Shen v. Han CA1/4

CourtListener 10679530Calctapp29 sept. 2025

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Filed 9/29/25 Shen v. Han CA1/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

CHUNFENG SHEN et al.,
Plaintiffs, Cross-defendants A170998
and Appellants,
(San Mateo County
v. Super. Ct. No. 19CIV00022)
LENG HAN,
Defendant, Cross-complainant
and Appellant.

This appeal and cross-appeal arise out of a dispute over the proceeds
from the sale of a luxury residential property after the parties jointly funded
the teardown and rebuilding of a home on the property as a speculative
project. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment for the
plaintiffs and cross-defendants, Chunfeng (Alan) Shen and Leia Shen
(collectively the Shens), on a detailed statement of decision finding the
defendant and cross-complainant, Ms. Leng Han, liable for breaching a
contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and awarding just short
of a million dollars in damages against her. The court found no merit to a
variety of other claims made by the Shens against Ms. Han or to any of the
claims made by Ms. Han against the Shens. We affirm the judgment.

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I. BACKGROUND
A.
In 2012, Alan Shen, an engineer, and his wife Leia Shen, a private
banker, had a “side business” in purchasing, renovating, rebuilding and
selling single-family homes for a profit. After an introduction through a
mutual friend to Ms. Leng Han, someone the Shens understood to be a “very
successful businesswoman” with an interest in residential real estate
development, they persuaded Ms. Han to invest with them. At the time, Ms.
Han lived in China, though at some later point in the parties’ business
relationship she moved to the United States, settling in the Bay Area.
The Shens and Ms. Han negotiated the terms of a “friendly”
arrangement which they sought to document in writing. Alan Shen
prepared and sent to Ms. Han a three-and-a-half page document in Chinese,
taken from a form he found on the internet, entitled “Contract Agreement.”1
The Contract Agreement, as translated into English, begins with a brief
“Project Overview” stating the parties wish to engage in a “Project” for the
“Renovation of Old Single-Building Homes” in “the San Francisco Bay Area.”
It refers to the contracting parties as Party A (Ms. Han) and Party B (Alan
Shen) and states that their “Total Joint Investment” will be in a range of
“USD $2,000,000 to $6,000,000.”
There follows a series of numbered paragraphs in a section called
“Cooperative Matters.” These paragraphs state, among other things, that
Party B will be responsible for the “implementation, operation and
comprehensive management of this project”; that the expected term of the

1 The execution status of the Contract Agreement, which was admitted

as an exhibit at trial in the form of an unexecuted document translated into
English by a certified translator, is unclear.

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project “shall range from 13 to 36 months”; that the parties’ “invested funds”
shall be “managed” by Party B; that the “posted amounts by the two parties
shall prevail to confirm the amount and proportion of investment by the two
parties”; and that, upon completion of the project, “dividends” shall be
divided in a manner “[p]roportional” to “specific capital from the sale price of
the new home” based on the “actual invested funds of the two parties”, after
“subtracting relevant costs.” The “labor” of Party B is a recognized cost, but
other than that, the term “relevant costs” is undefined.
Then there is a series of numbered paragraphs entitled “Rights and
Responsibilities of Party A.” These paragraphs address Party A’s right to
“engage[] in on-site inspections of the “cooperative project provided by Party
B”; responsibility to “[g]uarantee[] the validity of capital” by making
available “clean, autonomously allocable funds” in a timely manner; and
right, upon “conclusion of the project,” to “[r]ecover[] the capital and collect[]
dividends.” Following that section is a series of numbered paragraphs
addressing the “Rights and Responsibilities of Party B.” These paragraphs
state, among other things, that Party B has the responsibilities to
“[g]uarantee[] the validity of a project and perfect[] the lawful procedures for
the project”; for “specific project operations”; to “promptly report[] to Party A
on the progress of the project”; and to “guarantee the security of [Party A’s]
invested funds.”
There is no integration clause.
B.
In 2013, the Shens found a property in Atherton, located at 1 Belbrook
Way (1 Belbrook), that they deemed to be suitable for their venture with Ms.
Han (the 1 Belbrook project or the project). They retained an architect,
obtained necessary permits for a new home on the site, and commenced
work. During the course of the 1 Belbrook project—which took longer than

