Shields v. Al-Sadi CA2/8

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Filed 9/25/25 Shields v. Al-Sadi CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

CLAUDIA SHIELDS, B327219

Plaintiff and Appellant, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BC682431
v.

GHADA AL-ASADI, et al.,

Defendants and
Respondents.

APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Richard L. Fruin, Judge. Affirmed.
The Law Office of Sara B. Poster, Sara B. Poster; WLA
Legal Services, Bay Cities Law Group, Steven Zelig for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
Law + Brandmeyer, Kent T. Brandmeyer; Schmid & Voiles,
Denise H. Greer for Defendants and Respondents.
____________________
To get help, a person who twice attempted suicide and who
has a history of depression drives herself to a psychiatric
hospital. Morally, medically, and legally, the facility is concerned
about suicide. The facility places her on an involuntary hold,
offers her anti-depression medication that she refuses, and
releases her four days later.
Claudia Shields sued after spending four days at a
psychiatric hospital against her will. She went to trial against
three staff psychiatrists—not against the hospital that held her—
on claims for false imprisonment, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and medical malpractice. The trial court
nonsuited most of her claims. One malpractice claim remained
against the one psychiatrist who treated Shields. The jury
decided in this psychiatrist’s favor on causation. Shields
recovered nothing.
We affirm. We begin by outlining the statutory scheme for
psychiatric commitments under the Welfare and Institutions
Code. Undesignated statutory references are to this code. Then
we sketch a factual overview. Later we add more facts
concerning each defendant as we deal with particulars.
I
The governing law is the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act
(§ 5000 et seq.) (the Act).
It provides for “prompt, short-term, community-based
intensive treatment, without stigma or loss of liberty, to
individuals with mental disorders who are either dangerous or
gravely disabled.” (Ford v. Norton (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 974,
977 (Ford).)
In 2016, when Shields was in the hospital, section 5008
defined gravely disabled as “[a] condition in which a person, as a

2
result of a mental health disorder, is unable to provide for his or
her basic personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter.” (Former
§ 5008, subd. (h)(1), as amended by Stats. 2013, ch. 567, § 2.)
The Act provides for involuntary commitment over
successive periods of increasing duration. (Julian v. Mission
Community Hospital (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 360, 375 (Julian).)
Section 5150 is the first step in the process. It allows
specified professionals “to bring an individual to an appropriate
facility for assessment, evaluation, and treatment for up to 72
hours where there is probable cause to believe that the person is,
as a result of mental disorder, a danger to others, or to himself or
herself, or gravely disabled.” (Julian, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p.
375 [quotation marks and citations omitted].)
People who may take this action “include peace officers,
members of the staff of the evaluation facility, designated
members of a mobile crisis team, and other professional persons
designated by the county. Thus, a broad range of personnel can
initiate the placement of a mentally disordered individual for the
72-hour evaluation.” (Ford, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 979.)
Early release is possible, but “[a]n early release from a 72-
hour commitment may occur ‘only if … the psychiatrist directly
responsible for the person’s treatment believes, as a result of his
or her personal observations, that the person no longer requires
evaluation or treatment.’ ([§] 5152, subd. (a)[.)]” (Julian, supra,
11 Cal.App.5th at p. 376 [citations omitted].)
The Act recognizes early release “can pose a risk of harm to
others. The evaluation and treatment of mentally disordered
persons is inherently uncertain and cannot reliably predict future
conduct.” (Ford, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 979.)

3
If the patient is not ready to be released after 72 hours and
refuses further voluntary hospitalization, the professional staff of
the facility may certify the patient for not more than 14 days of
involuntary intensive treatment. (§ 5250; 2 CEB, California
Conservatorships and Guardianships, Conservatorships for the
Gravely Disabled Under the Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act
§ 15.3, p. 892.)
The Act provides checks on section 5250 certifications.
Those making the certification must provide the specific facts
forming the basis for their decision in the notice of certification.
(§ 5252.) Section 5259.1 provides that “[a]ny individual who is
knowingly and willfully responsible for detaining a person in
violation of the provisions of this article is liable to that person in
civil damages.” Moreover, “[c]ommitments longer than 72-hour
detention require a certification hearing before an appointed
hearing officer to determine whether there is probable cause for
confinement, unless the detainee has filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus.” (Julian, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 375.) The
hearing must take place within four days of the certification, and
the patient may no longer be detained involuntarily if no
probable cause is found. (§§ 5254, 5256, 5256.5.)
The Act also has an immunity provision, which is a focus of
this case. Section 5278 shields hold decisions made “in
accordance with the law.” The immunity provision “encourages
the protection of those endangered by a person suffering from
mental disorder.” (Cruze v. Nat. Psychiatric Services, Inc. (2003)
105 Cal.App.4th 48, 54 (Cruze).) Immunity allows professionals
authorized to place psychiatric holds to make this decision
without fear of exposure to liability. (Julian, supra, 11
Cal.App.5th at p. 376.)

4
Section 5278 immunity is far-reaching but not absolute. It
protects the decision to detain, the detention, and its inherent
attributes. Immunity extends to any civil claim based on the fact
the plaintiff was detained, evaluated, or treated without consent.
It does not, however, cover criminal acts, intentional
mistreatment, or negligent evaluation or treatment during a
hold. (See Jacobs v. Grossmont Hospital (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th
69, 75–79 (Jacobs); Gonzalez v. Paradise Valley Hospital (2003)
111 Cal.App.4th 735, 737, 741–742.)
II
Shields began her involuntary stay at Aurora Charter Oak
Hospital (Aurora) on Monday, November 7, 2016.
A
Shields has a Ph.D. in clinical psychology and is a longtime
psychology professor. She was chair of her department at the
Chicago School of Professional Psychology in November 2016.
Shields had cognitive issues before the key date of
November 7, 2016. She had complained of brain fog since 2013.
She experienced depression, anxiety, poor concentration, memory
problems, insomnia, and work stress. She easily became
overwhelmed.
Shields asked her primary care physician Dr. Yen Lai to
help her get a reduced work schedule.
Shields visited Lai on Monday, October 31, 2016—one week
before the events of November 7, 2016.
Shields told Lai she was suffering from depression, work
stress, and concentration problems. Shields did not want to
engage with people.
Shields was getting upset and going to “ ‘a dark place’ ” at
work.

