacate or modify the sentence.” (See People v. Codinha (2023)
92 Cal.App.5th 976, 985 [“imposition of a sentence unauthorized
by law is a jurisdictional error that may be corrected whenever it
comes to the court’s attention, even if correction requires
imposition of a longer sentence”].)
Accordingly, because the trial court lacked jurisdiction, the
order denying Ford’s petition is nonappealable, and we dismiss
the appeal. (People v. Singleton, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 797-798; see People v. Fuimaono (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 132,
135 [“[b]ecause the trial court lacked jurisdiction . . . the appeal
must be dismissed”].)
7
Nor was Ford entitled to bring a petition for resentencing
under section 1172.75, subdivision (a), which states that “[a]ny
sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1,
2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, . . . is legally
invalid.” Under that statute, the Secretary of the CDCR is
required to identify any individual in custody “currently serving a
term for a judgment that includes an enhancement described in
subdivision (a).” (§ 1172.75. subd. (b).) But Ford’s sentence did
not include a one-year prior prison term enhancement under
section 667.5, former subdivision (b), nor did the CDCR identify
Ford as eligible for resentencing under that provision. (See
People v. Cota (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 318, 332 [“[S]ection 1172.75
does not authorize a defendant to seek resentencing on his or her
own motion or petition. Rather the process is triggered by the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation identifying a
defendant as a person serving a sentence that includes a prior
prison term enhancement.”].)
Neither Ford nor his appellate counsel has identified a
cognizable legal issue. Our independent review has not identified
one either. (See People v. Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
pp. 231-232; see also People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 118-
119; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441-442.)
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
FEUER, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J. SEGAL, J.
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