CourtListener 10677569•People v. Moreno CA5
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Filed 9/24/25 P. v. Moreno CA5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F087140
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. BF168564A)
v.
JESUS RODRIGUEZ MORENO, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Judith K.
Dulcich, Judge.
Hilda Scheib, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney
General, Ian Whitney and William K. Kim, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
Following a retrial, a jury convicted defendant Jesus Rodriguez Moreno of murder
(Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)); count 1), gross vehicular manslaughter (id., § 191.5, subd.
(a); count 2) with enhancements for fleeing the scene (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (c)) and
three prior Vehicle Code section 23152 convictions (Pen. Code, § 191.5, subd. (d)), and
hit and run resulting in death or permanent serious injury (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd.
(b)(2); count 3), based on an incident during which defendant hit and killed David Rico, a
pedestrian, while defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol.
On appeal, defendant asserts insufficient evidence supports his conviction for
second degree implied malice murder.
We affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2019, a jury convicted defendant of murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count
1), gross vehicular manslaughter (id., § 191.5, subd. (a); count 2) with enhancements for
fleeing the scene (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (c)) and three prior Vehicle Code section
23152 convictions (Pen. Code, § 191.5, subd. (d)), hit and run resulting in death or
permanent serious injury to David Rico (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (b)(2); count 3), and
misdemeanor driving with a suspended or revoked license (Veh. Code, § 14601.2, subd.
(a); count 4). Defendant previously appealed and his convictions on counts 1, 2, and 3
were reversed and his sentence was vacated based on the appellate court’s conclusion
defendant’s statements to law enforcement were admitted in violation of Miranda v.
Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 and the error was prejudicial. The prosecution elected to
retry defendant on remand. Retrial began in July 2023. Thereafter, the jury again
convicted defendant of counts 1, 2, and 3 and found true the enhancement allegations.
Evidence Presented During Retrial
On June 3, 2017, between 9:30 and 9:45 p.m., the California Highway Patrol
responded to an accident at a highway intersection south of Lamont. When Officer
Ahearn Lucas arrived, he saw a fluid trail, a vehicle bumper on the eastside of the road,
and the deceased victim, David Rico, further on the right shoulder in a dirt area. South of
the victim’s body was a damaged utility pole. The “debris field” contained different parts
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of a vehicle. About one to two miles away, a vehicle, a Pontiac Aztek, was parked on the
right shoulder of the roadway. Its rear license plate matched the license plate found on
the bumper at the accident scene. The side-view mirror was missing and the front
windshield and hood were damaged. The vehicle was leaking fluid and the fluid trail
behind the vehicle led back to the scene of the accident and the victim, David Rico.
Officer Cecil McKinty followed the fluid trail from the scene of the accident to the Aztek
and noted that at points he lost a visual of the fluid trail. He testified that at certain points
the fluid trail “goes into oncoming traffic and then back” and then it crosses the double
yellow line.
When Officer McKinty approached the Aztek, the driver’s side window was open,
and he observed defendant in the driver’s seat; he testified defendant appeared to be
passed out with his head against the B pillar. McKinty shook defendant’s shoulder a little
to wake him. Defendant woke up and officers pulled him out of the car, guided him to
the ground, and placed handcuffs on him. Defendant had a bloody nose and blood on his
shirt. Defendant’s eyes were red and watery, his speech was slurred, and he smelled like
alcohol. He appeared to be walking unsteadily.
Based on these observations, the officers initiated a driving-under-the-influence
(DUI) investigation. Officers Lucas and Daniel Dinsing administered field sobriety tests
to help determine if defendant was under the influence of drugs or alcohol. The
prosecution introduced a video of defendant performing the tests during his contact with
law enforcement that night. Officer Lucas demonstrated each test to defendant and then
defendant attempted to perform them. The tests included the horizontal gaze nystagmus
test, the walk-and-turn test, and the one-leg stand test. When conducting the horizontal
gaze nystagmus test, during which defendant was to track the officer’s finger while the
officer moved it in front of defendant’s face, Lucas “observed a lack of smooth pursuit,”
and he had to tell defendant several times not to move his head. Defendant performed
poorly on the walk-and-turn test; he walked off the line and appeared shaky and
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unsteady. And during the one-leg stand test, defendant put his foot down multiple times
though he was instructed to hold it off the ground.