5
She had been thinking about harming herself.
She had not, however, formulated a concrete plan for
suicide.
On the crucial day of Monday, November 7, 2016, Shields
experienced a 45-minute episode of confusion and inability to
function at work.
Shields went to her doctor’s office, where she was visibly
distraught.
Shields told the receptionist she had fleeting thoughts of
hurting herself.
The receptionist gave her a list of counseling centers.
Shields called one name on the list, and the voicemail message
referred her to Aurora Behavioral Health for urgent but not
emergency matters.
Aurora is a psychiatric hospital less than two miles from
Shields’s home. Shields used to drive by it regularly. She knew
it was a psychiatric hospital and knew it did not provide
emergency medical services.
In other words, you would go there for psychological, as
opposed to physical, problems.
Shields called Aurora. A man asked her about insurance
and directed her to Aurora’s assessment center, which is adjacent
to the hospital. Shields drove there on November 7th.
When she arrived, Aurora staff took her belongings and
searched her. Shields had an intake interview with Aurora
employee Tina Davis, who was not a defendant in this case.
Shields agreed to stay overnight at Aurora. She signed a
form requesting voluntary admission to Aurora.
At trial, however, Shields and Davis disagreed about their
interaction.

6
According to Shields, Davis made statements to get Shields
to stay overnight.
Davis denied this.
Shields and Davis also disagreed about the pre-admit
screening form Davis completed while they met. This form
attributed statements to Shields.
Davis testified she accurately recorded Shields’s
statements.
Shields disputed this.
The form documented Shields’s chief complaint as follows:
“Claudia came into [Aurora] seeking assessment for recent issues
with memory loss, increased anxiety and feelings of being
overwhelmed. Upon face to face Claudia reports a recent
decrease in both sleep and appetite. . . . Increased stress at work.
‘I can’t remember doing things, I can’t concentrate. The simplest
tasks and I can’t function.’ Claudia is also dealing with her ex-
husband having 6 months to live and how this is going to affect
her 13 yr old daughter. ‘I’ve had thoughts to hurt myself,
especially when I’m not doing well at work.’ ”
The form continued to attribute direct quotations to
Shields.
“ ‘I’ve thought about cutting my wrists again. I do have the
fear I won’t stop, that I will keep going and really commit
suicide.’ ”
The form noted Shields had increased thoughts over the
last four to eight weeks of cutting her left wrist. Davis identified
the provisional diagnosis needed for admission purposes as major
depression, severe recurrent without psychosis.

7
Another part of the form stated Shields said she had been
admitted to other psychiatric hospitals. When asked how many
times, Shields could not recall.
The screening form is long and detailed and was a focal
point at trial. Shields acknowledged much of its content came
from her, but other parts were fabricated. She conceded she had
thoughts of hurting herself. She denied she was suicidal. Shields
criticized Davis for omitting the 45-minute episode at work,
among other things. She acknowledged information about her
history reflected in the form was true, though remote. She was a
victim of rape, molestation, and physical abuse. She had had
severe depression and had been on four different antidepressant
medications in the past.
Shields admitted she had attempted suicide twice. She
admitted she had a history of cutting herself. She also had
several psychiatric hospitalizations.
Shields maintained, however, that, after her daughter was
born in 2003, she never again considered suicide.
Defendant Dr. Said Jacob is a psychiatrist. He approved
Shields’s request for voluntary admission over the phone. He
never saw Shields or assessed her and never signed the
admission form, which has a certification portion for an attending
physician.
Shields said she was locked in a prison-like unit and
eventually was placed in something like solitary confinement.
Shields said she wanted to leave.
Around 11 p.m. on November 7th, nurse Denise Reiser
decided Shields posed a danger to herself and initiated a 72-hour
psychiatric hold under section 5150.

8
Reiser’s notes documented Shields was “highly anxious”
and complained of memory loss and feeling overwhelmed.
Reiser noted the probable cause for the hold as follows:
Patient stated her former husband “is dying + concerned about
how she will tell her [daughter.] Has had thoughts to cut her
wrist of which she has a hx. of. (scar on (L) wrist). She has had 2
prior suicide attempts. Has had increasing thoughts to cut over
past few mths.”
Shields testified she wrote a letter to Davis explaining her
notes were inaccurate, she was safe and not suicidal, and she was
primarily concerned with the memory issues she experienced at
work. The note says, “I did tell you that sometimes I do think of
cutting” but also “I DO NOT WANT TO CUT MYSELF.”
Shields testified she gave the note to Reiser and asked to
get Davis on the phone to “talk this through,” as there had been a
misunderstanding. The note was not in the hospital’s chart, but
plaintiff’s counsel introduced a somewhat legible copy at trial.
The next morning, on November 8th, internist Dr. Oliver
Solomon examined Shields to rule out any emergency medical
situation. His report shows he conducted a neurologic
examination, among other exams. Solomon documented Shields
had bilateral knee pain and a form of neuropathy known as
CIDP, but there was no emergency medical issue or acute
neurologic condition. Solomon cleared Shields to stay. He
recommended she follow up with her primary care doctor and her
rheumatologist upon discharge and see a neurologist for her
memory issues.
Shields testified the meeting with Solomon lasted about five
minutes, and when she told him about the 45-minute episode at
work, he “looked panicked” and blurted out that she should have

