ABP Parcel 8 v. Marina Pacifica CA2/2

CourtListener 10670139Calctapp11 sept. 2025

Texte intégral

Filed 9/11/25 ABP Parcel 8 v. Marina Pacifica CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

ABP PARCEL 8, LLC, B339122

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23STCP03931
v.

MARINA PACIFICA, LLC,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Daniel M. Crowley, Judge. Affirmed.

Greenberg Traurig and Scott D. Bertzyk for Defendant and
Appellant.

Russ, August & Kabat, Jules L. Kabat, Nathan D. Meyer
and Erica S. Kim for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________
The parties to this appeal arbitrated a dispute over the
meaning of a provision appearing in two related real property
leases. Plaintiff and respondent ABP Parcel 8, LLC (ABP)
prevailed and filed a petition in the superior court to confirm the
award. Defendant and appellant Marina Pacifica, LLC (Marina)
filed a cross-petition to vacate the award. The court granted the
motion to confirm, denied the motion to vacate, awarded ABP
fees and costs relating to the judicial proceeding, and entered
judgment accordingly.
Marina appeals, contending the superior court should have
vacated the arbitration award on four statutory grounds: (1) that
the arbitrator refused to hear material evidence to Marina’s
substantial prejudice (Code Civ. Proc.,1 § 1286.2, subd. (a)(5));
(2) the arbitrator exceeded her powers (§ 1286.2, subd. (a)(4));
(3) ABP procured the arbitration award by fraud (§ 1286.2,
subd. (a)(1)); and (4) the arbitrator’s bias against Marina
amounted to misconduct that substantially prejudiced Marina
(§ 1286.2, subd. (a)(3)).
For the reasons set forth herein, we are unpersuaded by
Marina’s arguments and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
ABP, as lessor, and Marina, as lessee, are parties to two
leases pertaining to an assemblage of real property located in
Long Beach. They are not the original parties. Their respective
predecessors in interest entered into these leases in the 1970’s
when the land was substantially undeveloped. As part of the
leases, Marina’s predecessor agreed to develop a shopping center
on the assemblage and ABP’s predecessor agreed to a rent
structure that would provide it a percentage of the rental revenue
from retail tenants. The original lessee, together with a joint

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.

2
venture partner, Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. (Hahn, Inc.) built the
Marina Pacifica Shopping Center and began subleasing space to
tenants. Though it has weathered periods of distress, the
development is, at present, very valuable.
The dispute submitted to the arbitrator concerns the
original parties’ intent regarding the duration of the lessee’s
rights under the leases. According to ABP, the leases terminate
in 2039 and Marina’s only right after termination is a right of
first refusal to enter into a new lease on terms ABP may choose to
negotiate with a third party that begins in the year following
termination, if any. According to Marina, it has a full year after
the leases terminate to unilaterally renew them on the same
terms as the original leases.
Though the merits of the arbitrator’s award are not (and
cannot be) at issue, we provide an overview of the circumstances
surrounding the leases and their relevant terms here for context,
adding pertinent detail to our analysis below as necessary.
I. The Leases and Development of the Shopping Center
The first lease was executed in October 1972 between San
Gabriel River Improvement Co. (SGRI), as lessor, and Marina
Pacifica, a limited partnership (MPLP), as lessee.
The term of the lease is 65 years, beginning on the
“commencement date,” defined, in relevant part, as the first date
upon which each of four specified conditions was satisfied. Among
these conditions was the execution of an agreement—what
Marina calls the Boundary Agreement—between SGRI and
various governmental entities to terminate California’s easement
rights arising from “tidelands” falling within the then-existing
property bounds.2 If any condition was unsatisfied by January 1,

2 The property’s status as tidelands would have been a
significant consideration for the parties in negotiating the lease

