CourtListener 10681915•People v. Wilson CA2/3
Texte intégral
Filed 9/30/25 P. v. Wilson CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B327451
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA071802)
v.
DARRYL WILSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Kelvin D. Filer, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Office of Winston K. McKesson and Winston K.
McKesson for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Daniel C. Chang, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Darryl Wilson appeals from an order denying his petition
for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 Wilson was
convicted of four counts of attempted murder for driving the
getaway car during two gang-related drive-by shootings that
injured four people. The trial court instructed the jury with a
modified version of CALJIC No. 3.02 that effectively removed the
natural and probable consequences doctrine from consideration.
Direct aiding and abetting remained as the only legally valid
theory of liability. We affirm because the record of conviction
conclusively establishes that Wilson was not convicted under an
invalid theory of liability.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. The Facts2
On September 18, 2003, affiliates of the Tree Top Piru
Bloods gang murdered Kevin Jones, also known as K-Loc, a
member of the Grape Street Crips gang.
On September 20, 2003, Wilson drove Dallan Louis, Rudy
Anderson, and one or two other men in a tan Ford Contour into
Tree Top Piru territory on Bullis Road in Compton, California.
When they arrived at the 1300 block of Bullis, the right rear
passenger opened the car’s right rear door and fired shots at
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2 We refer to the factual background from the nonpublished
opinion in People v. Wilson (Jan. 11, 2007, B183372) [nonpub.
opn.], which affirmed the judgment of conviction. These facts are
“for background purposes and to provide context for the parties’
arguments.” (People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 978, fn.
2.) We do not rely on these facts. (Id. at p. 988.)
2
Dametric Turner and Lamont (Douglas) Baskin, who were
outside of an apartment building. The front passenger also fired
shots. Baskin ran for cover and Turner went behind a parked
car. Turner was shot once in the hip. Baskin was shot three
times in the thigh.
Rayvonn Colbert heard shots and saw a tan-colored four-
door car approaching him, while he was walking on the 2100
block of Bullis Road, a quarter mile from the first shooting
incident. He saw four African American men in the car. The
front passenger had his upper body extended out the window
while carrying a Tec-9 pistol. When the car was about three feet
away, Louis yelled at Colbert and shot at him. Two men in the
rear seats also shot at Colbert. A shot hit Colbert’s shin as he
turned to run away. Colbert later identified Louis as the front
passenger.
Sixteen-year-old Denisha Shelton was standing in the
gated area of an apartment building on Bullis Road when she
heard shots fired. One shot struck her right knee.
Near the intersection of Bullis Road and Carlin Avenue,
Wilson lost control of the Ford Contour while speeding at about
70 miles per hour. He sideswiped one car and struck another
head on. Four or five men, including Wilson and Louis, got out of
the car. Louis had an injured leg and sat on a curb. Wilson and
the others fled.
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Deputy Thomas Peter heard
15 to 20 shots while he was driving north on Bullis Road. Soon
after, he heard seven additional shots. When Deputy Peter
reached the traffic collision site on Bullis Road, he detained Louis
and found a Tec-9 pistol on the front passenger floorboard.
Another deputy named Alfonso Garcia found Wilson’s cellphone
3
on the driver’s side floorboard. It had an entry programmed for
K-Loc.
Wilson fled through the yard of a residence occupied by
Kayla Ortiz. He was limping. He first told Ortiz that he had
been hit by a car. But then Wilson said he was running from a
crash because he was uninsured. Wilson asked Ortiz to hide him
and not call the police. Sheriff’s Deputy Brandon Dean entered
Ortiz’s yard and took Wilson into custody.
According to Los Angeles Police Department Officer
Christian Mrakich, Wilson, Louis, and Anderson were
documented Grape Street gang members. All three had gang-
related tattoos.