9
had an emergency CT scan; then he “gathered himself, as if on
script” and reversed course.
Solomon had no recollection of this and testified he “would
never say something like that to a patient and not act on it.”
Defendant Dr. Ghada Al-Asadi is the second psychiatrist.
She also met with Shields the morning of November 8th. She
became the attending physician responsible for Shields’s
hospitalization.
Before meeting with Shields, Al-Asadi reviewed the
screening form, the 5150 hold documentation, and other records.
Al-Asadi’s initial report said Shields told her about her
increasing depression.
Shields also said she had used the antidepressant
medication Effexor in the past.
The report documents that Shields had a sad affect and a
depressed mood.
Shields was eating and sleeping poorly, had poor memory
and was unable to concentrate, and had little energy and
motivation. At the same time, Shields was alert and properly
oriented. She had clear thoughts, coherent speech, and fair
judgment and insight about her illness.
Al-Asadi diagnosed Shields with major depressive disorder,
recurrent with no psychosis, and cognitive disorder, not otherwise
specified.
Al-Asadi determined Shields’s symptoms were very serious,
Shields was a danger to herself, and she was very high-risk. Al-
Asadi estimated the length of stay as three to seven days. Her
treatment plan included participating in various therapies and
resuming the antidepressant Effexor.

10
Al-Asadi ordered a family meeting. She testified these
meetings typically are a mandatory part of the investigation and
an important way to gain insight into the patient.
As would transpire, however, this family meeting did not
happen until November 10th, after a second hold was placed.
The parties dispute the reasons for the delay, as shortly will
appear.
Al-Asadi saw Shields each remaining day Shields was at
Aurora.
Shields maintained each visit was short (typically five to ten
minutes) and Al-Asadi was cold, rushed, and uncaring. Shields
told her about the 45-minute episode at work.
Al-Asadi noted Shields minimized and denied statements
from her admission, which was not unusual.
Al-Asadi recognized Shields should see a neurologist if her
confusion problems continued. She told Shields they could be
symptoms of depression but were more likely a medical condition
with a non-psychological cause.
Al-Asadi concluded Shields was not experiencing a medical
emergency at Aurora, meaning that the immediate problem was
psychological rather than physical. Al-Asadi explained she
needed to balance Shields’s assurances with her concerns for
Shields’s safety in light of her “very high-risk factors,” like
Shields’s past suicide attempts.
According to Al-Asadi, patients are more likely to harm
themselves when they lack family support, and Al-Asadi had to
ensure Shields had support.
Al-Asadi ordered a “family meeting ASAP” on November
9th. She told Shields a successful meeting was essential before
Aurora would discharge Shields.

11
Aurora’s records show many people visited Shields: doctors,
nurses, therapists, a social worker, a case manager, and others.
Shields maintained Aurora personnel made up things about
her and then simply copied lies verbatim throughout the chart.
She felt she did not receive treatment for depression at Aurora,
apart from the offer of Effexor, which she rejected.
Shields started experiencing headaches and other pain
related to the chronic medical conditions she had (neuropathy in
her legs and spontaneously dislocating knees) that went
untreated.
Shields repeatedly claimed that she was not suicidal or
depressed, that she would not hurt herself, and that she wanted
to leave. She felt powerless there. She also felt Aurora personnel
were cruel and were “gaslighting her”—trying to make her feel
like she had not overcome her history of suicidal depression when
she had.
The trial featured conflicting evidence about whether
Shields was cooperative at Aurora.
On one hand, Shields testified she did nothing to delay the
family meeting.
On the other hand, chart notes show Shields was
uncooperative. The notes say Shields refused to have the family
meeting and refused to take the Effexor that Al-Asadi had
prescribed to combat depression. The notes also say Shields
reported she had no support system and refused to allow hospital
staff to contact her family or friends.
Shields testified that she was concerned about sharing
personal information about her family and that she refused to do
so initially because she distrusted Aurora personnel. Shields also
maintained she had “tremendous” support.

12
Shields testified she did not need antidepressant medication
because she was not depressed, although she had “moments of
sadness and work stress[.]”
A family meeting eventually was scheduled for November
10th, the final day of the 5150 hold, around 1 p.m.
Shields did not leave Aurora when the 72-hour hold was set
to expire on November 10, 2016.
She did leave the next day, on November 11, 2016.
The parties disputed the circumstances of Aurora’s
discharge of Shields.
According to Al-Asadi’s notes, Shields on November 10th
agreed to “sign voluntary,” which meant Al-Asadi could discharge
her over the phone after the family meeting, if it went well. Al-
Asadi made this arrangement and left the hospital after meeting
with Shields.
Shields testified she did not recall a discussion about
“signing voluntary.” She maintained this discussion would not
make sense because, when the nurse presented the form to her,
Shields believed she was being discharged. Shields testified she
did not agree to a further voluntary stay.
Shields refused to sign the voluntary form.
A nurse called defendant Dr. Cesar Cruz to see Shields and
to evaluate the situation.
Cruz is the third psychiatrist in this case.
Cruz met with Shields midday on November 10, 2016,
before the scheduled family meeting. Cruz did not know when
the meeting would occur but knew the 72-hour hold was set to
expire later that very day, on November 10, 2016.
Before the 72-hour hold expired, Cruz certified Shields for
further treatment under section 5250.

