CourtListener 10673131•People v. Silva CA1/5
Texte intégral
Filed 9/17/25 P. v. Silva CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A169643
v.
VICTOR PIERRE BENTO SILVA, (Sonoma County
Defendant and Appellant. Super. Ct. No. SCR6845971)
In 2017, Victor Pierre Bento Silva was sentenced to 41 years to life
after he pleaded no contest to first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187,
subd. (a))1 and robbery (§ 211), and admitted to personal use of a firearm
(§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). In 2021, Silva filed a petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6. The trial court denied the petition after an evidentiary
hearing. Silva argues the court’s finding that he acted with reckless
indifference to human life is not supported by substantial evidence.
We affirm.
BACKGROUND
We summarized the facts as follows in our prior nonpublished opinion
(People v. Silva (Aug. 16, 2018, A153589)).
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
1
“The prosecution charged Silva with murder (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1),
kidnapping (§ 209, subd. (b)(1); count 2), first degree residential burglary
(§ 459; count 3), first degree residential robbery (§ 211; count 4), driving or
taking a vehicle without consent (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count 5), and
elder abuse (§ 368, subd. (b)(1); count 6). As to the murder charge, it was
alleged there were special circumstances, in that the murder was committed
during a kidnapping, a burglary and a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)).
In counts 1, 2, and 4, it was alleged Silva personally used a firearm
(§§ 12022.53, subd. (b), 1203.06, subd. (a)(1), 12022.5, subd. (a)), or the
principal was armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). In counts
3, 5, and 6, it was alleged Silva personally used a firearm (§§ 1203.06,
subd. (a)(1), 12022.5, subd. (a)), or the principal was armed with a firearm
(§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)).
“The prosecution alleged Silva and Stephanie Hill confronted an
84-year-old woman in Penngrove, California, at gunpoint, forced her into her
home, bound her to a chair, and shot her in the head. Silva and Hill stole
items from the victim’s home, including a car. Two days later, they were
located by law enforcement in Riverside County. After a high-speed chase
into the State of Arizona, Hill was killed in a shoot-out with law enforcement.
“On September 29, 2017, Silva pled no contest to murder
(§ 187, subd. (a)), and robbery (§ 211), and he admitted to personal use of a
firearm in the commission of the robbery (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). On
December 7, 2017, pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, the court
sentenced Silva to 41 years to life in prison, comprised of a determinate term
of 6 years for robbery and 10 years for the firearm use enhancement, and an
indeterminate term of 25 years to life for first degree murder.”
2
In 2021, Silva filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6.2
The trial court issued an order to show cause and held an evidentiary hearing
in 2023. At the evidentiary hearing, the prosecution presented testimony
from Detective Gary Freitas.3 Freitas was the lead detective in the case, and
he traveled to Arizona to interview Silva while he was in custody. Freitas
explained that the interview was recorded, and a transcript of the interview
was admitted into evidence.
The following facts from the robbery are based on Silva’s interview with
Detective Freitas. Silva told Freitas that he had only known Hill two to three
months, and they had been married for one month, at the time of the crimes.
Silva explained that two days before the robbery, he was riding with Hill in
her car when they were pulled over by the Novato Police Department. Hill
evaded the police because there was a gun in the car. They pulled over along
the freeway, abandoned the car, and slept in some bushes nearby. The
following morning they went back to the car and Hill drove them to the
victim’s property. Hill knew the victim, and the victim allowed them to stay
2 The statute was renumbered in 2022 from section 1170.95 to section
1172.6 without any substantive changes. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
3 The prosecution also introduced multiple exhibits into evidence, and
the trial court took judicial notice of the presentence report and the
preliminary hearing transcript. On appeal, the People argue Silva failed to
provide an adequate record on appeal because the record only included his
police interview and the testimony of Detective Freitas from the evidentiary
hearing. Silva attempted to augment the record to include the clerk’s
transcript from his previous appeal and various volumes of the preliminary
hearing transcript, but the deputy clerk was initially unable to find the
documents and later rejected the second filing for nonconformance. However,
Silva was eventually able to submit the documents to the court, and they are
before us today. And even without the augmented record, the record was
sufficient to resolve the matter before us. Therefore, we reject the People’s
argument that the record is inadequate.