II. Procedure
A. Original trial court proceedings and direct
appeal
On December 17, 2004, a jury convicted Wilson of four
counts of attempted murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664; counts 1–4)
against Rayvonn Colbert, Denisha Shelton, Douglas Baskin, and
Dametric Turner, respectively. The jury found that the
attempted murders against Colbert and Shelton were willful,
deliberate, and premeditated. The jury also found the gang
allegations (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) true as to each count. The jury
found the firearm use allegations (§ 12022.53, subds. (c), (d),
(e)(1)) not true.
For counts 1 and 2, the trial court imposed concurrent
prison terms of 15 years to life. For counts 3 and 4, it imposed
concurrent determinate terms of 19 years.
On direct appeal, this division affirmed Wilson’s conviction.
(People v. Wilson, supra, B183372.)
4
B. Resentencing petition
On August 26, 2021, Wilson, through counsel, filed a
petition for resentencing under former section 1170.95.3 On
January 25, 2022, the District Attorney responded. On February
15, 2022, Wilson’s counsel filed a reply. On March 2, 2022, the
superior court issued an order to show cause upon the People as
to why relief should not be granted.
On August 29, 2022, the superior court conducted an
evidentiary hearing. The court took judicial notice of the trial
transcript and jury instructions. The court denied the petition,
finding Wilson guilty of attempted murder as a direct aider and
abettor.
Wilson filed a notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Changes to murder law
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) amended the
substantive law on accomplice liability for murder by
significantly narrowing the felony murder rule and by requiring
that a principal in a crime act with malice aforethought. (§§ 189,
subd. (e), 188, subd. (a)(3); People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433,
448–449 (Curiel).) The latter change requires that malice “not be
imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a
crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) The change eliminated liability for
murder as an aider and abettor under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. (Curiel, at p. 449; People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).)
3 Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered
section 1172.6 with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
5
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 (2020–2021
Reg. Sess.) expanded eligibility for resentencing to include
convictions for attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); People v. Delgadillo
(2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 223, fn. 3.)
Section 1172.6 permits defendants convicted of attempted
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine (or
murder under the felony murder or natural and probable
consequences doctrines or any theory in which malice is imputed
based on participation in a crime) to petition to vacate the
conviction and be resentenced on any remaining counts, if they
could not now be convicted because of the changes made effective
January 1, 2019. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 959–960.) If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing, the
court must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary
hearing where the prosecutor and petitioner may offer new or
additional evidence.4 (§ 1172.6, subd. (c); Lewis, at p. 960.)
The prima facie inquiry is limited. (Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 971.) The superior court takes the petitioner’s
4 At the evidentiary hearing, the superior court may consider
evidence previously admitted “including . . . , stipulated evidence,
and matters judicially noticed.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) The
prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
the petitioner is guilty of attempted murder under the amended
law. (Ibid.; People v. Hill (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1065–
1066.) The trial court acts as an independent fact finder to
determine whether the prosecution has met its burden (Hill, at
p. 1066) but its factual determinations are limited to “issues
made relevant by the changes to the law effected by [the
amendments].” (Gomez v. Superior Court (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th
778, 787.)
6
factual allegations as true and refrains from factfinding. (Ibid.)
The record of conviction will necessarily inform the prima facie
inquiry, enabling the court to distinguish between potentially
meritorious petitions and clearly meritless ones. (Ibid.)
The jury instructions and verdicts are part of the record of
conviction. They “may provide ‘readily ascertainable facts from
the record’ that refute the petitioner’s showing. [Citation.]”
(People v. Soto (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 1043, 1055, overruled to the
extent it is inconsistent with Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th 952; People
v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 56 [affirming summary
denial because jury instructions and verdict established
ineligibility for relief as a matter of law].) If the record
conclusively establishes that the petitioner is ineligible for relief,
the superior court may dismiss the petition. (Curiel, supra, 15
Cal.5th at p. 450.)
Whether the record of conviction shows the petition is
ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law is a legal
question that we review de novo. (People v. Lopez (2022) 78
Cal.App.5th 1, 14.)
