CourtListener 10676353•People v. Mangubat CA2/2
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Filed 9/23/25 P. v. Mangubat CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B340390
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Los Angeles County
v. Super. Ct. No. XSEVA151785)
KYLE MICHAEL MANGUBAT
et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Andrew C. Kim, Judge. Affirmed.
Edward H. Schulman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Kyle Michael Mangubat.
Patrick Morgan Ford for Defendant and Appellant Anthony
Edward Varela.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kristen Inberg, Melanie Dorian, and
Nicholas J. Webster, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
_______________________
After a bar fight, defendants Kyle Michael Mangubat and
Anthony Edward Varela beat Ricky Munoz and left him
unconscious in the street. Munoz was struck and killed by a car.
Defendants now appeal their convictions for second degree
murder. Because we perceive no error, we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On September 17, 2019, Munoz joined a group of friends at
Maggie’s Pub in Santa Fe Springs to celebrate a birthday.1
Separately, defendants were also at the pub with their own group
of friends to celebrate Noah Quintero’s birthday. Around
12:44 a.m. on September 18, Munoz was headed to the restroom
with his friend Bayron Manuel-Martinez when Munoz was
accosted by one of defendants’ friends. Manuel-Martinez told
Munoz “ ‘It’s not worth it,’ ” and they proceeded to the restroom.
While Manuel-Martinez and Munoz waited outside the
restroom for other friends, Quintero pushed Munoz. Quintero
testified Munoz made hand gestures he believed to be gang signs,
and the two had a “verbal altercation.” Manuel-Martinez struck
Quintero in the face with the side of his hand; Quintero fell to
floor, unconscious. Quintero’s friend, Tyler Taft, saw the
altercation and tried to punch Manuel-Martinez, but was unable
to do so. Mangubat also swung at Manuel-Martinez and missed.
Security guards separated the groups and began to escort them
and the other patrons out of the bar. Manuel-Martinez testified
he and Munoz left of their own accord and were trying to avoid a
confrontation with Quintero’s friends.
1 In reciting this summary, “we ‘view the facts in the light
most favorable to the jury verdict.’ ” (People v. Navarro (2021)
12 Cal.5th 285, 302.)
2
Security followed Manuel-Martinez and Munoz outside and
told Manuel-Martinez to “ ‘come here.’ ” Manuel-Martinez was
uncomfortable doing so because Quintero’s friends were standing
behind the guards. When Manuel-Martinez heard Varela say
“ ‘[w]e have straps’ ” (i.e., guns), he lied and also claimed to have
a strap. Varela then said “ ‘catch my fade,’ ” challenging Manuel-
Martinez to a one-on-one fight.
The scene in the parking lot of Maggie’s Pub was chaotic.
Manuel-Martinez feared he was about to be attacked by
Quintero’s friends, so he told Munoz, “ ‘Let’s go Ricky,’ ” and the
two ran westbound on Telegraph Road. Telegraph Road has
three traffic lanes in both directions, divided at times by a center
median, and it can have “a lot of heavy vehicles, transportation
trucks.” Surveillance footage showed some traffic on Telegraph
Road and other cars in the vicinity during the relevant period.
Defendants chased Manuel-Martinez and Munoz in Mangubat’s
car. Mangubat was concerned about Quintero’s condition and
angry he had been hurt; Mangubat wanted to fight Manuel-
Martinez and Munoz. Defendants caught up to Manuel-Martinez
and Munoz in a parking lot a couple of blocks away, on the north
side of Telegraph Road. Manuel-Martinez and Munoz
unsuccessfully tried to hide behind a car in the lot. During the
chase, either Varela or Mangubat told Manuel-Martinez, “ ‘I’m
gonna get you, you fuckin’ [N-word].’ ”2
2 We have redacted the racial slur following the approach
taken in recent cases. (See Bailey v. San Francisco Dist.
Attorney’s Office (2024) 16 Cal.5th 611, 621, fn. 3 (Bailey).)
The record suggests Manuel-Martinez is or was perceived
to be African-American. He testified either Mangubat or Varela
used that slur. Varela denied doing so.
3
Mangubat parked his car, and he and Varela alighted to
pursue Manuel-Martinez and Munoz on foot. Manuel-Martinez
and Munoz ran southbound across Telegraph Road. Mangubat
chased Manuel-Martinez and Varela chased Munoz. Manuel-
Martinez eluded Mangubat, but Munoz fell behind and was set
upon by Varela.
