CourtListener 10672471•Conn v. Conn CA4/3
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Filed 9/16/25 Conn v. Conn CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
ROBERT L. CONN et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants, G062448, G062455
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2020-
01150274)
ROWENE MACMILLAN CONN,
Individually and as Trustee, etc., OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Kim R. Hubbard, Judge. Reversed with instructions.
Charles K. Mills for Plaintiff and Appellant Laurance C. Conn.
Robert L. Conn in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Tredway Lumsdaine & Doyle, Brandon L. Fieldsted and Brian J.
Ramsey for Defendant and Respondent.
* * *
This appeal arises from a trust dispute between Laurence (Larry)
and Robert (Robby) Conn, on the one hand, and their stepmother, Rowene
MacMillan Conn, on the other. Larry and Robert are remainder beneficiaries
of a trust created upon the death of their father, Ralph B. Conn, Rowene’s
husband (the “Exemption Trust”). Upon his death, Rowene, acting as trustee,
was obligated to fund the Exemption Trust with Ralph’s one-half share of the
couple’s community property, which consisted entirely of a one-half interest
in the family residence. The trust required that the funding occur in cash or
in-kind.
Instead of transferring either the cash equivalent or the property
itself, Rowene took no action for over three years. In 2013, she executed an
unsecured promissory note payable to the trust, listing herself as the
borrower. She used the note to purchase Ralph’s 50 percent interest in the
residence, but valued the property based on a 2010 appraisal—three years
out of date. In 2018, she made a “final” distribution to the decedents, which
Larry accepted but Robby did not, based on the 2010 appraisal.
The trial court held Rowene violated her fiduciary duty by relying
on the stale appraisal, and it awarded damages to Robby (but not Larry)
based on the difference between the stale appraisal and an appraisal as of the
time she executed the promissory note, plus interest.
We agree with the court’s ruling that Rowene violated her
fiduciary duties, though we conclude the court erred in its damages award in
three ways. First, because Robby never accepted any prior distributions,
awarding him the difference between the disbursement offer and the proper
appraisal was insufficient. He should have been awarded his full distribution.
Second, Larry was equally entitled to a full distribution. Third, because
2
Rowene is the income beneficiary of the trust, Robby and Larry were not
entitled to any interest accrued during the administration of the trust.
The other major issues in this case surround the finality of the
2018 distribution. Although Larry signed a document describing the
distribution as final, he contends he should not be held to have waived any
further benefits from the trust. Rowene contends Larry committed fraud
because he accepted the money with no intent to honor the finality of the
distribution.
We agree with Larry. The final distribution did not contain a
waiver of any breaches of trust by Rowene, and there is no evidence that
Larry knew Rowene had improperly funded the trust. We reject Rowene’s
fraud claim because, regardless of Larry’s subjective intent when he signed
the agreement, he is bound by its terms, as far as they go, and he was
entitled to file a lawsuit to resolve the scope of the agreement.
Ultimately, Rowene’s fiduciary duties require her to offer a final
disbursement that reflects a properly funded trust. Because Larry already
accepted the initial disbursement, he is entitled to the difference between
what he was given and what he should have been offered. Because Robby did
not accept the disbursement, he is entitled to the full amount, properly
calculated.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Larry and Robby are the adult children of Ralph Conn, who
married Rowene in 1986.1
1 Ralph had a third adult child, Catherine Conn Timme, who is
not a party to this proceeding.
3
In 2007, Ralph and Rowene established an inter vivos revocable
trust. At that time, they transferred their residence in Newport Beach into
the trust.
Under the terms of the inter vivos trust, upon the first death of
one of the spouses, three new trusts would be created, only two of which are
relevant here: the Survivor’s Trust, to be funded with the survivor’s one-half
share of the community estate, and the Exemption Trust, to be funded with
decedent’s one-half share. The surviving spouse became the sole trustee of
both trusts.
This appeal centers principally on the Exemption Trust. The
Exemption Trust provides, “Upon the death of the Deceased Grantor and in
the event that the Deceased Grantor is Grantor Husband, all of the assets of
the Exemption Trust . . . shall be distributed to the children of RALPH
CONN, CATIE CONN TIMME, ROBERT LEE CONN, and LARRY C.