3
in a barn on her property. Silva and Hill lay low in the barn the entire day
and slept there.
The next morning, Hill told Silva that her ex-boyfriend “made a living
stealing people’s identity, stealing their money, stealing their cars,” and that
“everything that he’s stolen” was “in one of those barns” on the property. Hill
wanted to go inside the victim’s house, get the keys to the barns, and take the
stolen goods. Silva then asked, “ ‘Okay, what would you like me to do?’ ” Hill
responded, “ ‘You can either come with me or you can watch me [sic] back.’ ”
Silva, as her newlywed husband, decided to take part in the robbery.
Silva and Hill put on masks and gloves. They were both holding guns
when they approached the victim in her garage. Silva ordered the victim to
the ground and inside the home. Silva demanded to know the location of the
keys to the barns, but the victim was uncooperative. Silva and Hill then tied
the victim down to a chair, placed a pillowcase over her head, and began
searching for the keys to the barns and other valuables.
Approximately 20–30 minutes after the robbery began, after Silva and
Hill were inside the home and tied up the victim, an older gentleman pulled
into the driveway in a truck and parked next to the garage. He did not enter
the home, and after approximately 15–20 minutes, he left. Silva asked the
victim whether he was going to come back, and she responded that he should
not be back.
After the truck left, Silva and Hill continued to ransack the victim’s
home, stealing approximately $10,000; jewelry; old, collectible coins; and
other valuables. After they gathered what they could and were getting ready
to go, Hill asked Silva, “ ‘What are we going to do with the lady?’ ” Silva
replied, “ ‘We’re not gonna do anything with the lady.’ [sic] You know she
didn’t do a damn thing to us why, we took everything that belongs to her
4
already.’ ” Hill pressed on, “ ‘So we’re gonna leave a witness?’ ” Silva again
replied, “ ‘She didn’t do anything to us.’ ‘We don’t need to hurt her or
anything.’ ” Hill again asked, “ ‘We gonna leave a witness?’ ” Silva
responded, “ ‘Look I’m gonna go to the car whatever it is that you wanna do
with her you do it.’ ‘Don’t tell me I don’t want to know.’ ” Silva placed all of
the bags on the front steps so he would not have to go back into the home and
“have to see anything if it did happen.”
Silva felt like they had been at the home for “too long,” saying that he
had never done this before and that he did not want to get in trouble for
something when he had “no . . . idea what’s going on.” Silva stated he was
only there to have Hill’s back and to show her that he loved her. Silva loaded
all of the bags into the victim’s car and asked Hill if she was ready to go. Hill
said, “ ‘I have to do something with the lady,’ ” and Silva responded, “ ‘Do
what you gotta do.’ ” Hill went back into the house after which Silva heard a
single gunshot. Hill came out of the house seconds after the gunshot, holding
the gun in her hand. Hill got into her own car and Silva was in the victim’s
car when they drove away. Shortly after, they discarded Hill’s car, and they
both drove away in the victim’s car.
A few months after the evidentiary hearing, the trial court filed a
written order finding Silva was a major participant in the robbery and acted
with reckless indifference to human life, and denied the petition for
resentencing.
5
DISCUSSION
We find that Silva was a major participant in the robbery and acted
with reckless indifference to human life.4
“Senate Bill [No.] 1437 [(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.)] significantly limited
the scope of the felony-murder rule to effectuate the Legislature’s declared
intent ‘to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not
the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major
participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to
human life.’ [Citations.] Penal Code section 189, as amended, now limits
liability under a felony-murder theory principally to ‘actual killer[s]’
(Pen. Code, § 189, subd. (e)(1)) and those who, ‘with the intent to kill,’ aid or
abet ‘the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree’
(id., subd. (e)(2)). Defendants who were neither actual killers nor acted with
the intent to kill can be held liable for murder only if they were ‘major
participant[s] in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to
human life, as described in subdivision (d) of [Penal Code] Section 190.2’—
that is, the statute defining the felony-murder special circumstance.
