People v. Aguilera CA4/1

CourtListener 10675452Calctapp22 sept. 2025

Texte intégral

Filed 9/22/25 P. v. Aguilera CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D085946

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. BAF1901077)

RUBEN AGUILERA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Matthew Perantoni, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Aaron J. Schechter, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve
Oetting and Paige B. Hazard, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
California’s One Strike law (Pen. Code,1 § 667.61) prescribes an
alternative, more severe penalty scheme when a defendant commits certain
sex offenses under aggravated circumstances. The penalty can be 15 years
to life, 25 years to life, or life without the possibility of parole depending on
the offenses and circumstances pled and proven. Here, defendant Ruben
Aguilera was convicted of four sex offenses against two victims, including two
counts of committing a lewd act upon a child under the age of 14. The trial
court imposed 25-year-to-life terms on those two counts pursuant to section
667.61, subdivision (j)(2) of the One Strike law, which applies when a
defendant commits a qualifying sex offense against multiple victims under
the age of 14.
Aguilera claims these 25-to-life terms are unauthorized and violate due
process because the prosecution failed to give fair notice that it sought this
penalty on the lewd act counts. The Attorney General concedes the operative
pleading was defective, but maintains the issue was forfeited and the error
harmless. As we explain, we agree Aguilera lacked timely, adequate notice
of the challenged penalties, and further conclude that the Attorney General
failed to carry his burden of establishing harmless error. We will remand to
the trial court to strike the 25-to-life terms and resentence Aguilera.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Between 2011 and 2016, Aguilera sexually abused his young daughters.
As to one daughter, the prosecution alternatively charged continuous sexual
abuse of a child under the age of 14 (§ 288.5; count 1) and committing a lewd
act upon a child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (a); count 2). Regarding the
other daughter, he was charged with two counts of rape of a child under the

1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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age of 14 (§ 269, subd. (a)(1); counts 3 & 4) and one count of committing a
lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (a); count 5). On all
five counts, the prosecution made the following One Strike allegation:

“It is further alleged that in the present case and cases
defendant(s) committed a qualifying sex offense against
more than one victim as listed in Penal Code section
667.61, subdivision (e)(4). [15-L, 25-L, LWOP]”

Two aggravating sentencing factors were also alleged. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(a)(1) & (11)).
Aguilera’s first trial resulted in a mistrial when the jury hung on all
offenses charged. Following his second trial, a jury found Aguilera not guilty
of continuous sexual abuse of a child (count 1) but convicted him on the
remaining counts. It found true the One Strike allegation as to counts 2 and
5 only. Specifically, it determined that Aguilera “committed a qualifying sex
offense against more than one victim as listed in Penal Code section 667.61,
subdivision (e)(4).” It did not return findings on the One Strike allegation
for the remaining counts or the aggravating sentencing factors.
In its sentencing brief, the prosecution asked the trial court to sentence
Aguilera to 80 years to life in prison, comprised of two terms of 15 years to
life for the rape offenses (counts 3 and 4) and two terms of 25 years to life
for the lewd act offenses (counts 2 and 5), all to run consecutively. The
prosecution argued that 25-year-to-life terms for the lewd act offenses were
authorized under section 667.61, subdivision (j)(2) because the offenses were
committed against multiple victims under the age of 14.
During the sentencing hearing, defense counsel objected to the court
imposing 25-to-life terms under section 667.61, subdivision (j)(2):

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“The defense would object to that because the enhancement
was pled in the Information only under 667.61, sub (e), sub
(4), and not specifically under 667.61(j)(2). Additionally,
the jury did not make findings specific to a 667.61(j)(2)
finding. The maximum penalty authorized for the jury
verdict, given the forms that were used, and given the
Information, is 15 to life under 667.61, subdivision (b).”

In response, the prosecutor argued that the One Strike allegations in
the operative information included “a triad” with a 25-to-life term—“[15-L,
25-L, LWOP]”—and that the underlying offenses required the jury to find the
victims were under the age of 14. Taken together, he maintained these
factors allowed the court to impose 25 years to life on the lewd act counts.
The court agreed with the prosecution that the One Strike allegations
“were properly pled and gave sufficient notice.” As a result, the judge
believed he was “bound to follow the law and impose a sentence of 25 years to
life on each” lewd act count. Two terms of 15 years to life were added for the
rape counts, for a total indeterminate sentence of 80 years to life.