Officer Lucas conducted a preliminary alcohol screening (PAS) test on defendant
using a handheld machine that defendant blew into to obtain a reading of his blood-
alcohol content. The first breath sample was taken at 11:21 p.m. and reflected a blood-
alcohol content of 0.24. The second sample was taken at 11:25 p.m. and reflected a
blood-alcohol content of 0.25. Given the totality of the circumstances, including what
Lucas observed at the crash scene, in contacting defendant, and defendant’s performance
on the field tests, Lucas determined defendant was under the influence. He took
defendant for an evidentiary blood draw, which was done at 1:30 a.m. The blood test
reflected a blood-alcohol concentration level of 0.251 percent.
A technical investigation was conducted on defendant’s vehicle on June 6, 2016.
Open and unopen beer cans were found in defendant’s car, including an open can of
Budweiser and five empty beer cans.1 Reddish stains were detected on the pillar
separating the front window and the passenger side door. A presumptive screening test
1Investigator Matt Iturriria, who was an officer with the California Highway Patrol for 21
years before working at the Kern County District Attorney’s Office, testified regarding his
training and background in DUI investigations and his expertise on drugs and alcohol. The
prosecutor posed Iturriria with the following hypothetical scenario mirroring the facts of the
case: “[I]f a man in his mid 50’s who is five feet five inches tall, 140 pounds, was involved in
two crashes, the second of which happened a short distance and moments after the first, hit a
pedestrian, both crashes were with objects, and the second one in the case a pedestrian who was
off the roadway, that is to say out of the lanes of travel, and that same man in his mid 50’s was
contacted within an hour after these crashes, that man … blew a PAS test of a .24 and a .25
approximately two hours after those crashes, and then two hours after the PAS test had a blood
draw which determined that he had .251 percent of a blood alcohol concentration; if you further
consider for this hypothetical that that man had no drinking after the contact, which was about an
hour after the two crashes, or at least within an hour after the two crashes, do you believe that in
that hour between the crashes … and that first contact, that if that man drank five beers, one of
which was a 25-ounce beer, … with the other facts …, would you expect them to have those
blood alcohol concentration results?” Iturriria responded, “[T]here would be no way that
someone could reach a .25 percent alcohol, which is very high, … consuming essentially six
beers.” He also opined that the person in the hypothetical scenario “would be too impaired to
drive a motor vehicle and their alcohol impairment likely caused the traffic collision.”
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conducted on the stain tested positive for blood. The stain was submitted for DNA
analysis. Defendant was excluded as a potential contributor to the DNA profile obtained
from the pillar. David Rico could not be excluded as a possible contributor to the DNA
extracted from the stain, and the pathologist testified the frequency of such a profile,
meaning that to have someone have that same profile, was one in 6.9 octillion. The
airbag in the car had deployed and defendant could not be excluded as a contributor to
DNA collected from the airbag.
The pathologist who autopsied David Rico’s body testified the cause of death was
determined based on an external examination of the body. He explained there was
evidence of a fracture at the base of Rico’s skull, a lethal injury, including bleeding from
the ears. The skin was scraped off the right side of the victim’s head, a type of blunt
force injury. There was bruising over Rico’s right eyebrow with a laceration within the
bruise, and a laceration on the back of his head.
At trial, the prosecution introduced certified records of three prior convictions
defendant had suffered for driving under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152)
and the attendant Watson2 advisals that were given at the time of defendant’s pleas to
each of these charges. Investigator Iturriria explained, “A Watson advisal is something
that law enforcement officers are … supposed to advise a DUI offender in regards to the
dangers of driving under the influence, and that it is so dangerous that it could kill
someone, and that that person could be charged with murder if they do, in fact, kill
someone as a result of driving under the influence.”
Verdict and Sentence
A jury convicted defendant of second degree murder of David Rico (Pen. Code,
§ 187; count 1), gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (id., § 191.5, subd. (a);
count 2) with enhancements for fleeing the scene (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (c)) and
2People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290 (Watson).
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three prior Vehicle Code section 23152 convictions (Pen. Code, § 191.5, subd. (d)), hit
and run resulting in death or permanent serious injury to David Rico (Veh. Code,
§ 20001, subd. (b)(2); count 3), and misdemeanor driving with a suspended or revoked
license (id., § 14601.2, subd. (a); count 4). The jury also found true circumstances in
aggravation pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 4.421(a)(1) (the offense involved
great violence, great bodily harm, or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty,
viciousness, or callousness), 4.421(a)(3) (the victim was particularly vulnerable),
4.421(b)(1) (defendant engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to
society) as to counts 1 and 3.
The court sentenced defendant on count 2 to 15 years to life enhanced by five
years pursuant to Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (c). It also sentenced
defendant on count 1 to 15 years to life and an upper term of four years on count 3, both
sentences to be stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654, until the successful
completion of the sentence and permanently thereafter. On count 4, defendant was
sentenced to the Kern County jail for a period of 180 days to be served concurrent with
his sentence on count 2.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, defendant challenges his murder conviction (count 1), asserting
insufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding of implied malice. We disagree and
affirm the judgment.
