CourtListener 10675451•People v. Barajas CA5
Texte intégral
Filed 9/22/25 P. v. Barajas CA5
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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F087575/F087577
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. Nos. 1062616, 1067548)
v.
ANTONIO BARAJAS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Kellee C.
Westbrook, Judge.
David L. Polsky, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Amanda D. Cary, Lewis A. Martinez
and Joseph Penney, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Antonio Barajas was sentenced in 2005 to a term of 40 years to life for
an attempted murder perpetrated when he was 17 years old; in 2007, he was sentenced to
a term of 50 years to life for a first degree murder he committed when he was 18 years
old. In 2023, appellant petitioned for recall and resentencing of both sentences under
Penal Code1 section 1170, subdivision (d) (section 1170(d)), which the trial court denied.
On appeal, we are asked to decide whether the denial of appellant’s petition under
section 1170(d) violates the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment
pursuant to the reasoning of People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608 (Heard).
Section 1170(d)(1)(A) affords an opportunity for recall and resentencing only to those
juveniles who were sentenced to an explicit term of life without parole (LWOP). Heard
held that section 1170(d) violates equal protection principles to the extent it excludes
from relief those juveniles sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP. (Heard,
supra, at p. 612.)
In affirming the trial court’s denial of the petition, we join in the reasoning
articulated in People v. Thompson (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1058 (Thompson). For
reasons we will explain below, we conclude appellant has not demonstrated that
section 1170(d) violates equal protection principles as applied to juvenile offenders
sentenced to 40 years to life, or as applied to young adult offenders sentenced to 50 years
to life.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I. Underlying Convictions
A. April 2003 Attempted Murder
Based on a shooting in April 2003, when appellant was 17 years old, appellant was
convicted in 2005 of attempted murder, assault with a firearm, and discharging a firearm
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
2.
at an occupied motor vehicle. The jury also found that all three offenses were committed
for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)); appellant had personally
discharged a firearm, causing death or great bodily injury as to counts 1 and 3
(§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), and he personally inflicted great bodily injury as to counts 2 and
3 (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 40 years to life
as follows: 15 years to life for count 1 (§§ 187, 186.22, subd. (b)(1), 664), plus 25 years
to life for the firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). The court imposed
concurrent determinate sentences of 16 and 17 years for counts 2 and 3, respectively.
B. September 2003 Murder
Arising from another shooting that occurred in September 2003, appellant was
convicted in 2007 of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a), count 1) committed when he
was 18 years old. The jury found true a firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) and
found the offense was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22,
subd. (b)(1)). The court sentenced appellant to an aggregate term of 50 years to life as
follows: 25 years to life for the murder offense, plus 25 years to life for the firearm
enhancement. The court also ordered this sentence to run consecutive to the sentence in
the first case.
II. Resentencing Petition Under Section 1170(d)
In 2023, appellant filed a petition to recall his sentences in both cases and for
resentencing under section 1170(d)(1) and pursuant to Heard. Section 1170(d)(1)(A)
provides, “When a defendant who was under 18 years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense for which the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for
[LWOP] has been incarcerated for at least 15 years, the defendant may submit to the
sentencing court a petition for recall and resentencing.” In Heard, the court held equal
protection principles are violated where a juvenile offender sentenced to a term
functionally equivalent to LWOP is precluded from relief under section 1170(d)(1)(A).
(Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at pp. 633–634.)
3.
The trial court denied the petition, concluding appellant was ineligible under
section 1170(d)(1) because he had not been sentenced to the functional equivalent of
LWOP in his first case. With respect to the second case, the court concluded appellant
was over 18 years of age when he committed the murder, and observed
section 1170(d)(1)(A) provides no recall and resentencing relief for those who were
18 years or older when they committed the relevant offense. Appellant appeals.
DISCUSSION
Appellant maintains the section 1170(d) resentencing process was “enacted to
incorporate into the state’s sentencing scheme the latest scientific understanding
regarding the incomplete brain development of young people and its relationship to
criminality and culpability.” According to appellant, there is no rational reason for
limiting section 1170(d) resentencing relief to juvenile offenders serving LWOP and
excluding from relief those defendants serving otherwise lengthy life terms for offenses
committed when under 18 years of age; as such, he maintains, the denial of his petition
with respect to his 40-year-to-life sentence violates equal protection principles.
For similar reasons, appellant contends, there is no rational reason for
section 1170(d) to deprive young adults of the same opportunity to prove they have
matured and changed as juvenile defendants sentenced to LWOP; as a result, appellant
argues, the trial court’s denial of his petition with respect to his 50-year-to-life sentence
also violated equal protection principles.
The Attorney General maintains appellant’s 40-year-to-life sentence is
distinguishable from the sentences considered in People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th
349 (Contreras) and is not the functional equivalent of LWOP because he will have a
meaningful opportunity for release at 57 years of age. As a result, the Attorney General
contends, appellant’s equal protection challenge to section 1170(d) as applied to juvenile
offenders serving a 40-year-to-life sentence fails. With respect to appellant’s 50-year-to-
life sentence, the Attorney General argues the Legislature could rationally limit relief
4.
under section 1170(d) to juveniles based on distinguishing characteristics of juveniles
developmentally, and as the youngest, and presumably most deserving group of young
offenders.
Appellant disputes application of the functional equivalency doctrine because it
derives from Heard, where the court concluded at the first step of the traditional equal
protection analysis that the defendant was similarly situated to juveniles sentenced
explicitly to LWOP. (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at pp. 627–631.) Because People v.
Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834 (Hardin) dispensed with the similarly situated analysis in
equal protection challenges to statutes like section 1170(d), appellant argues, functional
equivalency as analyzed in Heard is no longer a relevant consideration. Rather, appellant
contends, the only relevant question under Hardin is whether the Legislature had a
rational reason for excluding offenders like appellant from the scope of section 1170(d).
Moreover, even to the extent functional equivalency is relevant, Contreras’s formulation
of the functional equivalency of LWOP would encompass appellant’s sentences of 40 and
50 years to life.
To provide context for the parties’ arguments, we begin with a summary of the
relevant law.
I. Legal Background
A. Functional Equivalence of LWOP in the Eighth Amendment Context
The law governing juvenile punishment has undergone a sea change since
appellant was sentenced in 2005 and 2006 “based upon developments in scientific
research on adolescent brain development confirming that children are different from
adults in ways that are critical to identifying age-appropriate sentences.” (O.G. v.
Superior Court (2021) 11 Cal.5th 82, 88.) “As a result of this shift, the punishment that
could validly be imposed on juvenile offenders was curtailed. The changes in law also
restricted prosecutors’ authority to charge juveniles in adult criminal court.” (People v.
Bagsby (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1048 (Bagsby).)
5.