13
The parties provided vastly different accounts of how this
happened. Shields testified she may have had a brief encounter
with Cruz, but Cruz did not examine her, run tests, or discuss
activities of daily living. By contrast, Cruz maintained he
personally examined Shields during the course of a meeting
lasting from about 20 to 40 minutes. According to Cruz, they
discussed the “transition from a 5150 to 5250,” which Shields
understood. Cruz testified he reviewed the entire chart and
talked extensively with staff about Shields beforehand. He
dictated a note about the meeting with Shields. This dictation
was not transcribed, which Cruz said happens routinely, as he
has an accent and speaks quickly. He did not recall checking for
the transcription. He had been brought in for a consultation
only.
Cruz agreed with the diagnosis of major depressive disorder.
He was aware Shields denied wanting to hurt herself or having
suicidal ideation. But Cruz was concerned there were multiple
red flags beyond depression that undermined Shields’s ability to
provide for herself safely. The red flags included her memory
lapses and concentration issues, her past attempts to kill herself,
her recent thoughts of self-harm, her reversal on staying
voluntarily, and her resistance to a family session. He explained
the family session was a vital piece of information about Shields’s
safety. That piece was missing, for the family session had not
happened. There was no safety plan in place. Cruz believed he
could not ensure her safety at home.
Cruz concluded Shields was gravely disabled. He completed
the required notice of certification for further treatment at
Aurora. This event triggered the 5250 hold, meaning Aurora

14
would not discharge Shields when the 5150 hold reached the 72-
hour mark.
Shields testified she was concerned by the new hold but
knew it was invalid and would entitle her to a court hearing.
In the afternoon of November 10th, Shields did participate
in the family meeting with two others: a friend and a therapist.
The meeting went well, and the therapist recommended Shields’s
release.
Al-Asadi testified she did not learn about either Shields’s
refusal to “sign voluntary” or Cruz’s hold until the next day,
November 11, 2016.
The morning of November 11th, Al-Asadi met with Shields
and had a phone call with Shields’s priest, Reverend Dr. Sally
Howard, who has two psychology doctorates. Howard disagreed
Shields was gravely disabled. According to Howard, Al-Asadi
tried to justify the extended hold and maintained they needed a
“status” for Shields. Howard believed the hold was illegal.
Al-Asadi ordered Shields’s discharge after the call, around
10 or 11 a.m. on November 11, 2016.
Al-Asadi’s discharge summary shows she recommended
Shields see a neurologist as soon as possible. Al-Asadi recognized
cognitive symptoms like those Shields reported could signal a
transient ischemic attack, a kind of precursor to a stroke. But
she noted Solomon had assessed Shields and found nothing
wrong with her brain and no acute medical situation. Al-Asadi
advised Shields to go to the emergency room if a similar episode
happened again. She arranged a neurologist appointment for
Shields.
On November 12th, the day after her discharge, Shields
went to an Urgent Care clinic due to a migraine and blurred

15
vision. The clinic gave her an injection and told her to take pain
medication.
A few days later Shields visited Lai, complaining of acute
cognitive processing issues. Lai ordered magnetic resonance
imaging: an MRI. The MRI scan led to the discovery of an
aneurysm, which is a bulge in the side of a blood vessel. Shields
underwent elective surgery to repair the aneurysm in December.
The imaging showed no evidence of a stroke or a transient
ischemic attack.
Shields claimed she suffered nightmares, chronic migraines,
and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) from being
hospitalized against her will at Aurora. She went on medical
leave from work. She was “effectively demoted” from her Chair
position because she was not able to keep up, and she lost income
as result.
In April 2017, Shields started seeing Dr. Kamala Thomas, a
psychologist, who diagnosed Shields with PTSD. As of trial,
Thomas had had about 170 sessions with Shields. She testified
Shields would need lifelong treatment.
B
A year after her experience at Aurora, Shields sued Aurora,
its parent company, Al-Asadi, and Jacob. She later added
Solomon and Cruz as defendants. Defendants Jacob, Al-Asadi,
and Cruz were the three psychiatrists.
The trial court sustained, without leave to amend, the
psychiatrists’ demurrers to Shields’s claim for dependent adult
abuse under section 15600, et seq., on the ground that the
complaint outlined a claim for professional negligence, not
neglect as the dependent adult abuse statute defined it.

16
This left three claims against the psychiatrists: false
imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
medical malpractice. Shields contended Al-Asadi and Cruz were
Jacob’s agents, and he was liable for their acts and omissions.
Shields settled with some defendants but went to trial
against the three psychiatrists: Jacob, Al-Asadi, and Cruz. Her
case-in-chief featured testimony from psychiatric expert Dr.
Randolph Noble, economic damages expert Darryl Zengler,
Thomas, Lai, Howard, Shields’s roommate, her longtime close
friend, the coworker who succeeded her as Chair, and Shields
herself. Shields also called the three psychiatrist defendants as
witnesses.
Noble opined all three had deviated from the standard of
care in various ways. Noble acknowledged he never has had staff
privileges at a psychiatric facility like Aurora and never has been
certified to place holds under the Act. He attacked Aurora’s
recordkeeping. He emphasized “protective” factors about Shields
and observations in her chart that showed she was not depressed,
gravely disabled, or a danger to herself. Noble acknowledged
Shields was a psychology professor who chose to drive herself to a
psychiatric facility and not an emergency room; she had been
admitted to psychiatric facilities before; and she knew their
routines.
Various witnesses described Shields before and after her
experience at Aurora. Their testimony depicted Shields as a
dedicated mother, poised professional, and high-functioning
person who seemed neither depressed nor at risk of self-harm in
the weeks and years before Aurora, but who changed drastically
after Aurora as a result of that experience.