CONN.” However, somewhat inconsistently, it then provides, “[I]n the event
the Exemption Trust is not distributed to the beneficiaries described above,
the Trustee shall pay to . . . the Surviving Grantor, all of the net income of
the Exemption Trust . . . .” Not only is the Surviving Grantor entitled to the
income, but also has a power of invasion: “If at any time, in the discretion of
the Trustee, the Surviving Grantor shall be in need of additional funds for his
or her reasonable health, education, support or maintenance, the Trustee, in
addition to the income payments herein above provided, may in its discretion,
pay to or apply for the benefit of the Surviving Spouse of the Grantor, such
amounts of principal of the Exemption Trust, up to the whole thereof, as the
Trustee may, from time to time deem advisable. The Surviving Grantor need
not exhaust other sources of income or assets to be entitled to such payment.”
The parties have interpreted these provisions as providing the surviving
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spouse a life estate in the Exemption Trust, with the children being
remainder beneficiaries.
Elsewhere, the inter vivos trust provides discretion to the trustee
to make any property divisions either in kind or in money.
The inter vivos trust also specified that the interests of income
beneficiaries were considered primary over remainder beneficiaries: “The
primary purpose of this Trust Agreement is to provide for the income
beneficiaries and the rights and interests of remainder men are subordinate
to that purpose. The provisions of this agreement shall be construed liberally
in the interest of and for the benefit of the income beneficiaries.”
Finally, the inter vivos trust provided a six-month grace period
for the surviving spouse to make any property distributions pursuant to the
trust, and, within that period, “the deferred division or distribution shall be
made as if it had taken place at the time prescribed in this instrument . . . .”
Ralph passed away in November 2010.
Rowene commissioned an appraisal of the residence as of the
time of Ralph’s death, which valued the residence at $1,172,500.
Rowene did not fund the Exemption Trust at that time, nor
within the six-month grace period provided by the inter vivos trust. Instead,
in September 2013, she essentially sold the 50 percent interest in the
residence to herself by funding the Exemption Trust with an unsecured
“Demand Note” in the amount of $475,321.34, which bore interest at a rate of
0.35 percent per year. That amount was calculated by taking the appraised
value of the home as of November 2010, subtracting the existing mortgage,
and dividing the remainder by two to come up with the amount of Ralph’s
community property interest. She then conveyed Ralph’s fifty percent
5
interest in the residence to a new trust, of which she was the primary
beneficiary.2 This was all done on the advice of counsel.3
Beginning in March, 2018, Robby began asking for a meeting
with Rowene and her counsel to go over the administration of the trust. His
requests were repeated numerous times and in various ways over the ensuing
seven months, but Rowene either ignored him or put him off.
Sometime near the end of April 2018, Rowene mailed to Ralph’s
children a document entitled “Disbursement to the Children of R.B. Conn.”
That document stated, “I, Rowene M. Conn, do hereby make the final
distribution from the Estate of Ralph B. Conn, their father, to his three heirs:
to Catharine Conn Timme, Robert L. Conn, and Laurence C. Conn.” It then
went on to explain the use of the Demand Note, as well as how the value of
the residence was calculated. It also explained the amount of each heir’s
distribution. It concluded: “Please sign, date, and return to me that you are
receiving the final payments and that the demands of the Note have been
fulfilled.”
When Larry received the Disbursement Letter, he was aware
that Robby had concerns about the administration of the trust. He was also
aware that Robby did not intend to sign it. Nevertheless, with the exception
2 The actual conveyance was from the inter vivos trust to Rowene
as trustee of the Rowene M. Conn Trust established September 25, 2013 (the
new trust). This demonstrates that the Exemption Trust was never given
Ralph’s fifty percent of the community property.
3 There was a significant discrepancy on the Demand Note. It was
dated November 15, 2010. However, Rowene would later admit in amended
discovery responses that the Demand Note was actually prepared in
September 2013.
6
of asking for a correction of the spelling of his name, Larry signed it without
further objection. Larry received his distribution of $145,623.12.4
Robby, however, did not sign the letter and continued seeking a
meeting with Rowene. That meeting finally occurred on October 10, 2018.
According to Robby’s testimony, Rowene’s counsel admitted at the meeting
that the Exemption Trust had not been properly funded and that the
Exemption Trust was entitled to a 50 percent interest in the residence.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Larry filed a petition in the probate court against Rowene on
June 30, 2020. In it, he alleged Rowene breached the trust by undervaluing
the residence and backdating the demand note. He further alleged that
Rowene’s distribution fraudulently denied Larry the benefit of appreciation
on the residence, both by undervaluing the residence and by including an
interest rate well below the expected appreciation of the residence. Larry
sought damages of at least $162,900.37, plus punitive damages.