Beginning with Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 568, the United States
Supreme Court held the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits sentencing juvenile
offenders to death. In 2010, the nation’s high court expanded Roper and held the Eighth
Amendment also prohibits sentencing nonhomicide juvenile offenders to LWOP; only by
giving such offenders “some realistic opportunity to obtain release” would punishment
provided by the states comport with the Eighth Amendment. (Graham v. Florida (2010)
560 U.S. 48, 82 (Graham).) Two years later, although not extending Graham’s
categorical LWOP ban to juvenile homicide offenders, the United States Supreme Court
held the Eighth Amendment prohibits a sentencing scheme that makes LWOP a
mandatory sentence for juvenile offenders convicted of homicide. (Miller v. Alabama
(2012) 567 U.S. 460, 489 (Miller).) Miller outlined mitigating factors relating to youth
that must be considered by the sentencing court before committing a juvenile homicide
offender to prison for LWOP, and explained the “appropriate occasions for sentencing
juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon.” (Id. at p. 479.)
Two months after Miller, the California Supreme Court extended Graham, holding
the Eighth Amendment prohibits sentencing nonhomicide juvenile offenders to a “term-of-
years sentence that amounts to the functional equivalent of a [LWOP] sentence .…”
(People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 268, fn. omitted (Caballero).) The court’s
analysis centered on Graham and its holding that the Eighth Amendment requires the state
to afford a juvenile offender a “‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation .…’” (Caballero, supra, at p. 266.) Caballero
explained Miller had emphasized that “‘none of what [Graham] said about children—about
their distinctive (and transitory) mental traits and environmental vulnerabilities—is crime
specific.’” (Caballero, supra, at p. 267.) Rather, Miller had “made it clear that Graham’s
‘flat ban’ on [LWOP] sentences applies to all nonhomicide cases involving juvenile
offenders, including the term-of-years sentence that amounts to the functional equivalent of
a [LWOP] sentence imposed in this case.” (Caballero, supra, at pp. 267–268, fn. omitted.)
6.
Sentenced to 110 years to life, Caballero explained the defendant would become parole
eligible “over 100 years from now,” and he “would have no opportunity to ‘demonstrate
growth and maturity’ to try to secure his release, in contravention of Graham’s dictate.”
(Id. at p. 268.)
After the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Graham and Miller, our
Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 9 (2011–2012 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 9) that added
subdivision (d)(2) to section 1170; the added subdivision became effective January 1,
2013, and created a recall and resentencing provision for juveniles sentenced to an
explicit term of LWOP. (See Stats. 2012, ch. 828, § 1.) The statute permitted a
resentencing mechanism for those defendants who were under the age of 18 years at the
time of the commission of their offenses and who were sentenced to LWOP. In the
process of passing the bill, a legislative report included comments from the bill’s author
and supporters that “sentencing minors to die in prison is barbaric” (Assem. Com. on
Appropriations, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 9 (2011–2012 Reg. Sess.), as amended Aug. 15,
2011, p. 2), and discussed that the proposed remedy of recall and resentencing would, if
deemed appropriate by the sentencing judge, “result in a life sentence, but one with the
possibility of parole” (ibid.). Under the statute’s new provision, a defendant was
permitted to file a petition requesting recall and resentencing with the sentencing court
after having been incarcerated for 15 years. (§ 1170, former subd. (d)(2)(A)(i), now
subd. (d)(1)(A).)2
Then, effective January 1, 2014, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 260
(2013–2014 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 260) and added sections 3051, 3046, subdivision (c),
and 4801, subdivision (c) to the Penal Code “‘to bring juvenile sentencing into
conformity with Graham, Miller, and Caballero.’” (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at
2 In 2021, section 1170, subdivision (d)(2) was renumbered as subdivision (d)(1). (Stats.
2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.)
7.
p. 619; see § 3051, subd. (b)(1)–(3), added by Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 4.) Section 3051
requires the Board of Parole Hearings to conduct a youthful offender parole hearing “at
specified times during the incarceration of certain youthful offenders.” (People v. Sorto
(2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435, 443–444 (Sorto).) Although section 3051, as originally
enacted, created a schedule of youth offender parole hearings for juvenile offenders
sentenced to a determinate term, a term of less than 25 years to life, or a life term of
25 years to life, it provided no parole hearing for juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP.
(Heard, supra, at p. 619 & fn. 8.)
The California Supreme Court considered the effect of Senate Bill 260 on a
juvenile’s claim of an Eighth Amendment violation in sentencing. (People v. Franklin
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 269 (Franklin).) In Franklin, a 16-year-old defendant shot and killed
another teenager, and was convicted of first degree murder with a firearm enhancement;
he was sentenced to two consecutive terms of 25 years to life—i.e., 50 years to life. (Id.
at p. 271.) Franklin held that, “just as Graham applies to sentences that are the
‘functional equivalent of a [LWOP] sentence’ [citation], so too does Miller apply to such
functionally equivalent sentences.” (Id. at p. 276.) Franklin concluded, however, that the
availability of a youth offender parole hearing under section 3051 mooted the defendant’s
Eighth Amendment challenge to his sentence under Miller. (Franklin, supra, at pp. 279–
280.) Although the defendant remained bound by his original sentence, the court
explained, by operation of Senate Bill 260, the defendant “is now serving a life sentence
that includes a meaningful opportunity for release during his 25th year of incarceration.
Such a sentence is neither LWOP nor its functional equivalent. Because [the defendant]
is not serving an LWOP sentence or its functional equivalent, no Miller claim arises
here.” (Franklin, supra, at pp. 279–280.)
Subsequently, in 2017, our Supreme Court held that section 1170(d) was an
inadequate statutory mechanism to cure an error under Miller. (In re Kirchner (2017) 2
Cal.5th 1040, 1054–1055.) The court explained that section 1170(d) provided “only a
8.
selective and qualified remedy … premised on an inquiry that may, but does not
necessarily, overlap with the one demanded under Miller.” (Kirchner, supra, at pp. 1054–
1055.) After Kirchner, the Legislature amended section 3051 to add subdivision (b)(4),
which provides juveniles sentenced to LWOP a youth offender parole hearing during their
25th year of incarceration. (§ 3051, subd. (b)(4), added by Stats. 2017, ch. 684, § 1.5.)
Nevertheless, the Legislature did not repeal section 1170(d).
Months after section 3051 was amended, our Supreme Court again considered the
legality of juvenile sentences under the Eighth Amendment for nonhomicide offenses in
Contreras. Although not sentenced to the 110-year-to-life term in Caballero, two
juveniles had been sentenced to 50 and 58 years to life for One Strike nonhomicide
offenses and were ineligible for youth offender parole hearings under section 3051.
(Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 359.) Eschewing an actuarial approach to determine
whether the sentence amounted to de facto LWOP, the court centered its analysis on
Graham’s Eighth Amendment requirement that nonhomicide juvenile offenders must be
given “‘some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity
and rehabilitation.’” (Contreras, supra, at p. 367, quoting Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at
p. 75.)
Through the lens of Graham, the court reasoned a lawful sentence under the
Eighth Amendment must “recognize ‘a juvenile nonhomicide offender’s capacity for
change and limited moral culpability’”; “offer ‘hope of restoration’”; offer “‘a chance to
demonstrate maturity and reform’”; provide a “‘chance for fulfillment outside prison
walls,’ and a ‘chance for reconciliation with society’”; and offer “the juvenile offender an
‘incentive to become a responsible individual.’” (Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 367,
quoting Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at pp. 74, 70, 79.) Given these guidelines, Contreras
held a sentence of 50 years to life is functionally equivalent to LWOP for a juvenile
nonhomicide offender because it does not provide the opportunities Graham requires.
