People v. Collins CA2/3

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Filed 9/24/25 P. v. Collins CA2/3
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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B338049

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA492874)
v.

JUNAR COLLINS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Charlaine Olmedo, Judge. Reversed and
remanded.
Jeffrey Manning-Cartwright, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Michael J. Wise,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
A jury convicted Junar Collins of willful, premeditated, and
deliberate murder and of gang conspiracy. On appeal, he raises
two claims of instructional error: first, the court failed to instruct
the jury that voluntary intoxication can negate premeditation
and, second, the court omitted an element of the substantive
crime of gang conspiracy. Collins further contends there was
insufficient evidence to support his conviction of a gang
conspiracy, and the trial court erred in imposing an upper term
on a firearm enhancement. We agree that his conviction for gang
conspiracy must be reversed and that the trial court erred in
imposing the upper term on the firearm enhancement. We
therefore reverse the judgment as to count 2 for gang conspiracy
and remand for further proceedings and resentencing.
BACKGROUND
I. Evidence at Collins’s trial
Collins was tried for the murder of Miguel Marquez. The
People’s theory of the case was that Collins, an 18th Street gang
member, shot Marquez to prevent him from testifying against a
member of Collins’s gang.
A. The murder of Miguel Marquez
In 2020, R.G. owned a restaurant at 76th and Hoover.
Wilbur Cruz, an 18th Street gang member, demanded that R.G.
pay a quota or fee “for his big homies.” On February 12, 2020,
R.G. was at the restaurant with Marquez, who worked and lived
at the restaurant. Cruz came to the restaurant and demanded
money. Cruz shot R.G.’s dog and said R.G. would be next if he
did not cooperate. Cruz then ran off with a Black man. R.G. and
Marquez gave statements to the police about the incident. Cruz
was arrested.

2
A month later, R.G. ran into Cruz in county jail. Cruz told
R.G. he would look after R.G. if R.G. did not press charges; but if
R.G. did press charges, it would be the “opposite.” R.G. was
released from jail in March 2020. When he returned to his
restaurant, there was graffiti on the wall saying he was a rat.
Carlos Osorio, another 18th Street gang member, came to the
restaurant and warned R.G. and Marquez not to go to court.
A trial readiness conference was scheduled in Cruz’s case
for November 5, 2020.
But on the evening of October 5, 2020, which was about one
month before that conference was scheduled to occur, Collins shot
and killed Marquez across the street from R.G.’s restaurant. Law
enforcement was able to trace Collins’s steps the day of the
murder by searching for GPS devices worn by parolees that
might have been in the area when Marquez was killed. This data
led to Collins’s accomplice Henry Calleros. Using Calleros’s GPS
information, law enforcement traced his movements before,
during, and after Marquez’s murder and obtained video
surveillance from locations he visited that day.
The information showed that on the morning of October 5,
2020, 18th Street gang member Travon Watson picked up Collins
at about 11:00 a.m. in Victorville, where they lived. They drove
to Los Angeles and picked up 18th Street gang members Calleros,
Santiago Valle, and another man. The vehicle then went to an
18th Street gang stronghold at 54th and Vermont.
About 15 minutes before Marquez was shot, a video was
posted to Calleros’s social media account showing Calleros,
Collins, and Valle in a sports utility vehicle. Collins was in the
front passenger seat, and he held a gun. Someone in the car said,
“Dieciocho,” which is 18 in Spanish. At some point, someone said,

3
“ ‘Let’s roll out,’ ” and a couple of minutes later, Collins got out of
the car.
Video surveillance from a market captured what happened
next: Collins exited the vehicle, approached Marquez, and shot
him multiple times, killing him.1
M.S. and B.R. witnessed the murder. M.S. said a black
Tahoe pulled alongside him and Marquez as they were walking.
A Black man exited the vehicle with a gun and asked Marquez
where he was from. Marquez continued walking, but the man
shot Marquez. M.S. said that five people were in the Tahoe.
B.R., Marquez’s cousin, also said that a black Chevy Tahoe drove
up. A Black man “banged on” Marquez, asking where Marquez
was from or what was his gang affiliation.
After the shooting, Collins and the others drove to
Chinatown, where Collins, Calleros, Valle, and their unidentified
accomplice got out the car with a tank of “Nos,” nitrous oxide.
Collins put on a different shirt, a black tank top. Half an hour
later, a car arrived, and the men got in and left.
Nitrous oxide, which is also known as laughing gas, gives a
short, euphoric high lasting minutes.
Law enforcement found videos or photos of Calleros and
Watson, of Calleros and Osorio, and a “recording of a cell phone
playing the surveillance video from the murder” on Calleros’s
phone.
B. Collins’s statement
After Collins was arrested, detectives interviewed him.
After initially denying involvement in the crime, Collins admitted
he shot Marquez but denied it was his idea to kill Marquez.