Rowene filed a cross-petition against Larry on April 21, 2021. She
alleged that Larry fraudulently induced the disbursement by signing it
without any intention to honor the finality of the payment. Rowene sought
recission of the disbursement and damages.
Robby filed his petition against Rowene on May 21, 2021. Also
alleging breaches of fiduciary duty, Robby sought damages and removal of
Rowene as trustee. He also alleged a cause of action for elder abuse.
The matter came on for trial in November 2022 and continued on
several nonconsecutive days through early 2023. Ruling on Larry’s petition,
the court first made an adverse credibility finding, stating, “By the time
4 Catharine also signed the letter and received her distribution.
7
Larry Conn was done testifying, he had no credibility with this Court,
whatsoever.” On the merits, the court affirmed the enforceability of the
Disbursement Letter, finding Rowene had acted in good faith, and it denied
Larry’s petition in its entirety.
The court likewise denied Rowene’s cross-petition for fraud
against Larry. The court found insufficient evidence “that Larry had the
requisite intent to defraud . . . .”
The court granted Robby’s petition in part. It ruled that Rowene
was entitled to fund the Exemption Trust with an unsecured IOU, but that
she breached the trust agreement by funding the Exemption Trust in 2013
based on an appraisal of the property as of 2010. The court then calculated
the difference between the 2010 and 2013 valuations, and it awarded Robby
his 1/3 share of that difference in damages. It then calculated interest at 10
percent per year, resulting in a total damage award to Robby of $76,383.57.
The court rejected Robby’s claim for elder abuse.
Larry and Robby appealed, and Rowene filed a cross-appeal.
DISCUSSION
I.
THE FUNDING OF THE EXEMPTION TRUST
Both Larry and Robby contend Rowene breached the terms of the
trust by funding the Exemption Trust with an unsecured demand note. We
agree.
“The interpretation of a will or trust instrument presents a
question of law unless interpretation turns on the credibility of extrinsic
evidence or a conflict therein.” (Burch v. George (1994) 7 Cal.4th 246, 254.)
The essential facts surrounding the funding of the trust are undisputed and
thus we apply a de novo review.
8
We begin with an overview of the relevant trust provisions.
Under the terms of the inter vivos trust, upon the death of Ralph, Rowene
was required to divide the existing res of the trust into, as relevant here, two
different trusts: the Survivor’s Trust, which contained her separate property
and her 50 percent share of the community property, and the Exemption
Trust, which was to contain Ralph’s separate property and his 50 percent
share of the community property. This was supposed to occur “On the death
of the Deceased Spouse,” which Rowene failed to do at that time. That was a
breach of trust.
Next we consider what was to be gifted to each trust. The funding
of the Survivor’s Trust was expressly permitted to “be satisfied in cash or in
kind, or partly in each, only with assets to be valued at the date or dates they
are distributed to the Survivor’s Trust . . . .” The provisions concerning the
Exemption Trust do not contain a similar provision, but instead require
funding with “the balance of the Trust Estate,” which was expected to consist
of Ralph’s separate and community property. Nevertheless, under the general
powers of the trustee, section 16.1(O), a similar power to fund in either cash
or in kind is conferred: “In any case in which the Trustee is required,
pursuant to the provisions of the Trust, to divide any Trust property into
parts or shares for the purpose of distribution, or otherwise, the Trustee is
authorized, in the Trustee’s absolute discretion, to make the division and
distribution in kind, including undivided interests in any property, or partly
in kind and partly in money, and for this purpose, to make such sales of the
Trust property as the Trustee may deem necessary on such terms and
conditions as the Trustee shall see fit.” Given the way the trust is structured
and the powers conferred to the trustee, the trial court concluded that the
funding requirements applicable to the Survivor’s Trust apply equally to the
9
Exemption Trust. The parties do not dispute that interpretation, and we
agree it is sound. Rowene was entitled to fund the trust with either an
interest in the property or its cash equivalent.
The trial court found that Rowene breached the trust by funding
it in 2013 but relying on a valuation of the residence as of 2010. This
breached the provision, quoted above, that the asset be “valued at the date or
dates they are distributed.” Rowene does not really dispute the trial court’s
findings in this regard, and we agree the court’s findings are correct.
Where the parties principally differ is in whether Rowene was
entitled to fund the Exemption Trust with an unsecured promissory note. The
trial court found it was within Rowene’s powers as trustee to do so. We
conclude otherwise.