(Id., § 189, subd. (e)(3).)” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707–708,
1st & 2d bracketed insertions added (Strong).)
“Senate Bill 1437 also created a special procedural mechanism for those
convicted under the former law to seek retroactive relief under the law as
amended. [Citations.] Under newly enacted section 1172.6, the process
begins with the filing of a petition containing a declaration that all
requirements for eligibility are met (id., subd. (b)(1)(A)), including that
4 Accordingly, we decline to address whether substantial evidence
supported a finding that Silva committed second degree murder as a direct
aider and abettor.
6
‘[t]he petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted
murder because of changes to [Penal Code] Section 188 or 189 made effective
January 1, 2019,’ the effective date of Senate Bill 1437 (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a)(3)). [¶] When the trial court receives a petition containing the
necessary declaration and other required information, the court must
evaluate the petition ‘to determine whether the petitioner has made a
prima facie case for relief.’ [Citations.]” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708,
fn. omitted.)
“If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the petitioner is
entitled to relief, the [trial] court shall issue an order to show cause.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) The court may then hold an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether to vacate the murder conviction where the burden of proof
is on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner
could be presently convicted of murder. (Id., subd. (d)(1) & (d)(3).)
In People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks), our Supreme Court
identified a series of considerations in analyzing whether a defendant was a
major participant as defined in section 190.2: “ ‘What role did the defendant
have in planning the criminal enterprise that led to one or more deaths?
What role did the defendant have in supplying or using lethal weapons?
What awareness did the defendant have of particular dangers posed by the
nature of the crime, weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the other
participants? Was the defendant present at the scene of the killing, in a
position to facilitate or prevent the actual murder, and did his or her own
actions or inaction play a particular role in the death? What did the
defendant do after lethal force was used?’ ” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
pp. 704–706, citing Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803.) None of these
considerations is dispositive, and they “ ‘[a]ll may be weighed in determining
7
the ultimate question, whether the defendant’s participation “in criminal
activities known to carry a grave risk of death” [citation] was sufficiently
significant to be considered “major” [citations].’ ” (Strong, at p. 706.)
While Banks primarily focused on the major participant element, the
decision also discussed the reckless indifference element, holding “that
knowing participation in an armed robbery, standing alone, is insufficient to
establish a defendant’s reckless indifference to human life.” (Strong, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 706, citing Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 807–811.) A year
later, in People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark), our Supreme Court
“concluded that ‘ “reckless indifference,” . . . encompasses a willingness to kill
(or to assist another in killing) to achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant
does not specifically desire that death as the outcome of his actions.’ ”
(Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 706, quoting Clark, supra, 61 Cal.4th at
p. 617.)
The Clark court provided an additional list of considerations for the
reckless indifference analysis, “including use of or awareness of the presence
of a weapon or weapons, physical presence at the scene and opportunity to
restrain confederates or aid victims, the duration of the crime, knowledge of
any threat the confederates might represent, and efforts taken to minimize
risks.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 706, citing Clark, supra, 61 Cal.4th at
pp. 618–623.) “Because the major participant and reckless indifference
elements often ‘ “significantly overlap” ’ [citations], this list of factors also
overlapped with those we had identified in connection with the major
participant inquiry in Banks.” (Strong, at p. 706, quoting Clark, supra, 61
Cal.4th at p. 615.)
In determining whether a trial court correctly denied a section 1172.6
petition after an evidentiary hearing, we review the factual findings for
8
substantial evidence and the application of those facts to the statute de novo.
(People v. Cooper (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 393, 412.) “The scope of our review
for substantial evidence is well settled. The test is not whether the People
met their burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that [Silva] was
ineligible for resentencing, but rather ‘whether any rational trier of fact could
have’ made the same determination, namely that ‘[t]he record . . . disclose[s]
. . . evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a
reasonable trier of fact could find [as did the superior court]. [Citation.] In
applying this test, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution and presume in support of the [order] the existence of every fact
the [superior court] could reasonably have deduced from the evidence.