1
The shooter’s face cannot be seen in the video.

4
Collins also denied planning to kill Marquez, and instead thought
he and the others were just going to chill that day. But Collins
also said, “I did what I did,” and when he jumped out of the car, it
happened fast. Collins said he was doing Nos “the whole day.”
The Nos made him feel “weird,” and in the moment it was fun,
but “I don’t know I’m way down here. I keep fallin’,” and the Nos
“really had me.” The “Nos had me fucked up.” Everyone was
high and “actin’ funny.” While in the SUV, someone passed up
the gun. The others congratulated Collins after the shooting, but
he did not think it was “cool.”
C. Gang evidence
The parties stipulated that 18th Street is a criminal street
gang within the meaning of Penal Code2 sections 186.22,
subdivision (a), 186.2, subdivision (b)(1), and 182.5. Officer
Henry Canjura testified that he was assigned to monitor the 18th
Street gang. He encountered Cruz numerous times, and had seen
him with Osorio. Cruz’s moniker is Hell Boy. Based on Cruz’s
tattoos, his self-admissions, and Canjura’s contacts with Cruz,
Cruz was an active member of the gang and was in charge of
patrolling and ensuring that rival gang members did not come
into 18th Street territory. Osorio had status in the gang and
would be referred to as a big homie.
Officer Yudidt Martinez testified as a gang expert. He had
been investigating the 18th Street gang since 2015, and he had
worked with the FBI to investigate the gang for the past six
years. The 18th Street gang requires businesses in its territory
to pay rent in exchange for “permission” and protection from

2
All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

5
other gangs. If a business refuses to pay rent, there can be
severe repercussions. R.G.’s restaurant is in the gang’s territory
and would have been subject to that rent. Speaking to the police
can also result in severe consequences. Gang members will use
intimidation, threats, and acts of violence to prevent people from
testifying.
The officer described Cruz as a foot soldier and enforcer.
The officer also testified that Watson, Calleros, and Valle are
18th Street gang members. Officer Martinez had arrested
Calleros and Valle numerous times and spoken to them. Osorio,
whose moniker is Youngster or Y.G., is a member of the gang and
a “bigger homie on the street level.” According to the detective
investigating Marquez’s murder, Osorio ordered Marquez’s
murder.
In Officer Martinez’s opinion, Collins is an 18th Street gang
member based on Collins’s commission of a crime with other gang
members and association with them; for example, the officer
reviewed photographs of Collins at a gang party with 18th Street
gang members, including Watson. Collins’s moniker is Hop Outt.
The officer testified that the video taken just before Marquez was
shot shows the men hyping each other up.
II. Jury deliberations, verdict and sentence
Collins, Calleros, Watson, and Valle were charged with
murder and participating in a criminal street gang, and Valle
was also charged with assault with a semiautomatic firearm.
Before trial, Calleros, Watson, and Valle entered into pleas.
Watson and Valle pled no contest to assault with a
semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b)). Calleros pled no contest
to voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) and admitted a gang

6
enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (a)(1)(C)) and an aggravating
factor.
Collins was tried alone, and his jury convicted him of first
degree willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder and found a
personal gun use allegation true (§§ 187, subd. (a), 12022.5, subd.
(a); count 1) and of criminal street gang conspiracy (§ 182.5; count
2). Although Collins’s information had alleged four aggravating
circumstances (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1), (a)(3), (a)(8)
& (b)(1)), the jury was not asked to and did not make findings on
them.
On April 5, 2024, the trial court sentenced Collins to 25
years to life in prison and to a consecutive upper term of 10 years
for the gun enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). It imposed the
same sentence on count 2, but stayed the sentence.3
DISCUSSION
I. Instruction on voluntary intoxication
Collins contends that the trial court gave the wrong
CALCRIM instruction in response to a question the jury asked
about voluntary intoxication and that the error was prejudicial.
As we now explain, reversible error did not occur.
A. Additional background
At a conference regarding jury instructions, the defense did
not ask for a voluntary intoxication instruction. The trial court
therefore did not instruct the jury on that theory but did instruct

3
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court heard and denied
Collins’s new trial motion, which argued that CALCRIM No. 3426
was confusing.