The beating lasted about 15 to 30 seconds. Varela testified
he punched Munoz twice. After Mangubat lost sight of Manuel-
Martinez, he rejoined Varela and also beat Munoz. Mangubat
testified he hit Munoz two or three times. Varela and Mangubat’s
testimony regarding the location of the fight was inconsistent:
Varela said they left Munoz in the westbound lanes of Telegraph
Road, while Mangubat said they left him on the median.
Mangubat said Munoz’s eyes rolled back in his head. Varela said
Munoz appeared to be unconscious.
An off-duty police officer driving eastbound on Telegraph
Road witnessed the fight. He was traveling in the number three
lane (closest to the curb) as the fight occurred mostly in the
number one eastbound lane (closest to the median) but also
somewhat in the number two lane. That is consistent with the
location where Munoz’s body is seen on surveillance footage and
where it was ultimately found by police. The officer saw
defendants punching and kicking Munoz. At first, Munoz was
standing, but then he fell backward, landing on his back on the
road. Munoz did not appear to be moving. The officer saw
defendants continue to hit and kick Munoz after Munoz fell, but
by then, he had passed their location. In his rear view mirror, he
saw defendants flee in a northwestern direction on Telegraph
Road. Other evidence showed they returned to Mangubat’s car in
the parking lot.
4
The officer said the traffic on Telegraph Road at the time
was “light,” but he could see a vehicle’s headlights in his rearview
mirror, following behind him. He saw that vehicle stop where
Munoz had fallen. The vehicle was a Crown Victoria driven by
Oscar Villanueva in the number one lane. Although he saw an
object on the road, he did not realize it was a person. He told
police at the scene he drove over Munoz. Surveillance video
showed Mangubat’s car pulling out of the parking lot when
Villanueva drove over Munoz.
After his car struck Munoz, Villanueva realized the object
was not a tree branch or trash. As he reversed via the
number two lane, he realized it was a person. Villanueva
maneuvered his car to protect Munoz from other vehicles. He also
noticed a suspicious vehicle stopped on the westbound side of
Telegraph Road. Surveillance video indicated Mangubat’s car
drove away after Villanueva struck Munoz. Villanueva’s
passenger called 911. Police responded to the scene around
12:53 a.m.
Around 12:54 a.m., Varela placed a FaceTime call to his
friend Taft, who had been at the pub. Varela told Taft he and
Mangubat “ ‘beat him [(Munoz)] up’ ” and someone else had run
away. Sometime later, that group of friends, including
defendants, gathered at one of their homes. Defendants told their
friends they saw the two men involved in hitting Quintero: the
African-American man got away, but they had beaten up or
“fucked up” the Hispanic man. Varela later admitted that at the
time, he was concerned about Quintero’s well-being and was
proud to have avenged him.
Black marks on Munoz’s neck and face were consistent
with tire tracks from being run over. When found, Munoz’s head
was between the number one and number two lanes and the rest
5
of his body in the number one lane. Villanueva’s car had minor
dents, scratches, and blood on the passenger side and the front
chassis. The pathologist concluded Munoz died from being run
over by a car.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mangubat and Varela were charged in an amended
information with Munoz’s murder. (See Pen. Code, § 187,
subd. (a).3) They were tried by a jury in February 2024. At the
close of the People’s evidence, the trial court dismissed the first
degree murder theory of culpability.
Mangubat and Varela each testified in their own defense.
They admitted to chasing Manuel-Martinez and Munoz and to
beating Munoz to avenge Quintero. The theory of their defense
was they lacked the malicious intent required for second degree
murder. They denied kicking Munoz, denied leaving him in the
eastbound lanes of Telegraph Road, and denied seeing other
traffic (such as the off-duty officer’s car). While they
acknowledged seeing Villanueva’s car approaching, they claimed
to believe it was a slowing police vehicle, and they fled to avoid
arrest. They denied seeing Villanueva’s car strike Munoz.
The jury found Mangubat and Varela guilty of second
degree murder. The trial court denied their motions for new
trials. On August 22, 2024, they were each sentenced to 15 years
to life in state prison.
Mangubat and Varela timely appealed. (See § 1237,
subd. (a); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.308(a).)