Contreras explained Graham “envisioned more than the mere act of release or a de
9.
minimis quantum of time outside of prison.… Confinement with no possibility of release
until age 66 or age 74 seems unlikely to allow for the reintegration that Graham
contemplates.” (Contreras, supra, at p. 368.)
B. Eighth Amendment Concerns in the Equal Protection Context
After Contreras, our high court considered constitutional questions about youth
offender parole opportunities provided under section 3051 in Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th
834 and People v. Williams (2024) 17 Cal.5th 99 (Williams). In Hardin, the defendant
was serving an LWOP sentence for a special circumstance murder he committed at age
25. (Hardin, supra, at p. 839.) Although section 3051 permitted youth offender parole
hearings for most offenders incarcerated for a crime they committed between ages 18 and
25, the statute excluded from youth offender parole hearings those serving LWOP for a
crime they committed after the age of 18. (Hardin, supra, at pp. 838–839.) The
defendant argued section 3051 violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection
guarantee by excluding from early parole opportunities young adult offenders sentenced
to LWOP for special circumstance murder, but extending parole opportunities to young
adult offenders serving parole-eligible life sentences for other crimes. Our high court
ultimately concluded the Legislature had a rational basis for the exclusion of young
adults sentenced to LWOP based on its concerns about culpability and the appropriate
level of punishment for certain very serious crimes. (Hardin, supra, at pp. 853–864.)
Notably, the court rejected the defendant’s argument premised on the functional
equivalence doctrine: a young adult offender sentenced to a lengthy term-of-years
sentence that is functionally equivalent to LWOP would be entitled to a youth offender
parole hearing, while a young adult offender serving an explicit sentence of LWOP would
not. (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 863–864.) The appellate court below had
concluded this distinction was irrational because it permitted parole hearings for those
defendants with lengthy term-of-years sentences who perhaps had committed multiple
violent crimes and were, in some cases, sentenced to the functional equivalence of
10.
LWOP, while denying a parole opportunity to those defendants explicitly sentenced to
LWOP, perhaps for only a single crime. (Id. at p. 842.) The appellate court reasoned the
seriousness of the offender’s crimes was only a superficially plausible justification for the
distinction. (Ibid.) In raising this culpability issue before the Supreme Court, the
defendant noted the high court had previously described aggregate sentences that fix
parole eligibility outside an offender’s life expectancy as the functional equivalence of
LWOP, and essentially argued a sentence functionally equivalent to LWOP could involve
the same degree of culpability as those sentenced to LWOP, making a distinction based
on culpability an irrational one. (Id. at p. 863.)
In rejecting this argument, our high court explained it had “employed that
[functional equivalence] description in the context of identifying the category of juvenile
offenders to whom the Eighth Amendment limitations on [LWOP] sentences apply; for
that purpose, what matters is only whether the sentence, by its nature, forecloses any
realistic chance for a juvenile offender to rejoin society. [Citation.] We have not held
that a lengthy term-of-years sentence is necessarily equivalent to a [LWOP] sentence for
all purposes. Nor, more specifically, have we suggested that a set of crimes punishable
by a lengthy term-of-years sentence is necessarily more culpable, or equivalent in
culpability, to a single crime for which the law prescribes a sentence of [LWOP].”
(Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 863–864.)
Finally, in Williams, our high court again considered an equal protection challenge
to section 3051—this time based on its exclusion of all youth offenders sentenced under
the One Strike law. (Williams, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 112–113.) The defendant argued
there was no rational basis to exclude One Strike offenders, which involve nonhomicide
offenses, but not those convicted of first degree murder from parole eligibility. (Id. at
p. 125.) The defendant’s argument was premised, in part, on Graham’s statement “that
homicide offenses differ ‘in a moral sense’ from nonhomicide offenses in terms of ‘“their
11.
‘“‘severity and irrevocability.’”’” (Williams, supra, at p. 125, quoting Graham, supra,
560 U.S. at p. 69.)
The high court observed “[t]his argument based on the comparative seriousness of
crimes, however, is premised on concerns relevant in the context of Eighth Amendment
challenges to the death penalty and other severe criminal penalties, such as juvenile
LWOP; such concerns do not necessarily establish whether a Legislature’s classification
violates equal protection under a rational basis standard.” (Williams, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
p. 131.) The court acknowledged section 3051 “was crafted to ‘bring juvenile sentencing
in conformity with Miller, Graham and Caballero’ [citation], and to that end, Eighth
Amendment ‘protections outlined in Miller’ are featured in this provision. [Citation.]
However, despite ‘language echoing the holdings of these cases’ [citation], this equal
protection analysis of section 3051 should not be conflated with principles governing the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and its focus on
punishment and proportionality in capital and juvenile LWOP sentencing.” (Williams,
supra, at p. 131.) Based on recidivism concerns and that the aggravated nature of their
offenses diminished their prospects for rehabilitation, the court ultimately concluded the
Legislature “had a rational reason to categorically exclude young adult One Strike
offenders, but not young adults convicted of non-special-circumstance murder, from early
parole consideration under section 3051.” (Id. at p. 133.)
C. Equal Protection Challenges to Section 1170(d) and Sentences
Functionally Equivalent to LWOP
The concept of functional equivalence of LWOP arose again in the context of
equal protection challenges to section 1170(d). To reiterate, section 1170(d) permits a
defendant who was under the age of 18 at the time of the commission of the offense for
which the defendant was sentenced to LWOP and has been incarcerated for at least
15 years, to submit a petition for recall and resentencing to the sentencing court.
(§ 1170(d)(1)(A).)
12.
In Heard, decided before Hardin or Williams, the court addressed an equal
protection challenge to section 1170(d) and its exclusion of juveniles who were not
sentenced to an explicit term of LWOP. The defendant, who had been sentenced to a
term of 103 years to life, argued his sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP, and
if section 1170(d)(1) was not interpreted to apply to his sentence, then it violated his right
to equal protection. As matter of statutory construction, the court first determined the
plain language of section 1170(d)(1)(A) limited eligibility for recall and resentencing to
juvenile offenders sentenced explicitly to LWOP. (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at
p. 626.) Turning to the equal protection challenge, the court concluded the defendant was
similarly situated to those offenders sentenced explicitly to LWOP because his sentence
was “the functional equivalent” of LWOP. (Id. at p. 629.) In making this determination,
the court embraced no specific analytical method for determining what term-of-years
sentence constituted the functional equivalent of LWOP; instead, the court relied on
Caballero’s application of functional equivalency and explained the defendant would
have to serve 103 years before becoming parole eligible, which “constitutes a de facto
[LWOP] sentence.” (Heard, supra, at p. 629.)