[Citation.] “Conflicts [in the evidence] . . . subject to justifiable suspicion do
not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the
trial judge . . . to determine the . . . truth or falsity of the facts upon which a
determination depends. [Citation.]” ’ ” (People v. Williams (2020)
57 Cal.App.5th 652, 663.)
The trial court made various factual findings applying the Banks and
Clark factors and determined Silva was a major participant and acted with
reckless indifference. First, the court found Silva “was a ‘major participant’
in the underlying armed robbery. [Silva] was an active co-participant in the
robbery, involved in obtaining supplies such as guns and masks, and involved
in the apprehension of the victim, securing and blindfolding her, and
removing her property from the residence in a coordinated effort with his
wife, Ms. Hill. [Silva] was armed or had access to a firearm throughout the
robbery itself and in the flight from law enforcement that followed, as did his
wife, Ms. Hill. The court finds specifically that [Silva] must have been aware
of Ms. Hill’s threatening and violent nature, as the record of conviction
9
demonstrates she consistently portrayed herself in such a way, and
frequently made overt statements about committing violent acts. As her
partner in crime, and her husband, the court finds [Silva] must have known
she was dangerous. [Silva] was aware of the dangerousness of an armed
robbery, utilizing a firearm during the robbery and engaging in conversation
with Ms. Hill directly about whether the victim was to be left alive or killed.
While [Silva] was not present in the room the moment the shot was fired into
[the victim’s] face, he was very much in a position to dissuade Ms. Hill from
killing [the victim], physically intervene to stop her, or at the very least
render aid after the shooting occurred. Unfortunately for [the victim], [Silva]
instead gave tacit approval for Ms. Hill to eliminate any live witness to the
robbery when he told her to ‘Do what you need to do.’ ”
Likewise, the trial court held that Silva “acted with ‘reckless
indifference to human life.’ [Silva] knew that firearms would be used during
the felony, as demonstrated by the fact that both he and Ms. Hill were armed
throughout the event, and both of them actively used their guns to capture
and control the victim . . . . [Silva] must have known that Ms. Hill would use
the gun to shoot [the victim] after discussing with Ms. Hill whether they
would leave behind a live witness or not. [Silva] was physically present in
the company of the shooter, Ms. Hill, when she indicated she would not leave
behind a living witness to their crimes, and he essentially endorsed the
killing so long as he was not the shooter. He did nothing to protest against,
physically prevent or in any way dissuade or stop the killing, despite being at
the scene and the only person conceivably able to stop the murder of
[the victim]. Instead, knowing how violent Ms. Hill was, and aware of the
fact that she was armed with a pistol, had just committed a robbery, and had
a victim/witness tied to a chair with a pillowcase over her head, [Silva] said
10
for Ms. Hill to do what she needed to do, a chilling example of indifference to
human life.”
Here, Silva concedes he was a major participant in the robbery that led
to the victim’s death under the first two Banks factors—for his role in
planning the robbery and his personal use of a lethal weapon in carrying out
the robbery. Yet, Silva disputes the trial court’s finding that he acted with
reckless indifference because the record does not show he knew, before the
robbery, Hill would use her gun to shoot the victim. Silva argues the third
Banks factor—defendant’s awareness of the particular dangers posed by the
nature of the crime, weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the other
participants—focuses on Silva’s awareness of Hill’s violent nature before the
robbery. Specifically, Silva notes that the prosecution’s evidence that Hill
was dangerous and violent came from witnesses who encountered her after
the robbery and whose opinions were based on information about Hill
obtained after the robbery. In other words, Silva argues he was not aware of
Hill’s violent nature before the robbery and therefore the court’s finding that
he knew Hill would shoot the victim is not supported by substantial evidence.