7
on first and second degree murder and willful, premeditated, and
deliberate murder.
During deliberations, jurors asked, “What is ‘careful
consideration’ defined as? Should intoxication be a factor to
consider with regard to his (defendant’s) ability to ‘carefully
weigh considerations?’ ”
The trial court told counsel it proposed to respond with the
following: “Please refer to the instructions that I have provided
to you. Words and phrases not specifically defined in the
instructions are to be applied using their ordinary, everyday
meanings. (C[ALCRIM No.] 200.) Please see C[ALCRIM No.]
3426 for an instruction regarding voluntary intoxication.” The
trial court then told counsel it had prepared CALCRIM No. 3426
and would read it to the jury. It explained that it had not
originally given the instruction to the jury because it had no sua
sponte duty to do so, but, per the instruction’s use notes, had to
give it on request. So, “while neither party necessarily requested
this instruction, the jurors are asking for an instruction on
voluntary intoxication. The court feels it needs to give the jury
guidance with regard to this.” The court asked if its proposal was
acceptable, and counsel agreed.
The trial court then read its response and CALCRIM
No. 3426 to the jury as follows:
You may consider evidence, if any, of the
defendant’s voluntary intoxication only in a limited
way.
You may consider that evidence only in
deciding whether the defendant acted with a specific
intent or mental state required to do the act required.
A person is voluntarily intoxicated if he or she
becomes intoxicated by willingly using any
intoxicating drug, drink, or other substance knowing

8
that it could produce an intoxicating effect, or
willingly assuming the risk of that effect.
In connection with Count One and Count 2, the
People have the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with a
specific intent or mental state required.
If the People have not met this burden, you
must find the defendant not guilty.
You may not consider evidence of voluntary
intoxication for any other purpose.
Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to
implied malice second degree murder.
The trial court did not give CALCRIM No. 625, which is
titled “Voluntary Intoxication: Effects on Homicide Crimes (Pen.
Code, § 29.4).” That instruction provides:
You may consider evidence, if any, of the
defendant’s voluntary intoxication only in a limited
way. You may consider that evidence only in
deciding whether the defendant acted with an intent
to kill[,] [or] [the defendant acted with deliberation
and premeditation[,]] [[or] the defendant was
unconscious when (he/she) acted[,]] [or the defendant
________ <insert other specific intent required in a
homicide charge or other charged offense>.]
A person is voluntarily intoxicated if he or she
becomes intoxicated by willingly using any
intoxicating drug, drink, or other substance knowing
that it could produce an intoxicating effect, or
willingly assuming the risk of that effect.
You may not consider evidence of the
defendant’s voluntary intoxication for any other
purpose.

9
B. Analysis
A jury’s request for clarification of an instruction triggers
section 1138. (People v. Solis (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1002, 1015.)
Section 1138 provides that if a deliberating jury asks to be
informed on any point of law, then “ ‘the information must be
given’ ” to them. “This means the trial ‘court has a primary duty
to help the jury understand the legal principles it is asked to
apply. [Citation.] This does not mean the court must always
elaborate on the standard instructions. Where the original
instructions are themselves full and complete, the court has
discretion under section 1138 to determine what additional
explanations are sufficient to satisfy the jury’s request for
information.’ ” (Solis, at p. 1015; accord, People v. Yarbrough
(2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 303, 316–317.)
Once a trial court undertakes to instruct a jury on a topic of
law, it must do so correctly. (People v. Townsel (2016) 63 Cal.4th
25, 58.) Nevertheless, “[a] trial court has no sua sponte duty to
revise or improve upon an accurate statement of law without a
request from counsel [citation], and failure to request clarification
of an otherwise correct instruction forfeits the claim of error for
purposes of appeal.” (People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 638.)
We review a claim of instructional error de novo. (People v.
Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579.) We assess whether the
instruction accurately states the law, consider whether there is a
reasonable likelihood the instruction caused the jury to misapply
the law in violation of the Constitution, and view the challenged
instruction “ ‘in the context of the instructions as a whole and the
trial record to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood
the jury applied the instruction in an impermissible manner.’ ”
(Ibid.) Further, if there is error, its prejudicial nature depends on

