People v. Deflaun CA2/6

CourtListener 10672465Calctapp16 sept. 2025

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Filed 9/16/25 P. v. Deflaun CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B330427
(Super. Ct. No.
Plaintiff and Respondent, F000314004001)
(San Luis Obispo County)
v.

STEPHEN ARTHUR
DEFLAUN,

Defendant and Appellant.

Stephen Arthur Deflaun appeals the judgment entered
after a jury convicted him on two counts of first-degree murder
(Pen. Code,1 §§ 187, subd. (a), 189, subd. (a)) and assault with a
firearm upon a peace officer (§ 245, subd. (a)). The jury also
found true a multiple-murder special circumstance allegation (§
190.2, subd. (a)(3)) as well as allegations as to the murder counts
that appellant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm

1All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
causing death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) and personally used a
firearm in committing the assault upon a peace officer (id., subd.
(b)). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found appellant
had failed to meet his burden of showing by a preponderance of
the evidence that he was legally insane at the time of the
killings.2 The court sentenced him to an aggregate term of life
without the possibility of parole (LWOP) plus 66 years to life.
Appellant contends his trial attorney provided ineffective
assistance of counsel (IAC) at sentencing. We affirm.
Facts
On July 8, 2001, appellant drove his van to the campground
at Morro Strand State Beach. Appellant had lived in the van
since 1986 and had been previously diagnosed with paranoid
schizophrenia and alcohol use disorder. Since 1979, he had not
sought treatment or taken antipsychotic medication because he
was “afraid that they would have [him] committed and
murdered.”
Appellant checked in at the campground kiosk with park
aide Heidi Houdek and was assigned to a campsite. Appellant

2 Appellant’s crimes were committed in July 2001. In
February 2002, criminal proceedings were suspended after
appellant was declared incompetent to stand trial. In 2021, he
was returned to criminal court after the public guardian filed a
certification of his mental competency. In February 2022, the
court found appellant competent to stand trial and the criminal
proceedings were reinstated.

2
drove to the campsite, then drove to a nearby grocery store and
bought a 12-pack of beer.
After appellant had returned to his campsite, Stephen
Wells and his wife Elizabeth arrived at the campground in a
recreational vehicle (RV) along with Elizabeth’s 11-year-old
nephew Jerry, her 11-year-old son Brian, and her two other
children. Houdek told Wells to drive around the campground to
see if he could find a campsite large enough to accommodate the
RV. After entering the campground, Wells parked next to
appellant’s van and told Brian and Jerry to ask appellant if he
was staying the night.
Jerry asked appellant through his van window if he would
be moving and appellant answered no. After Jerry told Wells
what he had asked and how appellant had responded, Wells told
him to ask appellant more specifically if he was staying the night.
When Jerry asked this question, appellant yelled something like
“‘[g]et out of here. I’ll kick your ass.’” Wells got out of the RV and
asked appellant “‘why are you yelling at my kids?’” Wells and
appellant yelled at each other. Wells told appellant that he
smelled marijuana and alcohol and was going to report him.
Wells drove the RV to the exit side of the kiosk and parked.
Wells then walked to the entrance side of the kiosk with Jerry
and Brian and asked Houdek to call the park ranger. After
reaching the dispatcher, Houdek handed the phone to Wells.
Wells told the dispatcher that appellant had threatened his
nephew and was drunk and smelled of marijuana.
Appellant approached the exit side of the kiosk and began
arguing with Wells through the kiosk windows. Brian heard
appellant yell “‘[y]ou shouldn’t have fucked with me,’” then saw
him pull out a gun and start shooting. Brian saw Jerry fall to the

3
ground after being shot in the head, then ran and hid behind a
car.
Elizabeth heard two gunshots, saw Wells lying on the
ground near the kiosk, and called 911. Appellant opened the
living room door to the RV, pointed a gun at the children inside,
and asked Elizabeth if she had a gun. Elizabeth replied “[n]o”
and pleaded that she had two small kids. Appellant yelled,
“‘[w]hy’d you have to fuck with me’” and slammed the door closed.
Houdek heard the gunshots and got down on the floor of
the kiosk. After about a minute she crawled to the back door and
exited the kiosk to head toward her car. She saw appellant with
a gun and showed her hands. Appellant told Houdek he was not
going to hurt her and calmly “said something to the effect of it
was over.” Houdek got into her car and drove away as Park
Ranger Charles Jackson, a sworn peace officer, was arriving in
his patrol car. Houdek stopped and told Jackson that two people
had been killed.
As Jackson was driving toward the kiosk he saw two people
lying on the ground near the entry side. Jackson stopped his
vehicle and saw appellant near the exit side of the kiosk pacing,
talking, and waving a gun. Jackson exited his vehicle with a 12-
gauge shotgun, identified himself as state park peace officer, and
ordered appellant to drop his weapon. Appellant pointed his gun
at Jackson’s face. Jackson attempted to fire his shotgun at
appellant but there was no round in the chamber. He ran and
took cover behind the RV.
Jackson pointed his shotgun at appellant and again
ordered him to drop his weapon. Appellant once again pointed
his gun at Jackson. Jackson fired his shotgun at appellant, who
took cover behind another vehicle. Jackson eventually fired his