3
1974, the lessee had a two-month window in which to terminate
the lease. The lessee did not exercise that right. The Boundary
Agreement was fully executed on March 18, 1974, rendering the
leased property unencumbered by any tidelands, and the lease
commenced the following day, March 19, 1974.
About six weeks later, MPLP entered into a joint venture
between itself and Hahn, Inc., called Marina Pacifica 1-C. Hahn,
Inc., was the partner primarily responsible for developing,
financing, leasing, and managing the shopping center.
Construction on the shopping center was underway by no later
than September 1975.
Although the original parties to the 1972 lease amended it
after being freed from the 66-year limitation imposed by Civil
Code section 718, they did not revise its duration. Indeed, they
reaffirmed it. In February 1976, they entered into an amendment
to the 1972 lease to exclude a 1.5-acre parcel from its ambit and
executed a separate lease for that parcel. The term of the 1976
lease matched that of the 1972 lease then underway: “sixty-five
(65) years, computed from March 19, 1974 and terminating at
12:01 A.M., Pacific Coast Time, on March 19, 2039.”
II. Paragraph 25 of the Leases
The 1972 and 1976 leases each contain the same
paragraph 25, which was the subject of the underlying
arbitration. That paragraph provides: “Lessor agrees that within
a period of one (1) year commencing on the termination of the full
term hereof, or any holding over, extension or renewal hereof, it
will not lease or rent the premises or any portion thereof to any

because of Civil Code section 718. Whereas section 718 generally
limits real property leases to 99 years, it limits leases of tidelands
to 66 years. The parties’ agreement to a 65-year term at the time
when the property remained subject to tideland easements fell
within the limitation.

4
person other than Lessee until Lessor has first offered so to lease
or rent the premises or portion thereof to Lessee on the same
terms and conditions and Lessee has rejected said offer. Said
offer shall be made in writing, and Lessee shall have sixty (60)
days from the receipt of it within which to accept or reject it.” The
caption of paragraph 25 is “Right of First Renewal.”
(Underscoring omitted.) However, paragraph 28A of the leases
states “captions of the paragraphs and articles of this Lease are
for convenience only and shall not be considered or referred to in
resolving questions of interpretation or construction.”
III. Transfers of the Original Parties’ Rights Under the
Leases
Between July 6, 1976 and 1981, the lessee interests were
assigned multiple times to entities not relevant here.
In 1981, ABP’s parent entity, Alamitos Bay Partnership,
LLC (ABP Parent), bought the lessor interests from SGRI. ABP
Parent is owned by a number of other entities, including Watt
Companies, LLC (Watt Cos.). ABP Parent later conveyed the
lessor interests to its wholly owned subsidiary, ABP. For
simplicity, we disregard the distinction between ABP and ABP
Parent.
In or about 1989, Bank of America foreclosed on the lessee
interests.
Marina purchased the lessee interests from Bank of
America in 1995.
IV. Diverging Views on Paragraph 25 Rights
ABP and Marina first addressed the paragraph 25 rights at
the heart of this dispute in connection with Marina’s acquisition
of the lessee’s interest from Bank of America. An affiliate of
Marina received an estoppel certificate from ABP in December
1993 relating to the 1976 lease which provided the lease “does not
grant Tenant any options to extend the term of the Ground Lease
beyond [March 19, 2039].”