II. The felony murder doctrine does not apply to
attempted murder
Wilson’s primary argument on appeal is he is eligible for
relief under section 1172.6 because substantial evidence did not
support that he was a “major participant” in the attempted
murders and acted with “reckless indifference to human life.”5
5 To support his argument, Wilson incorrectly evaluates the
factors under People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 and People v.
Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, which apply to the acts and mental
state of an aider and abettor in the underlying felony for felony
murder.
7
He fails to recognize that these are the elements to establish
aider and abettor liability under the felony murder doctrine for
first-degree murder only. (§ 189, subd. (e).) The felony murder
doctrine does not apply to attempted murder. (People v. Billa
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 1064, 1071, fn. 4; People v. Brito (1991) 232
Cal.App.3d 316, 321; People v. Patterson (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d
610, 614.)
Not surprisingly, the trial court never instructed Wilson’s
jury on the felony murder doctrine. During the resentencing
proceedings, the superior court also never considered whether
Wilson satisfied any condition for eligibility under a felony
murder theory provided in section 189, subdivision (e).6
We need not decide any challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the superior court’s finding at the
evidentiary hearing that Wilson remains guilty of attempted
murder under current law. The record of conviction conclusively
establishes that Wilson is ineligible for resentencing as a matter
of law. Even if a trial court issues an order to show cause and
holds an evidentiary hearing in a case where the record of
conviction forecloses relief as a matter of law, a reviewing court
6 Section 189, subdivision (e) provides for felony murder
liability if the defendant was the actual killer, was not the actual
killer but with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, or assisted the
actual killer in the commission of first degree murder, or was a
major participant in the underlying felony and acted with
reckless indifference to human life.
8
may affirm the denial of the petition based on the petitioner’s
legal ineligibility.7
III. Attempted murder and the natural and probable
consequences doctrine
Attempted murder requires a “specific intent to kill and the
commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing
the intended killing.” (People v. Superior Court (Decker) (2007)
41 Cal.4th 1, 7.) Prior to Senate Bill Nos. 1437 and 775, the
natural and probable consequences doctrine provided a theory of
aider and abettor liability for attempted murder, even though the
defendant lacked a specific intent to kill. Under this doctrine, a
defendant may be liable as an aider and abettor not only for an
intended or target crime, but also for any unintended or non-
target crime that was the natural and probable consequence of
that target crime. (People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248,
254, 261 (Prettyman); People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830,
844.) To qualify as the natural and probable consequence of the
target offense, the non-target offense must have been reasonably
foreseeable. (Prettyman, at p. 261.) Unlike direct aiding and
abetting, culpability does not require sharing the direct
perpetrator’s intent. The non-target offense may not have been
intended at all. (Gentile, at p. 845.)
Section 1172.6 relief for a conviction of attempted murder is
only available if it was based on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1); People v. Coley
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548 (Coley); People v. Lovejoy (2024)
7 The record is not clear as to the superior court’s reason for
finding a prima facie showing, issuing an order to show cause,
and conducting an evidentiary hearing.
9
101 Cal.App.5th 860, 865.) To properly deny a petition for
resentencing a conviction for attempted murder, the record must
conclusively demonstrate that the jury did not rely on the natural
and probable consequences doctrine. (Lovejoy, at p. 865.)