On the second prong of the analysis, the court found it could “conceive of no
legitimate reason for making juvenile offenders sentenced to explicit [LWOP] terms
eligible to seek resentencing but not juvenile offenders sentenced to the equivalent of a
[LWOP] sentence.” (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 632.) The court reasoned the
Legislature could not rationally base the distinction on the excessiveness of an LWOP
sentence because the same concern applies to those with a functionally equivalent term-
of-years sentence. (Ibid.) Differential treatment also could not be justified, the court
reasoned, by differences in the relative culpability of each group. The statute had the
“incongruous effect” of extending sentencing leniency (resentencing) to those offenders
generally regarded as the least deserving of it—e.g., juveniles convicted of first degree
murder whose cases involve a special circumstance finding whose punishment is explicit
13.
LWOP. (Id. at p. 633.) The court also considered, and rejected, whether the Legislature
might have viewed a juvenile whose multiple offenses caused a lengthy term-of-years
sentence as more deserving of severe punishment. The court pointed out
section 1170(d)(1)(A) includes those with explicit LWOP sentences regardless of whether
they are convicted of other additional offenses, so the number of offenses theoretically
committed by each group of offenders (LWOP offenders versus de facto LWOP
offenders) failed to justify their disparate treatment. (Heard, supra, at p. 633.)
Two years later, in Sorto, the court reviewed the denial of a section 1170(d)
petition where the defendant had been sentenced to a determinate term of 10 years, plus
an indeterminate term of 130 years to life. (Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th 435.) The
appellate court confirmed Heard’s equal protection analysis, and concluded neither
Hardin nor Franklin undercut it.3 Consistent with Heard, the court found there was no
rational basis for section 1170(d) to exclude from relief those juveniles serving sentences
that were the functional equivalent of LWOP. The court rejected the Attorney General’s
arguments the Legislature had a rational basis to distinguish LWOP as a response to
Graham; or based on moral principles; empirical facts; fiscal concerns; and relative
culpability. (Sorto, supra, at pp. 450–454.)
3 In People v. Ortega (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1252, review granted September 17, 2025,
S292070, our colleagues in the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Three, parted company
with Heard and Sorto regarding how eligibility for a youth offender parole hearing under
section 3051 affects an equal protection challenge to section 1170(d). (Ortega, supra, at
pp. 1263–1264, review granted.) Relying on Franklin, the court in Ortega reasoned that because
the defendant was eligible for a section 3051 youth offender parole hearing, his sentence of
42 years to life had been converted by operation of law to a sentence of 25 years to life. Based
on this, the court concluded the defendant’s sentence was not the functional equivalent of LWOP,
and the defendant’s equal protection challenge to section 1170(d) was moot. (Ortega, supra, at
pp. 1264–1265, review granted.) Prior to Ortega, Heard and Sorto had declined to adopt similar
reasoning and had concluded that, although section 3051 may change how a defendant’s sentence
currently operates, section 1170(d)’s plain language requires only that a defendant “was
sentenced” to an LWOP term. (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 629; accord, Sorto, supra,
104 Cal.App.5th at pp. 447–448.)
14.
After Sorto, the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Bagsby rejected the Attorney
General’s argument that Heard was wrongly decided, and concluded a sentence of
107 years to life for offenses committed when the juvenile was 15 years old was the
functional equivalent of LWOP, and there was no rational basis for section 1170(d) to
differentiate between LWOP and those sentenced to de facto LWOP. (Bagsby, supra, 106
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1054–1067.)
Like Caballero, these section 1170(d) cases (Heard, Sorto and Bagsby) involved
term-of-years sentences with a parole eligibility date that was unquestionably beyond the
juvenile’s natural life span. None of these cases confronted how functional equivalence
should be assessed when a defendant’s term-of-years sentence could potentially offer a
parole opportunity inside the juvenile’s natural life. Courts have varied as to the rationale
for making this determination in the equal protection context and exactly where the line
should be drawn for functional equivalence when a term-of-years sentence offers an
opportunity for parole that is probably, or at least possibly, inside the juvenile’s natural
life expectancy.
For example, in People v. Olmos (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 580, our colleagues in
the Second District Court of Appeal, Division Five, concluded a sentence of 33 years to
life is not the functional equivalent of LWOP for purposes of section 1170(d) pursuant to
Heard’s equal protection analysis. Accepting Heard’s equal protection analysis
arguendo, the court reasoned a 33-year-to-life sentence was readily distinguishable from
the sentence of 103 years to life in Heard (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 629),
140 years to life in Sorto (Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at pp. 439–440) and was far
shorter than the 50- and 58-year sentences imposed on the juveniles in Contreras
(Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 356). (Olmos, supra, at p. 583.)
In Munoz, a split panel of our colleagues in the Second District Court of Appeal,
Division Seven, concluded that a 50-year-to-life term for a juvenile homicide offender is
not the functional equivalent of LWOP in the context of an equal protection challenge to
15.
section 1170(d). The majority distinguished Heard, Sorto, and Bagsby because those
cases involved minimum parole eligibility dates far greater than 50 years. (People v.
Munoz (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 499, 510–512, review granted June 25, 2025, S290828
(Munoz).) Despite that Caballero, a nonhomicide Eighth Amendment case, “gave some
guidance” about how to ascertain functional equivalency, Munoz concluded it was not
controlling in the equal protection context and similarly distinguishable. (Munoz, supra,
at p. 508, review granted.) Caballero, like Heard, Sorto, and Bagsby, considered a
defendant with parole eligibility after more than 100 years—a sentence that obviously
would not provide a meaningful opportunity to secure release during the juvenile’s
expected lifetime. Munoz reasoned that unlike the defendant in Caballero, Munoz would
be 65 years old when he became eligible for parole, and thus would have a realistic
opportunity to obtain release from prison during his expected lifetime. (Munoz, supra, at
p. 508, review granted.)
In declining to consider various extra-record evidence showing Munoz would
likely die in prison before reaching his parole eligibility date, the court explained the data
was not presented to the trial court, and it would not evaluate its untested validity.
(Munoz, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at pp. 508–509, review granted.) The court also noted it
was the function of the Legislature, not the courts, to sift through studies and research to
make policy decisions. (Id. at p. 509, review granted.) The Munoz majority also
reasoned that Contreras’s formulation of functional equivalency did not govern the
analysis because it was an Eighth Amendment case in a nonhomicide context. (Munoz,
supra, at pp. 510–511, review granted.)
The dissent in Munoz maintained Contreras’s reasoning “must inform” the
functional equivalence analysis for equal protection purposes as section 1170(d) “was
enacted in response to the principles articulated in Graham[, supra,] 560 U.S. 48 … —
the decision at the heart of Contreras.” (Munoz, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 513, review
granted (dis. opn. of Feuer, J.).) The dissent relied on various studies and statistics cited
16.
by the defendant and amici curiae filings, including those showing the average age of
death of California inmates between 2010 and 2012 was 54–55 years of age (id. at p. 515,
review granted); and how juveniles are disproportionately subjected to childhood trauma
that is linked to higher mortality rates (id. at p. 517, review granted). The dissent
concluded that a term of 50 years to life imposed on a 15- or 16-year-old “is the
functional equivalent of an LWOP sentence because a substantial percentage of juvenile
offenders will die in prison or be released at the end of their lifetimes, without a
meaningful opportunity to become productive members of society.” (Id. at p. 517, fn.
omitted, review granted.)
