Rambunctious Ventures v. J.W. Financial Solutions CA4/3

CourtListener 10675569Calctapp22 sept. 2025

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Filed 9/22/25 Rambunctious Ventures v. J.W. Financial Solutions CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

RAMBUNCTIOUS VENTURES,
LLC et al.,
G064578
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
(Super. Ct. No. 30-2023-
v. 01368439)

J.W. FINANCIAL SOLUTIONS, OPINION
INC. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

Appeal from a prejudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange
County, Erick L. Larsh, Judge. Affirmed.
Reinhardt Savic Foley, Stefan Savic, Law Office of Sheila
Mojtehedi, Sheila Mojtehedi for Defendants and Appellants.
Talg, Ismail Amin, Katherine J. Vescera, Cassidy R. Kitterman
for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
* * *
Respondents Rambunctious Ventures, LLC and Robert
Ainsworth (collectively, Rambunctious) filed a complaint alleging numerous
causes of action against Defendants and Appellants J.W. Financial Solutions,
Inc., J.W. FS LLC, and W. Joseph Mashini (collectively, J.W. Financial),
whose businesses offer consumer debt relief solutions. The bases of the
lawsuit were claims by Freedom Legal Plan, LLC (FLP)1 that J.W. Financial
had damaged FLP by making disparaging statements to third parties
regarding FLP’s legal services, which J.W. Financial had contracted to
recommend to its debt relief clients.
J.W. Financial filed a special motion to strike claims and
allegations of the complaint, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure2 section
425.16 (the “anti-SLAPP” motion). J.W. Financial argued the statements it
made regarding FLP were issues of public interest, particularly regarding
regulation of the debt settlement industry. The trial court denied the anti-
SLAPP motion, concluding the purpose of the speech was in connection with
a private contract dispute and was not a matter of public interest. J.W.
Financial appeals the denial of its motion. We conclude the court correctly
denied the anti-SLAPP motion and affirm the prejudgment order.

1 FLP entered into an asset purchase agreement in 2022 in
which it sold all of its assets, including its interest in the instant suit, to
Rambunctious.

All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
2

Procedure unless otherwise stated

2
FACTS
Before FLP ceased operations in 2022, it offered a member
benefits plan which included prepaid legal services to defend consumers in
suits brought by a creditor or debt collector (the FLP Plan). FLP and J.W.
Financial entered into an oral agreement in which J.W. Financial agreed to
offer the FLP Plan to J.W. Financial’s clients in exchange for FLP paying to
J.W. Financial a portion of its enrollment fee and monthly fee charged to FLP
clients. J.W. Financial used Reliant Payment, LLC and CFTPay (collectively,
the Payment Processors), to process the payments by its clients for FLP’s
legal services.
J.W. Financial alleges it discovered that FLP was not providing
legitimate legal defense services. J.W. Financial subsequently contacted the
Payment Processors to make them aware of the alleged problem with FLP.
The Payment Processors eventually discontinued processing any payments to
FLP. In 2022, J.W. Financial terminated its relationship with FLP.
In 2023, Rambunctious filed a complaint against various parties,
including J.W. Financial, alleging causes of action for breach of written
contract (claim 1), three separate claims of breach of oral contract (claims 2–
4), breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (claim 5),
intentional interference with contract (claim 6), intentional interference with
prospective economic advantage (claim 7), conversion (claim 8), and unfair
competition (claim 9).
In March 2024, J.W. Financial filed an anti-SLAPP motion,
challenging claims 3, 5, 6, 7, and 9. J.W. Financial argued these causes of
action arose from protected activity as defined in section 425.16, and
Rambunctious could not present any admissible evidence to show a
probability of success.