IV. Modified jury instruction
In its original format, CALJIC No. 3.02 was the pattern
instruction for the natural and probable consequences doctrine.8
8 The 2000 revision of CALJIC No. 3.02 stated:
“One who aids and abets [another] in the commission of a
crime [or crimes] is not only guilty of [that crime][those crimes],
but is also guilty of any other crime committed by a principal
which is a natural and probable consequence of the crime[s]
originally aided and abetted. [¶] In order to find the defendant
guilty of the crime[s] of _____, [as charge in Count[s] ______,] you
must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that: [¶] 1. The
crime [or crimes] of _____ [was][were committed]; [¶] 2. That the
defendant aided and abetted [that][those] crime[s]; [¶] 3. That a
co-principal in that crime committed the crime[s] of _____; and [¶]
4. The crimes[s] of _____ [was][were] a natural and probable
consequence of the commission of the crime[s] of _____. [¶] [You
are not required to unanimously agree as to which originally
contemplated crime the defendant aided and abetted, so long as
you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt and unanimously
agree that the defendant aided and abetted the commission of an
identified and defined target crime and that the crime of [charged
crime] was a natural and probable consequence of the
commission of that target crime.] [¶] [Whether a consequence is
‘natural and probable’ is an objective test based not on what the
defendant actually intended but on what a person of reasonable
and ordinary prudence would have expected would be likely to
occur. The issue is to be decided in light of all of the
circumstances surrounding the incident. A ‘natural consequence’
10
But the trial court provided the jury with a modified version of
CALJIC No. 3.02 that contained nothing about the natural and
probable consequences doctrine.9
As modified, the instruction read:
“In order to find the defendant guilty of the
crimes as charged as an aider [and] abettor, you must
be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that:
“1. The crime or crimes as charged were
committed;
“2. That the defendant aided and abetted that
those [sic] crimes;
“3. That a co-principal in that crime committed
the crimes charged.”
The modified instruction did not use the phrase “natural
and probable consequence” or any similar terms. It did not
discuss aider and abettor liability for any unintended or non-
target crime committed by a principal that was the natural and
probable consequence of an intended or target crime which the
defendant originally aided and abetted. (People v. McCoy (2001)
25 Cal.4th 1111, 1117; Prettyman, supra, 14 Cal.4th 248, 262.)
The instruction did not identify any specific target crime, nor
distinguish between target and non-target crimes. It did not
require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the attempted
murder was the natural and probable consequence of the
is one which is within the normal range of outcomes that may be
reasonably expected to occur if nothing unusual has intervened.
‘Probable’ means likely to happen.]”
9 The record does not reveal why CALJIC No. 3.02 was
modified. It only indicates that the parties did not object to the
jury instructions.
11
commission of any target offense. These omissions effectively
removed the natural and probable consequences doctrine from
the jury’s consideration.
The only theory of liability provided by the instructions was
direct aiding and abetting. The trial court read CALJIC
Nos. 3.00 and 3.01 on principals to a crime and direct aiding and
abetting liability, respectively. CALJIC No. 3.01 explained the
requirements of aiding and abetting, including knowledge of the
perpetrator’s unlawful purpose, intent of committing,
encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the crime, and by
act or advice, aiding the commission of the crime. The modified
version of CALJIC No. 3.02 essentially repeated the distinction
between the two types of principals in CALJIC No. 3.00 by
stating the defendant aided and abetted those crimes and a co-
principal committed the crimes. At most, the modified version of
CALJIC No. 3.02, along with these instructions, could only have
permitted the jury to convict Wilson of attempted murder under
the currently valid theory of direct aiding and abetting.
The prosecutor’s theory of the case was consistent with only
these instructions. The prosecutor argued that Wilson directly
aided and abetted the attempted murders. He had the specific
intent to kill each of the attempted murder victims based on his
role as the driver in the drive-by shooting and his motive to
retaliate for his friend’s murder. The argument provided no
reference to liability for attempted murder as the natural and
probable consequence of aiding and abetting a target crime.
Cases consistently affirm the denial at the prima facie
showing stage when “[n]othing in the charges, the instructions, or
the balance of the trial permitted the jury to find [the petitioner]
guilty on a theory other than direct aiding and abetting.” (People
12
v. Cortes (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 198, 205–206; People v. Estrada
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 941, 943, 946; People v. Rushing (2025) 109
Cal.App.5th 1025, 1034–1035; Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at
p. 548.) We see no need to conclude differently.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court’s order denying Wilson’s petition
for resentencing under section 1172.6.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
HANASONO, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
ADAMS, J.
13
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