The trust required that the funding be in “cash” or “in kind.”
Those are straightforward terms. “Cash” is about as clear as can be: it means
money; currency. The term “in kind” has a well-known meaning in the law: it
means the property itself. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “distribution in
kind” as “A transfer of property in its original state, such as a distribution of
land instead of the proceeds of its sale. (DISTRIBUTION, Black's Law
Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).) This is consistent with the trust itself, which
qualifies the term “in kind” with the phrase “including undivided interests in
any property.” This shows the trust itself understood “in kind” to refer to
actual property as well. A promissory note is neither cash nor “in kind”
property.
Rowene counters that section 16.1(O) of the trust (quoted above)
permits the trustee “absolute discretion” and confers the power to “to make
such sales of the Trust property as the Trustee may deem necessary on such
terms and conditions as the Trustee shall see fit.” However, she takes those
10
portions out of context. The “absolute discretion” is the discretion to choose
between a cash distribution or an in-kind distribution; it is not the absolute
discretion to fund the trust with something else altogether. And while the
trustee does have the power of sale, that power is qualified by the phrase “for
this purpose”—i.e., for the purpose of a cash or in-kind distribution. In other
words, the trustee can sell the property and distribute the cash proceeds from
the sale. But that power does not alter the fundamental obligation to fund the
Exemption Trust with either cash or an interest in the property itself. In
concluding otherwise, the trial court erred.
II.
DAMAGES
The second major point of disagreement between the parties is
whether Robby and Larry were entitled to any damages. We first address the
damages awarded to Robby and then damages to Larry.
The trial court awarded approximately $76,000 in damages to
Robby, consisting of Robby’s share of the difference between the 2010 and
2013 appraisal of the property, which amounted to $33,750, plus interest at
10 percent per year, compounding annually, from 2013 to 2023. Robby
contends he should have been granted his entire distribution, not just the
difference, whereas Rowene contends Robby was not entitled to any damages
at all. We agree with both parties in part: (1) the court should have granted
Robby his full distribution, but (2) Robby was not entitled to interest between
2013 and 2018.
We begin with the amount of the distribution. The court awarded
Robby the difference between the 2010 appraisal and the 2013 appraisal. But
this would only make sense if Robby had already received the distribution
11
based on the 2010 appraisal. Unlike Larry, he did not. Thus, he should have
been awarded the full amount of his distribution utilizing the 2013 appraisal.
Rowene takes the position that because the Disbursement Letter
constituted a waiver of any further liability for Rowene, she was entitled to
make a selective early disbursement to only those beneficiaries who signed
the waiver but refuse a distribution to those who did not. On that logic,
because Robby did not sign the waiver, he was not, and is not, entitled to any
distribution. We disagree.
Rowene reads too much into the Disbursement Letter. It was not
a waiver agreement. Nowhere does the Disbursement Letter mention
anything about a waiver or release of liability. The closest it gets is (1)
describing the distribution as “final”, and (2) a signature line acknowledging
receipt of the distribution and “that the demands of the Note have been
fulfilled.” We have already determined that the Note was a breach of her
duty, and thus that part of the Distribution Letter has no effect. Beyond that,
the recipients were not asked to agree to anything at all, much less a waiver
of liability.
Ultimately, Rowene decided to fully distribute the principal of the
trust prior to her death. She was not required to do that. However, as the
trial court observed, once she made that decision, she had to carry it out in a
manner that was consistent with her fiduciary duties. That included a
requirement that she properly calculate the principal and fully distribute it
to all of the beneficiaries. Because she took on that duty as trustee, Robby
was entitled to enforce it.
However, we agree with Rowene that awarding interest damages
from 2013 was error. Indeed, Larry concedes the error. The problem is that
the trust is clear that Rowene is the income beneficiary of the Exemption
12
Trust. Larry and Robby are remainder beneficiaries. Even when Rowene dies,
while the principal must be distributed to Ralph’s children, Rowene’s children
are entitled to any income that had not been previously distributed to
Rowene. Because Robby is not entitled to any income generated by the
principal of the trust, there was no sound basis for awarding Robby interest
from the period of 2013 through the time of trial.
Nevertheless, Robby contends the court should have awarded
interest starting in May 2018, which was the time Rowene decided to
distribute the rest of the trust. In theory, at least, interest from 2018 makes
some sense. Since Robby was entitled to a distribution at that time based on
Rowene’s decision to liquidate the trust, he could have invested his
distribution and earned income from the investment, but he was deprived of
that opportunity by Rowene’s breach.