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After hearing oral argument, the trial court denied the motion.
The court laid out the two-part test articulated by our Supreme Court in
FilmOn.com Inc. v. Double Verify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133, 149-151 (FilmOn)
to determine whether the speech was “in connection with a public issue or an
issue of public interest,” pursuant to section 425.1, subdivision (e)(4):
“First, the court must determine ‘what public issue or . . . issue of
public interest the speech in question implicates,’ which is determined by
‘looking to the content of the speech.’ [Citation.] [¶] Second, ‘a statement falls
within subdivision (e)(4) [of section 425.16] if it contributes to—that is,
partici[pates] in or furthers—some public conversation on the issue.
[Citation.]
‘“[T]his analysis must include a consideration of the context or
specific circumstances in which the statement was made, including the
identity of the speaker, the audience, and the purpose of the speech.’
[Citation.] Here, the identity of the speaker is alleged to be [J.W. Financial],
the recipients of the speech were the two [P]ayment [P]rocessors, and the
purpose of the speech was in connection with a private contract dispute . . . .
“[T]he alleged communications to the [P]ayment [P]rocessors did
not contribute to public debate or public conversation and there are no
allegations that any member of the public received the communications, as
they were sent to a limited number of business entities (2), and there was no
expectation that any of the recipients would communicate . . . them to the
plan members.
“Defendants fail to show that the alleged communications fell
within the SLAPP statute and therefore, the burden does not shift to
plaintiffs to show: (1) a legally sufficient claim; and (2) that the claim is
supported by competent, admissible evidence. [Citation.]”

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DISCUSSION
I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THE ANTI-SLAPP MOTION
We conclude the trial court did not err in denying J.W.
Financial’s anti-SLAPP motion because it failed to demonstrate the
statements arose from activity protected by the statute.
A. Legal Standard
The anti-SLAPP statute aims to shield defendants from “lawsuits
brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of
freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances.” (§ 425.16, subd.
(a).) To curb such abuses of the civil justice system, “the statute authorizes a
special motion to strike a claim ‘arising from any act of that person in
furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United
States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public
issue.’ (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7
Cal.5th 871, 884.) “The anti-SLAPP statute does not insulate defendants
from any liability for claims arising from the protected rights of petition or
speech. It only provides a procedure for weeding out, at an early stage,
meritless claims arising from protected activity.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1
Cal.5th 376, 384.) The statute must “be construed broadly.” (§ 425.16, subd.
(a).)
Courts evaluate anti-SLAPP motions through a two-step process.
(Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009.) First, “the
moving defendant bears the burden of establishing that the challenged
allegations or claims ‘aris[e] from’ protected activity in which the defendant
has engaged.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017)
2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061 (Park).) Second, if the defendant satisfies the first step,

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the plaintiff must show “there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail
on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) The plaintiff must establish the claim
has “at least ‘minimal merit.’” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1061.)
At step one, “the critical consideration is whether the cause of
action is based on the defendant’s protected free speech or petitioning
activity.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89.) To carry its burden at
step one, the moving defendant must establish “that the ‘conduct by which
plaintiff claims to have been injured falls within one of the four categories
described in subdivision (e) [of section 425.16].’” (Rand Resources, LLC v. City
of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 620.) The four categories of protected activity
“describe conduct ‘“in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech
under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a
public issue.”’” (Ibid., quoting § 425.16, subd. (e).)
The only category relevant here is section 425.16, subdivision
(e)(4), the so-called catchall provision. Section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4)
protects “any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the
constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in
connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”
The catchall provision “calls for a two-part analysis.” (FilmOn,
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 149.) First, we examine the “content of the speech” to
decide what “‘issue of public interest’ the speech in question implicates.”
(Ibid.) In determining what is an “issue of public interest,” courts have
considered various factors, including “whether the subject of the speech or
activity ‘was a person or entity in the public eye’ or ‘could affect large
numbers of people beyond the direct participants,’ . . . and whether the
activity ‘occur[red] in the context of an ongoing controversy, dispute or
discussion,’ [Citation] or ‘affect[ed] a community in a manner similar to that

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of a governmental entity.’” (Id. at pp. 145–146.) The first part of the analysis
“is satisfied so long as the challenged speech or conduct, considered in light of
its context, may reasonably be understood to implicate a public issue, even if
it also implicates a private dispute.” (Geiser v. Kuhns (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1238,
1253.)
Second, we look at the context of the speech. “[W]e ask what
functional relationship exists between the speech and the public conversation
about some matter of public interest.” (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 149–
150.) Contextual considerations include the “audience, speaker, and purpose”
of the statement. (Id. at p. 152.) “[T]he catchall provision demands ‘some
degree of closeness’ between the challenged statements and the asserted
public interest.” (Id. at p. 150.) “‘[I]t is not enough that the statement refer to
a subject of widespread public interest; the statement must in some manner
itself contribute to the public debate.’” (Ibid., italics added.) “We are not
concerned with the social utility of the speech at issue, or the degree to which
it propelled the conversation in any particular direction; rather, we examine
whether a defendant—through public or private speech or conduct—
participated in, or furthered, the discourse that makes an issue one of public
interest.” (Id. at p. 151.)
“We review the parties’ pleadings, declarations, and other
supporting documents at this stage of the analysis only ‘to determine what
conduct is actually being challenged, not to determine whether the conduct is
actionable.’” (Castleman v. Sagaser (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 481, 491.) “By
requiring that a moving defendant demonstrate that the targeted cause of
action is one arising from protected speech or petitioning (§ 425.16, subd. (b)),
our anti-SLAPP statute utilizes a reasonable, objective test that lends itself

