People v. Burns CA1/3

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Filed 9/30/25 P. v. Burns CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A168662

v. (San Mateo County
FRANK BURNS, Super. Ct. No. 23SF002808A)
Defendant and Appellant.

Frank Burns appeals from a judgment following his convictions for
conspiracy and inducing false testimony by a victim of domestic violence.
After finding Burns had a prior strike conviction, the trial court sentenced
him under the Three Strikes law to an aggregate term of 32 months in
prison. On appeal, Burns contends the court erred in denying his motion to
strike his prior strike conviction pursuant to People v. Superior Court
(Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). We shall affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
In June 2023, Burns was charged by information with committing
three offenses: conspiracy to induce false testimony, a felony (Pen. Code,
§§ 137, subd. (c), 182, subd. (a)(1))1; inducing false testimony, a misdemeanor

1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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(§ 137, subd. (c)); and conspiring to violate a protective order, a felony (§§ 182,
subd. (a)(1), 166, subd. (c)(1)). The events that gave rise to these charges
occurred in November 2022, when Burns was in jail for an unrelated matter.
Burns’s cellmate at the time, Jason Hewitt, had been charged with domestic
violence and was subject to a restraining order prohibiting contact with the
victim, Sarah Doe, either directly or through a third party.
Evidence presented at trial showed that between November 17 and
November 23, 2022, Burns acted as an intermediary between Hewitt and Doe
by arranging and participating in phone calls with Doe and by using a chess
game metaphor to coach Doe about what to say if called to testify against
Hewitt. The evidence also showed that Doe followed Burns’s directions when
she testified at Hewitt’s preliminary hearing. And after Burns was released
from jail in December, he continued to maintain contact with Doe and to act
as Hewitt’s intermediary.
Burns denied wrongdoing, testifying at trial that he did not know about
the restraining order prohibiting Hewitt from contacting Doe. Burns
explained to the jury that he reached out to Doe of his own accord in his
capacity as a senior inmate at the jail because it was his responsibility to
investigate charges against new inmates, and he denied attempting to
influence her testimony.
On June 16, 2023, the jury convicted Burns of all charges. On June 22,
the court found Burns had suffered a 1991 conviction for first degree murder
that constitutes a strike under the Three Strikes law. (§§ 187, 667,
subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12.) The court found that the People also proved that
Burns incurred another felony conviction in 2001 for possession of a weapon
while in custody. (§ 4502, subd. (a).) In addition, the People presented
evidence that Burns was convicted of committing a felony burglary in 2022,

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but the court did not treat that offense as a qualifying prior conviction for
sentencing purposes because it appeared that the burglary was committed
during the same time that Burns committed his current offenses.
On August 23, 2023, the court held a sentencing hearing. Burns’s
threshold request was to strike the prior strike allegation. Defense counsel
argued the 1991 murder conviction was more than 30 years old, was
committed when Burns was a youthful offender, and was unrelated to the
current offense which involved only misdemeanor conduct. Burns also relied
on evidence of his “horrible” early life, and his effort to integrate into society
after serving a lengthy prison sentence. Regarding sentencing, Burns
requested that the court place him on probation or, alternatively, impose a
minimum term so he could return to society.
The People requested that the court deny the Romero motion and
impose a midterm four-year prison sentence. They forcefully disagreed with
the defense’s characterization of the current offenses as involving only
misdemeanor conduct. According to the People, Burns took advantage of a
vulnerable domestic violence victim and made a mockery of the justice
system. The People also argued that Burns does not fall outside the spirit of
the Three Strikes law notwithstanding that the murder was committed a
long time ago, and pointed out that Burns was on parole for only a short time
before committing a burglary and then the current offenses.
The court ruled on the Romero motion first. It recognized that the
strike was “remote in nature,” but also found the crime was extremely
serious. The court also considered defendant’s conduct since committing the
strike offense: he committed a felony while in prison by having a weapon; he
committed a burglary while he was on parole for the strike offense; and he
was in jail for the burglary when he committed the current offenses. Thus,

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“his ability to successfully complete parole did not occur,” the court found. As
to other pertinent factors, the court found that Burns has a history of violence
but his current offenses did not involve violence. The court also considered
mitigating evidence pertaining to Burns’s “background, age, history, [and]
health issues.” But, at “the end of the day,” the court concluded that it could
not find that Burns falls outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law,
particularly in light of his inability to successfully complete parole, and the
fact that he committed burglary around the same time that he committed the
current offenses.
Regarding sentencing, the court found there were aggravating
circumstances as to the current offenses, in that Burns took advantage of a
vulnerable victim and displayed criminal sophistication. However, there was
“clear mitigation” with respect to Burns’s childhood upbringing which was
“extremely difficult,” and based on that factor alone, the court elected to
impose a lower rather than midterm sentence. Using the conviction for
conspiring to induce false testimony as the base offense, the court imposed a
low term of 16 months, which was doubled due to the strike. For inducing
false testimony, which was charged as a misdemeanor violation of section
137, subdivision (c), the court imposed a 179 day jail term, with credit for
time served. Finally, as to the conviction for conspiring to violate the
protective order, the court stayed imposition of sentence pursuant to section
654.
DISCUSSION
Burns contends the trial court erred by denying his Romero motion
because the record shows that he falls outside the spirit of the Three Strikes
law. We do not agree.