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shotgun underneath the vehicle behind which appellant had
taken cover and appellant was struck by multiple pellets.
Appellant threw his gun backward over his head and was taken
into custody and transported to the hospital for treatment of his
injuries.
A sample of appellant’s blood taken at the hospital
contained a blood alcohol level of 0.12 percent. A forensic
toxicologist opined that appellant had a blood alcohol level of 0.15
to 0.17 percent at the time of the shootings.
Jerry had two gunshot wounds to his head and was
pronounced dead at the scene. Wells had gunshot wounds to the
side of his head, below his right eye, in his right bicep, and above
his left knee. Wells was transported to the hospital and died in
the emergency room.
Appellant testified in his own defense. On the day of the
shootings, he was hearing voices and quickly drank 12 beers to
calm himself. When Wells approached appellant’s van to
confront him about his treatment of Brian, appellant “gave him
the finger[.]” Wells yelled at appellant and told him to get out of
the van if he wanted to fight. Appellant “might have been a little
nervous” but Wells “didn’t really scare [him].”
Appellant claimed that about 10 minutes after Wells left in
the RV, appellant heard voices telling him that Wells was a “fed
agent assassin sent by the programmers to murder [him].”
Appellant exited the van with his loaded .357 caliber revolver
because he wanted to protect himself and “give Wells an excuse
to shoot [him].” As appellant walked from his van to the kiosk,
he decided to “die by fed agent assassin” to avoid “being captured
and tortured at some future time by the program.”

5
After arguing with Wells from the exit side of the kiosk,
appellant walked around the kiosk and shot Wells in the head.
Wells fell to the ground and when he tried to get up, appellant
shot him two more times. Appellant claimed he shot Wells
because he had seen Wells reaching toward his right-hand pocket
and was “scared.” According to appellant, he “changed [his] mind
about dying at the last minute.” After shooting Wells, appellant
saw a “quick movement to [his] left” in his peripheral vision and
then turned and shot Jerry. Appellant subsequently walked over
to Jerry, who was lying on the ground, and shot him again.
Appellant then walked over to Wells, who was also lying on the
ground, a shot him again as well. In shooting both victims in this
manner, appellant “let [his] arm hang down” and “looked straight
ahead and pulled the trigger.”
When appellant encountered Jackson, he did not fire his
gun at him because he “didn’t know whether he was with
Stephen Wells, the assassin, or whether he was actually a park
ranger.” He claimed that he wanted Jackson to shoot him, but
then “gave up on him shooting [him]” and decided to take cover
behind a nearby vehicle. When Jackson ordered appellant to
drop his weapon, appellant responded “‘[n]o fucking way’”
because he still “didn’t know whether he was an assassin . . . or
whether he was a real park ranger.”
Appellant also presented the testimony of two mental
health experts. Dr. Carolyn Murphy, a forensic psychologist,
diagnosed appellant with paranoid schizophrenia and opined that
the disorder prevented him from appreciating the quality of his
actions or understanding moral or legal right from wrong. Dr.
Kevin Perry opined that appellant was able to understand the
nature and qualify of his actions, but at the time of the offenses