5
Marina decided to go forward with the purchase of the
lease interest and sought financing. In connection with that
financing, Marina’s lender required another estoppel certificate.
We are directed to no executed version of that estoppel certificate
in the record, but a markup by counsel for ABP Parent shows it
was based on the 1993 pre-purchase estoppel certificate and
proposed adding to the existing language the words italicized
here: “The Ground Lease does not grant Tenant any options to
extend the term of the Ground Lease beyond [March 19, 2039]
except those, if any, that are explicitly set forth in the Ground
Lease.”
The initial financing was short-term only. As a result,
Marina again sought financing in 1997. The estoppel certificates
ABP issued to the new lender include the language ABP’s counsel
proposed in connection with the prior financing. They stated:
“The Ground Lease does not grant Tenant any options to extend
the term of the Ground Lease beyond [March 19, 2039] except
those, if any, that are explicitly set forth in the Ground Lease.”
ABP issued the same estoppel certificates to the same lender
through 2007. Marina asserts in its opening brief that this
language “equat[ed] Paragraph 25 to an ‘option to extend the
Leases.’ ” We fail to see how.
In any event, ABP made its position clear in 2012 that
paragraph 25 contained not an “option to extend” but a “right of
first refusal.” As part of broader discussions between the parties,
Allison Lynch, an employee of Watt Cos. but acting on behalf of
ABP, sent an e-mail to a Marina representative in January 2012
that included the following statement: “[I]n our review we have
noted that [paragraph] 25 of the Ground Lease . . . provides the
tenant with a right of first refusal [(ROFR)] at the end of the
term. Specifically, until one year following the expiration of the
term, the tenant has a ROFR on any lease for any part of the
property. Our request would be to provide for an elimination of

6
the provision at this time and are having an agreement reflecting
[sic] that change.” The Marina representative did not dispute
Lynch’s characterization of paragraph 25.
However, in 2014, a difference of opinion emerged. To
illustrate this, Marina directs us to an e-mail from Gregory Gill,
another individual acting on behalf of ABP, to a Marina
representative. Gill indicated Manny Simchowitz, a partner in
Marina, raised the possibility of “some question of interpretation
of the termination date of the ground lease.” Gill continued, “[m]y
partners want to understand if there is any legitimate question
as to the ending date of the ground lease and get it sorted out
now.” The Marina representative relayed that Simchowitz’s
perspective was based on paragraph 25. The issue was not
“sorted out” then.
In 2020, struggling in the face of COVID-19 restrictions,
Marina sought a forbearance agreement from its lender. As part
of that process, the lender requested updated estoppel certificates
based on those issued in connection with the original financing.
In response, ABP offered a certificate that reverted to the
language contained in the certificate it provided Marina’s affiliate
before its acquisition of the lessee interests, i.e., “[t]he Ground
Lease does not grant Tenant any options to extend the term of
the Ground Lease beyond its scheduled expiration date.” The
lender proceeded without new certificates.
Shortly thereafter, Marina requested new estoppel
certificates to support another refinancing. In recognition of
disputes between the parties, ABP proposed to provide only the
bare estoppel required of the lessor under the terms of the leases,
as well as the statement that “[t]he term of the Ground Leases
expires on March 18, 2039.”
V. Judicial Suit and Settlement
In August 2021 Marina sued ABP and Gill in the superior
court. Among other things, it alleged ABP’s refusal to sign

7
estoppel certificates in the historical form Marina preferred was
wrongful and jeopardizing its refinancing efforts.
Marina sought specific performance directing ABP to
execute estoppel certificates in its preferred historical form,
including the sentence “[t]he Ground Lease does not grant
Tenant any options to extend the term of the Ground Lease
beyond its scheduled expiration date except those, if any that are
explicitly set forth in the Ground Lease.”
The litigation quickly settled. By agreement dated
August 30, 2021, ABP committed to give a form of estoppel
certificate attached to the agreement.3 The parties further agreed
to arbitrate their dispute about paragraph 25. The agreement
provides: “Paragraph 25 Arbitration. All disputes in any way
regarding, relating to and/or arising from paragraph 25 of the
Ground Leases shall be resolved by final and binding arbitration
at JAMS pursuant to JAMS’ comprehensive rules[4]; provided
that time is allowed for reasonable discovery prior to the
initiation of the arbitration hearing. . . . [B]y a prompt arbitration
to be initiated by the Ground Lessor not later than November 1,
2021, Ground Lessor shall state there is a dispute between the
parties regarding the scope of any rights and limitations set forth
in paragraph 25 of the Ground Leases, and Ground Lessee’s
response to the demand for arbitration shall concur that there is
such dispute; in turn, the arbitrator shall set forth a schedule for

3 The settlement purports to attach the form but Marina
directs us to a settlement in the appellate record which omits the
attachments. According to Marina, the certificate was in the form
it demanded in its complaint. However, the citation it provides
for this assertion does not provide support for that statement.
4 This refers to the JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules
and Procedures, made effective June 1, 2021 (JAMS rules).