Similarly, Silva argues the fourth Banks factor—whether he was
present at the scene of the killing, in a position to facilitate or prevent the
actual murder, and whether his own actions or inaction played a particular
role in the death—does not support the trial court’s finding of reckless
indifference to human life. Silva first notes that he was not present in the
home when Hill killed the victim. Silva also claims the court erred in finding
that he did nothing to stop the murder because the court “placed no
limitation on what [Silva] was required to do ‘to stop [Hill],’ including putting
his own life at risk.” We are not persuaded.
11
Tellingly, Silva relies on the third and fourth Banks factors in claiming
that the trial court erred in finding he acted with reckless indifference to
human life. Yet, the Banks factors were developed to analyze whether a
defendant is a major participant in the underlying felony. (Strong, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 706, citing Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 807–811.) While
the “major participant and reckless indifference elements often
‘ “significantly overlap” ’ ” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 706, quoting Clark,
supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 615), the Clark factors are specifically geared toward
the reckless indifference analysis.
Moreover, Silva’s concession that he was a major participant in the
underlying robbery obviates the need to analyze the Banks factors and makes
it more likely that he acted with reckless indifference. (Clark, supra,
61 Cal.4th at p. 615, citing Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 153
[95 L.Ed.2d 127] [“the greater the defendant’s participation in the felony
murder, the more likely that he acted with reckless indifference to human
life”].) Thus, we consider whether substantial evidence supports the trial
court’s finding that Silva acted with reckless indifference to human life using
the Clark factors and address Silva’s arguments in the appropriate context.
Under the first Clark factor—knowledge of weapons, including the use
and number of weapons—the trial court found that Silva knew that multiple
guns were going to be used, as both he and Hill “actively used their guns to
capture and control the victim . . . .” “A defendant’s use of a firearm, even if
the defendant does not kill the victim or the evidence does not establish
which armed robber killed the victim, can be significant to the analysis of
reckless indifference to human life.” (Clark, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 618.) The
mere fact that Silva participated in an armed robbery does not establish
reckless indifference to human life. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 706,
12
citing Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 807–811.) Here, however, Silva was
aware that multiple weapons would be used in the robbery, and he personally
used a gun to commit the robbery.
Under the second Clark factor—physical presence at the crime and
opportunity to prevent the crime and/or aid victims—the trial court found
Silva was physically present in the company of the shooter, Hill, when she
indicated she would not be leaving behind a witness. Silva did nothing to
“protest against, physically prevent or in any way dissuade or stop the
killing . . . .” “Proximity to the murder and the events leading up to it may be
particularly significant where . . . the participant who personally commits the
murder exhibits behavior tending to suggest a willingness to use lethal force.
In such cases, ‘the defendant’s presence allows him to observe his cohorts so
that it is fair to conclude that he shared in their actions and mental state. . . .
[Moreover,] the defendant’s presence gives him an opportunity to act as a
restraining influence on murderous cohorts. If the defendant fails to act as a
restraining influence, then the defendant is arguably more at fault for the
resulting murders.’ ” (Clark, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 619.)
Here, Silva failed to act as a restraining influence after Hill indicated
her intent not to leave a witness. We acknowledge Silva was not present in
the home when Hill shot the victim, but he was “physically present during
the entire sequence of events culminating in the murder[].” (Clark, supra,
61 Cal.4th at p. 619.) He made no effort to provide aid to the victim and
explicitly avoided having to go back into the home to check on her status.
Under the third Clark factor—duration of the felony—the trial court did
not make any factual findings. “Where a victim is held at gunpoint,
kidnapped, or otherwise restrained in the presence of perpetrators for
prolonged periods, ‘there is a greater window of opportunity for violence’
13
[citation], possibly culminating in murder.” (Clark, supra, 61 Cal.4th at
p. 620.)
Here, Silva and Hill held the victim at gun point, transported her from
her garage to the home, questioned her regarding the location of the barn
keys, tied her down to a chair and put a pillowcase over her face, and
ransacked the victim’s property. Moreover, Silva stated that approximately
20–30 minutes into the robbery a truck pulled into the driveway and stayed
for an additional 15–20 minutes before leaving. While the evidence does not
show the specific duration of the underlying felony, we can gather that the
robbery lasted at least an hour, and Silva also expressed that the robbery had
been going on for “too long” before asking Hill if she was ready to leave.