Subsequently, relying on Contreras, our colleagues in the Second District Court of
Appeal, Division Five, concluded a 50-year-to-life sentence for a juvenile homicide
offender is functionally equivalent to LWOP for equal protection purposes under
section 1170(d). (People v. Cabrera (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 650, 653.) A separate
concurring statement explained that, “[w]ere the slate clean, I would defer to our
Legislature’s decision as to where to draw the line between entitlement and
nonentitlement to relief under … section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A)—at least in a case,
like this one, where the question presented is whether there is a rational basis to
distinguish a sentence of 50 years to life from a [LWOP] sentence. However, our
Supreme Court’s holding in People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349, 369 … is, in my
view, inescapable and indistinguishable.” (Id. at p. 654 (conc. opn. of Hoffstadt, P.J.).)
Finally, and most recently, our colleagues in the Second District Court of Appeal,
Division Three, agreed with the majority in Munoz that section 1170(d)’s exclusion of a
juvenile sentenced to 50 years to life for a homicide offense did not violate equal
protection principles. (Thompson, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 1072 & fn. 4.) Thompson
explained that Contreras had limited the question before it regarding functional
equivalence “‘to the Eighth Amendment concerns that constrain lawful punishment for
juvenile nonhomicide offenders .…’” (Thompson, supra, at p. 1072, quoting Contreras,
17.
supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 364.) Thompson found this to specifically tether the functional
equivalence question before Contreras to the Eighth Amendment, particularly in light of
the high court’s statements in Hardin and Williams “rejecting attempts to collapse the
separate Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment analyses into one.” (Thompson, supra, at
p. 1073, citing Williams, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 131 & Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 863.)
Thus, Thompson explained, because Contreras had addressed functional
equivalence under Eighth Amendment standards, and not under the equal protection
guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment, its Eighth Amendment concerns in determining
functional equivalency did not extend to an equal protection challenge under
section 1170(d). For purposes of equal protection, Thompson explained, rather than
“asking whether a 50-year-to-life term functions like [LWOP] with respect to Eighth
Amendment concerns that constrain lawful punishment for juvenile nonhomicide
offenders, we must ask whether ‘“a statutory distinction [between LWOP and a 50-year-
to-life term] is so devoid of even minimal rationality that it is unconstitutional as a matter
of equal protection.”’” (Thompson, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 1074, quoting Williams,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 123 & citing Munoz, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 510, review
granted.)
Turning to the equal protection analysis, Thompson noted that although Senate
Bill 9’s legislative history indicates Graham violations and cruel or disproportionate
sentences imposed on juveniles were among the Legislature’s general considerations in
enacting section 1170(d), “it was expressly concerned about juveniles being sentenced to
die in prison.” (Thompson, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 1075.) After examining various
legislative reports analyzing Senate Bill 9, the court concluded those materials suggested
“the Legislature’s concern was not merely excessive punishment of juveniles that failed
to take into consideration their capacity for change, or even lengthy sentences. Instead, a
specific goal was to provide an opportunity for juvenile offenders whose sentences
18.
ensured they would die in prison.” (Thompson, supra, at p. 1076.) Thompson pointed
out the defendant had not shown these concerns stated in the legislative materials would
have applied equally to sentences of 50 years to life as to sentences of LWOP. (Ibid.)
Thompson also found the Legislative history established the Legislature intended
to proceed incrementally with respect to addressing the larger problem of excessive
punishment for juveniles. (Thompson, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 1076.) Senate Bill 9
was described as a “‘modest and narrowly focused piece of legislation’” (Sen. Com. on
Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 9 (2011–2012 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Dec. 6,
2010, p. 11), which financial reports indicated would apply to only 293 California
inmates (Sen. Appropriations Com. Fiscal Summary of Sen. Bill No. 9 (2011–2012 Reg.
Sess.) as introduced Dec. 6, 2010, pp. 1, 2). At the time of enactment, Thompson
reasoned, the Legislature could reasonably have considered LWOP to be the most severe
and unjust punishment imposed on juvenile offenders, and it could have rationally
concluded that “providing the relatively small number of juvenile offenders otherwise
certain to die in prison an opportunity to obtain a lesser sentence was the most pressing
priority.” (Thompson, supra, at p. 1077.) In light of that objective, the court reasoned it
was rational for the Legislature to distinguish only juveniles sentenced to LWOP as
compared to those with terms of 50-year-to-life because, prior to enactment of
section 3051, it was only juveniles sentenced to LWOP who had a “100 percent chance of
dying in prison.” (Thompson, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 1078.)
The court also rejected the defendant’s arguments of irrationality with respect to
culpability, pointing to rational bases the Legislature may have had to benefit LWOP
juveniles who, unlike those with lengthy term-of-years sentences, could not benefit from
conduct credit and were deprived of educational and rehabilitative opportunities, even if
they had theoretically committed more egregious offenses than those serving lesser term-
of-years sentences. (Thompson, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 1080.) Finally, Thompson
joined Munoz in acknowledging that tough questions remained regarding sentences with
19.
parole eligibility closer to the end of a juvenile’s natural life expectancy, but noted its
review was limited to the specific question before it. (Thompson, supra, at p. 1081.)
Against this backdrop, we turn to the specific equal protection challenge appellant
makes with respect to his sentences of 40 years to life for crimes committed as a juvenile
and 50 years to life for a crime committed as a young adult.
II. Analysis
A. Equal Protection Principles and Standard of Review
“The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that no state may ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.’” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 847, fn. omitted, quoting
U.S. Const., 14th Amend.) “This provision is ‘essentially a direction that all persons
similarly situated should be treated alike.’ [Citation.] ‘At core, the requirement of equal
protection ensures that the government does not treat a group of people unequally without
some justification.’ ([People v.] Chatman [(2018)] 4 Cal.5th [277,] 288.)” (Hardin,
supra, at p. 847.)
The justification required to satisfy equal protection hinges on the type of unequal
treatment at issue. (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 847.) Heightened scrutiny is applied
when a challenged statute or regulation involves a suspect classification such as race, or a
fundamental right such as the right to vote, and these classifications require greater
justification for the differential treatment. (Ibid., citing People v. Chatman (2018) 4
Cal.5th 277, 288 (Chatman).) However, when a statute involves none of these suspect
classifications or fundamental rights, as a general rule the legislation is presumed to be
valid and will be sustained if the classification is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest. (Hardin, supra, at p. 847.) “A court applying this standard finds ‘a denial of
equal protection only if there is no rational relationship between a disparity in treatment
and some legitimate government purpose.’ (Chatman, at pp. 288–289.)” (Ibid.)
20.