3
expected, and was not completed until 2017—the Shens contributed a total
of $7,974,272.92, which came from some cash on hand at the beginning of
the project, proceeds from the sale of a prior residential development project
in Los Altos, a loan from First Republic Bank, various loans from friends and
family, and an additional amount from a source that was never identified.
Ms. Han contributed a total of $1,940,623. Her contributions, however,
ceased in 2016, when she stopped sending money to the Shens despite their
repeated requests for more funding at a point when they were having
difficulty making further contributions of their own and were concerned that
they may have to seek bankruptcy protection. Due to Ms. Han’s failure to
continue investing in the project, the Shens “unilaterally” decided to convert
Ms. Han’s interest in the project from an equity investment to a loan, which
they documented in the form of a secured promissory note for $2 million.
They recorded a second mortgage lien securing the note against 1 Belbrook.
The lien was placed behind a first mortgage lien held by First Republic
Bank, and ahead of liens held by friends and family members who had lent
the Shens money for the project. The Shens provided the note and deed of
trust to Ms. Han—and Ms. Shen sent Ms. Han a WeChat text pointing out
that a deed of trust had been filed in her favor—but there was no response.
It is undisputed that, when finally completed, the 1 Belbrook project
was a success. The 10-bedroom home plus guesthouse, designed in a
“unique” modern style, was constructed with high quality materials and met
the Shens’ original goal of building an ultra-premium residential property.
It sold for $14.5 million. Although the parties now disagree about the capital
contributions to and costs of the project, there is substantial evidence in the
record, taking into account the Shens’ claimed “sweat equity”—i.e., the value
of their management of the project—that the net profit realized on the

4
project was $5,359,748.90. Of this amount—had Ms. Han’s equity position
not been converted to a loan—the Shens’ share would have been 81.37
percent ($4,361,227.68) and Ms. Han’s share would have been 18.67 percent
($998,521.22), prorated in proportion to the funds they respectively
contributed to the project.
A dispute between the Shens and Ms. Han arose in 2018 in connection
with the closing of the sale of 1 Belbrook and the distribution of the sales
proceeds. As the closing approached, Ms. Han claimed that she should be
paid not just $2 million plus interest as repayment of the secured promissory
note she held—for which she submitted a demand to the escrow company—
but on top of that an additional $1 million in sharing of profits. She
ultimately reduced her profit-sharing demand from $1 million to $640,000,
and in order to close the sale the Shens acquiesced and paid her the
additional amount she claimed. Ms. Han does not dispute that she was
ultimately paid $2,792,222.22, which included both repayment of principal
and interest on the promissory note plus the additional payment she
demanded. The closing statement of the 1 Belbrook sale lists payment to
Ms. Han of $2 million in principal balance, $152,222.22 in interest, and
$640,000 as an “Additional Fee”.
The Shens later learned, and presented evidence at trial, that in a
marital dissolution proceeding following the sale, Ms. Han filed a sworn
statement of assets and liabilities that (1) omitted any mention of the
$2,792,222.22 payment she received from them at the closing of the 1
Belbrook sale, (2) listed $640,000 in indebtedness Ms. Han owed to them (the
Shens claimed this contradicted Ms. Han’s demand that they owed her
$640,000 in profit sharing on the 1 Belbrook project), and (3) listed both $1
million in mortgage indebtedness on a home she purchased in Fremont in

