CourtListener 10670149•People v. Reynolds CA2/3
Texte intégral
Filed 9/11/25 P. v. Reynolds CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B336551
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA122815)
v.
HAISANI REYNOLDS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Ricardo R. Ocampo, Judge. Affirmed.
Haisani Reynolds, in pro. per.; and Nicholas Seymour,
under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
A jury convicted Haisani Reynolds of first degree murder
with true findings on premeditation and principal gun use
allegations. Thereafter, Reynolds petitioned for resentencing
under Penal Code section 1172.6,1 which limited accomplice
liability for some murder-related crimes. The trial court denied
the petition at the prima facie stage on the ground that the
record of conviction established Reynolds was not convicted under
an invalid theory. Reynolds appeals from the order denying his
petition. His appellate counsel filed a brief under People v.
Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, and Reynolds filed a
supplemental brief. We affirm the order denying Reynolds’s
petition.
BACKGROUND
Reynolds was a member of the 11 Deuce Neighborhood
gang.2 On the night of March 12, 2012, Reynolds, fellow gang
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered to
section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
2 We derive the background from this court’s opinion
affirming Reynolds’s judgment of conviction, People v. Reynolds
(Aug. 11, 2015, B247784) [nonpub. opn.]. (See People v. Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 972 (Lewis) [appellate opinion generally
part of record of conviction in § 1172.6 proceedings].) We
reference the evidence described therein only “for background
purposes and to provide context for the parties’ arguments.”
(People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 978, fn. 2,
disapproved on another ground in People v. Patton (2025) 17
Cal.5th 549, 569.) We do not rely on these facts in assessing
whether the trial court properly concluded that Reynolds failed to
2
member Terrance Bell, and “Ace” were at a gas station. Mark
Lewis was also there, buying gas. Reynolds asked Lewis where
he was from. When Lewis answered he was from “ ‘Avalon,’ ” Bell
retrieved a gun. A witness heard multiple gun shots, saw
Reynolds kick Lewis in the head, and heard Reynolds yell,
“ ‘Neighborhood.’ ” Lewis’s girlfriend, who was with him at the
gas station, said that after Lewis said he was from Avalon,
Reynolds said, “ ‘Get that nigga, cuz,’ ” and the man with a gun
shot Lewis. Reynolds then stomped on the fallen Lewis three or
four times, saying, “ ‘Fuck Avon.’ ” Thereafter, a witness
overheard Reynolds telling someone over the phone, “ ‘The nigga
act like he was challenging me, cuz. He told me he was from
Avalon. And so I told that boy—bust on this bitch ass.’ ” (People
v. Reynolds, supra, B247784.)
A jury convicted Reynolds of first degree murder with true
findings on premeditation, principal gun use, and gang
allegations (§§ 187, subd. (a), 12022.53, subds. (d) & (e)(1),
186.22, subd. (b)(1(C)).3
In 2013, the trial court sentenced Reynolds to 25 years to
life doubled to 50 years to life under the Three Strikes law based
on a prior conviction found true, plus 25 years to life for the gun
enhancement.
In 2022, Reynolds filed a form section 1172.6 petition for
resentencing. The trial court appointed counsel for him and
directed the People to file a response. In a written response, the
make a prima facie showing of eligibility for resentencing.
(Flores, at p. 988.)
3 Bell was tried separately. (People v. Bell (Oct. 27, 2015,
B255356) [nonpub. opn.].)
3
People argued that Reynolds was not prosecuted under felony
murder or natural and probable consequences theories or any
other theory under which malice could have been imputed to him.
Instead, he was prosecuted as an aider and abettor who acted
with actual malice. The People attached the opinion affirming
Reynolds’s judgment on direct appeal, verdicts, and CALCRIM
Nos. 400, 401, 500, 520, and 521, which were given to the jury.
On January 23, 2024, the trial court denied the petition.
The trial court found that Reynolds was not prosecuted under a
now-invalid theory. His conviction instead was “based on intent
to kill” “based on aiding [and] abetting.” The trial court further
noted that Reynolds was convicted of first degree murder with a
premeditation finding. Accordingly, the trial court found that
Reynolds had not established a prima facie case for relief.