“Traditionally, the rational basis test has been described as a two-part inquiry, with
courts ‘“first ask[ing] whether the state adopted a classification affecting two or more
groups that are similarly situated in an unequal manner,”’ and then ‘“consider[ing]
whether the challenged classification” is adequately justified,’ i.e., whether it ‘“bears a
rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.”’ (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 848.)” (Williams, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 124.) In Hardin, the California Supreme
Court held that “when plaintiffs challenge laws drawing distinctions between identifiable
groups or classes of persons, on the basis that the distinctions drawn are inconsistent with
equal protection, courts no longer need to ask at the threshold whether the two groups are
similarly situated for purposes of the law in question.” (Hardin, supra, at p. 850.) That
holding applies to this case where the issue presented is whether section 1170(d)(1)(A)
violates equal protection by excluding young adults convicted of lengthy term-of-years
sentences for recall and resentencing, while juveniles convicted of LWOP or its
functional equivalent are eligible for such relief.
In this situation, we are to “presume that a given statutory classification is valid
‘until the challenger shows that no rational basis for the unequal treatment is reasonably
conceivable.’ [Citation.] The underlying rationale for a statutory classification need not
have been ‘ever actually articulated’ by lawmakers, nor ‘be empirically substantiated.’
[Citation.] Evaluating potential justifications for disparate treatment, a court reviewing a
statute under this standard must ‘treat the statute’s potential logic and assumptions far
more permissibly than with other standards of constitutional or regulatory review.’
[Citation.] ‘If a plausible basis exists for the disparity, courts may not second-guess its
“‘wisdom, fairness, or logic.’”’ [Citation.] ‘[T]he logic behind a potential justification
need [not] be persuasive or sensible—rather than simply rational.’” (Hardin, supra, 15
Cal.5th at p. 852, fn. omitted.)
The constitutional validity of a statute is a question of law reviewed de novo.
(People v. Alexander (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 469, 474.)
21.
B. Contreras and the Framework for Analyzing an Equal Protection
Challenge to Section 1170(d)
Appellant contends that whether a sentence is de facto LWOP was originally part
of Heard’s similarly-situated equal protection analysis, but that step—including the
functional equivalency question—is no longer applicable under Hardin. Highlighting the
cognitive development research that precipitated, at least in part, many of the changes to
juvenile sentencing law, including section 1170(d), appellant contends the Legislature had
no rational basis to exclude section 1170(d) recall and resentencing relief to any juvenile
offender who received lengthy term-of-years sentences, “especially those of 25 years to
life or longer, such as [appellant],” regardless of whether the sentence constitutes de facto
LWOP.
The Attorney General disputes that the functional equivalency assessment is
irrelevant under the more streamlined equal protection analysis embraced in Hardin, and
points out that Hardin explicitly cautioned that its dispensation of the similarly situated
prong of the equal protection analysis for certain types of challenges should not be
interpreted as raising doubts about precedent utilizing the similarly situated inquiry.
Relying on Contreras, the Attorney General argues that a juvenile like appellant,
sentenced to 40 years to life, with a parole opportunity in their late 50’s, still has a
meaningful opportunity to reintegrate into society within his or her expected lifetime.
Thus, the sentence is not the functional equivalent of LWOP; and, as a result, although
the Attorney General does not elaborate on this point, there is a rational basis for
section 1170(d) to exclude from relief those who are not serving LWOP or its functional
equivalent.
The Attorney General’s argument imports Contreras’s Eighth Amendment
formulation of functional equivalence and applies it in a manner that generally mirrors
Heard’s traditional two-step equal protection analysis. Heard relied on Caballero—an
Eighth Amendment case—for its formulation of functional equivalence to LWOP to
22.
conclude a term of 103 years to life was functionally equivalent to LWOP such that the
two groups were similarly situated. (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 629.) Yet,
different from the 110-year-to-life sentence in Caballero that clearly exceeded natural life
expectancy and lent itself to a “straightforward” conclusion it was functionally equivalent
to LWOP in an actuarial sense, the question of functional equivalence presented in
Contreras was different. (Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 364.)
In Contreras, the term-of-years sentences did not clearly exceed the offenders’
respective lifespans, and presented a more complex question about whether such
sentences nonetheless “impinge[d] on the same substantive concerns that make the
imposition of LWOP on juvenile nonhomicide offenders impermissible under the Eighth
Amendment.” (Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 364.) The functional equivalence issue
addressed in Contreras was shaped around Eighth Amendment concerns and expressly
limited to whether “a term-of-years sentence may function like LWOP with respect to the
Eighth Amendment concerns that constrain lawful punishment for juvenile nonhomicide
offenders .…” (Contreras, supra, at p. 364.) Contreras answered this question under the
lens of Graham, analyzing whether sentences of 50 and 58 years to life provided the
defendants with a “‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated
maturity and rehabilitation.’” (Contreras, supra, at p. 367, quoting Graham, supra, 560
U.S. at p. 75.)
Here, unlike Caballero or Heard, appellant’s sentence of 40 years to life offers
parole eligibility at age 57 and allows for an opportunity for release that is not clearly
outside his natural lifetime. Although appellant’s sentence is more akin to the sentences
confronted in Contreras, the functional equivalence analysis in Contreras was built on,
and expressly tethered to, Eighth Amendment concerns that do not necessarily extend to
an equal protection analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment. As observed in our
Supreme Court’s recent equal protection opinions, Eighth Amendment concerns “do not
necessarily establish whether a Legislature’s classification violates equal protection under
23.
a rational basis standard” (Williams, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 131), and our high court has
“not held that a lengthy term-of-years sentence is necessarily equivalent to a [LWOP]
sentence for all purposes” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 863). We understand from
these cases that Contreras’s formulation of functional equivalency, particularly with its
focus on Eighth Amendment concerns, does not necessarily apply to other legal contexts
and analyses without regard for the nature of the legal question presented.
The Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments “flows from the
basic ‘precept of justice that punishment for [a] crime should be graduated and
proportioned to [the] offense’”; the Eighth Amendment’s meaning is drawn from
“‘evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,’” which
“must embrace and express respect for the dignity of the person, and the punishment of
criminals must conform to that rule.” (Kennedy v. Louisiana (2008) 554 U.S. 407, 419,
420.) Assessing punishment under the Eighth Amendment “requires consideration of the
culpability of the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and characteristics, along with
the severity of the punishment in question.” (Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 67.)
Differently, the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee is meant to
“‘ensure[] that the government does not treat a group of people unequally without some
justification’”; it “‘confers no substantive rights and creates no substantive liberties’”; its
function “‘is simply to measure the validity of classifications created by state laws.’”
(Williams, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 122.) Appellant does not make a claim under the
Eighth Amendment; he challenges section 1170(d) on equal protection grounds under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Rather than analyzing a sentence’s functional equivalence to
LWOP around the demands of the Eighth Amendment as considered in Contreras,
evaluating section 1170(d)’s distinction for those sentenced to LWOP in an equal
protection context requires “an equal protection specific analysis” (Thompson, supra, 112
Cal.App.5th at p. 1073) as presented in Hardin and Williams.
24.
As here, “when plaintiffs challenge laws drawing distinctions between identifiable
groups or classes of persons, on the basis that the distinctions drawn are inconsistent with
equal protection, … [t]he only pertinent inquiry is whether the challenged difference in
treatment is adequately justified under the applicable standard of review.” (Hardin,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 850–851.) “[W]hen a statute involves neither a suspect
classification nor a fundamental right, the ‘general rule is that the legislation is presumed
to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally
related to a legitimate state interest.’” (Id. at p. 847.)