There is a potential problem, however. Where does the interest
payment come from? If Rowene fully distributes the properly funded
Exemption Trust, there will be nothing left to pay interest. And the trust
exonerates Rowene from any personal liability “so long as the Trustee shall
have been acting in good faith and without gross negligence.” The trial court
made an express finding that Rowene was relying on the advice of counsel in
good faith throughout her administration of the trust, and we have no reason
to disturb that finding.
While this is an issue that needs to be explored, because this
issue has not been adequately briefed, we will remand to the trial court to
consider in the first instance whether interest can and should be awarded
from 2018 onward.
The other issue of damages concerns Larry. The trial court denied
Larry’s petition in its entirety. However, our conclusions above apply equally
13
to Larry. He is also entitled to a full distribution from the trust based on the
2013 appraisal.
Rowene’s principal argument against Larry is that he signed the
Disbursement Letter, which Rowene characterizes as a waiver. The trial
court agreed with that characterization. As we explained above, we do not.
When the Disbursement Letter used the word “final,” that meant Rowene
intended to fully distribute the Trust leaving nothing to be distributed in the
future. What it did not purport to do is waive any breaches of the trust or
release Rowene from any liability as trustee. Nowhere in the Disbursement
Letter is the word “waiver” or “release” mentioned. It simply did not touch on
that topic at all. Moreover, it did not even require an acknowledgment that
the terms of the trust had been fulfilled—it required an acknowledgment that
the terms of the Demand Note had been fulfilled.
Additionally, even if the Disbursement Letter had purported to
release Rowene, it would not have complied with Probate Code section 16464.
That section provides that a beneficiary may release a trustee from a breach,
but such a release is not effective in the following circumstances: “(2) Where
the beneficiary did not know of his or her rights and of the material facts (A)
that the trustee knew or reasonably should have known and (B) that the
trustee did not reasonably believe that the beneficiary knew,” and “(4) Where
the transaction involved a bargain with the trustee that was not fair and
reasonable.” (Prob. Code, §§ (b)(2), (b)(4).) There was no evidence that Larry
actually knew about Rowene’s breach of trust, and the transaction did involve
a bargain with the trustee that was not fair—Rowene sold the residence to
herself at a below market price.
Both because the Distribution Letter did not purport to be a
waiver or release, and also because it would have failed the test of Probate
14
Code section 16464 in any event, Larry was not precluded from seeking his
full distribution under the trust.
* * *
The foregoing resolves most of the major issues surrounding the
interpretation and implementation of the trust. We turn now to more
peripheral issues briefed by the parties.
III.
ROBERT’S APPEAL WAS TIMELY
Rowene contends Robert’s fiduciary duty claims are time-barred
under Probate Code section 16460, which imposes a three-year statute of
limitations from the date a beneficiary receives sufficient disclosure of a
claim. Rowene argues the limitations period began in April 2018 when she
transmitted the Disbursement documents. Robert’s petition was filed in May
2021.
Even assuming the statute began to run in April 2018, Robert’s
claims are timely. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Judicial
Council enacted Emergency Rule 9(a), which tolled unexpired statutes of
limitations from April 6 to October 1, 2020. (Ross v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP
(2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 722, 743.) That 178-day tolling period extends the
three-year limitations window, in this case, to October 2021. Because Robert
filed in May 2021, his claims fall well within the extended period.
We reject Rowene’s argument that Robert forfeited reliance on
Emergency Rule 9 by not raising it in the trial court. The applicability of
judicially enacted tolling rules presents a pure question of law on undisputed
facts, which we may consider for the first time on appeal. (Ramirez v.
Department of Motor Vehicles (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1313, 1335.) Robert’s
petition was timely.
15
IV.
ROBBY’S CLAIM FOR ELDER ABUSE
Robby asserted a cause of action for financial elder abuse based
on him turning 65 on August 12, 2020. Even though most of the relevant
events of this case took place before he turned 65, he contends Rowene still
committed elder abuse because, after he turned 65, Rowene retained the
property. (See Welfare & Institutions Code, § 15610.30, subd. (a)(1) [defining
financial elder abuse to include “retain[ing] real or personal property of an
elder or dependent adult for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud”].)