10
whether it was reasonably probable the error affected the verdict
adversely to the defendant, per People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d
818, 836. (See, e.g., People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838,
896–899 [where erroneous voluntary intoxication instruction
concerning aider and abettor liability did not violate due process,
Watson applies].)
Here, we first reject the Attorney General’s argument that
Collins forfeited any issue on appeal regarding the voluntary
intoxication instruction because he did not object to it below. As
we have said, once the trial court undertook to instruct the jury,
it had to do so correctly. (People v. Townsel, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
p. 58.) A claim that an instruction is incorrect in law does not
require an objection to preserve a challenge on appeal. (People v.
Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 976, fn. 7.) In any event, counsel
need not object to an instruction when a defendant’s substantial
rights are at issue. (§ 1259.) We therefore consider the issue on
the merits.
Turning to the merits, evidence of voluntary intoxication is
admissible on whether the defendant “actually formed a required
specific intent, or, when charged with murder, whether the
defendant premeditated, deliberated, or harbored express malice
aforethought.” (§ 29.4; see also People v. Soto (2018) 4 Cal.5th
968, 975.) CALCRIM No. 625, which the trial court did not give,
expressly instructs the jury that it may consider evidence of a
defendant’s voluntary intoxication in deciding whether the
defendant acted with an intent to kill or with deliberation and
premeditation. CALCRIM No. 625’s use note states that the
instruction is “a specific application of CALCRIM No. 3426,
Voluntary Intoxication, to homicide.” Thus, CALCRIM No. 625
should be used in murder cases, whereas CALCRIM No. 3426

11
should be used in nonhomicide offenses requiring a specific
intent.
The trial court here, however, did not use CALCRIM
No. 625 and instead instructed Collins’s jury with CALCRIM
No. 3426, that it could not consider evidence of his voluntary
intoxication “for any other purpose” except whether Collins acted
“with a specific intent or mental state required to do the act
required.” Although the better practice would have been to give
CALCRIM No. 625 or to edit CALCRIM No. 3426 to expressly
state that evidence of voluntary intoxication is relevant to
premeditation, we do not agree that the trial court erred in giving
CALCRIM No. 3426 because there is no reasonable likelihood the
instruction caused the jury to misapply the law. (See generally
People v. Mitchell, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 579.)
People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009 (Castillo) is
instructive on this point. In that case, there was evidence the
defendant was affected by his use of PCP before committing a
murder. The trial court instructed the jury on voluntary
intoxication with CALJIC No. 4.21, which provided, “ ‘In the
crimes of murder and attempted murder . . . , a necessary
element is the existence in the mind of the perpetrator of the
specific intent to kill. [¶] If the evidence shows that the
defendant was intoxicated at the time of the alleged crime, you
should consider that fact in determining whether the defendant
had such specific intent or mental state. . . .’ ” (Castillo, at
p. 1014, fn. 2.) The court then further instructed with CALJIC
No. 4.21.1 that “ ‘where a specific intent or mental state is an
essential element of the crime’ ” “ ‘you should consider the
defendant’s voluntary intoxication in your determination of
whether the defendant possessed the required specific intent or

12
mental state at the time of the commission of the alleged crime.
[¶] Thus in the crimes of murder and attempted murder . . . a
necessary element is the existence in the mind of the defendant of
a certain specific intent or mental state which is included in the
definition of the crimes set forth elsewhere in these
instructions.’ ” (Castillo, at p. 1014, fn. 2.) A jury convicted the
defendant of first degree murder where the sole theory was
premeditation and deliberation. (Id. at p. 1012.)
On appeal, the defendant argued that trial counsel was
ineffective “for failing to request a ‘pinpoint’ jury instruction
specifically relating voluntary intoxication to premeditation and
deliberation.” (Castillo, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1012.) The court
found that no reasonable juror would have understood the
instructions to permit it “to consider intoxication in determining
whether defendant specifically intended to kill but to prohibit it
from considering that same intoxication in determining whether
he premeditated and deliberated. Premeditation and
deliberation are clearly mental states; no reasonable juror would
assume otherwise.” (Id. at p. 1017.)
We agree with Castillo that reasonable jurors would have
understood that premeditation is a mental state. Although
Collins does not directly address Castillo, he argues that the
version of CALCRIM No. 3426 given to his jury was different
because it referred to the “specific intent or mental state required
to do the act required.” (Italics added.) “The act required” was
defined in the murder instruction; that is, murder required proof
of (1) an act that caused a person’s death and (2) malice
aforethought. (CALCRIM No. 520.) Premeditation thus was not
an element of murder; instead, premeditation elevates a second
degree murder to a first degree murder. (People v. Prince (2007)

