People v. Beamon CA4/1

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Filed 9/24/25 P. v. Beamon CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D083333

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD2815178)

ANTHONY MONTRELL BEAMON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Evan P. Kirvin, Judge. Affirmed.
Heather E. Shallenberger, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A.
Swenson and Monique Myers, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
A jury found Anthony Montrell Beamon guilty of four counts of first

degree burglary (Pen. Code,1 §§ 459, 460, subd. (a)) and one count of simple
assault (§ 240). Beamon was sentenced to a prison term of nine years four
months.
Beamon makes two contentions on appeal. First, he argues that,
pursuant to section 654, the trial court should have stayed the punishment
for either the burglary in count 1 or for the simple assault that occurred
during that burglary. Second, he contends that, as to the burglary in count 1,
insufficient evidence supports a finding that he entered the victim’s
apartment with the intent to commit theft or a felony.
We conclude that Beamon’s arguments lack merit, and we accordingly
affirm the judgment.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The jury was asked to deliver verdicts on four counts that arose from
four different residential burglaries. The issues in this appeal arise from one
of those residential burglaries, for which Beamon was found guilty in count 1.
We accordingly focus our factual discussion on that residential burglary, but
we also briefly describe the facts of the others.
The residential burglary in count 1 occurred in the early morning hours
of March 16, 2020. At the time, V. was in bed in her apartment. Her doors
were locked, but her living room window had been left open a few inches. In
the middle of the night, V. was awakened by a clicking sound. She sat up in
bed and saw someone, later found to be Beamon, crawling into her bedroom.
V. screamed as loud as she could, and Beamon then jumped on top of her,

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2
with his legs straddling her thighs. V. fought back against Beamon by trying
to punch him and by moving around as much as possible while Beamon tried
to cover her face with his hands. V. continued to scream, and Beamon told
her multiple times to “shut up.” Beamon also grabbed V.’s underpants
multiple times and ripped them. When V. screamed the name of her male
neighbor and cried for help, Beamon stopped the assault and left the
apartment.
After Beamon left, V. noticed that the drawers in her kitchen were
open, which is not how they were when she went to bed. Further, DNA
testing of the strap on the purse that was hanging on V.’s bedroom doorknob
showed “limited support for inclusion” of Beamon as a contributor to some of

the DNA.2
The burglary in count 2 occurred on August 13, 2019. A woman awoke
after 4:00 a.m. to find Beamon in her bedroom, unzipping her backpack. The
woman got out of bed and then grabbed and shook Beamon, after which he
fled.
The burglaries in count 5 and count 6 occurred on February 10, 2020, in
two different residence halls on the University of San Diego campus. In the
middle of the night, Beamon was seen on surveillance video inside one
residence hall, after which he exited with a yellow bag. Later, around 5:00
a.m., someone saw Beamon sitting on a couch inside a different residence hall

2 “Limited support for inclusion” means that in analyzing how much
more likely the DNA results are if a specific person is a contributor than if
that person is not, it is “less than 100 times more likely that a person is a
contributor.” As the expert explained, in the case of the purse strap, it “is
more likely to get these DNA results if [Beamon] is a contributor than if [he’s]
not, but [it] is not very much more likely.”
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with a large sack next to him. Police responded and detained Beamon. They
found a yellow bag full of items stolen from the residence halls.
For the incident on March 16, 2020, Beamon was charged in count 1
with assault with the intent to commit rape or forcible penetration in the
commission of a first degree burglary. (§ 220, subd. (b).) For the other
incidents, Beamon was charged in counts 2, 5 and 6 with first degree

burglary. (§§ 459, 460, subd. (a).)3
In counts 2, 5 and 6, the jury found Beamon guilty of first degree
burglary. However, in count 1, instead of convicting Beamon of assault with
the intent to commit rape or forcible penetration in the commission of a first
degree burglary (§ 220, subd. (b)), the jury found Beamon guilty of two lesser
included offenses. Specifically, the jury convicted Beamon of simple assault
(§ 240) and first degree burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (a)).
The trial court imposed a sentence of nine years four months.
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Section 654 Does Not Apply to the Simple Assault and the Burglary in
Count 1
Beamon first contends that the trial court should have applied section
654 to stay the punishment for either the simple assault or the burglary in
count 1.
Section 654, subdivision (a) provides that “[a]n act or omission that is
punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished
under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be