17
Lai testified about Shields’s medical condition before and
after Aurora. She confirmed various cognitive and mental health
complaints by Shields before Aurora and her cognitive and PTSD
symptoms afterward. Lai was not concerned Shields would harm
herself in October 2016 because she had insight and no plan. Nor
was she concerned then that Shields could not take care of her
basic needs. Records from Lai’s clinic showed Shields reported
PTSD from several traumatic experiences in 2020 and 2021
unrelated to Aurora.
Thomas tied Shields’s PTSD and chronic migraine syndrome
to her experience at Aurora. She opined Shields likely would
experience PTSD for the rest of her life. Zengler discussed
Shields’s damages, which admittedly stemmed from the
assumption Shields was wrongly imprisoned.
After the close of Shields’s evidence, all three defendants
moved for nonsuit on each cause of action under Code of Civil
Procedure section 581c. The trial court reviewed both sides’
written submissions and held a lengthy hearing. The court
provided an oral tentative ruling at the outset, saying it was
inclined to grant the motion in large part. Plaintiff’s counsel
requested leave to amend to add back the claim for dependent
adult abuse. The court refused this relief.
The court held to its ruling at the end of the hearing and
ruled Al-Asadi and Cruz were not Jacob’s employees. The only
claim that survived was the medical malpractice claim against
Al-Asadi.
In the defense case, the jury heard from Al-Asadi again, as
well as from Davis, Solomon, and two experts: a psychiatrist and
a neurologist. This psychiatrist opined on the standard of care
and the purpose and typical length of involuntary psychiatric

18
holds. He explained Al-Asadi’s actions were appropriate and
protective, agreed with her diagnosis, and said Shields’s stay at
Aurora was life-saving.
The neurologist undercut various elements of Shields’s
malpractice claim. He testified aneurysms usually are congenital
from birth. Shields’s aneurysm was asymptomatic, meaning that
it created no symptoms. As a result, there was no reason for
these doctors to suspect Shields had one. Shields also had a
history of migraines, and her overuse of pain medicine
transformed her episodic headaches into chronic headaches.
Shields was not suffering from any neurologic emergency at
Aurora and did not need emergency imaging.
Solomon confirmed his job was to make sure the patient is
stable and had no acute medical problem requiring a transfer.
He evaluated Shields and found no acute or emergency medical
problem of any kind.
Davis had conducted intake interviews at Aurora for five
years as of November 2016. She said her role did not require
licensing. She did not make clinical decisions; rather, she was
merely a scribe who wrote down what patients said. Davis used
quotation marks to signify exact statements by patients,
including on Shields’s form. Davis denied falsifying screening
forms.
Shields provided brief rebuttal testimony about her room at
Aurora.
After deliberating for less than four hours, the jury reached
its verdict. It found Al-Asadi was negligent, but her negligence
was not a substantial factor in causing harm to Shields.
Shields moved for a new trial. The court denied her motion.

19
III
Shields’s appeal largely focuses on the nonsuit rulings.
Shields also argues the trial court improperly dismissed the
dependent adult abuse claim before trial and improperly denied
her request to proceed with the claim at trial. Shields concludes
her lengthy opening brief by reciting the contents of her motion
for new trial but making no related argument, thereby forfeiting
any challenge to the ruling on the motion for a new trial. (See
Haley v. Casa Del Rey Homeowners Assn. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th
863, 867, fn. 1 (Haley) [issues lacking argument are forfeited].)
We affirm.
A
Nonsuit is proper if the evidence cannot support a
judgment in the plaintiff’s favor. (Lopez v. City of Los Angeles
(2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 675, 684 (Lopez).)
We independently review these rulings, accepting as true
the evidence favorable to the plaintiff, drawing all legitimate
inferences in plaintiff’s favor, and disregarding conflicting
evidence. We neither weigh evidence nor assess witness
credibility. (O'Neil v. Crane Co. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 335, 347
(O’Neil); see also Haley, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 876 [review
is independent].)
We nevertheless require evidence showing a viable path on
each claim. Nonsuit is proper if the plaintiff’s proof is merely
speculation or conjecture. (Lopez, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p.
684.)
On independent review, we conclude the trial court’s result
was correct.
Shields’s appellate briefs often lump the defendants
together along with Aurora staff, which is unhelpful in

20
determining whether a nonsuit was proper as to the claims
against any individual based on that individual’s conduct. We
focus on each defendant separately, viewing the evidence from
Shields’s case-in-chief in the light favorable to Shields. (See
O'Neil, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 347.)
1
Starting with psychiatrist Jacob, Shields’s evidence did not
support a judgment in Shields’s favor. After she drove herself to
Aurora for help, Shields had no case against this doctor who
merely approved her admission to Aurora.
Jacob’s role was minimal. He never interacted with Shields
and did not place an involuntary psychiatric hold. He gave
admission orders over the phone for Shields’s voluntary
admission after speaking with an Aurora employee about the
case. That is all. He never saw Shields and was not involved in
her care. He never made notes about her. He did not bill for the
one call he had about her. He was not Shields’s attending
physician responsible for her hospitalization and care. That role
belonged to Al-Asadi.
While Jacob’s name appears throughout the chart as the
“Doctor” or “Att” (for attending), or similar designations, this
evidence does not give rise to a reasonable inference of further
involvement given the undisputed evidence of Jacob’s minimal
role. Jacob’s name appeared throughout the chart because he
was on call that first day and was the one who admitted Shields.
No evidence countered this point.
Considering Jacob’s undisputed minor involvement, nonsuit
was proper on each claim.
There was no false imprisonment. Involuntary
hospitalization can constitute false imprisonment. (See Julian,