8
Ground Lessor and Ground Lessee to simultaneously file and
serve in the arbitration their respective positions of the scope of
any rights and limitation [sic] set forth in paragraph 25 of the
Ground Leases. . . . The arbitration shall be a ‘baseball
arbitration,’ with the arbitrator limited to choosing one of the two
positions (and with this ‘baseball arbitration’ limitation on the
arbitrator’s authority superseding any contrary provision in the
comprehensive rules) . . . . Paragraph 23 of the Ground Leases
[concerning entitlement to attorney fees and costs] shall apply to
this arbitration to the same extent to which it would apply in a
lawsuit filed in superior court.”
ABP submitted a demand for arbitration pursuant to the
settlement agreement and Marina timely filed its response.
JAMS assigned the Honorable Elizabeth White (Ret.) to serve as
the arbitrator in January 2022 and she held a preliminary
hearing in March 2022. The parties thereafter engaged in
discovery and sought the arbitrator’s intervention on certain
issues as they arose. The hearing went forward in May 2023 and
lasted seven days. The arbitrator entered an interim award in
favor of ABP in August 2023 and invited ABP to submit a motion
for attorney fees and costs as allowed under paragraph 23 of the
ground leases and incorporated by reference into the settlement
agreement. Following briefing and a hearing on ABP’s fee and
cost request, the arbitrator issued her final award on October 10,
2023. It included $2,829,433.78 for ABP’s fees and costs.
On October 27, 2023, ABP filed in the superior court a
petition to confirm the arbitration award; Marina filed a cross-
petition to vacate. After extensive briefing and a hearing, the
court granted ABP’s petition and denied Marina’s cross-petition.
Upon ABP’s further request, the court granted ABP $242,194 in
attorney fees and costs incurred on account of the confirmation
proceeding, postjudgment interest on the arbitrator’s fee and cost
award, and entered judgment.

9
Marina timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
We review de novo a superior court’s judgment confirming
an arbitration award. (Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp.
(1994) 9 Cal.4th 362, 376, fn. 9 (Advanced Micro Devices).)
II. Analysis
“To uphold public policy favoring the use of arbitration as a
relatively quick and inexpensive form of dispute resolution, and
to vindicate the parties’ intention of obtaining a final award,
judicial review of arbitration awards is limited. [Citations.] The
permissible grounds of judicial review are found in . . .
sections 1286.2 (vacating awards) and 1286.6 (correcting
awards).” (Sy First Family Ltd. Partnership v. Cheung (1999)
70 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1345.) Only the vacatur grounds are
relevant here.
Because an arbitration award is not reviewable on the
merits, the grounds for vacatur set forth in section 1286.2 are
necessarily limited and given a correspondingly narrow
construction by courts. Our Supreme Court has described them
as protecting only “against error that is so egregious as to
constitute misconduct or so profound as to render the process
unfair. The Legislature has authorized ‘judicial review in
circumstances involving serious problems with the award itself,
or with the fairness of the arbitration process.’ [Citation.] ‘ “The
statutory provisions for [review of an arbitration award] are
manifestly for the sole purpose of preventing the misuse of the
proceeding, where corruption, fraud, misconduct, gross error, or
mistake has been carried into the award to the substantial
prejudice of a party to the proceeding.” ’ ” (Heimlich v. Shivji
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 350, 368, fn. omitted, first bracket added
(Heimlich).)