13
40 Cal.4th 1179, 1266 [murder with malice but without
premeditation is of the second degree].)
Collins thus argues that because premeditation was not
“required to do the act,” the jury would have believed it could not
consider voluntary intoxication. However, as in this case, the
instructions in Castillo also linked specific intent and mental
state to the elements of attempted murder and murder, of which
premeditation is not one. Yet, the Castillo court was
unpersuaded that the jury would have thought that
premeditation was not a mental state to which voluntary
intoxication applied.
In addition, the premeditation instruction given to Collins’s
jury stated that he was guilty of first degree murder if the People
proved “he acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation.”
(CALCRIM No. 521.) The instruction then described the mental
processes relevant to premeditation; for example, carefully
weighing considerations for and against his choice, knowledge of
consequences, and length of deliberation. (CALCRIM No. 521.)
Thus, a reasonable reading of the instructions as a whole is that
premeditation, a mental state, was required to commit the act of
first degree murder.
Therefore, while the jury would have understood that
evidence of voluntary intoxication was relevant to premeditation,
any error in giving CALCRIM No. 3426 instead of CALCRIM
No. 625 was harmless. First, based on the context in which
CALCRIM No. 3426 was given, it is not reasonably probable the
jury would have thought the instruction was inapplicable to
premeditation. The instruction was not given when the trial
court initially instructed the jury before it retired for
deliberations. Instead, the trial court gave the instruction in

14
response to the deliberating jury’s specific request for
clarification of the “careful consideration” language in the
premeditation instruction, CALCRIM No. 521. The jury would
not have reasonably thought that the trial court would answer its
question with an inapplicable instruction. Jurors would have
understood that the trial court gave a new instruction, CALCRIM
No. 3426, because it affirmatively responded to their question,
“Should intoxication be a factor to consider with regard to his
(defendant’s) ability to ‘carefully weigh considerations?” By
instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 3426, the trial court
signaled that the jury could consider voluntary intoxication for
the purpose of determining whether Collins premeditated.
Also, while the evidence showed that Collins was using
nitrous oxide, or Nos, before shooting Marquez, voluntary
intoxication is a defense only where the evidence shows
intoxication affected the defendant’s actual formation of the at-
issue mental state. (See People v. Serrano (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th
902, 918–918.) Thus, a voluntary intoxication instruction was
not warranted when the evidence showed merely that the
defendant was “ ‘probably spaced out,’ ” “ ‘doped up,’ ” and
“ ‘smokin’ pretty tough’ ” when he committed murder. (People v.
Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 677.) Similarly, Collins said the
Nos made him feel “weird,” like he was “way down here” and
“fallin,” and it “fucked” him up. However, he also said, “I did
what I did,” and that everything happened fast.
Moreover, the evidence overwhelmingly showed that
Marquez’s murder was planned and deliberate: 18th Street gang
members had threatened R.G. and Marquez not to testify; Collins
and his accomplices drove to R.G.’s restaurant where Marquez
worked and lived; and when Collins jumped out of the vehicle, he

15
issued a gang challenge to Marquez and then shot him multiple
times but left Marquez’s companion who was standing next to
him untouched. Thus, there was little evidence that Collins’s use
of Nos prevented him from premeditating.
Finally, for the same reasons, we reject Collins’s additional
contention that any error in failing to instruct the jury with
CALCRIM No. 625 prejudiced him as to his conviction for a gang
conspiracy in count 2.
II. Instruction on substantive offense of participation in a
criminal street gang
Collins next contends that the trial court failed to instruct
the jury on an element of the crime of participation in a criminal
street gang, namely, identifying a felony at least two fellow gang
members committed. We disagree with this contention; however,
we agree with his other contention, that there was insufficient
evidence to support his conviction of that crime.
A. Legal principles
Section 182.5, enacted in 2000, “created a new form of
conspiracy distinct from the traditional understanding of the
crime and was intended to ‘ “expand[ ] the law on conspiracy to
include gang-related activities.” ’ ” (People v. Abbate (2020) 58
Cal.App.5th 100, 108.) Section 182.5 thus provides:
“Notwithstanding subdivisions (a) or (b) of Section 182, any
person who actively participates in any criminal street gang, as
defined in subdivision (f) of Section 186.22, with knowledge that
its members engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal
gang activity, as defined in subdivision (e) of Section 186.22, and
who willfully promotes, furthers, assists, or benefits from any
felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang is guilty of