21
supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 382.) But Jacob was not involved in
the holds here. He enabled Shields’s voluntary admission after
she drove herself to Aurora and completed the intake. No
evidence created an inference Jacob confined Shields against her
will. (See CACI No. 1400; Fermino v. Fedco, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th
701, 715 [claims for false imprisonment require nonconsensual,
intentional confinement by the defendant, without lawful
privilege, for an appreciable period].)
There was no intentional infliction of emotional distress.
That tort requires extreme and outrageous conduct. The conduct
must exceed all bounds usually tolerated in a civilized
community. (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050–1051
(Hughes).)
Trial courts properly act as a gatekeeper on this issue. (See
Hughes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1051 [affirming summary
judgment on this basis]; Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th
518, 534 (Berkley) [whether challenged conduct is outrageous is
a question of law initially committed to the court and goes to the
jury only if reasonable minds may differ].)
As a matter of law, Jacob’s conduct was not outrageous.
Shields does not argue otherwise on appeal, which ends the issue.
There was no medical malpractice. No evidence showed
Jacob’s conduct falling below any standard of care. (See Johnson
v. Superior Court (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 297, 305 [medical
malpractice cause of action includes the elements of duty and
breach and requires the plaintiff to prove through expert
testimony that the defendant’s treatment fell below the standard
of care]; CACI Nos. 501 & 502; see also Lopez, supra, 196
Cal.App.4th at p. 684 [plaintiffs cannot prevail against a nonsuit

22
motion unless they demonstrate substantial evidence in the
record to support each claim].)
According to Shields, Jacob was at fault because he
“literally ‘called it in.’ ” She points to Noble’s testimony, which
blamed Jacob for not explaining the voluntary admission form to
her, for relying on a deficient history taken by hospital staff, and
for not immediately referring Shields to the emergency room in
light of the 45-minute work episode.
Noble’s testimony is not a valid basis for attacking the trial
court’s ruling on the Jacob nonsuit. Three separate flaws ruin
Shields’s argument.
First, Noble made speculative assumptions to support his
conclusions. He admitted he had no idea what Jacob was told
about Shields. Jacob testified he did not remember this
conversation. This lack of evidence is not evidence supporting a
claim. The nonsuit was proper on this claim. (See Lopez, supra,
196 Cal.App.4th at pp. 684 & 689; see also id. at p. 689 [expert
opinions may not be based on assumptions of fact without
evidentiary support or on speculative factors].)
Second, Shields testified she read the voluntary admission
form completely before signing it. The form warned of the
possibility of involuntary commitment. Shields thus was aware
of this warning. An additional and superfluous failure to warn
could not cause her harm. (See Berkley, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th
at p. 526 [proximate cause is an element of any negligence
claim].)
Third, Shields’s expert negated the inference Jacob acted
wrongly. Noble conceded that there was a rationale for admitting
Shields as a danger to herself, that she should have been
voluntarily admitted, and that admitting someone to a

23
psychiatric hospital voluntarily over the phone is routine.
Consistent with this evidence, Al-Asadi confirmed doctors can
issue admission orders over the phone without seeing the patient.
Nonsuit was proper as to Jacob.
2
Moving to Cruz, Shields’s case established section 5278
immunity covered Cruz’s actions and shielded him from liability
on all three claims. No evidence met the high statutory standard
for exceptions to liability: that is, no evidence showed Cruz
knowingly detained Shields in violation of the law. (See
§ 5259.1.)
The statute sets a towering barrier: the plaintiff must prove
the defendant doctor knew he was breaking the law.
Trial courts properly rule on this immunity as a legal
matter. (See Cruze, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 53.)
It is undisputed Cruz’s sole involvement was on November
10, 2016, when Cruz certified Shields for further treatment under
section 5250. For Shields, this meant extending her stay at
Aurora overnight, for about an extra 14 hours.
We independently consider section 5278’s applicability and
construe the statutory scheme. (See Julian, supra, 11
Cal.App.5th at p. 374.) Our starting place is the statute’s words.
(Hughes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1045.)
Section 5278 provides, in relevant part: “Individuals
authorized under this part to . . . certify a person for intensive
treatment pursuant to Article 4 (commencing with Section
5250) . . . shall not be held either criminally or civilly liable for
exercising this authority in accordance with the law.” Under
section 5250, a psychiatrist may certify an already detained
person for not more than 14 days of intensive treatment provided

24
“[t]he professional staff of the agency or facility providing
evaluation services has analyzed the person’s condition and has
found the person is, as a result of a mental health disorder . . . , a
danger to others or to themselves, or is gravely disabled.”
(§ 5250, subd. (a).)
Undisputed evidence shows Cruz did just that.
In accordance with section 5250, Cruz found Shields was
gravely disabled. (See former § 5008, subd. (h)(1), as amended by
Stats. 2013, ch. 567, § 2.) Consistent with the law, Cruz
recognized safety concerns are part of the calculus and the
patient’s support system bears on the grave disability
determination. (See § 5250, subd. (d)(1) [“a person is not ‘gravely
disabled’ if that person can survive safely without involuntary
detention with the help of responsible family, friends, or others
who are both willing and able to help provide for the person's
basic personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter”].)
After reviewing the chart and speaking with the hospital
staff, Cruz agreed the proper diagnosis for Shields was major
depressive disorder, which was “all across the charting[.]” Cruz
explained multiple risk factors beyond depression raised concern
that Shields could not safely provide for herself. These factors
included her memory lapses, her concentration issues, her
psychiatric history, and her behavior at Aurora. At the same
time, he was missing vital information about her safety: he did
not know when, or if, a family session would occur, or whether
Shields had a safe home environment to which to return. He
worried about her being discharged near midnight, when the
5150 hold was set to expire.
Cruz filled out a notice of certification that tracked the
required form. (See § 5252.) It says: patient presented to Aurora