5
2016 and $1.5 million in judgment indebtedness she owed in connection with
a defaulted loan from a friend, Lihuai Ma, who lent her funds to buy the
Fremont house (the Shens claimed it was contradictory to list both the
mortgage debt and the judgment debt).
C.
In 2019, the Shens filed the operative first amended complaint (FAC) in
this case asserting four causes of action: (1) breach of contract, (2) fraud, (3)
negligent misrepresentation, and (4) fraudulent conveyance. Ms. Han filed a
cross-complaint asserting claims for (1) breach of contract, (2) fraud, (3)
breach of fiduciary duty and duty of loyalty, and (4) accounting. All claims in
the FAC and the cross complaint were tried to the court in January 2024.
1.
Prior to trial, upon stipulation of the parties, the court appointed Terry
Lloyd to serve as a Special Master under Code of Civil Procedure section
638.2 The task the court gave Mr. Lloyd was “ ‘to conduct a forensic analysis
and written tracing of the sources and uses of funds for the purchase,
redevelopment and sale’ ” of 1 Belbrook. Mr. Lloyd subsequently submitted
his report, which was admitted and considered at trial.
In his report, Mr. Lloyd was able to trace funds totaling $7,535,409 that
were used to fund the development of 1 Belbrook. Because of the Shens’
intermingling of funds they received for the project, Mr. Lloyd was not able to
trace the source of $2,879,487 of funds the Shens claimed was invested in the
project. Mr. Lloyd also encountered difficulty finding documentation of costs
and expenses. Of the $10,132,637 in costs and expenses the Shens claimed

2 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil

Procedure.

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they had incurred on the 1 Belbrook project, Mr. Lloyd was able to document
only $6,870,332.
The Shens presented an accounting expert at trial, Mr. Brian Repucci,
who analyzed all of the costs and expenses the Shens claimed to have spent
on the 1 Belbrook project. Mr. Repuccci, too, like Mr. Lloyd, was unable to
find documentation for all of the costs and expenses the Shens claimed. His
analysis of the costs and expenses was similar to that of Mr. Lloyd, but he
was able to document somewhat more than Mr. Lloyd found—$7,651,405 in
supported costs and expenses, against $10,292,441 claimed by the Shens.
Mr. Repucci was not asked to attempt to trace or analyze capital
contributions to the project.
Ms. Han’s accounting expert at trial, Mr. Joseph Tseng, testified that,
in his opinion, none of the funds the Shens borrowed from First Republic,
friends, and family qualified as equity contributions. He offered the opinion
that Ms. Han was entitled to 95 percent of the profits from the 1 Belbrook
project and the Shens were entitled to only 5 percent, a percentage based on
the $100,000 in cash they contributed to their 2013 purchase of 1 Belbrook at
the beginning of the project.
2.
In its statement of decision following trial, the court concluded that the
written Contract Agreement prepared by Mr. Shen in 2013 was too indefinite
to enforce as a contract, but that, based on the parties’ course of dealing, the
parties had an “implied agreement,” “partly written, partly oral, and partly
formed by their conduct.” Specifically, the court found that the agreement
called for “the Shens and Ms. Han to contribute at least $2,000,000 to
purchase, redevelop, market, and sell a property, and share any profits pro
rata[, and the] Shens would also contribute ‘sweat equity’ in the form of
labor.” Having so found, the court did not further specify the exact terms of

7
the parties’ agreement; how much of it was written; how much of it was oral;
how much of it was based on conduct; or what the respective written, oral,
and conduct-based terms were.3
While the court found that the parties “materially performed their
obligations to contribute to the construction of the home,” it also found that
“[w]hen it came time to close the sale, Ms. Han demanded first $1 million in
addition to the principal and interest for the $2 million loan, then dropping
her demand to $640,000 before she would sign the closing documents.”
Concluding, essentially, that Ms. Han managed to force the Shens to
pay her $640,000 more than they owed her when the sale of 1 Belbrook
closed, the trial court found Ms. Han liable to the Shens for breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court expressly rejected the
testimony of Ms. Han’s expert that she was entitled to 95 percent of the
profits on the sale—implicitly determining in its damages analysis that she
was entitled to no profits at all, only the payment of principal and interest on
the $2 million loan.
The court’s damages analysis was as follows.
“Both Mr. Lloyd and Mr. Repucci were unable to fully trace all of the
expenditures related to the project. Accordingly, the Court’s damages
analysis relies on Mr. Repucci’s more complete data re the expenses and Mr.
Lloyd’s unrebutted evidence concerning the funding of the project. . . . .
“Mr. Repucci’s testimony and exhibits demonstrate that the costs to
purchase and construct the property, for which evidentiary support exists,
totaled $7,651,405 (he was unable to document over $2.6 million in claimed

3 Nothing in the record indicates that, in the process of the statement of

decision’s preparation, either of the parties requested that the court make
any specific findings about the nature of the “partly written, partly oral”
contract terms to which the parties agreed.