In the context of equal protection, therefore, “[i]nstead of asking whether a [4]0-
year-to-life term functions like [LWOP] with respect to Eighth Amendment concerns that
constrain lawful punishment for juvenile nonhomicide offenders [under Graham], we
must ask whether ‘“a statutory distinction [between LWOP and a [4]0-year-to-life term]
is so devoid of even minimal rationality that it is unconstitutional as a matter of equal
protection.”’” (Thompson, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 1074, quoting Williams, supra,
17 Cal.5th at p. 123 & citing Munoz, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 510, review granted.)
Although the Attorney General centers his analysis around Contreras’s Eighth
Amendment formulation of LWOP functional equivalency, we follow Thompson’s lead
and address appellant’s as-applied challenge in the context of the equal protection
framework under Hardin and Williams.
C. Rational Basis For Legislature to Treat Juvenile Offenders Sentenced
to 40 Years to Life Differently From Juvenile’s Sentenced to LWOP
Appellant argues section 1170 was enacted to “incorporate into the state’s
sentencing scheme the latest scientific understanding regarding the incomplete brain
development of young people and its relationship to criminality and culpability.” Based
on this legislative purpose, and relying on Heard, appellant argues there is no rational
reason for limiting section 1170(d) resentencing relief to juvenile offenders serving
25.
LWOP and excluding from relief those defendants serving otherwise lengthy terms for
offenses committed when under the age of 18.
The Legislature enacted what is now section 1170(d)(1)(A) in response to
“concerns regarding sentences of [LWOP] for juvenile offenders.” (Kirchner, supra, 2
Cal.5th at p. 1049; see Assem. Com. on Appropriations, Analysis of Sen. Bill. No. 9
(2011–2012 Reg. Sess.), as amended Aug. 15, 2011, pp. 3–5.) While the legislative
history discusses scientific brain research which differentiates juveniles from adults and
affects the degree of juvenile offenders’ culpability, legislative committee analyses reflect
the Legislature’s central focus in enacting section 1170(d) was mitigating the harshest
juvenile punishments—those juveniles whose sentences guaranteed their death in prison
because they offered no opportunity for parole.
Specifically, legislative committee reports reflect concerns centered specifically on
LWOP, not lengthy juvenile sentences generally. An Assembly Committee on
Appropriations bill analysis included contentions of the bill’s author and supporters that
LWOP for juveniles is a “barbaric” sentence, “counter to principles of cognitive and
emotional development in minors, and all but unprecedented in [the] rest of the world.”
(Assem. Com. on Appropriations, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 9 (2011–2012 Reg. Sess.), as
amended Aug. 15, 2011, p. 2; see McHugh v. Protective Life Ins. Co. (2021) 12 Cal.5th
213, 241 [“Where, as here, the author’s statements are part of committee materials—and
are therefore relayed not merely as personal views, but instead as part of the Legislature’s
consideration of the bill—they can serve as salient reflections of legislative purpose.”].)
Both the Assembly Committee on Appropriations and the Assembly Committee on
Public Safety issued analyses that discussed statistics provided by the Senate Bill 9’s
author that were specifically relevant only to LWOP. For example, both analyses
referenced background facts showing “45% of the minors sentenced to LWOP did not
personally commit murder, but were convicted of felony murder—as accomplices in a
felony during which a murder was committed”; and that recent developments in brain
26.
science “‘have proven that youth are far more influenced by group behavior than the
same individuals will be as adults’”—“‘[u]nsurprisingly, over 75% of the youth
sentenced to LWOP acted within a group at the time of their crime.’” (Assem. Com. on
Appropriations, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 9 (2011–2012 Reg. Sess.), as amended Aug. 15,
2011, p. 3; see Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 9 (2011–2012
Reg. Sess.), as amended May 27, 2011, pp. 7–8.)
Also included were background facts provided by the Senate Bill 9’s author
indicating many of California youth sentenced to LWOP were acting under the influence
of an adult—in 70 percent of cases where the youth was not acting alone, at least one
codefendant was an adult; and that California “‘has one of the worst records in the nation
for racial disparity in the imposition of [LWOP] for juveniles. African American youth
are sentenced to [LWOP] at over 18 times the rate of white youth. Hispanic youth are
sentenced to [LWOP] five times more often than white youth.’” (Assem. Com. on Public
Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 9 (2011–2012 Reg. Sess.), as amended May 27, 2011,
pp. 7–8.) The analysis provided by the Assembly Committee on Appropriations included
information taken from a 2007 report by the Center for Law and Global Justice and the
Frank C. Newman International Human Rights Law Clinic at the University of San
Francisco School of Law that “‘LWOP for minors violates customary international
law .…’” (Assem. Com. on Appropriations, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 9 (2011–2012 Reg.
Sess.), as amended Aug. 15, 2011, p. 4.)
As reasoned in Thompson, “[t]his history suggests the Legislature’s concern was
not merely excessive punishment of juveniles that failed to take into consideration their
capacity for change, or even lengthy sentences. Instead a specific goal was to provide an
opportunity for juvenile offenders whose sentences ensured they would die in prison.”
(Thompson, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 1076.) “At the time of enactment, the
Legislature could reasonably consider [LWOP] to be the most severe and unjust
punishment imposed on juvenile offenders.” (Id. at p. 1077.) As in Thompson, appellant
27.
has not demonstrated how the Legislature’s concerns regarding the harshest punishments
guaranteeing death in prison apply equally to those sentenced to 40 years to life with
parole eligibility at 57 years of age.
Moreover, the legislative history indicates the Legislature planned to proceed
“incrementally in addressing the larger problem of excessive punishment of juvenile
offenders.” (Thompson, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 1076.) The Senate Appropriations
Committee’s fiscal summary of Senate Bill 9 indicated the law would apply to only 293
inmates in California, and the anticipated fiscal impact was calculated accordingly. (Sen.
Appropriations Com. Fiscal Summary of Sen. Bill No. 9 (2011–2012 Reg. Sess.) as
introduced Dec. 6, 2010.) Further, the bill was described by supporters as a “‘modest and
narrowly focused piece of legislation’” given the limited number of inmates the bill was
anticipated to affect. (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 9 (2011–
2012 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Dec. 6, 2010, p. 11.)
The Legislature could rationally determine that “providing the relatively small
number of juvenile offenders otherwise certain to die in prison an opportunity to obtain a
lesser sentence was the most pressing priority.” (Thompson, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1077.) While this excludes juveniles with lengthy term-of-years sentences that do not
guarantee their death in prison, the Legislature is “entitled to proceed incrementally, so
long as it proceeds rationally, in ‘walking [the] tightrope’ of the political process.”
(Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 866.) “‘Nothing compels the state “to choose between
attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all” [Citation.] Far
from having to “solve all related ills at once” [citation], the Legislature has “broad
discretion” to proceed in an incremental and uneven manner without necessarily
engaging in arbitrary and unlawful discrimination.’” (Williams, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 125, quoting People v. Barrett (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1081, 1110.)