16
conspiracy to commit that felony and may be punished as
specified in subdivision (a) of Section 182.”
A criminal street gang conspiracy differs from a traditional
conspiracy in five ways. (People v. Johnson (2013) 57 Cal.4th
250, 261–262.) First, the defendant cannot be a stranger to
coconspirators; instead, the defendant “must be an active gang
participant with knowledge of other members’ pattern of criminal
gang activity.” (Id. at p. 262.) Second, while a traditional
conspiracy encompasses misdemeanors, a section 182.5
conspiracy requires the commission or attempted commission of a
felony. (Johnson, at p. 262.) Third, “traditional conspiracy
requires both the specific intent to agree, and specific intent to
commit a target crime. [Citation.] A [section] 182.5 conspiracy
does not require any prior agreement among the conspirators to
promote, further, or assist in the commission of a particular
target crime. Even without a prior agreement, an active and
knowing gang participant who acts with the required intent to
promote, further, or assist in the commission of a felony by other
gang members can violate section 182.5. That act of assistance or
promotion replaces the required prior agreement to commit a
crime that is ordinarily at the heart of a traditional conspiracy.”
(Ibid.) Fourth, “traditional conspiracy liability attaches once an
overt act is committed. A [section] 182.5 conspiracy requires the
actual commission of felonious criminal conduct as either an
attempt or a completed crime.” (Ibid.) And fifth, section 182.5
extends to gang members who merely benefit from crimes
committed by other gang members, “even if [the defendant] did
not promote, further, or assist in the commission of that
particular substantive offense. This constitutes a substantial
expansion of a traditional conspiracy application. The ‘one who

17
benefits’ provision recognizes that gang activities both
individually and collectively endanger the public and contribute
to the perpetuation of the gang members’ continued association
for criminal purposes. Due to the organized nature of gangs,
active gang participants may benefit from crimes committed by
other gang members. When such benefits are proven along with
the other elements of the statute, section 182.5 permits those
benefitting gang participants to be convicted of conspiracy to
commit the specific offense from which they benefitted.”
(Johnson, at p. 262.)
There is no pattern instruction for the offense of
participating in a criminal street gang/gang conspiracy under
section 182.5, so the trial court here fashioned the following:
The defendant is charged in Count 2 with
“Participation in criminal street gang” in violation of
[ ] section 182.5.
The parties have stipulated that 18th Street is
a criminal street gang as defined in the law and that
the gang participates in a pattern of criminal activity.
In order to prove the crime of “Participation in
criminal street gang” in violation of [ ] section 182.5,
each of the following elements must be proved:
1. The defendant actively participated in a
criminal street gang;
2. The defendant had knowledge that its
members engage in or have engaged in a pattern of
criminal activity; AND
3. The defendant willfully promotes, furthers,
assists or benefits from any felonious criminal
conduct by at least two members of the criminal
street gang.
Active participation in a criminal street gang
means involvement with a criminal street gang in a
way that is more than passive or in name only. The

18
phrase, “active participant in a criminal street gang”
refers to a person who 1) actively participates in a
criminal street gang with knowledge that its
members engage in or have engaged in a pattern of
criminal gang activity, and 2) willfully promotes,
furthers, assists, or benefits in any felonious criminal
conduct by members of that gang.
To act willfully means to do so knowingly. To
prove that the defendant willfully benefitted from
any felonious conduct, the People must prove that the
defendant knew, expressly or impliedly, that he
benefitted from that felonious conduct.
Proving that the defendant benefitted from any
felonious conduct does not require proof that the
defendant promoted, furthered or assisted in that
felonious conduct.
“Felonious criminal conduct” includes the
commission of murder, in violation of [ ] section 187.
The crime of “Participation in criminal street
gang” does not require evidence of any prior
agreement among the conspirators to promote,
further or assist in the commission of the felonious
criminal conduct in question.
The People have the burden of proving each
allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People
have not met this burden, you must find that the
allegation has not been proved.
The trial court gave the instruction to all counsel to review,
and counsel did not object to it.
We independently review claims of instructional error.
(People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1210.) “Instructional error
regarding the elements of the offense requires reversal of the
judgment unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.”
(People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1201.) More generally,

19
“we look to whether the defendant has shown a reasonable
likelihood that the jury, considering the instruction complained of
in the context of the instructions as a whole and not in isolation,
understood that instruction in a manner that violated his
constitutional rights. [Citations.] We interpret the instructions
so as to support the judgment if they are reasonably susceptible
to such interpretation, and we presume jurors can understand
and correlate all instructions given.” (People v. Vang (2009) 171
Cal.App.4th 1120, 1129.)
“ ‘When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record in
the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it
contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable
trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. [Citation.] We presume in support of the judgment the
existence of every fact the trier of fact reasonably could infer from
the evidence.’ ” (People v. Covarrubias, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 890;
Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318–319.)
B. Analysis
Collins makes two arguments regarding his conviction of
this count: (1) the instruction failed to state he could be guilty of
violating section 182.5 only if there was proof that at least one
other gang member also committed first degree murder, and
(2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of that
offense. We address each in turn.
First, the instruction the trial court gave here informed
jurors that an element of the crime was that at least two gang
members engaged in “felonious criminal conduct.” The
instruction then stated that “felonious criminal conduct”