Standard of Review—Sufficiency of the Evidence
On appeal, the relevant inquiry governing a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence is “‘“‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.’”’” (People v. Navarro (2021) 12 Cal.5th 285, 302.) The
reviewing court’s task is to review the entire record in the light most favorable to the
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judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (See People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297,
331; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) “In so doing, a reviewing court
‘presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could
reasonably deduce from the evidence.’” (People v. Powell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 921, 944.)
“The standard of review is the same in cases in which the prosecution relies mainly on
circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11.) “‘We must also
“accept logical inferences that the jury might have drawn from the circumstantial
evidence.”’” (People v. Navarro, supra, at p. 302.)
It is the jury, not the appellate court, that must be convinced of a defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Rodriguez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 11.) If the
circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing
court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding
does not warrant a reversal of the judgment. (Ibid.)
Applicable Law
“Murder” is defined as the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with
malice aforethought. (§ 187, subd. (a).) “For purposes of Section 187, malice may be
express or implied.” (§ 188, subd. (a).) “Malice is express when there is manifested a
deliberate intention to unlawfully take away the life of a fellow creature.” (Id., subd.
(a)(1).) “Malice is implied when no considerable provocation appears, or when the
circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.” (Id., subd.
(a)(2).) “As a general rule, malice is implied when the defendant deliberately performs
an act, knowing that their conduct endangers the life of another, and acts with conscious
disregard for life.” (People v. Collins (2025) 17 Cal.5th 293, 310.) That is, “[m]urder is
committed with implied malice when ‘the killing is proximately caused by “‘an act, the
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natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately
performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who
acts with conscious disregard for life.’”’” (Id. at p. 321.)
In Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d 290, the California Supreme Court held that an
automobile collision resulting in death could result in prosecution for second degree
murder and for vehicular manslaughter. (Id. at pp. 294–295.) The Watson court
explained, a finding of implied malice “depends upon a determination that the defendant
actually appreciated the risk involved, i.e., a subjective standard.” (Id. at pp. 296–297.)
Watson further held the evidence in that case was sufficiently wanton to support a
probable cause finding of implied malice to sustain an indictment charging the defendant
with second degree murder. (Id. at pp. 293–295, 300–301.) This included evidence the
defendant had consumed enough alcohol to support a finding he was legally intoxicated;
he was aware of the hazards of driving while intoxicated; and, while intoxicated,
defendant drove at highly excessive speeds through city streets and nearly collided with
another vehicle after running a red light, and thereafter the defendant resumed his
excessive speed and collided with another vehicle, causing the death of a driver and her
six-year-old daughter. (Ibid.)
Analysis
Defendant contends insufficient evidence supports the jury’s conclusion he
committed second degree implied malice murder. He asserts the facts in Watson, supra,
30 Cal.3d 290 are distinguishable. Specifically, he argues the facts in the current case do
not exhibit endangering conduct or subjective awareness. Rather, he contends, there was
no showing he drove at high rates of speed through city streets prior to the incident or
that he ran a red light. We conclude substantial evidence supports defendant’s murder
conviction and, relatedly, the jury’s finding of implied malice.
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Initially, as discussed, it is settled that “malice may be implied when a person
drives a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol and kills someone.” (People v.
Lagunas (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 996, 1005; see Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 293–
294.) Indeed, “[s]ince Watson, numerous cases have upheld drunk driving murder
convictions.” (People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 358; People v. Lagunas,
supra, at p. 1005 [“Following Watson, published opinions have—without exception—
found sufficient evidence to uphold murder convictions when defendants kill people
while driving under the influence of alcohol”].) “[T]hese cases have relied on some or all
of the following factors in upholding such convictions: (1) blood-alcohol level above the
.08 percent legal limit; (2) a predrinking intent to drive; (3) knowledge of the hazards of
driving while intoxicated; and (4) highly dangerous driving.” (People v. Autry, supra, at
p. 358; see People v. Lagunas, supra, at p. 1005.)
“[A]ll four factors are present here.” (People v. Autry, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p.
358; see People v. Talamantes (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 968, 973.) Defendant’s breath
samples during the preliminary alcohol screening test following the accident reflected a
blood-alcohol content of 0.24 percent at 11:21 p.m. and a blood-alcohol content of 0.25
percent at 11:25 p.m. His evidentiary blood test reflected a blood-alcohol concentration
level of 0.251 percent at 1:30 a.m. The jury could reasonably infer from such evidence,
coupled with testimony that defendant was visibly intoxicated, that defendant was driving
with a blood-alcohol level of over three times the legal limit of 0.08 percent. There was
also evidence from which the jury could conclude defendant had taken alcohol in the car
with him and had been drinking in the car, given the empty and open beer cans in his car.
