People v. Sanchez CA2/5

CourtListener 10675571Calctapp22 sept. 2025

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Filed 9/22/25 P. v. Sanchez CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B337225

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. LA055484)

DAVID PAUL SANCHEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Martin Herscovitz, Judge. Affirmed.
John F. Schuck, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Michael J. Wise, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted defendant and appellant David Sanchez
(defendant) of nine counts of robbery, and the trial court
sentenced him to 78 years to life in prison. Years later, the
Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) recommended, as permitted by Penal
Code section 1172.1, that the trial court recall and reduce
defendant’s sentence for “exceptional” good behavior while in
custody.1 At a hearing to consider CDCR’s recommendation, the
Los Angeles County District Attorney (District Attorney) and
defendant jointly recommended the court impose a 16-year
sentence, which would work out to about time-served. The trial
court agreed to recall defendant’s sentence but imposed a new
sentence that, although significantly reduced (41 years to life),
was still much longer than what the parties proposed. We
consider whether the court abused its discretion in reducing
defendant’s sentence by less than what the parties recommended.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Defendant’s Crimes and Convictions
From February to April 2007, defendant committed a string
of robberies at retail stores. In most but not all of the robberies,
the victims saw a gun on defendant’s person. During one of the
robberies, defendant pointed his gun at a cashier.
The District Attorney charged defendant in an amended
information with nine counts of second degree robbery. The
information alleged defendant personally used a handgun in the
commission of six of the robberies. It also alleged defendant had

1
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Penal Code.

2
four prior convictions (all robberies too) that qualified as serious
or violent felonies under the Three Strikes law. The information
further alleged prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) and prior
serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) enhancements.
A trial jury convicted defendant on all nine counts and
found true five of the six firearm use enhancements. At a bench
trial on defendant’s prior conviction allegations, the court found
true the Three Strikes law allegations, the prior serious felony
conviction enhancements, and the prior prison term
enhancements. Pursuant to defendant’s Romero motion,2 the
court struck three of defendant’s four prior “strike” offenses as to
seven of his counts of conviction (the court did not, however,
strike the Three Strikes law allegations on the other two counts,
counts one and two).
The court sentenced defendant to a total of 78 years to life
in prison. The court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life on
count one, plus 10 years for the personal use of a firearm
allegation. (The court imposed the same term on count two, but
ordered that term to run concurrent to the term on count one.)
On the other counts, the court selected the middle term of three
years as the base term for count three, which it doubled to six
years because of the prior strike, and then added a consecutive
term of 10 years for the personal use of a firearm allegation, for a
total of 16 years. The court imposed one-third of the middle term
doubled, which was 2 years, on six other counts, and added one-
third of the personal use enhancement (3 years, four months) to
three of those counts. The court ordered all the determinate
terms were to be served consecutively and added five years for

2
People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.

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the prior serious felony conviction enhancements while striking
the prior prison term enhancements.

B. CDCR Recommends Recalling Defendant’s Sentence
Pursuant to section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1), CDCR sent a
letter to the trial court in October 2023 recommending the court
resentence defendant in light of his “exceptional conduct” in
prison. The letter attached a cumulative case summary and
evaluation report, which indicated defendant had received only
one rule violation report during his incarceration (a January
2014 report of destruction of property valued less than $400) and
one counseling chrono (an October 2013 report of covering a
window). CDCR’s letter also represented defendant had been
discipline free since January 2014. The letter did not recommend
a specific new reduced sentence that the court should impose.
The trial court appointed counsel for defendant. He then
submitted documentation in support of resentencing, including a
statement regarding his history and his plans for the future, an
offer of employment as a painter upon release, proof of his
participation in programs during his incarceration, a threat
assessment from CDCR, letters from defendant to his victims,
letters of support from family members, a series of laudatory
statements from individuals who supervised or otherwise
interacted with him during his incarceration, and samples of
murals he painted in prison. The trial court also received a copy
of defendant’s central file on a CD.3
The District Attorney filed a response joining in
defendant’s request for resentencing. The District Attorney

3
The CD is not included in the appellate record.

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argued it was in the interests of justice to resentence defendant
given his low number of rule violations during his incarceration,
his education and employment as a painter while in prison, his
participation in self-improvement programs, his low risk of
recidivism, the time he already served in custody, his age (46
years old), and factors related to the determination of whether to
dismiss his enhancements. The District Attorney informed the
court that he had arrived at a stipulated disposition with the
defense whereby defendant would be resentenced to
approximately 16 years in state prison on counts 3 through 9
(including additional time based on one prior conviction), with his
sentences on counts 1 and 2 to be served concurrently, and his
enhancements to be dismissed.

C. Defendant’s Resentencing
The trial court held a hearing at which it indicated it had
read and considered the letter from the Department of
Corrections, defendant’s exhibits in support of resentencing, and
the District Attorney’s submission in support of resentencing.
The court also noted it had reviewed the original sentencing
materials and the Court of Appeal decision summarizing the facts
of the case even though it had presided over the trial and
sentencing.
The District Attorney represented he was requesting a
sentence that amounted to time served for defendant because the
CDCR referral was for exceptional conduct. The court asked the
District Attorney’s deputy if it was in the interests of justice for
someone who had committed nine armed robberies with a gun,
and who had four prior armed robbery convictions, to receive a
sentence of roughly two years per armed robbery, which