3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
6
DISCUSSION
I. Substantial Evidence Supports the Verdicts
Mangubat and Varela both argue4 there was not
substantial evidence to support their second degree murder
convictions. Specifically, they argue the evidence of the objective
and subjective components of implied malice was insufficient. We
do not agree.
A. Standard of Review
When assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, “we review
the whole record to determine whether any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime or special
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . [W]e review the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and
presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact
the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence. . . .
A reversal for insufficient evidence ‘is unwarranted unless it
appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
substantial evidence to support” ’ the jury’s verdict.” (People v.
Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357, citations omitted; see also
People v. Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 278 (Gomez) [court does not
“resolve credibility issues or evidentiary conflicts”].)
B. Implied Malice
As relevant here, to convict a defendant of second degree
murder, the evidence must show he acted with implied malice.
4 Mangubat and Varela join each other’s arguments. (See
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.200(a)(5).) For simplicity, we generally
refer to arguments as made by the defendant who discussed it at
greatest length in his briefing. Nevertheless, our reasoning
applies equally to both defendants.
7
(See People v. Elmore (2014) 59 Cal.4th 121, 133 [“the mens rea
required for murder is malice, express or implied”]; see also
§§ 187, subd. (a), 189, subd. (b).) “Murder is committed with
implied malice when ‘the killing is proximately caused by “ ‘an
act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life,
which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows
that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with
conscious disregard for life.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th
981, 988 (Reyes); see also § 188.)
Implied malice therefore has two components: an objective
component describing the act the defendant must commit, and a
subjective component describing the mental state with which he
must act. (See People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 153, 157
(Knoller).) The objective component requires “ ‘ “the performance
of ‘an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to
life’ ” ’ ” (People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 508 (Cravens))
“not merely . . . in some vague or speculative sense,” but which
“ ‘ “involve[s] a high degree of probability that it will result in
death” ’ ” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 989). The subjective
component requires that “ ‘ “the defendant ‘knows that his
conduct endangers the life of another and . . . acts with a
conscious disregard for life.’ ” ’ ” (Cravens, at p. 508.)
C. There Was Substantial Evidence of Implied
Malice
There was abundant evidence supporting both the objective
and subjective components of implied malice here.
First, there was substantial evidence of the objective
component of implied malice. This was not just a fistfight.
(See Cravens, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 508–509 [a fistfight can
sometimes be murder].) Rather, the jury could reasonably infer
defendants beat Munoz senseless in a six-lane public roadway, at
8
night, while other vehicles drove past—one of which defendants
saw heading directly toward Munoz. Leaving a victim
unconscious in a roadway, at night, directly in the path of an
oncoming car, creates a virtual-inevitability he will be struck and
killed—if not by that particular vehicle, then by another.
(See Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 989 [act “must ‘ “involve[] a
high degree of probability that it will result in death” ’ ”].) That is
more than adequate to demonstrate defendants committed an act
whose natural consequences were dangerous to human life.
(See id. at p. 988.)
Second, there was substantial evidence of the subjective
component of implied malice. “[T]he jury was entitled to infer
[defendants’] subjective awareness that [their] conduct
endangered [Munoz’s] life from the circumstances of the attack
alone, the natural consequences of which were dangerous to
human life.” (Cravens, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 511.) Moreover, the
evidence supports the inference defendants knew they had
beaten Munoz unconscious and helpless in the street where he
could be struck by a vehicle but took no steps to assist him—
instead, they fled to avoid being hit by an oncoming car and
bragged to friends about the beating. (See ibid.) From that
evidence, the jury could reasonably infer defendants knew their
conduct endangered Munoz’s life and they acted with a conscious
disregard for life. (See id. at p. 508.)
Defendants’ arguments to the contrary depend entirely
upon crediting their self-serving accounts they fled because they
believed Villanueva’s vehicle was actually the police, who would
arrest them and render aid to Munoz, and their testimony Munoz
may have been conscious when they fled. But “[t]he jury was not
required to accept [defendants’] version[s] of events,” particularly
when their accounts were inconsistent with each other’s, with the
9
testimony of other witnesses, and with video and physical
evidence from the scene. (See People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th
345, 369; see also Gomez, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 278.)