25
after placed a 5150 for danger to self, stating thoughts of cutting
self, continues to be guarded, will continue to monitor, plus eval,
unable to formulate safe plan. According to Cruz, the new hold
would enable a safe plan to be formulated.
Shields’s evidence did not take Cruz outside of section
5278’s protection.
Shields did not recall interacting with Cruz and
acknowledged she may have had an extremely short encounter
with him. Shields did not come close to proving Cruz knew he
was breaking the law.
Noble focused on the validity of Cruz’s conclusion and
testified nothing in the chart supported this hold. The foundation
for this opinion is faulty, as Cruz testified his exam note had not
been transcribed and thus was not in the chart. Obviously,
though, Cruz’s thoughts were in Cruz’s mind. This proof about
Cruz’s state of mind was not proof Cruz thought he was breaking
the law. It is proof to the contrary.
Moreover, whether another doctor would have reached a
different conclusion about Shields’s condition does not affect the
immunity under section 5278.
Shields relies on cases analyzing section 5150 holds and
appears to claim nonsuit was improper because there was
conflicting evidence on the existence of probable cause to detain.
But the issue here is certifications under section 5250, not
probable cause determinations under section 5150. Shields did
not proceed at trial against the hospital or the people who
detained her under section 5150.
We explain this difference between sections 5150 and 5250.
Section 5150 allows many different actors, including police
officers and other non-medical personnel, to place someone on an

26
initial 72-hour hold. Probable cause is written into section 5150.
This statutory safeguard makes sense in this context, because a
broad array of people without medical licenses can initiate the
hold. (See Ford, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 979.)
In contrast, section 5250 does not mention probable cause.
Certifications under this provision must be made by professional
staff at the facility. (§§ 5250 & 5254.) The statutory scheme
thereby displays more deference to credentialed psychological
professionals, although it keeps them on the hook to the extent it
expressly permits liability for those who “knowingly and
willfully” detain in violation of section 5250. (See § 5259.1.)
Shields never mentions section 5259.1, and she points to no
evidence showing any subjective belief by Cruz that he was
detaining her in violation of section 5250.
The crucial evidence that Cruz subjectively believed he was
violating the law is entirely missing. All the evidence contradicts
this subjective belief.
Shields implies Cruz acted badly by imposing a second hold
(based on Shields’s grave disability) that contradicted the earlier
hold (based on the risk she posed to herself). The holds were
placed at different times, and they are not mutually exclusive. In
other words, by certifying Shields was gravely disabled, Cruz was
not saying she was at no point a danger to herself.
In any event, the stated basis for the section 5250
certification does not show Cruz knew he was breaking the law.
This evidence did not negate the immunity of section 5278.
Shields relies on statements about the certification
attributed to Al-Asadi in claiming Cruz acted wrongfully. But Al-
Asadi played no part in this certification and did not speak with

27
Cruz about Shields or the hold. Her comments do not shed light
on Cruz’s state of mind when he acted.
Cruz testified he certified Shields for further treatment
after she changed her mind and would not sign for voluntary
treatment. Section 5250, subdivision (c), requires that the facility
present the option of voluntary treatment before extending the
patient’s involuntary commitment. Thus, contrary to Shields’s
arguments, seeking to transition Shields back to a voluntary
admission was proper and does not suggest retaliation was the
aim.
Shields argues Cruz extended her commitment for his
convenience and for financial reasons. The record does not
support either inference. Nothing countered Cruz’s testimony he
was brought in for a one-time consultation, he was concerned
about Shields’s safety, he did not bill for this matter, and he
received no money and had no incentive for extending Shields’s
care. (See also Lopez, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at pp. 684–685
[inferences much be logical and reasonable, not based on mere
possibility or flowing from speculation or conjecture].)
Cruz’s certification decision was “in accordance with the
law” and was protected by section 5278 immunity. This
immunity applies to all three causes of action because all three
necessarily center on Cruz’s decision to extend Shields’s
commitment at Aurora, and Cruz did not treat Shields. (See
Jacobs, supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 78 [immunity covers the
decision to detain and extends to claims based on facts inherent
in an involuntary detention].)
3
Finally, we turn to Al-Asadi. Recall the medical
malpractice claim against her went to the jury, which returned a

28
defense verdict based on causation. Thus, we address only the
claims for false imprisonment and intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
a
There was no legal basis for Shields’s false imprisonment
claim. Al-Asadi did not restrain, confine, or detain Shields. (See
CACI No. 1400.)
Shields’s opening brief concedes “Al-Asadi did not place
either of the holds[.]” Indeed, when Al-Asadi first got involved,
on November 8, 2016, the first hold was already in place,
permitting Shields’s detention for 72 hours. Noble conceded facts
documented by Aurora employee Davis, if true, made it rational
to detain Shields under section 5150.
Shields’s position appears to be Al-Asadi wrongly
maintained the holds. But she cites no authority for the
proposition that a treating doctor can be liable for false
imprisonment on this basis. Nor would this basis for potential
liability be sensible, for a treating psychiatrist in a short-term
psychiatric hold is and should be focused on patient safety and
psychiatric treatment, not on reevaluating a past hold decision
made by others. (Cf. Brimmer v. Cal. Charter Medical, Inc.
(1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 678, 683–685 [upholding nonsuit of claims
for false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional
distress in three doctors’ favor, including one doctor who
interviewed the plaintiff at the psychiatric hospital that held the
plaintiff, where there was no substantial evidence they
participated in the decision to detain].)
At the trial court, Shields pointed to section 5152—the
early release provision applicable to 5150 holds—and maintained
this provision authorized liability for false imprisonment by Al-