20
“includes murder” in violation of section 187. To be sure, the
instruction could have been more specific.
In People v. Ware (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 919, 945 (Ware),4
for example, a jury convicted Simpson and two others of gang
conspiracy under section 182.5. As to Simpson, the gang
conspiracy was based on a shooting that occurred on April 4, 2012
where two members of Simpson’s gang shot a rival gang member.
(Ware, at p. 945.) Simpson’s jury was instructed that the
prosecution had to prove Simpson willfully promoted, furthered,
assisted, or benefited from “ ‘any felonious criminal conduct’ ” by
members of that gang. (Id., at p. 949.) “Regarding this element,
the court further instructed the jury that to find Simpson guilty
of gang conspiracy it must find that ‘on April 4, 2012, members of
the criminal street gang committed Deliberate and Premeditated
Attempted Murder in violation of . . . Sections 664/187/189.’ ”
(Ibid.) Accordingly, to “convict Simpson of gang conspiracy, the
jury needed to find that the April 4, 2012 shooting was an
attempted murder committed by a Brim gang member.”5 (Ibid.)
Although the instruction given to Collins’s jury was not as
specific as that given in Ware, Collins’s jury nonetheless would
have understood “murder” to refer to the murder of Marquez on
October 5, 2020, because it was the only murder on which
evidence was presented at Collins’s trial. We therefore do not

4
Reversed on other grounds by People v. Ware (2023) 14
Cal.5th 151.

5
The jury was similarly instructed as to codefendant Ware
that to find him guilty of gang conspiracy, the jury had to find
that on March 25, 2014, members of the criminal street gang
committed deliberate and premeditated attempted murder.
(Ware, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 947.)

21
agree that the instruction omitted an element or that there is a
reasonable likelihood the jury would have interpreted the
instruction in a manner that violated Collins’s constitutional
rights.
That being said, Collins’s second argument that the
evidence was insufficient to support that element of gang
conspiracy has merit. Again, Ware is instructive. In that case,
two of Simpson’s fellow gang members pled guilty to the murder.
(Ware, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at pp. 948–949.) However, the
nature of their convictions was not presented at Simpson’s trial.
The court said, “While it is undisputed that Norman Sanchez and
Lucas were Brim gang members, there is no evidence in the
record regarding to what crime these individuals pleaded guilty,
or whether this crime constituted a felony,” and it was not within
a layperson’s common knowledge to make that determination
from the testimony. (Id. at p. 949.) The court found that without
“any evidence regarding the nature of the crimes committed by
these Brim gang members the jury is left with speculation,”
which is not evidence. (Ibid.) Given this failure of proof on an
element of the crime of gang conspiracy, the court reversed
Simpson’s conviction of that crime. (Id. at p. 950.)
Similarly, the evidence here was insufficient to establish
that Valle, Calleros, and Watson murdered Marquez. Rather,
Valle and Watson pled no contest to assault with a
semiautomatic firearm, and Calleros pled no contest to voluntary
manslaughter. Setting aside that the codefendants did not plead
to first degree premeditated murder, the People did not introduce
any evidence of their pleas and did not make any argument that
the crimes to which they did plead satisfied the felonious criminal
conduct element of section 182.5.

22
Instead, the jurors were instructed to ignore evidence that
others were involved in Marquez’s murder. They were instructed
that the “evidence shows that other persons may have been
involved in the commission of the crimes charged against the
defendant. There may be many reasons why someone who
appears to have been involved might not be a codefendant in this
particular trial. You must not speculate about whether those
other persons have been or will be prosecuted. Your duty is to
decide whether the defendant on trial here committed the crimes
charged.” (CALCRIM No. 373.) And in closing argument, the
prosecutor discussed the elements of active participation and
knowledge the gang engages in a pattern of criminal activity, but
he did not address or specify what felonious criminal conduct
other 18th Street gang members engaged in. Thus, to the extent
the “felonious criminal conduct” 18th Street gang members
engaged in was the murder of Marquez, the instructions told
jurors not to consider Valle’s, Watson’s, and Calleros’s
involvement in it.
We therefore conclude that there was insufficient evidence
that Collins participated in a gang conspiracy and reverse
Collins’s conviction of count 2. Because we reverse that
conviction, we need not direct the trial court to correct the
abstract of judgment to reflect that the sentence imposed on that
count was stayed.
III. The sentence on the firearm enhancement
Collins contends, and the Attorney General concedes, that
the trial court improperly imposed the upper term on the firearm
enhancement based on aggravating circumstances not found true
by a jury or stipulated to by Collins. Accordingly, the matter
must be remanded for resentencing.