8
expenses). The property sold for $14.5 million; closing costs totaled
$1,137,591.66. Interest and payments on the four loans other than Ms. Han’s
totaled $351,254.44. With the exception of the payments to Ms. Han (the
$640,000 demand and $152,222.22 interest), the total cost to purchase, build,
and sell the property amounted to $9,140,251.10.
“Mr. Lloyd’s unrebutted evidence showed that Ms. Han contributed
$1,940,623.00, and the Shens contributed $7,974,272.92. [Mr. Lloyd] found
an additional $500,000 for which he could not identify the source, [but] there
is no evidence that Ms. Han was responsible for that contribution.
Accordingly, the Court attributes it to the Shens. [¶] The Shens therefore
contributed (through their own or borrowed funds), 81.37% of the total and
Ms. Han contributed 18.63%. Had she received a pro rata share of the net
profits, she would have been paid $998,521.22. However, because the Shens
converted her contribution to a loan, she was paid $2 million in principal and
$152,222.22 in interest. Substantial evidence exists that Ms. Han’s demand
to be paid an additional $640,000 was without legal basis and that the Shens
were injured by having to pay her demand in order to close the sale.” (Italics
added.)
On the foregoing analysis, the court awarded the Shens damages of
$997,523.29, consisting of $640,000 plus prejudgment interest of $375,523.29.
3.
Other than the breach of the covenant of good faith by Ms. Han and the
damages awarded for that breach, the court found no basis for relief on any of
the other claims in either the FAC or the cross-complaint. To support their
fraudulent conveyance claim, the Shens cited and relied on omissions and
discrepancies in the statement of assets and liabilities Ms. Han filed in her
marital dissolution proceeding, but the trial court found they failed to prove
that claim. The court explained, “Even if Ms. Han misrepresented her assets

9
and liabilities to the court in connection with her divorce, or falsely claimed that
the funds belonged to her daughter,[4] such misrepresentations alone are not
fraudulent transfers. Ms. Han testified that she has not recorded a deed of
trust in Mr. Ma’s favor on the Fremont property. Further, the Shens did not
present evidence that she otherwise encumbered that property or transferred
assets to a third party.”
Ms. Han now appeals the judgment entered on the court’s statement of
decision, claiming that the trial court erred in failing to find a breach of
contract by the Shens, in rejecting her claims for an accounting and for fraud,
and in finding a breach of the covenant of good faith against her. The Shens
cross-appeal, claiming that the court erred in failing to find a fraudulent
conveyance of assets by Ms. Han.
II. DISCUSSION
A.
After hearing two days of testimony and admitting 126 documentary
exhibits, the trial court prepared a detailed statement of decision setting
forth its factual findings and legal conclusions. Both parties claim error in
the statement of decision.
Relying on the idea that a trial court’s determinations of the meaning
of a written contract is reviewable de novo on appeal, and citing our decision
in Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970 (Thompson)—which
addresses the standard of review in appeals from judgments following bench
trials where there is a statement of decision under section 632—Ms. Han

4 In her trial testimony, Ms. Han’s explanation for the apparently

deceptive statements on the schedule of assets and liabilities in her marital
dissolution case was that the proceeds she received from the sale of 1
Belbrook constituted her “daughter’s inheritance,” and as such, were not
assets owned by her.