5
amounted to an 80% reduction in the originally imposed
sentence. The Deputy District Attorney responded that, based on
CDCR’s recommendation, it was. Defendant for his part argued
he had done an extraordinary job in prison, his crimes were
connected to his former substance abuse addiction, and he
remained sober while in prison. Defendant also stated he
believed CDCR contemplated releasing him immediately because
it prepared a release plan for him.
The court acknowledged there was a strong presumption
for resentencing, but it rejected the idea that there was a strong
presumption for resentencing defendant to time served for such
serious crimes with such a serious record. The court stated it had
given defendant the benefit of the doubt at his original
sentencing, including by partially granting his Romero motion. It
believed the sentence proposed by the District Attorney in this
proceeding, however, was “totally unreasonable” and not in the
interests of justice. While the court recognized defendant’s
conduct in prison was admirable and merited a reduction in
sentence, the court was unwilling to grant him time served, or
effectively 2 years per robbery. The court explained that it
believed doing so would be outside the spirit of the Three Strikes
Law.
The court resentenced defendant to a term of 41 years to
life, down from the earlier 78-years-to-life sentence. The court
reaffirmed its prior ruling on defendant’s Romero motion,
granting it as to three of the four prior convictions for counts
three through nine, but denying it as to counts one and two.
Using count three as the base term, the court selected the low
term of two years, based on defendant’s behavior and the
presumptions in laws that had been enacted since defendant’s

6
original sentencing. The court doubled the two-year term for the
prior “strike” conviction and added one third of the midterm
doubled for counts four through nine, which was 12 years, leading
to a total determinate sentence of 16 years. The court then
sentenced defendant to a consecutive term of 25 years to life
based on counts one and two, with the second 25 year to life
sentence to run concurrent to the first.
Defendant asked the court to reconsider and to give him
only a determinate sentence on counts one and two. The court
stated it had considered doing so, but “the reason I did not was I
think the next time the defendant is eligible for parole that will
keep him on track. He’ll know he has to face a parole board
before he’s released. If he was to receive a determinate sentence,
he would have no great incentive to do that. So I thought about
that and I decided against it.” When defendant and the People
argued for a further reduction, the court stated, “Maybe I didn’t
make it clear. I struck the 667(b) allegations. I struck the 667(a)
allegations. I’m striking [from] count three, the use allegation;
that is more than enough credit for the good behavior up to this
point.”

II. DISCUSSION
The statute in question, section 1172.1, vests ultimate
decision-making authority in the trial court, not in the parties or
CDCR. The appropriate amount of a sentence reduction is
accordingly a quintessential discretionary call, and there is no
basis to say the amount chosen by the trial court here was error.
The record demonstrates the trial court understood applicable
law, thoughtfully considered the issue before it, and significantly

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reduced defendant’s sentence. That, in our view, precludes
reversal under the applicable standard of review.
Section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1) authorizes a trial court,
“at any time upon the recommendation of” CDCR to “recall the
sentence and commitment previously ordered and resentence the
defendant in the same manner as if they had not previously been
sentenced, whether or not the defendant is still in custody, and
provided the new sentence, if any, is no greater than the initial
sentence.” The court is empowered, in the interests of justice, to
“[r]educe a defendant’s term of imprisonment by modifying the
sentence.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(3)(A).) When a request for recall
and resentencing is initiated, the statute provides for “a
presumption favoring recall and resentencing of the
defendant . . . .” (§ 1172.1, subd. (b)(2); People v. McMurray (2022)
76 Cal.App.5th 1035, 1040.) However, once a sentence is
recalled, “the sentence ultimately imposed by the court is left to
its discretion without any further application of the
presumption.” (People v. Braggs (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 809, 820.)
When a court grants a request to recall and resentence
under subdivision (a) of section 1172.1, it “shall apply the
sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any changes in
law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as
to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of
sentencing.” It “shall” also “consider postconviction factors,
including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of
rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that
reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical
condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future
violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have
changed since the original sentencing so that continued

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incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.” (§ 1172.1,
subd. (a)(5).) Our review of a trial court’s section 1172.1
determination is for abuse of discretion. (People v. Gonzalez
(2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 312, 323; see also People v. Superior
Court (Alvarez), 14 Cal.4th 968, 978 [a trial court’s sentencing
decision “will not be reversed merely because reasonable people
might disagree”].)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion here; at most,
the extent to which defendant’s sentence should have been even
further reduced is an issue about which reasonable people could
disagree. Defendant had made significant, positive changes to
his life while incarcerated, and the court was required to consider
those postconviction factors. However, the court was not required
to make its decision solely based upon defendant’s record while in
prison. Rather, it was directed to “apply the sentencing rules of
the Judicial Council” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1)), which also permit
the court to consider a variety of factors in aggravation and
mitigation, including factors relating to the defendant and factors
relating to the crime. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 4.420-4.423.)
Considering the whole picture, the trial court reasonably
rejected the proposal to sentence defendant to, as the court noted,
what would amount to about two years for each of the nine
robberies—some armed. Defendant had been released from
parole following his earlier strike offenses for less than a year
before he committed the string of robberies that led to his present
convictions. His prior felony convictions were also for robberies.
Though defendant’s progress while in prison is laudable, the trial
court’s decision to recognize that progress with a reduction in

9
sentence by nearly half of the non-indeterminate component was
well within the range of reasonable options.4

DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, J.

We concur:

HOFFSTADT, P. J.

MOOR, J.

4
Insofar as defendant contends the trial court failed to
consider certain facts, like his age and current sobriety, the
record does not support the contention. The court stated it
reviewed all of the documents submitted in support of
resentencing, which included references to those facts. Further,
the court’s remarks indicate the court disagreed with the parties’
evaluation of the significance of those facts, not an unawareness
of those facts.

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