II. We Reject Defendants’ Challenges Arising from the
Implied Malice Jury Instruction
Among the instructions given to the jury was the version of
the CALCRIM No. 520 pattern instruction then in effect. As
relevant here, it told jurors in order to convict the defendants of
second degree murder, they needed to find defendants acted with
malice aforethought, which could be express or implied. The
instruction explained that “[a] defendant had implied malice if:
[¶] 1. He intentionally committed the act; [¶] 2. The natural and
probable consequences of the act were dangerous to human life;
[¶] 3. At the time he acted, he knew his act was dangerous to
human life; AND [¶] 4. He deliberately acted with conscious
disregard for human life.”
After the verdicts were rendered, CALCRIM No. 520 was
revised to include additional language in element 2, so the
pattern instruction now reads: “2. The natural and probable
consequences of the (act/ [or] failure to act) were dangerous to
human life in that the (act/ [or] failure to act) involved a high
degree of probability that it would result in death.” (Mar. 2024
rev.)
Defendants make several challenges premised upon the
implied malice instruction given to their jury and their counsels’
failure to object. We are not persuaded by their arguments.
A. Standard of Review
“An appellate court reviews the wording of a jury
instruction de novo and assesses whether the instruction
accurately states the law.” (People v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th
561, 579.) “ ‘A party may not complain on appeal that an
10
instruction correct in law and responsive to the evidence was too
general or incomplete unless the party has requested appropriate
clarifying or amplifying language.’ ” (People v. Landry (2016)
2 Cal.5th 52, 99–100 (Landry).)
B. Defendants Forfeited Their Challenge to the
Implied Malice Instruction
Defendants concede they failed to object to the
CALCRIM No. 520 instruction. However, they argue no objection
was required because the instruction was wrong. (See People v.
Hudson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002, 1011–1012 [forfeiture “rule does
not apply when . . . the trial court gives an instruction that is an
incorrect statement of law”].) We do not agree.
A “ ‘ “trial court must instruct on general principles of law
relevant to the issues raised by the evidence” ’ and ‘ “necessary
for the jury’s understanding of the case,” ’ ” even in the absence of
a request. (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 73; see also People
v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 332 [“ ‘The trial court has a
sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on the essential elements of
the charged offense.’ ”].) The trial court did so here: it gave both
CALCRIM No. 520 and CALCRIM No. 580, which defined the
elements of second degree murder and involuntary
manslaughter, and defined the concept of implied malice. We
already explained in part I.B., ante, that implied malice
comprises both an objective and subjective component. It is well
established the objective component can be understood in two
ways: (1) “ ‘an act that involves a high degree of probability that
it will result in death’ ”; and (2) “ ‘ “an act, the natural
consequences of which are dangerous to life.” ’ ” (Knoller, supra,
41 Cal.4th at p. 152.) It is also well settled those two definitions
“articulate[] the same standard.” (Ibid.; see People v. Dellinger
(1989) 49 Cal.3d 1212, 1219 [same].)
11
For that reason, our Supreme Court held long ago a trial
court has no sua sponte duty to instruct the jury that an act’s
“ ‘natural consequences . . . are dangerous to life’ only when there
is ‘a high probability that [the act] will result in death.’ ” (People
v. Nieto Benitez (1992) 4 Cal.4th 91, 111 (Nieto Benitez).) Rather,
because “the two linguistic formulations—‘an act, the natural
consequences of which are dangerous to life’ and ‘an act
[committed] with a high probability that it will result in death’—
are equivalent and are intended to embody the same standard,”
no additional explanation is required. (Ibid.)
According to defendants, our Supreme Court changed those
well-established principles and adopted a new standard for the
objective component of implied malice in Reyes, which was
decided before their trial. (See Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 989.)
But Reyes was a section 1172.6 resentencing case that announced
no new implied malice standard. Nothing in Reyes purports to
undermine or modify any of the governing law regarding the
objective component of implied malice; on the contrary, it
reiterated and reinforced that existing law by citing it with
approval. (See ibid., quoting Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 152;
see also People v. Pierce (Sept. 17, 2025, F086411) __ Cal.App.5th
__ [2025 Cal.App. Lexis 589 at pp. *45–*46].) Reyes therefore does
not support defendants’ argument the instruction given to this
jury misstated the law.