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claims the trial court’s statement of decision rests on “clear legal error.” In
effect, she asks us to ignore the statement of decision, place ourselves in the
position the trial court was in at the close of the evidence, and prepare our
own findings and conclusions without deference to the trial court’s work in
any respect. The Shens, for their part, do not address the applicable
standard of review.
None of the parties appreciates or applies correctly the principles we
enunciated in Thompson. “In reviewing a judgment based upon a statement
of decision following a bench trial, we review questions of law de novo.
[Citation.] We apply a substantial evidence standard of review to the trial
court’s findings of fact. [Citation.] Under this deferential standard of review,
findings of fact are liberally construed to support the judgment and we
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party,
drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the findings. [Citation.] [¶]
. . . It is not our role . . . to reweigh the evidence or to assess witness
credibility. [Citation.] ‘A judgment or order of a lower court is presumed to
be correct on appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are indulged in
favor of its correctness.’ [Citation.] Specifically, ‘[u]nder the doctrine of
implied findings, the reviewing court must infer, following a bench trial, that
the trial court impliedly made every factual finding necessary to support its
decision.’ ” (Thompson, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 981.)
We also described in some detail the process parties must follow in
order to preserve objections to a statement of decision. “Together, sections
632 and 634, as implemented by rule 3.1590(d)–(g) of the California Rules of
Court, establish a two-step procedure for requesting a statement of decision
and preserving objections for pursuit on appeal. First, following the court’s
announcement of its tentative decision, section 632 requires a party to

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specify, in timely fashion and in proper form, ‘those controverted issues as to
which the party is requesting a statement of decision. After a party has
requested the statement, any party may make proposals as to the content of
the statement of decision.’ This initial step serves the function of advising
the trial court of exactly what issues the parties view as materially
controverted at the close of the evidence, just as the process of settling jury
instructions serves to frame issues for decision by the fact finder in the jury
trial setting. Second, section 634 requires that any omissions or ambiguities
in the statement of decision must be ‘brought to the attention of the trial
court either prior to entry of judgment or in conjunction with’ a new trial
motion (§ 657) or a motion to vacate the judgment (§ 663), thus allowing the
court to respond to objections before the taking of an appeal. The second step
is not a substitute for the first. Objections are germane only as to issues
framed as materially controverted under section 632.” (Thompson, supra, 6
Cal.App.5th at p. 982, footnotes omitted.)
“For the doctrine of implied findings to be disabled on appeal, both
steps of the two-step procedure under section 632 and 634 must be followed.
[Citation.] Where a party fails to ‘specify . . . controverted issues’ or
otherwise ‘make proposals as to the content’ of a statement of decision under
section 632 (forcing the trial court to guess at what issues remain live during
preparation of the statement of decision), or where a party complies with
section 632 but fails to object under section 634 (depriving the trial court of
the opportunity to clarify or supplement its statement of decision before
losing jurisdiction), objections to the adequacy of a statement of decision may
be deemed waived on appeal. [Citation.] Because either procedural defect
impedes the trial court’s ability to fulfill its duty under section 632 and
potentially undermines the effectiveness of any statement of decision it

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prepares as a tool of appellate review, strict adherence to both steps of the
process is necessary before we will reverse the presumption of correctness
generally accorded trial court judgments on appeal.” (Thompson, supra, 6
Cal.App.5th at p. 983.)
B.
Ms. Han attempts to argue that the trial court’s statement of decision
is erroneous in numerous respects, but nowhere does she provide any record
citations to demonstrate that any of the errors she now asserts were brought
to the trial court’s attention under the procedures we outlined in Thompson,
supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at pages 981 to 983. It is not enough simply to point
out, as Ms. Han does, that she filed unspecified objections (for which she
provides no record citation) to the trial court’s tentative statement of
decision. Under Thompson, her burden on appeal is to show that she took
steps to specify materially controverted issues under section 632 and then
made appropriate objections to any asserted error by the court in addressing
those issues. In the absence of such record support, we conclude that
virtually all of Ms. Han’s claims of error in the trial court’s articulated legal
grounds for decision have been waived. (Thompson, at p. 983.).
Except for the threshold issue of contractual indefiniteness—a legal
issue that Ms. Han preserved by arguing below that she proved a claim of
breach based on the terms of the Contract Agreement (an argument she
renews here on appeal)—the presumption of correctness decides this appeal.
Suffice it to say that, on the issue of contractual indefiniteness, we agree with
the court’s legal assessment that the Contract Agreement is too uncertain to
be enforced. Beyond that, and to the extent the trial court went on to find an
implied contract, no breach of that contract by either side, and a breach of the
covenant of good faith by Ms. Han, we will imply all necessary factual
findings to support those conclusions.