Thus, the jury could reasonably infer defendant had “‘a predrinking intent to drive’” after
consuming alcohol. (See People v. Lagunas, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1005–1006;
see People v. Autry, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 358.) Furthermore, defendant had
multiple prior convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol in which “he was
explicitly warned that he could be convicted of murder if he continued to do so”;
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therefore, there was evidence he “had knowledge of the hazards of driving while
intoxicated.” (People v. Lagunas, supra, at p. 1006; see People v. Autry, supra, at p. 359
[“The jury could reasonably infer that [defendant’s four prior convictions of drunk
driving] alone … impressed upon appellant the dangers of drunk driving”].) Finally,
there was substantial evidence from which the jury could conclude defendant engaged in
highly dangerous driving. Specifically, the jury could reasonably have concluded
defendant hit a utility pole, severely damaging his car; then he continued to drive onto the
shoulder and dirt where he hit the victim; at some point defendant’s airbag deployed; and
then defendant continued to drive for another one to two miles, crossing lanes into
oncoming traffic, before eventually stopping on the side of the road.
Defendant’s attempts to distinguish Watson, by arguing there was no evidence
here that he was speeding or ran a red light, are unpersuasive. As discussed, even if the
specific facts differ from those in Watson, the evidence presented in this case supports the
jury’s finding of implied malice. Defendant also contends his prior incidents of drunk
driving for which he suffered convictions do not support a finding of actual knowledge or
appreciation of the hazards associated with drunk driving because those incidents did not
result in vehicle damage or injury. Again, we disagree. Rather, evidence of defendant’s
prior convictions supports a finding that defendant appreciated the dangers of driving
while intoxicated. (See People v. Ortiz (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 104, 112 [“courts have
recognized repeatedly that a motor vehicle driver’s previous encounters with the
consequences of recklessness on the highway—whether provoked by the use of alcohol,
of another intoxicant, by rage, or some other motivator—sensitizes him to the
dangerousness of such life-threatening conduct”].) Furthermore, here there was evidence
defendant was given a Watson advisal during all three of the prior conviction
proceedings, specifically advising him that “being under the influence of alcohol or drugs
or both impairs your ability to safely operate a motor vehicle; therefore, it is extremely
dangerous to human life to drive under the influence of alcohol or drugs or both. If you
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continue to drive while under the influence of alcohol or drugs or both and as a result of
that driving, someone is killed, you can be charged with murder.” (Veh. Code, § 23593.)
Thus, there was evidence he was expressly put on notice on three different prior
occasions that driving under the influence of alcohol is extremely dangerous and could
result in someone being killed. In addition, the evidence introduced at trial supported a
conclusion defendant first hit a utility pole, losing his bumper and side mirror, before
continuing to drive under the influence and hitting and killing the victim on the shoulder
of the road. Thus, the initial collision with the utility pole also put him on notice of the
dangers of driving while intoxicated and the potential for significant additional harm, yet
he continued to drive.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude
sufficient evidence supports the jury’s conclusion defendant acted deliberately with
conscious disregard for human life (implied malice). (See Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at
pp. 300–301 [“‘One who willfully consumes alcoholic beverages to the point of
intoxication, knowing that he thereafter must operate a motor vehicle, thereby combining
sharply impaired physical and mental faculties with a vehicle capable of great force and
speed, reasonably may be held to exhibit conscious disregard of the safety of others’”].)
Notably, defendant also contends the finding in his prior appeal in this matter that
he did not understand his right to request attorney assistance affected his retrial. He
argues, “while [he] may have signed the Watson advisal acknowledgements, the absence
of an attorney to assist him, resulting in large measure from insufficient Miranda
advisements, as well as his inability to understand technical English, and a likely
misunderstanding as to the purpose of his signatures, failed to establish his understanding
of the warnings contained in the Watson advisals.” As the People note, contrary to
defendant’s argument, nothing in the record suggests defendant did not understand the
Watson advisals. And the probative value, or weight, to be given such evidence was an
issue for the jury to decide. (People v. Turner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 786, 806.) It is well-
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settled that “‘[a] reviewing court neither reweighs [the] evidence nor reevaluates a
witness’s credibility.’” (People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 378.)
For all these reasons, we reject defendant’s contentions.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
PEÑA, J.
WE CONCUR:
FRANSON, Acting P. J.
SNAUFFER, J.
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