3 In counts 3 and 4, Beamon was charged with crimes arising out of
another incident, but at the close of the People’s evidence, the trial court
entered a judgment of acquittal as to those counts pursuant to Beamon’s
motion brought under section 1118.1.
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punished under more than one provision.” (§ 654, subd. (a).) The statute
“precludes multiple punishments for a single act or indivisible course of
conduct.” (People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 294.) “It is defendant’s
intent and objective, not the temporal proximity of his offenses, which
determine whether the transaction is indivisible. [Citations.] . . . [I]f all of
the offenses were merely incidental to, or were the means of accomplishing or
facilitating one objective, defendant may be found to have harbored a single
intent and therefore may be punished only once.” (People v. Harrison (1989)
48 Cal.3d 321, 335.) “Although the question of whether defendant harbored a
‘single intent’ within the meaning of section 654 is generally a factual one,
the applicability of the statute to conceded facts is a question of law,” which
we review independently. (Ibid.)
The offense of burglary “requires an entry into a specified structure
with the intent to commit theft or any felony.” (People v. Tafoya (2007)
42 Cal.4th 147, 170 (Tafoya).) “When a defendant is convicted of burglary
and the intended felony underlying the burglary, section 654 prohibits
punishment for both crimes.” (People v. Islas (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 116,
130; see also People v. Centers (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 84, 98, [“ordinarily, if
the defendant commits both burglary and the underlying intended
felony, . . . section 654 will permit punishment for one or the other but not for
both,” citation omitted].)
Beamon contends that he cannot be punished for both the burglary in
count 1 and the simple assault that occurred during that burglary because,
with respect to the burglary in count 1, “the prosecution alleged and the jury
found true that [Beamon] committed the burglary with the intent to commit a
sexual assault.” Therefore, according to Beamon, section 654 precludes
multiple punishment because the assaultive conduct that formed the factual

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basis for the simple assault conviction was the same assaultive conduct that
Beamon intended when he entered the apartment to commit burglary.
The argument fails because it is based on a flawed premise. As we will
explain, both the jury instructions and the prosecutor’s closing argument
establish that the burglary conviction in count 1 was based on a finding that
Beamon entered V.’s apartment with the intent to commit theft, not with the
intent to commit an assault.
The crime charged in count 1 was assault with intent to commit rape or

sexual penetration during first degree burglary. (§ 220, subd. (b).)4 The jury
was instructed regarding certain lesser included offenses to that crime. One
of those was first degree burglary. The relevant jury instruction stated, “A
lesser included offense of Count One, assault with intent to commit rape or
sexual penetration during first degree burglary, is first degree Burglary, in
violation of Penal Code sections 459 and 460. [¶] Please refer to Instruction
#1700 for the definition of Burglary . . . .” In turn, the instruction on
burglary, which was labeled “1700. BURGLARY,” stated “To prove that the
defendant is guilty of the crime of burglary, the People must prove that: [¶]
1. The defendant entered a building; [¶] 2. When he entered a building, he

4 Section 220, subdivision (b) applies when a person “in the commission
of a burglary of the first degree . . . assaults another with intent to commit”
any of the specified sex crimes. (§ 220, subd. (b).) Therefore, Beamon is
mistaken in stating that a violation of this provision “requires proof that
defendant entered with the specific intent to commit a sex offense.” The
plain language of the statute requires only that the sex offense occur during
the burglary, not that the defendant’s entry into the building was with the
intent to commit the sex offense. (Cf. People v. Dyser (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th
1015, 1020 [describing the offense in § 220, subd. (b) as “assault with intent
to commit rape during the commission of first degree burglary,” italics
added]; CALCRIM No. 890 [for a conviction under § 220, subd. (b), requiring
a finding that “[w]hen the defendant acted, (he/she) was committing a first
degree burglary”].)
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intended to commit theft. [¶] AND [¶] 3. The structure that the defendant
entered was a noncommercial establishment. [¶] . . . [¶] A burglary was
committed if the defendant entered with the intent to commit theft.” (Italics
added.)
Therefore, based on the instructions, by finding in count 1 that Beamon
committed the lesser included offense of first degree burglary, the jury
necessarily found that Beamon entered V.’s apartment with the intent to
commit theft. The jury was not asked to decide whether Beamon entered
with the intent to commit an assault. Although the jury also found that
Beamon committed assault while in the apartment, that additional finding
does not negate the fact that the jury was instructed to return a burglary
verdict only if it found that Beamon entered V.’s apartment with the intent to
commit theft.
Consistent with the identification of theft as the target crime in the
jury instruction on burglary, the prosecutor’s closing argument also identified
theft as the target crime. Regarding count 1, the prosecutor argued, “This is
a first degree burglary. He went in with the intent to steal. He went in
unlawfully, and he went into a home. That is a first degree burglary. So he
is guilty of that, and he is guilty of assault to commit rape or assault to
commit sexual penetration during the first degree burglary. That is exactly
what his motivation and his actions show us, and we know through the
circumstantial evidence that is what is there and that is what he did.”
Further, as the prosecutor described, “Although he entered with the intent to
steal because that’s what he does, it changed. It changed when he saw her,
and it probably excited him. It excited him when she started yelling and
screaming right away. He didn’t retreat. He didn’t make efforts to stop. He
went the opposite.”