6
was unable to understand right from wrong due to his mental
illness. On rebuttal, two prosecution mental health experts
opined that although appellant was suffering from schizophrenia
when the crimes were committed, he was capable of
understanding the nature and quality of his actions and
distinguishing right from wrong.
Sentencing
In anticipation of sentencing, appellant’s trial attorney filed
a statement in mitigation asserting among other things that the
court should dismiss all three firearm enhancements pursuant to
sections 1385 and 12022.53, subdivision (h). Counsel argued that
“the court should not impose the firearm enhancements because
it would cause the court to impose an unjust sentence. An
indeterminate life sentence, without the possibility of parole, is
more than sufficient punishment for a man who has
demonstrable severe mental health disorders.” Counsel also
identified mitigating factors including (1) that appellant was
suffering from a mental condition that significantly reduced his
culpability for the crimes, and (2) that multiple enhancements
were alleged in the case. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 4.423(b)(2) &
4.423(b)(11).) Counsel further asserted that “[i]f the court, in its
discretion, does not impose both of the 25-life firearm
enhancements under [section] 12022.53(d), then the court could
impose the ten (10) year enhancement under [section]
12022.53(b).”
Prior to sentencing appellant, the trial court stated “I’m
well aware of the significant mental health issues that
[appellant] suffers from and has suffered from for a long-standing
period of time.” In subsequently imposing a sentence of 25 years
to life on count 1 for the first-degree murder of Wells, the court

7
exercised its discretion to dismiss the 25-year firearm
enhancement attendant to that count “pursuant to [section]
12022.53 subsection (h) and . . . section 1385[.]” On count 2 (the
first degree murder of Jerry), the court imposed a consecutive
sentence of LWOP plus a consecutive 25-year firearm
enhancement pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (d). On
count 3 (the assault of Jackson), the court imposed a consecutive
midterm sentence of six years plus a consecutive 10-year firearm
enhancement pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (b).
Discussion
Appellant contends his trial attorney provided ineffective
assistance of counsel (IAC) at sentencing by failing to argue for
dismissal of the firearm enhancements pursuant to section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2), and by failing to request imposition of the low
term on count 3 pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A).
We are not persuaded.
To establish his IAC claims, appellant must demonstrate
that trial counsel’s alleged failures fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness and that absent those errors there is
a reasonable probability appellant would have achieved a more
favorable result. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668,
687–688, 694.) We may reject the claim “without determining
whether counsel’s performance was deficient” if appellant fails to
demonstrate prejudice. (People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349,
366.) Appellant fails to satisfy this high burden. (People v.
Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 937 [prejudice must be proved as
a “‘demonstrable reality,’ not simply speculation as to the effect of
the errors or omissions of counsel”].)
Under section 12022.53, subdivision (h), “[t]he court may,
in the interest of justice pursuant to [s]ection 1385 and at the

8
time of sentencing, strike or dismiss an enhancement otherwise
required to be imposed by this section.” Section 1385, subdivision
(c)(1) states: “Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall
dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do
so . . . .” Subdivision (c)(2) of section 1385 instructs that in
determining whether an enhancement should be dismissed in
furtherance of justice, “the court shall consider and afford great
weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of
the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are
present. Proof of the presence of one or more of these
circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the
enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety. ‘Endanger public
safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the
enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious
danger to others.”
As relevant here, subdivision (c)(2) of section 1385 requires
the court to consider and give great weight to evidence that
multiple enhancements are alleged in a single case (id., subd.
(c)(2)(B)), as well as evidence that the defendant’s crimes are
connected to mental illness (id., subd. (c)(2)(D)). The statute,
however, “does not ‘presume’ an enhancement should be
dismissed whenever an enumerated mitigating circumstance is
present, but instead ‘the ultimate question before the trial court
remains whether it is in the furtherance of justice to dismiss an
enhancement’ and this ‘furtherance of justice’ inquiry requires a
trial court’s ongoing exercise of ‘discretion[.]’ Thus,
notwithstanding the presence of a mitigating circumstance, trial
courts retain their discretion to impose an enhancement based on
circumstances ‘long deemed essential to the “furtherance of

9
justice” inquiry.’” (People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024,
1033 (Walker), citations omitted.) “[I]f the court does not
conclude that dismissal would endanger public safety, then
mitigating circumstances strongly favor dismissing the
enhancement. But ultimately, the court must determine whether
dismissal is in furtherance of justice. This means that, absent a
danger to public safety, the presence of an enumerated mitigating
circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an
enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial,
credible evidence of countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless
neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance,
such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of
justice.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1036.)
In reviewing appellant’s claims, we must presume the trial
court was aware of, understood, and followed the law. (People v.
Weddington (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 468, 492.) Appellant fails to
overcome the presumption here that the trial court properly
applied section 1385, subdivision (c) in deciding whether to
dismiss the firearm enhancements. Trial counsel’s statement in
mitigation cited sections 1385 and 12022.53, subdivision (h), and
urged the court “not [to] impose the firearm enhancements
because it would cause the court to impose an unjust sentence.
An indeterminate life sentence, without the possibility of parole,
is more than sufficient punishment for man who has
demonstrable severe mental health disorders.” (Fn. Omitted.)
Moreover, the court actually dismissed the firearm enhancement
on count 2 pursuant to section 1385. Although counsel did not
specifically cite subdivision (c) of section 1385, he referred the
court to the two applicable mitigating factors that are stated in
that subdivision, i.e., that appellant’s offenses were connected to