23
A. Additional background
The information alleged four aggravating circumstances:
the crime involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of
great bodily harm, or other acts disclosing a high degree of
cruelty, viciousness, or callousness (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.421(a)(1)); the victim was particularly vulnerable (id., rule
4.421(a)(3)); the way in which the crime was executed indicates
planning, sophistication, or professionalism (id., rule 4.421(a)(8));
and the defendant engaged in violent conduct that indicates a
serious danger to society (id., rule 4.421(b)(1)). The record does
not show that the trial court asked Collins whether he wanted to
waive his right to a trial on the aggravating circumstances. The
aggravating circumstances were not presented to the jury, and it
rendered no verdict on them.
Then, at Collins’s sentencing hearing, the trial court stated
it did not “really have discretion with regard to the sentence.
Since the jury came back with first-degree murder, the sentence
is 25 to life, and with a 12022.5 enhancement, that’s 10 years. So
I think the sentence is 10 years, plus 25 to life.” The trial court
noted that the aggravating circumstances had not been pled or
proved to the jury, but “in any event, the court doesn’t have
discretion to impose a low, high, or midterm for either the gun or
count 1, the murder, so the court is not making a ruling on the
aggravating factors at this time, as they have no impact on the
sentence that applies in this case.” The trial court thus imposed
the upper term of 10 years on the firearm enhancement.
B. Analysis
A firearm enhancement under section 12022.5, subdivision
(a), carries a sentence of 3, 4 or 10 years. Where a statute

24
specifies three possible terms, a court shall impose the middle
term unless “circumstances in aggravation of the crime that
justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the
middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances have
been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a
court trial.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1) & (2).)
Section 1170 accords with the Sixth Amendment’s
requirement that virtually any fact that exposes a defendant to a
potentially greater sentence must be submitted to a jury and
found unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v.
Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 747; Cunningham v. California
(2007) 549 U.S. 270, 281.) A defendant therefore has a federal
constitutional right to jury trial on aggravating circumstances
alleged in a charging document, and the right may be waived “by
the consent of both parties expressed in open court by the
defendant and the defendant’s counsel.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 16.)
“When the constitutional right to jury trial is involved, we have
required an express waiver even in cases in which the
circumstances make it apparent that all involved—the trial court,
the prosecutor, defense counsel, and the defendant—assumed
that the defendant had waived or intended to waive the right to a
jury trial.” (People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 47.)
Here, the trial court did not obtain Collins’s express waiver
of jury, and it imposed an upper term on the firearm
enhancement on count 1 believing, erroneously, it had no
discretion to do otherwise. The trial court, however, had no
authority to impose the upper term because the jury had not
found any of the aggravating circumstances true and Collins did
not stipulate to them.

25
Such error is reviewed under the Chapman v. California
(1967) 386 U.S. 18 standard. (People v. Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th
at p. 775.) Under that standard, reversal is required “unless,
after examining the entire cause, including the evidence as to all
relevant circumstances,” “we can conclude that the omission of a
jury trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to every
aggravating fact the trial court used to justify an upper term
sentence.” (Ibid.)
We cannot make such a conclusion here. Collins never
expressly waived his right to a jury trial, and the People never
proved the aggravating circumstances to the jury. Moreover,
nothing in the record establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that
a jury would have found the alleged aggravating circumstances
true. It is unclear, for example, what evidence supports that
Marquez was particularly vulnerable (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.421(a)(3)), and that the crime was committed in a sophisticated
or professional manner (id., rule 4.421(a)(8)).
Remand is therefore required for the trial court to comply
with section 1170. In the absence of Collins’s stipulation to the
aggravating circumstances or circumstance, Collins is entitled to
a jury trial on them. If Collins waives a jury trial, then he is
entitled to a court trial on the aggravating circumstances.
(§ 1170, subd. (b)(1) & (2).) If the People decline to proceed on the
aggravating circumstances, the trial court shall resentence
Collins on count 1, but it may not impose the upper term.

26
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed as to count 2. The matter is
remanded for further proceedings and resentencing as to count 1
in a manner consistent with this opinion.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

ADAMS, J.

HANASONO, J.

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