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Accordingly, based both on the jury instructions and on the theory of
the case that the prosecutor presented to the jury, the burglary conviction in
count 1 was based on entry into V.’s apartment with the intent to commit
theft, not with the intent to commit an assault. Because the burglary and the
assault were committed with different intents and objectives, section 654
does not preclude punishment for both the burglary in count 1 and crime of
simple assault that was committed during that burglary.
B. Substantial Evidence Supports a Finding That Beamon Entered V.’s
Apartment With the Intent to Commit Theft or a Felony
In a supplemental opening brief, Beamon challenges the sufficiency of
the evidence to support an element of the burglary conviction in count 1,
namely, that he entered V.’s apartment with the intent to commit a theft or
any felony. On that basis, he seeks reversal of the burglary conviction in
count 1.
One necessary element for a burglary conviction is a finding that the
defendant entered “with the intent to commit theft or any felony.” (Tafoya,
supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 170, italics added; see also § 459 [the crime of burglary
requires entry “with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony”].)
Here, reflecting the same misconception as in the argument we have
discussed above, Beamon asserts that “in count one, the prosecution alleged
that [Beamon] committed a first degree residential burglary when he entered
[V.’s] apartment with the intent to commit an assault by rape or sexual
penetration . . . .” (Italics added.) As Beamon understands the verdict on the
burglary in count 1, the jury rejected the theory that he entered with the
intent to commit a felony sexual assault, and instead the jury “found he
entered [V.’s] apartment . . . with the intent to commit a misdemeanor simple
assault.” (Italics added.) Beamon concludes, “because the jury found
[Beamon] entered with the intent to commit a misdemeanor assault offense,

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there is insufficient evidence to sustain a burglary conviction in count one”
(italics added), as burglary requires the intent to commit theft or a felony, not
a non-theft misdemeanor.
The argument fails because, as we have explained, the jury
instructions, consistent with the prosecutor’s closing argument, establishes
that, for the burglary conviction in count 1, the jury found that Beamon
entered V.’s apartment with the intent to commit theft. Entry with the intent
to commit theft is a valid basis for a burglary conviction. (Tafoya, supra,
42 Cal.4th at p. 170.) The record does not support Beamon’s assertion that
the jury based its burglary conviction in count 1 on a finding that Beamon
entered the apartment with the intent to commit simple assault.
Further, although Beamon does not expressly develop an argument
that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support a finding that
he entered V.’s apartment with the intent to commit theft, the argument
heading in Beamon’s brief asserts that “there is insufficient evidence that
[Beamon] entered [V.’s] apartment with the intent to commit a theft or felony
offense.” (Capitalization omitted.) We could treat the contention as forfeited,
as it is undeveloped. (Delta Stewardship Council Cases (2020)
48 Cal.App.5th 1014, 1075 [“When an appellant fails to raise a point, or
asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to
authority, we treat the point as forfeited.”].) However, exercising our
discretion to reach the issue, we conclude it is without merit.
“ ‘ “In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not
determine the facts ourselves. Rather, we ‘examine the whole record in the
light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses
substantial evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid
value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty

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beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citations.] We presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from
the evidence. [Citation.] [¶]. . . .‘[I]f the circumstances reasonably justify the
jury’s findings, the judgment may not be reversed simply because the
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary
finding.” ’ ” (People v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997, 1117–1118.)
A defendant’s “intent must usually be inferred from all of the facts and
circumstances disclosed by the evidence, rarely being directly provable.”
(People v. Matson (1974) 13 Cal.3d 35, 41.) Here, the jury was presented with
evidence that could reasonably support a finding that Beamon entered V.’s
apartment with an intent to commit theft. For one thing, the jury heard
evidence about three other burglaries committed by Beamon where the facts
showed that he entered the buildings with the intent to steal something in
the middle of the night. Specifically, during the burglary on August 13, 2019,
Beamon was observed unzipping a backpack, and during the two burglaries
on February 10, 2020, Beamon took items from the residence halls. The jury
could reasonably infer that Beamon had the same intent when he entered
V.’s apartment. In addition, evidence in V.’s apartment suggested that
Beamon attempted to steal something. Specifically, Beamon had opened up
kitchen drawers, as if looking for something to take, and DNA that could
have come from Beamon was found on V.’s purse, suggesting that he may
have been looking inside V.’s purse. These facts, taken together, support a
reasonable inference that Beamon entered V.’s apartment with the intent to
commit theft.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

IRION, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, J.

RUBIN, J.

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