10
mental illness and that multiple enhancements were alleged in
the case. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 4.423(b)(2), 4.423(b)(11);
compare § 1385, subds. (c)(2)(B) & (c)(2)(D).) We must presume
that the court was aware of section 1385, subdivision (c)—which
had been in effect for over 18 months at the time of sentencing—
and properly applied that law in both dismissing the the firearm
enhancement on count 2, and in declining to dismiss the
enhancements on counts 1 and 3.
Appellant offers no support for his assertion that the
presumptions of regularity and correctness do not apply to his
IAC claims. Merely pointing out that counsel did not expressly
refer to subdivision (c) of section 1385, and that the court did not
refer to that subdivision at sentencing or explain its reasons for
declining to dismiss the enhancements on counts 1 and 3
pursuant to that law, does not lead to a conclusion that the court
failed to consider and apply that law. Section 1385 requires a
court to state its reasons for dismissing an enhancement (id.,
subd. (a)), but the statute contains no similar requirement for
when a court decides not to dismiss (see id., subdivision (c)).
(See People v. Roach (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 178, 184 [“‘An
intention to legislate by implication is not to be presumed.
[Citation.] In construing a statute, we do not insert words into it
as this would “violate the cardinal rule that courts may not add
provisions to a statute”’”]; Yoo v. Shewry (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th
131, 146 [“‘“‘[W]hen the Legislature has carefully employed a
term in one place and has excluded it in another, it should not be
implied where excluded’”’”]; see also In re Coley (2012) 55 Cal.4th
524, 1278.) Although the court in Walker noted that a statement
of reasons for declining to dismiss an enhancement “serves the[]
same interests” as a statement of reasons for a dismissal (Walker,

11
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 158, fn. 6), the court did not hold that such
a statement is compelled.
Moreover, appellant does not contend the trial court abused
its discretion in declining to dismiss the firearm enhancements
on counts 1 and 3; rather, he merely asserts that trial counsel
provided IAC by “failing to understand the law and to adequately
advocate for a sentencing disposition that was most favorable to
him.” He does not dispute that the evidence overwhelmingly
supports the court’s findings that the violent, vicious, and callous
nature of appellant’s crimes—which included the brutal and
senseless execution of an 11-year-old child—and his serious
danger to society were aggravating factors for purposes of
sentencing. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 4.421(a)(1) & (b)(1).) Nor
does he dispute that the court could reasonably find these factors
“‘neutralize[d] even the great weight of the mitigating
circumstance[s], such that dismissal of the enhancement[s on
counts 1 and 3 was] not in furtherance of justice.’” (Walker,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1036.) Because appellant does not
overcome the presumption that the court was aware of,
understood, and applied subdivision (c) of section 1385 in
deciding whether to dismiss the firearm enhancements on counts
1 and 3, his claim that trial counsel provided IAC by failing to
refer to that subdivision fails for lack of prejudice.
Appellant fares no better in claiming that his trial attorney
provided IAC by failing to argue for imposition of the low term on
count 3. Section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A), which also went into
effect on January 1, 2022, provides in relevant part that “unless
the court finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the
mitigating circumstances [such] that imposition of the lower term
would be contrary to the interests of justice, the court shall order

12
imposition of the lower term” if the defendant “has experienced
psychological . . . trauma” that “was a contributing factor in the
commission of the offense.” As appellant notes, a defendant with
a mental disorder is entitled to the benefit of this subdivision if
the disorder has resulted in psychological trauma that
contributed to the crime. (People v. Banner (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th
226, 241.)
As with section 1385, subdivision (c), we must presume the
court was aware of section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A) when it
sentenced appellant on count 3. Moreover, the court declined to
exercise its discretion to dismiss the 10-year firearm
enhancement on count 3 notwithstanding its reliance on
appellant’s mental illness as a mitigating factor. Because it is
not reasonably probable that trial counsel’s express reference to
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A) would have led the court to
impose the low term on count 3, appellant’s claim that counsel
provided IAC by failing to argue for the low term also fails.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

CODY, J.

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Jacquelyn Duffy, Judge
Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo
______________________________

Jin H. Kim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, Michael J. Wise, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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