29
Asadi. Shields did not renew this argument in her opening brief
and thereby forfeited it.
Even absent forfeiture, section 5152 is not a requirement
that a psychiatrist release a patient early regardless of concerns
for patient safety. It says, with our emphasis, the person “shall
be released before 72 hours have elapsed only if” the treating
psychiatrist believes, based on personal observation, that the
person no longer requires evaluation or treatment. (§ 5152, subd.
(a), italics added.) Al-Asadi did not make this finding. She
consistently maintained a family meeting was an important and
necessary part of the evaluation of Shields and consistently called
for this meeting to ensure Shields would be safe upon release.
(Noble also acknowledged “a successful family meeting is
required” for discharge, and this meeting could “shed important
light” on the probability of suicide.) Al-Asadi had arranged for
Shields to “sign voluntary” to enable her discharge after the
meeting, if it went well. She was not part of Cruz’s certification
decision imposing a new hold before this meeting. And she
ordered Shields’s discharge upon her first encounter with her
thereafter. Section 5152 is not a basis for liability here.
Shields notes Al-Asadi acknowledged the 72-hour hold
could have been withdrawn at any time. But having the power to
discharge a patient early does not mean it is appropriate to
discharge any given patient before completing an evaluation. Al-
Asadi’s statement is no concession Shields should have been
released before a successful family meeting took place.
b
Shields’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress was deficient. Al-Asadi’s conduct was not extreme and
outrageous as a matter of law. (See Hughes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at

30
pp. 1050–1051 [court properly determined the defendant’s
conduct was not so outrageous as to permit recovery].)
Claims centered on medical diagnosis and treatment
ordinarily will not be considered outrageous unless bad faith is
involved. (Berkley, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 534.) Phrased
differently, mere failure to meet a standard of care is not extreme
and outrageous conduct.
The evidence does not support a reasonable inference of bad
faith by Al-Asadi. Indeed, Noble conceded Al-Asadi and the other
defendants attempted to do right by Shields.
Shields identifies various acts and omissions by Al-Asadi
throughout her briefs, emphasizing the following: Al-Asadi
signed and dated the superseded voluntary admission form more
than a week after Shields’s discharge, when staff made her aware
it needed a signature; Al-Asadi suspected Shields may have had a
transient ischemic attack, yet she failed to investigate adequately
the reported memory and confusion problems and failed to
arrange for a neurological consultation and imaging during
Shields’s stay at Aurora; Al-Asadi recognized the importance of a
family meeting but failed to follow through with it; and Al-Asadi
failed to discharge Shields earlier and to arrange for her
discharge adequately.
These acts, and the others identified in Shields’s brief, may
have given rise to a claim for medical malpractice, but they do
not give rise to a reasonable inference of bad faith and do not
otherwise amount to outrageous conduct. This is particularly
true given Noble’s concession about Al-Asadi’s high-minded
motives. It is all the more so true in light of Shields’s undisputed
psychiatric history and Solomon’s undisputed medical clearance
of Shields to stay at Aurora.

31
Because Al-Asadi’s conduct was not extreme and
outrageous, granting a nonsuit on her claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress was proper. (See Cortez v.
Macias (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 640, 650–653 [nonsuit proper on
mother’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
based on her child’s doctor’s refusal to treat the child at the
hospital after examining, diagnosing, and prescribing medicine
for the child, who later died].)
4
We need not delve into Shields’s arguments about Jacob’s
vicarious liability.
Vicarious liability means liability solely through the acts of
an agent. “The employer’s liability is wholly derived from the
liability of the employee. The employer cannot be held
vicariously liable unless the employee is found responsible.”
(Lathrop v. HealthCare Partners Medical Group (2004) 114
Cal.App.4th 1412, 1423.)
The defense verdict on causation means there is no possible
vicarious liability for Al-Asadi’s negligence. (See Toste v.
CalPortland Construction (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 362, 371–372 [a
judgment on the merits in an employee’s favor bars recovery
against the employer based on vicarious liability].) If Al-Asadi
did not cause Shields’s damages, then Jacob did not cause them
vicariously.
We need not discuss the other claims against Al-Asadi and
Cruz because we have found they properly were nonsuited.
B
We affirm the challenged demurrer rulings, and the trial
court’s refusal to permit Shields leave to amend or to revive the

32
dependent adult abuse claim, because Shields did not adequately
brief these issues on appeal and thereby forfeited them.
Shields had the burden to demonstrate error. For
demurrers sustained without leave to amend, this means
showing the complaint alleges facts sufficient to establish every
element of the cause of action. (Rakestraw v. Cal. Physicians’
Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43.) To show there is a
reasonable possibility of amendment, plaintiffs must specify how
they can amend the complaint to change its legal effect. (Id. at
pp. 43–44.)
More generally, Shields had the burden to supply cogent
argument on her appellate issues, supported by legal analysis
and authority. (See United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies,
LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 146, 153; see also Crawley v.
Alameda County Waste Management Authority (2015) 243
Cal.App.4th 396, 404 [appellant must frame the issues for the
appellate court, show where the superior court erred, and provide
proper record and legal citations; review is limited to the issues
adequately briefed].)
Shields’s opening brief does not identify the elements of a
dependent adult abuse claim. It does not discuss ways Shields
could amend her pleadings successfully. It does not apply the law
to the facts concerning each defendant to show why she had any
viable claim here. Shields’s only argument is the defendants
considered her a “dependent adult” and they “cannot have it both
ways”—which says nothing about any other element and does not
show how the claim was viable against any defendant. Shields
does not establish error.
//
//

33
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgments and award costs to respondents.

WILEY, J.

We concur:

STRATTON, P. J.

RUBIN, J.*

* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second

Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

34

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