However, his argument depends on the premise that Rowene was obligated to
transfer an interest in the residence to the trust. As we have already
concluded, Rowene had the option of funding the Exemption Trust with
money or in kind, and in 2013, she chose money (albeit mistakenly believing
a promissory note satisfied that condition). Since that occurred well before
Robby turned 65, we agree with the trial court that his claim for elder abuse
fails. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.27 [defining “elder” as a person age 65
or older].)
V.
THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDING THAT ROWENE ACTED IN GOOD FAITH
Robby challenges the trial court’s finding that, in funding the
trust, Rowene acted in good faith on the advice of counsel. His principal
challenge to that finding is that the court erred in excluding evidence that
when Robby met with Rowene and her counsel in 2018, Rowene’s counsel, in
an admission against interest, took the position that the trust required
Rowene to transfer an interest in the property to the trust.
Assuming the trial court erred in excluding that evidence, we are
not persuaded the error was prejudicial. As we have already concluded, the
16
alleged position taken by Rowene’s counsel at that time was erroneous.
Rowene was entitled to fund the trust with money rather than an interest in
the property. As such, its relevance is limited. Moreover, Rowene’s good-faith
reliance would have occurred in 2013 when she actually funded the trust, and
thus her counsel’s statements in 2018 have little relevance and were not
likely to change the trial court’s finding of good faith. Accordingly, exclusion
of that evidence was not prejudicial.
VI.
ROWENE’S FRAUD CLAIM
Finally, Rowene claims the trial court erred in concluding she
had not proven her fraud claim against Larry. Rowene’s fraud claim was
based on Larry’s testimony stating that he did not intend the Disbursement
Letter to be final and did not intend the Disbursement Letter to be a
contract. Rowene contends this testimony compelled a finding that Larry
committed promissory fraud. The trial court found Larry did not have the
requisite intent to commit fraud.
Rowene’s fraud claim makes very little sense to us. As we have
already noted above, the Disbursement Letter was not clearly a contract. It
characterized the disbursement as “final,” but the nature of the document
was more an explanation by Rowene of how she calculated the disbursement.
The only arguable contractual term in it came in the signature line and was
an acknowledgment that the terms of the Demand Note had been satisfied.
We can certainly understand the ambiguity Larry may have felt upon
reading it.
Moreover, Rowene’s fraud claim has another, more fundamental
problem. This is not your typical promissory fraud case where a party
promises to do something without any intent to do it. There was nothing left
17
for Larry to do. He signed the acknowledgment, and the Disbursement Letter
did not call for any other action on his part. To the extent the Disbursement
Letter created any legal obligations, it would have been enforceable
regardless of Larry’s subjective intent. So it is not clear what exactly the
misrepresentation was. He was certainly entitled to file a lawsuit to test the
validity and scope of the agreement, and, in any event, if the claim is that he
committed fraud by filing a lawsuit, that claim would run headlong into the
litigation privilege. (See Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 214
[litigation privilege “immuniz[es] participants from liability for torts arising
from communications made during judicial proceedings” and noting it applies
to theories of fraud].) Accordingly, Rowene’s fraud claim was problematic on
multiple levels and the court was correct to reject it.5
* * *
5 Larry filed a motion to dismiss Rowene’s cross-appeal as to the
court’s ruling on his fraud claim. He argued that Rowene’s notice of cross
appeal specified only the appellate case number for Robby’s appeal, not his.
We deny that motion. Rowene’s cross appeal must be interpreted liberally.
(K.J. v. Los Angeles Unified School District (2020) 8 Cal.5th 875, 882.)
Rowene’s notice of cross appeal was sufficient because it specified the ruling
that contains the trial court’s decision on the fraud claim. Our ruling is
consistent with other courts that have held that specifying the wrong case
number does not render a notice of appeal ineffective. (See In re Jordan
(1992) 4 Cal.4th 116, 131 fn.9; Aguilar v. Gostischef (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th
475, 479 [“affixing the wrong case number on a notice of appeal does not
warrant dismissal”].)
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In the end, our resolution of this appeal simply requires Rowene
to do what she already decided to do: make a final distribution of the
Exemption Trust assets to each beneficiary. That final distribution must be
properly calculated based on the 2013 appraisal of the residence, which is the
sole asset of the Exemption Trust.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. On remand, the court is instructed to
award Robby and Larry the full amount of their final trust distribution based
on the evidence from the first trial. The court is further instructed to assess
whether an award of interest is appropriate from 2018 onward. Robby and
Larry shall recover their costs incurred on appeal.
SANCHEZ, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, ACTING P.J.
SCOTT, J.
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