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to adjudication on pretrial motion.” (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause,
Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 65.)
“We review de novo the grant or denial of an anti-SLAPP
motion.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1067.) “‘“Thus, we apply our
independent judgment, both to the issue of whether the cause of action arises
from a protected activity and whether the plaintiff has shown a probability of
prevailing on the claim.””’ (Balla v. Hall (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 652, 671.)
B. Analysis
As noted, the Supreme Court in FilmOn set out a two-part
analysis for determining whether a defendant has met its burden under
section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4). Consequently, J.W. Financial must
demonstrate both that the content of its speech implicates an issue of public
interest, and that this speech contributes to the public conversation about a
matter of public interest. We conclude J.W. Financial has met the first step of
the two-part test but cannot establish the second.
First, J.W. Financial argues the statements it made to the
Payment Processors regarding FLP’s alleged failure to provide legitimate
legal services to J.W. Financial’s debt relief clients implicate an issue of
public interest because the debt settlement industry is highly regulated in
California and is thus a matter of public importance. In support of its
argument, J.W. Financial cites to California’s extensive regulation of the debt
settlement industry, in particular, the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (Civ. Code, § 1788 et seq.) and the California Consumer
Financial Protection Law (Fin. Code § 90005, subd. (k)(8)(b)). Additionally,
J.W. Financial cites a statement by California State Senator Thomas Umberg
regarding the importance of providing oversight of deceptive practices by the
debt settlement industry to protect vulnerable consumers. We conclude the

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subject of the speech was sufficiently related to an issue of public importance,
the heavily regulated debt settlement industry. As our Supreme Court noted,
“virtually always, defendants succeed in drawing a line—however tenuous—
connecting their speech to an abstract issue of public interest.” (FilmOn,
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 150.)
However, we conclude J.W. Financial has failed to establish, at
step two, that its communications contributed to the public debate regarding
the debt relief industry. Here, J.W. Financial made its statements regarding
FLP’s alleged fraud in failing to provide legitimate legal services, not to the
public at large, but only to the Payment Processors, who used it solely for the
purpose of discontinuing processing payments to FLP. There is no evidence
J.W. Financial requested the Payment Processors inform the “thousands of
customers who had signed up for FLP’s services” that it believed FLP was not
a legitimate business. Nor did J.W. Financial notify its customers directly.
Just like in FilmOn, J.W. Financial did not provide these statements to the
“wider public,” but rather “privately” to the Payment Processors who “in turn,
use[d] the information . . . for their business purposes alone.” (FilmOn, supra,
7 Cal.5th at p. 153.) Accordingly, “[t]he information never entered the public
sphere, and the parties never intended it to.” (Ibid.)
Moreover, the statements made by J.W. Financial to the Payment
Processors regarding FLP’s alleged fraud were “too remotely connected to the
public conversation” regarding the debt relief industry to contribute to the
public dialogue. (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 140) Although J.W. Financial
is a service provider in the debt relief industry, its statements to the Payment
Processors were unrelated to the issue of debt relief. Rather, the statements
were made for the purpose of discontinuing automatic payments to a legal

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services provider which J.W. Financial had concluded was failing to provide a
legitimate service to its clients. As the trial court properly found, the purpose
of the speech was in connection with a private contract dispute. Accordingly,
because the statements did not contribute to the discourse and public debate
regarding the issue of debt relief or its regulation, J.W. Financial has failed
to demonstrate entitlement to relief under section 425.1, subdivision (e)(4).
DISPOSITION
The prejudgment order denying the anti-SLAPP motion is
affirmed. Rambunctious Ventures is entitled to its costs on appeal.

DELANEY, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

SCOTT, J.

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