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To illustrate why we must resolve Ms. Han’s appeal in this manner,
consider her argument based on the text of the Contract Agreement. She
argues it is “clear that ‘investment of capital’ is the basis for calculating profit
shares.” “This is underscored,” she claims, “by reference to the ‘actual funds
of the two parties.’ ” According to Ms. Han, the contract language is
ambiguous about what the parties meant in stating that Mr. Shen’s “labor”
would be a recognized element of the profit calculation.5 She now asks us
conduct our own analysis of the profits from the 1 Belbrook project “as a
matter of law,” using Mr. Lloyd’s tracing of funds analysis and a
characterization of the capital contributions that gives her 95 percent of the
profits from the project (using the same profit split her expert offered at
trial), or an alternative capital contribution approach that gives her 65
percent of the profits. She is not definitive about the bottom line she wishes

5 Where ambiguity exists in an unintegrated contract that is partly

written, partly oral, or partly based on the parties’ conduct—a situation in
which the legal meaning of contract terms is intertwined with factual
assessment of what the parties said to each other or the parties’ conduct—
Thompson explained the standard of review applicable to the trial court’s
resolution of ambiguities in contractual terms. “If . . . ambiguity exists, the
appellate standard of review turns on whether the trial court based its
interpretation on the resolution of conflicts in the evidence. Our review is de
novo where the evidence is undisputed [citation], but where the trial court’s
interpretation rests on its resolution of conflicting evidence, ‘any reasonable
construction will be upheld as long as it is supported by substantial
evidence.’ ” (Thompson, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 987.) The applicable
standard of review for contract interpretation issues of this nature turns on
whether, under sections 632 and 634 and rule 3.1590(d)–(g) of the California
Rules of Court, the trial court has been asked to construe the meaning of a
disputed contractual term. Where that has not happened, any reasonable
construction of the contract supported by substantial evidence will be
implied. (See Thompson, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 989 [“[W]e conclude that
the trial court’s interpretation in Thompson’s favor—not expressed, but
which we imply—is a reasonable one, supported by substantial evidence].)

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us to adopt, but she suggests two scenarios, one in which she was underpaid
by as much as $6,357,021 and another in which she was underpaid by as
much as $1,779,220.
It is not our role on appeal to undertake a fresh analysis of the parties’
relative capital contributions to the 1 Belbrook project based on an
interpretation of contractual terms the trial court was never asked to
construe and then apply the contract as construed, as if we were sitting as
the trier of fact. The overreach Ms. Han urges in this respect is especially
evident when she asks us to adopt an analysis of her purported profit share
that just happens to mirror the 95 percent share her expert, Mr. Tseng,
advocated for her in trial testimony the court expressly refused to accept.
But more fundamentally than that, Ms. Han assumes that the nearly
indecipherable profit-sharing formula in the Contract Agreement governed
the distribution of funds to her at the closing of the 1 Belbrook sale. We do
not think it did. Because the trial court’s damages analysis impliedly accepts
Ms. Han’s status at closing as a lender, not an equity participant, that
formula—no matter how it is construed—had no continuing legal relevance to
anything in 2018, whatever the parties subjectively understood it to mean in
the Contract Agreement.
Had Ms. Han wanted to preserve an argument that the profit sharing
language in the Contract Agreement governed the distribution of proceeds
from the 1 Belbrook sale in 2018, she should have asked the trial court to
address as a materially controverted issue exactly what “written” and “oral”
terms of the parties’ contract governed at that time. The trial court’s
statement of decision is not clear on this issue. Having passed on that issue,
Ms. Han now insists that the record cannot support a legal determination
that she consented to have her equity converted to a loan. She testified that