DISCUSSION
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill
1437) and subsequent related legislation limited accomplice
liability under the felony-murder rule, eliminated the natural
and probable consequences doctrine as it relates to murder, and
eliminated convictions for murder based on a theory under which
malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime. (See generally People v. Reyes (2023) 14
Cal.5th 981, 986; Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 957, 959; People
v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843 (Gentile).)
Senate Bill 1437 added section 188, subdivision (a)(3),
which provides that “to be convicted of murder, a principal in a
crime shall act with malice aforethought” and malice “shall not
be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in
a crime.” Senate Bill 1437 also amended the felony-murder rule
by adding section 189, subdivision (e), which provides that a
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participant in the perpetration of qualifying felonies is liable for
felony murder only if the person (1) was the actual killer, (2) was
not the actual killer but, with the intent to kill, acted as a direct
aider and abettor, or (3) the person was a major participant in
the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to
human life, as described in section 190.2, subdivision (d).
(Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 842.)
Senate Bill 1437 created a procedure, codified at section
1172.6, for a person convicted of murder under the former law to
be resentenced if the person could no longer be convicted of those
crimes under current law. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959;
Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 847.) A defendant commences
that procedure by filing a petition containing a declaration that,
among other things, the defendant could not presently be
convicted of murder under current law. (People v. Strong (2022)
13 Cal.5th 698, 708.)
At this prima facie stage, the trial court takes as true the
petitioner’s factual allegations and assesses whether the
petitioner would be entitled to relief if those allegations were
proved. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) In determining
whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief, the
trial court may look at the record of conviction, including jury
instructions, verdicts and closing argument, to determine readily
ascertainable facts such as the crime of conviction. (People v.
Duchine (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 798, 815; see, e.g., People v.
Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 56.) If at the prima facie stage
the record of conviction establishes that the petition is meritless,
the trial court may dismiss it. (Lewis, at p. 971.) To deny a
petition at the prima facie stage, the record of conviction must
5
demonstrate the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of
law. (People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 101.)
The record of conviction establishes that Reynolds was
ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law. Reynolds’s jury
was not instructed on felony murder or the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. Instead, the trial court instructed the
jury on direct aiding and abetting with CALCRIM Nos. 400 and
401. Direct aiding and abetting remains a valid theory of murder
after the passage of Senate Bill 1437. (Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th
at p. 848.)
The trial court also instructed the jury with CALCRIM
No. 521 on first degree murder. The instruction provided that
“the defendant” acted willfully “if he intended to kill,”
deliberately if “he carefully weighed the considerations for and
against his choice and, knowing the consequences, decided to
kill,” and with premeditation “if he decided to kill before
completing the act that caused death.” Because the jury found
the premeditation allegation true, the jury necessarily found
Reynolds, who was the sole defendant charged with murder in
the information, had express malice. (See In re Lopez (2023) 14
Cal.5th 562, 579 [when an aider or abettor who acts with
personal mens rea of premeditation and deliberation, knowingly
and intentionally assists another to kill someone, aider and
abettor is guilty of first degree premeditated murder]; People v.
Mumin (2023) 15 Cal.5th 176, 190 [“To elevate that offense [of
second degree murder] to murder in the first degree on a malice
theory, the defendant must act with a specific intent to kill that
is formed willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation.”].)
Reynolds therefore is not eligible for relief under section 1172.6.
(§ 188, subd. (a)(1) & (3).)
6
As for arguments Reynolds raises in his supplemental brief,
they appear to concern alleged error at his trial, including
sufficiency of the evidence that he was the shooter or an aider
and abettor, the credibility of trial witnesses, and admission of
“false” evidence. However, a section 1172.6 petition is not a
vehicle to relitigate alleged trial errors. (See, e.g., People v. Coley
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 549 [§ 1172.6 “is not a means by
which a defendant can relitigate issues already decided”]; People
v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 947 [“mere filing” of
§ 1172.6 petition doesn’t afford petitioner new opportunity to
raise trial error claims or attack sufficiency of evidence to support
jury’s findings]; People v. DeHuff (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 428, 438
[§ 1172.6 is not a direct appeal].) These issues therefore are not
properly before us.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Haisani Reynolds’s Penal Code section
1172.6 petition is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
EDMON, P. J.
We concur:
EGERTON, J. HANASONO, J.
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