DISCUSSION

The One Strike law mandates a prison sentence of 15 years to life, 25
years to life, or life without the possibility of parole when a jury has convicted
a defendant of a qualifying sex offense—listed in section 667.61, subdivisions
(c) and (n)—and has also found true one or more aggravating circumstances.
As relevant here, committing a lewd act upon a child under the age of 14
(§ 288, subd. (a)) is an offense that could subject a defendant to a term of
15 years to life or 25 years to life in prison, depending on the circumstance(s)
the jury finds true. (§ 667.61, subds. (a), (b), & (c)(8).)
Subdivision (b) of section 667.61 states that “[e]xcept as provided in
subdivision (a), (j), (l), or (m), a person who is convicted of an offense specified
in subdivision (c) under one of the circumstances specified in subdivision (e)

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shall be” sentenced to “15 years to life” in prison. One of the circumstances
listed in subdivision (e) is the defendant committed a qualifying sex offense
“against more than one victim.” (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(4).) “Thus, a defendant
convicted of lewd acts against two victims must be imprisoned for 15 years to
life. (Id., subds. (b), (c)(8), (e)(4).)” (People v. Nash (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th
483, 491 (Nash).)
But under subdivision (j)(2) of section 667.61—one of the exceptions to
subdivision (b)—“[a] person who is convicted of an offense specified in
subdivision (c) under one of the circumstances specified in subdivision (e),
upon a victim who is a child under 14 years of age, shall” receive “25 years to
life” in prison. “Put together, a defendant convicted of lewd acts against two
victims, each under the age of 14, faces exposure of 25 years to life on each
count under the One Strike law.” (Nash, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 492.)
Notwithstanding potential exposure based on the circumstances of an
offense, “[a] defendant has a due process right to fair notice of any sentencing
allegation that, if proven, will increase the punishment for a crime. In the
sentencing enhancement context, the touchstone of fair notice is whether the
accusatory pleading enables the defense to predict the sentence the defendant
faces if convicted. To enable a defendant to make this prediction, an
accusatory pleading must provide the defendant with fair notice of the factual
basis on which the prosecution is seeking an increased punishment and of
‘the potential sentence.’ [¶] When the prosecution has not alleged a
particular sentencing enhancement in connection with a specific count,
a ‘defendant is ordinarily entitled to assume the prosecution made a
discretionary choice not to pursue the enhancement . . . and to rely on that
choice in making decisions such as whether to plead guilty or proceed to
trial.’ ” (In re Vaquera (2024) 15 Cal.5th 706, 717 (Vaquera), citations

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omitted.) These due process principles apply to One Strike allegations.
(Id. at p. 718.) “[T]o satisfy due process, an accusatory pleading must inform
the defendant that the prosecution is relying on specific facts to support
imposition of a particular One Strike sentence.” (Id. at p. 719.)
In Vaquera, supra, 15 Cal.5th 706, the Supreme Court provided some
examples of how the prosecution can provide proper notice. In the One Strike
allegation, the prosecution can describe the factual circumstances on which it
relies and cite the One Strike law generally (§ 667.61). While reference to the
specific subdivision invoked would be clearer, it is not necessary in that
scenario. Alternatively, the prosecution can specify in the One Strike
allegation the sentence it seeks and describe the factual circumstances on
which it relies to support that sentence. Or, the One Strike allegation can
“make[] clear that the prosecution intends to rely on the facts alleged in
connection with the underlying count” in combination with the specific
sentence sought and/or the subdivision of section 667.61 invoked. (Vaquera,
at pp. 720, 725 & fn. 12.)
Here, we agree with the parties that the One Strike allegations did not
give Aguilera fair notice that the prosecution would pursue 25-year-to-life
terms on the lewd act counts under section 667.61, subdivision (j)(2) based

on the victims’ ages.2 As noted above, that allegation provided as follows:

2 We reject the Attorney General’s assertion that Aguilera forfeited this
claim on appeal. During the sentencing hearing, defense counsel plainly
objected to imposition of 25-to-life terms on the lewd act counts on grounds
that the section 667.61, subdivision (j)(2) circumstance was not pled in the
information and that the jury did not find that circumstance true beyond a
reasonable doubt. It is clear that the prosecutor and the court understood the
objection to embrace the fair notice issue, as the prosecutor highlighted the
“triad” appended to the One Strike allegation and the court specifically found
the circumstance was “properly pled and gave sufficient notice . . . .”
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“It is further alleged that in the present case and cases
defendant(s) committed a qualifying sex offense against
more than one victim as listed in Penal Code section
667.61, subdivision (e)(4). [15-L, 25-L, LWOP]”

This allegation does not describe the factual circumstance that the
victims were under the age of 14, nor does it incorporate the facts alleged in
connection with the underlying lewd act counts. (See, e.g., Vaquera, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 725, fn. 12.) The allegation also fails to reference section
667.61, subdivision (j)(2) or specify the One Strike penalty the prosecution
intended to pursue. Contrary to the prosecution’s argument in the trial court
below, it is not enough that the ages of the victims were alleged in the
underlying counts themselves. Likewise, the appendage of “15-L, 25-L,
LWOP”—the entire range of possible penalties under the One Strike law—
did not afford Aguilera notice of the particular sentence being sought. (See
Vaquera, at pp. 718–719 [rejecting the argument that “the prosecution
provides fair notice so long as it alleges the facts that support the One Strike
sentence somewhere in the charging document and generally apprises the
defendant of the potential for an enhanced penalty”].)
Thus, the critical question in this case is whether Aguilera is entitled
to resentencing. The Supreme Court has recognized that in cases where the
record indicates the prosecution failed to charge a particular One Strike
circumstance because of a discretionary charging decision—as opposed to a
mistake or other excusable neglect—”the doctrines of waiver and estoppel,
rather than harmless error, apply.” (People v. Mancebo (2002) 27 Cal.4th
735, 749.) Aguilera claims the record here shows the prosecution deliberately
chose to forgo the 25-to-life penalty under section 667.61, subdivision (j)(2),
so he is entitled to have his sentence automatically reduced to 15 years to life
on the lewd act counts. The Attorney General, on the other hand, insists that

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harmless error analysis applies, and the pleading error here was harmless
because Aguilera had actual, timely notice that the prosecution was pursuing
the 25-to-life sentence under subdivision (j)(2).
As in Vaquera, we need not decide whether the prosecution waived its
right to pursue the more severe penalty under section 667.61, subdivision
(j)(2). Even assuming a prejudice analysis applies, we conclude Aguilera is
entitled to resentencing because the Attorney General has failed to carry his
burden of establishing the due process violation was harmless. (Vaquera,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 726.) The Attorney General points to three places in
the record that, in his view, affirmatively demonstrate Aguilera understood
he faced the 25-to-life penalty under subdivision (j)(2).
First, before Aguilera’s original trial, the court asked defense counsel
whether Aguilera wanted to try the aggravating sentencing factor allegations
to the jury or the court. Counsel responded:
“I would be requesting that the jury make the
determination. By my estimation, the only way this
would be something that would need to occur is if the jurors
convicted as to Count 1 or 2, because they’re an alternative,
or Count 5. If they convict of all those things, then it’s
irrelevant because it’s an indeterminate 15 to 25 life
sentence. [¶] So it seems extremely unlikely that we are
going to cross this bridge . . . .” (Italics added.)

Second, in the middle of trial, the prosecution objected to the defense
presenting additional character witnesses on grounds that the evidence had
become cumulative. In opposition, defense counsel maintained:

“The People had ample opportunity to present all the
evidence that they wanted. The defense case has taken,
at this point, less than a full day. And I have every
anticipation if we start now, we will be done before 2:30.
So it is less than hour of testimony, and Mr. Aguilera is

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looking at being in prison for the rest of his life.” (Italics
added.)