15
she never agreed to such a conversion, and she points out that, after the
project was completed, the Shens testified they still understood Ms. Han was
entitled to receive a profit share percentage. But the key to understanding
how the trial court resolved the dispute over profit sharing is in its
calculation of damages, and specifically its finding that “[h]ad [Ms. Han]
received a pro rata share of the net profits, she would have been paid
$998,521.22,” but that “because the Shens converted her contribution to a
loan, she was paid $2 million in principal and $152,222.22 in interest.”
The testimony on this point was confused and contradictory, with both
Shens testifying that Ms. Han’s interest was converted to a loan “to protect
her” because of the risk of possible bankruptcy, while at the same time
acknowledging that they understood she retained a proportional profit
sharing interest at the completion of the project. But Mr. Shen also testified
he “stopped considering Ms. Han a partner” on the project in early 2017, and
both of the Shens testified that Ms. Han did not respond when they gave her
the promissory note and deed of trust. They both said they tried to reach her
to explain the significance of the note and deed of trust, but could not find
her. In colloquial terms, they testified, she “ghosted” them at a critical time
when the project was in peril and the interests of everyone involved were in
danger of being compromised.6 Moreover, despite Ms. Han’s testimony that

6 Ms. Han vigorously disputes this, claims she was always in regular

communication with the Shens, and takes the position that their testimony
about her disappearing on them is “fabricated.” This is not the only evidence
adverse to her position on appeal that Ms. Han deals with by claiming falsity.
She also claims, for example, that the $2 million secured promissory note to
her was “forged and fictitious” and that the deed of trust securing it “falsely”
identified her as the trustor. Her opportunity to persuade a court to believe
her evidence and not that of the Shens was at trial. Under the substantial
evidence test, we do not resolve credibility questions or weigh the strength of
properly admitted evidence below.

16
she never consented to the conversion, the fact is that she resurfaced in 2018
and submitted a demand to the escrow company for payment on the
promissory note upon the closing of the sale of 1 Belbrook, which supports an
inference of implied consent, since she not only understood she could benefit
from having a lien, but she used the lien as leverage to obtain more money
from the Shens than she was owed under the note.
Although the court made no specific determination on the issue of Ms.
Han’s consent to equity conversion and did not explain how it assessed the
evidence pertaining to the issue, it calculated damages on the premise that
the only payment Ms. Han was owed was on the $2 million promissory note
plus interest, implicitly finding that there was, in fact such a conversion.
There are any number of legal routes the court could have taken to support
this determination, starting with the possibility that, after Ms. Han stopped
making contributions to the project in 2016, she waived, abandoned, or was
estopped to claim whatever equity-sharing commitments the Shens originally
made in 2013. Granted, the court provides no reasoning along any of these
lines, but none of the parties appears to have requested a specific legal or
factual determination on the highly material issue of conversion of Ms. Han’s
interest from equity to debt. Which is why, here on appeal, the presumption
of correctness is decisive.
Despite the lack of clarity in the statement of decision on the issue of
equity conversion, we see substantial justice in the court’s implicit
determination that Ms. Han was only a lender at the completion of the
project. Not only did Ms. Han’s conduct belie her testimony, but her attempt
to claim profit sharing in addition to repayment on the note—in other words,
to have it both ways—plainly cannot be correct. At the end of the project, she
was either an equity participant or a lender, but not both. And as the trial