We recognize after defendants’ trial, the CALCRIM No. 520
pattern instruction was revised to further explain a defendant’s
act had to “involve[] a high degree of probability that it would
result in death,” which defendants argue was done in response to
Reyes. (See CALCRIM No. 520 (Mar. 2024 rev.).) But as
defendants acknowledge, “jury instructions . . . are not
themselves the law, and are not authority to establish legal
12
propositions or precedent.” (People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th
34, 48, fn. 7.) Thus, CALCRIM No. 520’s subsequent modification
does not affect our conclusion the instruction given (without
objection) at this trial correctly stated the law.
Varela additionally argues “the phrase ‘dangerous to life’ ”
has a technical legal meaning the court should have explained,
but he cites no authority supporting that proposition. Nor has he
provided any nonlegal definition of the phrase, let alone
explained how that supposedly differs from its “ ‘technical, legal
meaning.’ ” (People v. Lopez (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1306–
1307.)
Thus, Mangubat and Varela were required to object in
order to preserve their challenge to the implied malice instruction
on appeal. (See Landry, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 99–100.) Because
they did not do so, we decline to consider the issue. (See Doers v.
Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 180, 184, fn. 1
(Doers) [“ ‘[we] will ordinarily not consider procedural defects or
erroneous rulings . . . where an objection could have been but was
not presented to the lower court . . . .’ ”], overruled in part by
Quach v. California Commerce Club, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 562,
581–582.)
C. Defendants Forfeited Their Equal Protection
Challenge
Mangubat argues “the former version of CALCRIM 520
permitted the jury to apply a lower standard of culpability for
implied malice murder than is currently required” under the
revised instruction, and that discrepancy violates his
constitutional right to equal protection. Because Mangubat failed
to object to the instruction on that basis, we decline to consider
the issue. (See Doers, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 184, fn. 1.)
13
D. Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective
A defendant has a right to effective assistance of counsel.
(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 684, 686; People
v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 745–746 (Ledesma).) “In order
to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant
bears the burden of demonstrating, first, that counsel’s
performance was deficient because it ‘fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness . . . under prevailing professional
norms.’ ” (Ledesma, at pp. 745–746.) “[U]nless the record reflects
the reason for counsel’s actions or omissions, or precludes the
possibility of a satisfactory explanation, we must reject a claim of
ineffective assistance raised on appeal.” (Id. at p. 746.)
On this record, defendants have not demonstrated their
counsel’s performance was deficient. They argue there was “no
tactical or strategic reason” for counsel not to seek to add
language to the implied malice instruction explaining a
defendant’s act had to “involve[] a high degree of probability that
it would result in death.” (CALCRIM No. 520.) But we can readily
identify possible reasons competent counsel may not have sought
to add that language.
Counsel could have concluded the then-extant instruction
correctly stated the law and required no further explanation. (See
Nieto Benitez, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 111.) Or counsel’s strategy
could have focused on undermining the People’s evidence on the
subjective component of implied malice. Defense counsels’ closing
arguments largely conceded “[l]eaving someone on the middle of
the road . . . is inherently dangerous to human life.” Counsel may
have reasonably determined that concept was so obvious that
arguing otherwise risked confusing the jury or undermining their
theory regarding subjective intent. (See People v. Maury (2003)
30 Cal.4th 342, 394 [a reasonable attorney could “have tactically
14
concluded that the risk . . . outweighed the questionable benefits
such instruction would provide”].) The jury ultimately was not
persuaded by that strategy, but on this record, we cannot say
that tactical decision was professionally unreasonable. (See
People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 333 [“[t]actical errors are
generally not deemed reversible”].)
Because this “record does not preclude the possibility that
defense counsel’s actions were based upon reasonable strategic
decisions,” we reject defendants’ ineffective assistance of counsel
claims. (Ledesma, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 746.)
III. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Admitting the Racial Slur into Evidence
Defendants argue the trial court should have prevented
Manuel-Martinez from testifying that one of them referred to him
with a racial slur. The statement was relevant, and the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in deciding its probative value
was not substantially outweighed by a risk of undue prejudice.
A. Standard of Review and Governing Law
“ ‘We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude
evidence “for abuse of discretion, and [the ruling] will not be
disturbed unless there is a showing that the trial court acted in
an arbitrary, capricious, or absurd manner resulting in a
miscarriage of justice.” ’ ” (People v. Young (2019) 7 Cal.5th 905,
931 (Young).)