The Legislature’s “line-drawing authority and ability to proceed incrementally has
been recognized in numerous contexts, not limited to punishing relative culpability more
28.
severely, or to prescribing disparate punishments for different offenses.” (Thompson,
supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1080–1081, citing Chatman, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 283; see
People v. Barrett, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1110 [recognizing Legislature’s discretion to
proceed incrementally in not authorizing jury trials or require jury advisements in Welf.
& Inst. Code, § 6500 commitment proceedings, even though several other commitment
schemes include such rights].) The Legislature’s authority to sculpt a solution for a
problem rationally perceived to be the most pressing is not subject to a court’s “judgment
on the wisdom or desirability of [the Legislature’s] policy choices.” (Hardin, supra, 15
Cal.5th at p. 864.)
Appellant argues precluding section 1170(d) relief for juveniles sentenced to a
term of 40 years to life is irrational because it has the “‘incongruous effect of extending
sentencing leniency’” to offenders least deserving of it, while excluding those who
committed offenses not warranting LWOP. (Quoting Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at
p. 633.) But, the Legislature could have rationally differentiated those serving LWOP
from those serving 40 years to life, despite potential culpability differences. Unlike
juveniles with term-of-years sentences, those sentenced to LWOP cannot benefit from
conduct credits, even if it was earned, to advance a parole date. “[C]ourts have
concluded the Legislature may rationally provide a rehabilitative benefit to a group of
offenders who committed more serious crimes, while excluding those convicted of lesser
crimes, when the less culpable group may have other avenues for relief.” (Thompson,
supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 1080, citing Chatman, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 294–295 & In
re Spencer S. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1329.) Also as part of its line-drawing
authority, the Legislature rationally could have distinguished LWOP and 40-year-to-life
sentences given differences in terms of their confinement. “That ‘it is the policy in some
prisons to withhold counseling, education, and rehabilitation programs for those who are
ineligible for parole consideration’ (Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 79), would provide the
29.
Legislature with reason to give [LWOP] juvenile offenders in particular an opportunity to
be resentenced to a life with parole sentence.” (Thompson, supra, at p. 1080.)
Although rejecting equal protection challenges to section 1170(d) as applied to
juvenile sentences of 50 years to life for homicide, Thompson and Munoz acknowledge
“tough questions” remain regarding other term-of-years sentences with respect to equal
protection challenges to section 1170(d). (Munoz, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 510,
review granted; accord, Thompson, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 1081.) Determining
what term-of-years sentence will result in the juvenile’s death in prison and, thus,
becomes rationally indistinguishable from a term of LWOP in light of the Legislature’s
purposes in enacting section 1170(d), becomes even more difficult where a sentence
extends beyond 50 years. “What about 60 to life for a 15-year-old defendant? Or
53 years eight months to life for a 20-year-old defendant?” (Munoz, supra, at p. 510,
review granted.) Here too, those questions are not presented, and we likewise do not
reach them.
In sum, as applied to juvenile offenders sentenced to 40 years to life, appellant
fails to demonstrate section 1170(d)’s eligibility limitation has no rational basis and is
therefore unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Williams, supra, 17
Cal.5th at p. 130, fn. omitted [“We must uphold the Legislature’s classification against an
equal protection challenge unless ‘it fairly can be said that there is no “reasonably
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.”’”].)
D. Rational Basis to Exclude Young Adults From Recall and Resentencing
Under Section 1170(d)
As to his sentence of 50 years to life for the murder he committed when he was
18 years old, appellant maintains excluding him from eligibility under
section 1170(b)(1)(A) likewise violates equal protection principles. Appellant argues
there is no rational reason for depriving 18-year-old defendants who commit serious
30.
crimes of the same opportunity to prove they have matured and changed as juvenile
defendants sentenced to LWOP.
Appellant maintains the Legislature enacted section 1170(d) and section 3051 in
response to neuroscientific research on brain development showing the brain does not
fully develop until one’s mid-20’s. While section 3051 extends youth offender parole
consideration to juveniles and young adults under the age of 26, only the juvenile is
eligible for resentencing under section 1170(d). Given the neuroscientific underpinnings
of section 1170(d), appellant contends, there is no rational reason for depriving an 18-
year-old the same opportunity to prove they have matured and changed as the 17-year-old
sentenced to LWOP.
The Attorney General argues the law has recognized that children are
constitutionally different from adults for the reasons explained in Miller. Pointing to
California courts that have already “affirmed the rationality of drawing a line between
minors under the age of 18, and adults over the age of 18,” the Attorney General
maintains the appellant’s argument has already been rejected in In re Jones (2019) 42
Cal.App.5th 477 (Jones).
In Jones, the defendant sought recall and resentencing relief under section 1170(d)
for a murder and other offenses he committed when he was 19 years old. He argued
section 1170(d) violated his right to equal protection of the law because it did not apply
to youthful offenders between the ages of 18 and 25 years old. (Jones, supra, 42
Cal.App.4th at p. 480.) The defendant maintained the underlying rationale for
section 1170(d) recall and resentencing relief was that young people were
developmentally and neurologically different from older offenders, and that young adults,
like juveniles, have the same developing brains, lack maturity, and have the same
increased potential for rehabilitation. (Jones, supra, at p. 481.) In rejecting the
defendant’s argument, the court reasoned that even assuming adult LWOP offenders
under the age of 25 are similar to juvenile LWOP offenders “in the sense that their brains
31.
are not fully developed,” it was within the province of the Legislature to draw a line of
inclusion under section 1170(d). (Jones, supra, at p. 482.) The court reasoned the
“Legislature could reasonably decide that for those convicted of LWOP crimes, the line
should be drawn at age 18, rather than at some later date when the brain is fully
developed. Drawing a bright line at age 18 establishes an objective and easily
implemented measure, which has been used by the United States Supreme Court for
sentencing purposes.” (Id. at p. 483.)
We agree. While young adults over the age of 18 also experience continued
cognitive development, the Legislature’s stated concerns for enacting section 1170(d)
were focused on juveniles, not young adults, sentenced to LWOP. While recognizing that
brain development continues into young adulthood, the Legislature could have rationally
concluded juveniles subjected to the harshest punishment were the priority in addressing
the issue, particularly because juveniles could be rationally viewed as even less culpable
than young adults and have the “greatest prospects for reform.” (Miller, supra, 567 U.S.
at p. 471.) As explained in Williams, “the Legislature may institute reform in an area of
law in an ‘incremental and uneven manner’ without having to ‘“choose between attacking
every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all.”’” (Williams, supra, 17
Cal.5th at p. 135.) “Equal protection ‘does not prohibit the Legislature from regulating
certain classes of cases in which the need is deemed most evident.’” (Ibid.)
Appellant has not demonstrated the Legislature had no rational basis for making a
distinction between juveniles and young adults under section 1170(d), and thus fails to
establish section 1170(d) violates his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
32.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed.
MEEHAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
DETJEN, Acting P. J.
FRANSON, J.
33.
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