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court pointed out in comparing the profit split that would have governed in
the absence of an equity-to-debt conversion, what the Shens did in giving her
a secured promissory note actually left her better off than she would have
been had she remained an equity participant. Indeed, if we were to accept
Ms. Han’s invitation to make a determination on appeal of the parties’
relative capital contributions to the project, we would be bound to reverse and
remand with instructions to award higher damages to the Shens—the
difference between $2,792,222.22 and $998,521.22, plus interest—since
substantial evidence supports the 81.37/18.63 percent profit split the court
found would have governed in the absence of the secured promissory note.
But we need not go that far. To resolve Ms. Han’s appeal, we need only
conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Ms.
Han was entitled to nothing more than payment as a secured promissory note
creditor. Having reviewed the full trial record, we so conclude. From that
conclusion, it follows that the record also supports the court’s finding that
Ms. Han had no basis to claim the $640,000 she extracted from the Shens
over and above her repayment on the note—which is the predicate for the bad
faith finding against her—as well as the further finding that the Shens were
damaged by Ms. Han’s bad faith actions.7
In support of her argument that the trial court erred in failing to find
that the Shens defrauded her, Ms. Han makes two contentions. First, she
repeats her argument that she never consented to an equity conversion,
and second, she argues that the Shens failed to properly report on the
progress of the project and failed to properly document their claimed costs

7 Ms. Han makes no claim of error in the calculation that produced an

award of $997,523.29 in damages, including prejudgment interest. She only
claims error in the finding that she is liable for those damages.

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and expenses. We have already addressed and rejected Ms. Han’s
argument on the issue of consent to equity conversion, so that cannot be
the basis for a fraud claim. The trial court’s statement of decision does not
address her second theory of fraud, but she has waived that argument.
Because Ms. Han points to nothing in the record indicating that she
specified as a materially controverted issue that a deficiency in progress
reporting or documenting costs somehow deceptively induced her
participation or continued participation in the project, and then that she
objected to the court’s failure to address this particular issue in its
statement of decision, we will imply adverse findings of no fraudulent
intent, no materiality, and no reliance, each of which defeats the claim.
Substantial evidence supports these implied findings.8
C.
The Shens’ cross-appeal also fails in the face of the presumption of
correctness. They, too, provide no citations to the record to show that they
specified as materially controverted the issues they now contend the trial
court inadequately addressed and then made appropriate objections to the
findings on those issues.
The Shens argue that “[t]he transfer of these funds, both the initial
$1.9 million put into the [1 Belbrook project] and the $900,000 of profit to her
daughter and to another unnamed individual, such that none of it appears on
[Ms.] Han’s Sworn Statement, are fraudulent transfers that should be voided
so that she has funds to pay the judgment in this matter.” For this argument
the Shens provide no legal citations to support the requisite elements of a

8 We need not address Ms. Han’s accounting claim. Having impliedly
determined that she was entitled to no equity stake in the profits the Shens
realized upon the sale of 1 Belbrook, the court properly rejected that claim as
moot.

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fraudulent concealment claim. As the trial court correctly pointed out,
however, “A fraudulent conveyance is a transfer by the debtor of property to a
third person undertaken with the intent to prevent a creditor from reaching
that interest to satisfy its claim.” (Yaesu Electronics Corp. v. Tamura (1994)
28 Cal.App.4th 8, 13; Kirkeby v. Superior Court (2004) 33 Cal.4th 642, 648;
see Civ Code, § 3439.04.)
In concluding that the Shens failed to prove a fraudulent transfer claim
meeting these elements, the trial court made three findings. First, even
assuming that the statements and omissions on the asset schedule Ms. Han
filed in her divorce case were misrepresentations, “such misrepresentations
alone are not fraudulent transfers.” Second, Ms. Han testified that she had not
recorded a deed of trust in favor of Mr. Ma on the Fremont property. And third,
the Shens did not present evidence that Ms. Han otherwise encumbered the
Fremont property or otherwise transferred assets to a third party. Although the
first of these findings is conclusory and the second two, though somewhat more
specific, are a bit vague, they are all supported by substantial evidence and are
sufficient to support an implied determination that the Shens failed to meet
their burden of providing the intent element of a fraudulent transfer claim.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The costs of the appeal are awarded to the
Shens. The costs of the cross-appeal are awarded to Ms. Han.

STREETER, J.

WE CONCUR:

BROWN, P. J.
GOLDMAN, J.

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