Based on this circumstantial evidence, it seems the robbery went on for a
prolonged period of time, increasing the opportunity for violence.
Under the fourth Clark factor—knowledge of cohort’s likelihood of
killing—the trial court found that Silva knew Hill would use the gun to shoot
the victim after they discussed whether they would leave behind a witness.
“A defendant’s knowledge of factors bearing on a cohort’s likelihood of killing
are [sic] significant to the analysis of reckless indifference to human life.
Defendant’s knowledge of such factors may be evident before the felony or
may occur during the felony.” (Clark, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 621.) Here,
Silva had advance notice of the possibility Hill would shoot the victim
because she continued to ask whether they were going to leave a witness.
Contrary to Silva’s argument, information bearing on Hill’s likelihood
of killing gained during the felony is also relevant under Clark. Thus, even
assuming Silva was not aware of Hill’s violent nature before the robbery,
Silva became aware of the likelihood that Hill would shoot and kill the victim
14
during the robbery because Hill indicated she did not want to leave any
witnesses.5
Lastly, under the fifth Clark factor—efforts to minimize the risk of
violence during the felony—the trial court found Silva did nothing to “protest
against, physically prevent or in any way dissuade or stop the killing” and
“essentially endorsed the killing so long as he was not the shooter.”
“[A] defendant’s apparent efforts to minimize the risk of violence can be
relevant to the reckless indifference to human life analysis. If the evidence
supports an argument that defendant engaged in efforts to minimize the risk
of violence in the felony, defendant may raise that argument and the
appellate court shall consider it as being part of all the relevant
circumstances . . . . But the existence of evidence that defendant made some
effort to minimize the risk of violence does not, in itself, necessarily foreclose
a finding that defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life . . . .”
(Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 622.)
Here, Silva initially did tell Hill that they did not need to harm the
victim and made an effort to minimize the risk of violence. However, Silva’s
efforts were minimal and ceased upon additional questioning from Hill, and
he eventually acquiesced to her statement that she needed to
“ ‘do something’ ” with the victim. Thus, Silva’s efforts to minimize the risk of
5 As part of the trial court’s major participant analysis, the court found
“specifically that [Silva] must have been aware of Ms. Hill’s threatening and
violent nature, as the record of conviction demonstrates she consistently
portrayed herself in such a way, and frequently made overt statements about
committing violent acts. As her partner in crime, and her husband, the court
finds [Silva] must have known she was dangerous.” As the court indicated,
there was additional testimony during the preliminary hearing that shows
Hill had violent tendencies and often spoke of killing others to protect herself,
prior to the robbery. We find it hard to believe that Silva, despite their short
relationship, was oblivious to Hill’s violent nature before the robbery.
15
violence do not foreclose a finding of reckless indifference or diminish his
culpability.
In this context, Silva’s argument that the trial court’s finding “placed
no limitation on what [Silva] was required to do ‘to stop [Hill],’ including
putting his own life at risk,” is disingenuous. As illustrated ante, the fifth
Clark factor asks whether the defendant took steps to minimize the risk of
violence. If a defendant takes such steps, he or she may raise that argument
to the trial court and the court may consider it as part of its overall analysis.
For example, if Silva had taken more meaningful steps to minimize the risk
of violence, such as those identified by the court—dissuaded, protested
against, or physically prevented and stopped the killing—the court could
have considered his culpability diminished. The court did not require, nor
does the Clark analysis suggest, that there be no limit on what Silva was
required to do to minimize the risk of violence. Furthermore, we reject
Silva’s invitation to incorporate a reasonableness standard into the reckless
indifference analysis as unnecessary.
Overall, each of the Clark factors supported a finding that Silva acted
with reckless indifference to human life. Therefore, we find the trial court
appropriately applied the Clark factors and its factual findings were
supported by substantial evidence.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Silva’s resentencing petition is affirmed.
Jackson, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
Simons, J.
Chou, J.
A169643/People v. Victor Pierre Bento Silva
16
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