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The Three Strikes law “ ‘was intended to restrict courts’ discretion in
sentencing repeat offenders.’ ” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377
(Carmony), quoting Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 528.) “To achieve this
end, ‘the Three Strikes law does not offer a discretionary sentencing choice,
as do other sentencing laws, but establishes a sentencing requirement to be
applied in every case where the defendant has at least one qualifying strike,
unless the sentencing court “conclud[es] that an exception to the scheme
should be made because, for articulable reasons which can withstand
scrutiny for abuse, this defendant should be treated as though he actually fell
outside the Three Strikes scheme.” ’ ” (Carmony, at p. 377.)
Under this statutory scheme, the trial court retains discretion to strike
prior convictions in the furtherance of justice. (§ 1385, subd. (a); Romero,
supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 504, 529–530.) In exercising this discretion, the
court “ ‘must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his
present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the
particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may
be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should
be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more
serious and/or violent felonies.’ ” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377,
quoting People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.) The standards for
striking prior convictions under the Three Strikes law are “stringent.”
(Carmony, at p. 377.) The law establishes a sentencing norm, “circumscribes
the trial court’s power to depart from this norm,” and requires it to justify
explicitly its decision to do so, creating a “strong presumption that any
sentence that conforms to these sentencing norms is both rational and
proper.” (Id. at p. 378.)

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We review the trial court’s denial of a motion to strike a prior strike
conviction for abuse of discretion. (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 374.) If
the record shows the court “ ‘balanced the relevant facts and reached an
impartial decision in conformity with the spirit of the law,’ ” we will affirm its
ruling, “ ‘even if we might have ruled differently in the first instance.’ ” (Id.
at p. 378.) Generally, “a trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its
decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree
with it.” (Id. at p. 377.) The circumstances must be “extraordinary,” such
that “no reasonable people could disagree that the criminal falls outside the
spirit of the three strikes scheme.” (Id. at p. 378.) This means a court will be
found to have abused its discretion in failing to strike a prior felony
conviction allegation only in limited circumstances, such as where the court
was unaware of its discretion or considered impermissible factors. (Ibid.)
Applying these principles, we conclude the court did not abuse its
discretion here. The record shows that the court considered relevant factors
not impermissible ones. Moreover, it took account of potentially mitigating
factors and circumstances. Ultimately though, Burns’s history of continuing
to violate the law and failing to succeed on parole caused the court to
determine it would not depart from the sentencing norm established by the
statutory scheme.
Burns contends that a proper consideration of the totality of the
circumstances precludes characterizing him as a “career or habitual criminal
within the meaning of the Three Strikes law.” As support for this contention,
Burns relies primarily on People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1143
(Avila). The Avila defendant, who had two strike priors, was convicted of
attempted second degree robbery and attempted extortion, based on evidence
that he had demanded that people selling oranges near a freeway off-ramp

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pay him rent for selling at that location and destroyed bags of fruit when they
refused to pay. (Id. at p. 1139.) The trial court imposed a third strike
sentence, denying the defendant’s Romero motion, but the appellate court
reversed. The Avila court found that the trial court had abused its discretion
in numerous ways: it refused to consider applicable mitigating factors,
including that the defendant’s strike priors were remote in time and were
committed when defendant was 18 and 20 years old (id. at pp. 1141–1142); it
mischaracterized defendant’s current offenses as violent crimes (id. at pp.
1142–1143); and it did not consider whether it would be “unjust” to impose a
sentence that meant the defendant would “likely die in prison” (id. at
p. 1144). Ultimately, the Avila court concluded that “no reasonable person
could agree that the sentence imposed on Avila was just.” (Id. at p. 1145.)
Avila does not assist Burns here, where the record shows that the trial
court considered the relevant factors and did not mischaracterize the nature
of Burns’s offenses or any other evidence. Burns’s efforts to suggest
otherwise are unavailing. For example, he acknowledges the “seriousness of
the murder” that he committed, but intimates that the court failed to
consider its remoteness, and the fact that he was only 24 when he committed
that offense. But Burns’s trial counsel emphasized these same facts and
nothing in the record supports his assumption that the court ignored them.
(See e.g., People v. Czirban (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 1073, 1097 [sentencing
error not presumed from a silent record].) Moreover, the trial court did
expressly recognize that the remoteness of the strike was a relevant factor,
and for that reason it correctly focused on Burns’s conduct after the strike
was committed. (See People v. Humphrey (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 809, 813.)
This is because the remote nature of a strike may be justification for granting
a Romero motion if the crime was followed by “a crime-free cleansing period

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of rehabilitation after a defendant has had the opportunity to reflect upon the
error of his or her ways.” (Ibid.) Here, the record of Burns’s convictions
shows that he committed felonies while in prison, while on parole, and again
while he was jail. Burns attempts to discount these facts by describing his
post-strike offenses as relatively less serious. This comparison is not
dispositive, particularly when Burns’s strike was for a first degree murder.
Carrying a weapon in prison and committing a felony burglary are serious
offenses and potentially extremely dangerous. The trial court did not abuse
its discretion by considering these offenses in deciding not to dismiss the
strike prior despite its remoteness.
Although Burns purports to base his claim on the totality of the
circumstances, the nub of his argument is that the court should have given
greater weight to mitigating factors. The argument fails in light of our
standard of review; the question is not whether we would have granted
defendant’s motion, but whether the trial court could have reasonably
concluded that the defendant did not fall outside the spirit of the Three
Strikes law. (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.) In contrast to Avila, the
facts of this case do not compel a finding that the sentence imposed on Burns
was unjust. (Compare with Avila, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 1145.) This is
so, even in light of the “growing trend” to reduce long prison sentences and
focus on rehabilitation. In presenting these policy arguments, Burns glosses
over the fact that he had been released from prison and was on parole when
he committed a burglary and the current offenses.
In sum, the principles governing a Romero motion and our attendant
standard of review are well settled, and we apply them here in upholding the
trial court’s determination that Burns does not fall outside the spirit of the
Three Strikes law.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

TUCHER, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

FUJISAKI, J.
RODRÍGUEZ, J.

People v. Burns (A168662)

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