Evidence is relevant when it “ ‘ “tends ‘logically, naturally,
and by reasonable inference’ to establish material facts such as
identity, intent, or motive.” ’ ” (Young, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 931;
see also Evid. Code, § 210.) While the Evidence Code makes “all
relevant evidence . . . admissible unless prohibited by statute,”
“the trial court retains the discretion to exclude relevant evidence
if ‘its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
15
probability that its admission will’ either ‘necessitate undue
consumption of time’ or ‘create substantial danger of undue
prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.’ ”
(Young, at pp. 930–931, quoting Evid. Code, § 352; see also Evid.
Code, § 351.)
B. The Trial Court Reasonably Determined the
Slur Was Relevant and Not Unduly Prejudicial
At the outset, we recognize the extreme offensiveness of the
slur that was used. The word “ ‘is pure anathema to African-
Americans’ ” and “ ‘is highly offensive and demeaning, evoking a
history of racial violence, brutality, and subordination.’ ” (Bailey,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 630.) But the racial vitriol exemplified by
the slur was relevant to the defendants’ intent and state of mind
at the time of the crime. (See People v. Quartermain (1997)
16 Cal.4th 600, 628 (Quartermain) [“Expressions of racial animus
by a defendant towards the victim and the victim’s race . . . is
relevant evidence in a murder . . . case.”].) As the defendants
acknowledge, they intended to fight and beat up both Munoz and
Manuel-Martinez to avenge Quintero’s injury.
Moreover, defendants’ use of a repugnant racial slur during
their pursuit of Manuel-Martinez and Munoz reasonably suggests
their rage, desire for revenge, and intent to inflict harm may
have been exacerbated by the fact a man they perceived to be
African-American (Manuel-Martinez) had knocked Quintero
unconscious with one strike of his hand and then successfully
eluded them. It is therefore relevant to show the subjective
component of implied malice: that defendants, stymied in
retaliating against Manuel-Martinez, unloaded their rage upon
Munoz and left him in the street in the path of oncoming traffic
“ ‘ “ ‘know[ing] that [their] conduct endangered [Munoz’s] life . . .
and act[ing] with conscious disregard for life.’ ” ’ ” (Reyes, supra,
16
14 Cal.5th at p. 988.) Whether Varela and Mangubat acted with
implied malice was a critical issue in this case.5
Defendants have not demonstrated the court abused its
discretion by determining the admission of the statement was not
unduly prejudicial. Undue prejudice does not “ ‘include any
evidence the [defendant] finds inconvenient,’ ” (People v. Doolin
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 438) but rather, evidence that
“ ‘ “ ‘uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against the
defendant as an individual and . . . has very little effect on the
issues’ ” ’ ” (id. at p. 439). For that reason, we reject defendants’
argument the evidence should have been excluded because their
sole motive in beating Munoz was to avenge Quintero.6 That the
evidence may have undermined their defense does not mean it
was unduly prejudicial. (See People v. Alexander (2010)
49 Cal.4th 846, 905 [“ ‘ “ ‘prejudicial’ is not synonymous with
‘damaging’ ” ’ ”].)
Defendants also argue the slur “is so vulgar” it would
necessarily offend the jury and “necessarily impact a reasonable
juror’s view of the speaker.” But our Supreme Court has already
held racial slur evidence does not “inevitably bias the jury
against the defendant.” (Quartermain, supra, 16 Cal.4th at
p. 628.) Where, as here, the slur was a minimal portion of the
evidence and was not mentioned by the prosecutor’s closing
argument, we see no reasonable possibility it so “ ‘inflame[d] the
5 We also reject defendants’ suggestion the evidence was
cumulative, which is also logically undercut by defendants’
position the evidence of implied malice was insufficient to
support the verdict.
6 In fact, Munoz himself had not hit Quintero.
17
emotions of the jury’ ” as to unduly prejudice them against
defendants. (See Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 439; see also
Quartermain, at p. 628.) Certainly, it was not “ ‘arbitrary,
capricious, or absurd’ ” for the trial court to conclude as much.
(Young, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 931.)
Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing
Munoz-Martinez’s testimony that one defendant used the slur.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
RICHARDSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
LUI, P. J.
GOORVITCH, J.*
* Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
18
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