Finally, on the eve of retrial, the prosecution offered a plea deal in
which Aguilera could plead guilty to the lewd act counts in exchange for six
years in prison. Aguilera rejected the offer. The court addressed him:

“I know your attorney has talked to you, so I’m not going to
belabor it too much, but I just want to make sure that you
understand that if you are convicted of what the district
attorney has charged you with, this Court, me, has no
choice but to sentence you to spend the rest of your life in
state prison. I don’t have any discretion, which means,
even if I were to, you know, think that that was not a fair
sentence, or some other reason, it wouldn’t matter. I would
have no choice but to sentence you to spend the rest of your
life in state prison. I just want to make sure that you
understand that before we proceed and pick a jury.”
(Italics added.)

Aguilera confirmed he understood and wanted to proceed with trial.
The foregoing exchanges fall short of clearly establishing that Aguilera
knew the prosecution was seeking 25-to-life terms on the lewd act counts
under section 667.61, subdivision (j)(2) based on the victims’ ages. In
reviewing defense counsel’s remarks regarding the aggravating sentencing
factors, we understand counsel to be saying those factors—which, if found
true beyond a reasonable doubt, would allow the court to select the upper
term in imposing a determinate sentence (see § 1170, subd. (b)(2))—would
become significant if the jury convicted Aguilera of counts 1, 2, or 5 only.
This is because—absent any One Strike circumstances—continuous sexual
abuse of a child carries a penalty of six, 12, or 16 years in prison (§ 288.5;
count 1) and committing a lewd act with a child under the age of 14 carries a
penalty of three, six, or eight years in prison (§ 288, subd. (a); counts 2 & 5).

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Counsel’s intended meaning in referring to “an indeterminate 15 to 25
life sentence” if the jury were to “convict of all those things” is simply too
ambiguous to demonstrate a clear understanding that the prosecution was
seeking 25-to-life terms on the lewd act counts under section 667.61,
subdivision (j)(2). By “those things,” it seems entirely possible that counsel
meant all of the offenses charged, since Aguilera faced an indeterminate
sentence if convicted of one or both rape offenses (§ 269, subd. (a)(1); counts 3
& 4), which carried 15-year-to-life penalties without any One Strike
circumstances. And, as Aguilera points out, there is no such thing as a “15 to
25 life sentence.”
With respect to the remaining two record references relied on by the
Attorney General—counsel’s comment that Aguilera was “looking at being in
prison for the rest of his life,” and the court’s similar remark that it would
have “no choice but to sentence [him] to spend the rest of [his] life in state
prison” if found guilty as charged—they are even less convincing that
Aguilera had actual, timely notice. As previously mentioned, if convicted of
even one rape offense Aguilera faced a 15-to-life sentence. He also faced a 15-
to-life terms if the jury found true the multiple-victim circumstance under
section 667.61, subdivisions (b) and (e)(4) as to the lewd act counts. In either
case, Aguilera could spend the rest of his life in prison if he were never
granted parole. Observing that he faced life imprisonment therefore said
nothing about whether the prosecution was pursuing 25-to-life terms on the
lewd act counts under section 667.61, subdivision (j)(2).
Accordingly, we are left to assume the defense first became aware that
the prosecution was pursuing the challenged penalties via its sentencing brief
and the probation report. Indeed, this is supported by the fact that defense
counsel objected to the 25-to-life terms on the lewd at counts during

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sentencing on grounds that the section 667.61, subdivision (j)(2) circumstance
was not pled in the operative information. Presumably, had the defense
understood that the prosecution was seeking this heightened penalty all
along, counsel would not have objected on this basis. The Attorney General is
required to establish that Aguilera “was aware of the sentence the
prosecution was seeking at a time when he could have taken his sentencing
exposure into consideration in making key decisions about how to conduct his
defense, ‘including whether to plead guilty, how to allocate investigatory
resources, and what strategy to deploy at trial.’ ” (Vaquera, supra, 15 Cal.5th
at p. 727.) He has not met that burden. It was too late for Aguilera to learn
that the prosecution was seeking the 25-to-life terms for the first time just
before sentencing. (See ibid.)

DISPOSITION

We remand to the trial court with directions to strike the 25-year-to-life
terms imposed on counts 2 and 5 and to resentence Aguilera. Thereafter, the
clerk shall forward a certified copy of the amended abstract of judgment to
the Department of Corrections. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.

DATO, J.
WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

RUBIN, J.

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