10
It is a feature, not a flaw, that many errors and defects in
the arbitral process are unreviewable. “ ‘Submission of disputes
to arbitration always risks an accumulation of procedural and
evidentiary shortcuts that would proper[l]y frustrate counsel in a
formal trial. But because “the advantages of arbitration are speed
and informality, an arbitrator should be expected to act
affirmatively to simplify and expedite the proceedings before
him.” [Citation.] Thus, whatever indignation a reviewing court
may experience in examining the record, it must resist the
temptation to condemn imperfect proceedings without a sound
statutory basis for doing so.’ ” (Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc.
(2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 810, 835 (Pour Le Bebe).)
A. The Arbitrator Did Not Exceed Her Powers
Within the Meaning of Section 1286.2,
Subdivision (a)(4)
Section 1286.2 requires vacatur of an arbitration award
when “arbitrators [have] exceeded their powers and the award
cannot be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision
upon the controversy submitted.” (§ 1286.2, subd. (a)(4).) “The
powers of an arbitrator derive from, and are limited by, the
agreement to arbitrate.” (Advanced Micro Devices, supra,
9 Cal.4th at p. 375.) Relevant limitations include any “ ‘specific
restrictions in the arbitration agreement, the submission [to
arbitration] or the rules of arbitration.’ ” (Cooper v. Lavely &
Singer Prof. Corp. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1, 17, italics omitted.)
Marina contends the arbitrator exceeded her powers in
three ways: by her (1) misapplication of “baseball arbitration”
rules; (2) exclusion of material evidence based on evidentiary
rules; and (3) denial of some of Marina’s requests for discovery.
The first two ways purportedly violated JAMS rules. The third
way purportedly violated Marina’s right to “reasonable discovery”
established in the parties’ settlement agreement.

11
1. The Purported JAMS Rules Violations Do
Not Furnish a Basis for Vacatur
The arbitrator complied with JAMS rules as she
interpreted them. Her interpretation is final.
In Greenspan v. LADT, LLC (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1413,
1451 (Greenspan), the court held that an arbitrator’s
interpretation of applicable arbitral rules “may be judicially
reviewed on the merits where the parties have explicitly and
unambiguously agreed that the arbitration award is subject to
that scope of review.” The parties in Greenspan had made no such
agreement. Rather, as the parties did here, they agreed to be
governed by JAMS rules, including JAMS rule 11(a). (Greenspan,
supra, at p. 1442.) That rule provides for the arbitrator to
“resolve disputes about the interpretation and applicability of
the[] [JAMS] Rules and conduct of the Arbitration hearing. The
resolution of the issue by the Arbitrator shall be final.” (JAMS
rule 11(a); Greenspan, supra, at p. 1440.) This provision renders
the arbitrator’s interpretation and application of the rules final.
(Greenspan, supra, at p. 1455.)
Here, the arbitrator interpreted the JAMS rules to allow
her to conduct a baseball arbitration in the manner that she did
and to exclude material evidence based on generally applicable
rules of evidence. Marina characterizes the arbitrator’s conduct
as a deliberate flouting of the rules. For the reasons that follow,
we disagree.
a. Baseball Arbitration
The parties’ agreement to use JAMS “baseball arbitration”
to resolve their dispute about contract interpretation involving no
money damages was a curious one. JAMS baseball arbitration is
governed by JAMS rule 33 and is predicated on there being a
dispute over money damages: “the Parties shall exchange and
provide to JAMS written proposals for the amount of money
damages they would offer or demand.” (JAMS rule 33(a), italics

12
added.) This is consistent with explanations of baseball
arbitration found in published California decisional law. (See,
e.g., Bowers v. Raymond J. Lucia Companies, Inc. (2012)
206 Cal.App.4th 724, 734 [“Baseball-style arbitration [entails] an
arbitrator decid[ing] a monetary dispute by selecting from the
parties’ final proposals . . . .” (Italics added.)].)
Indeed, before the trial court, Marina’s counsel conceded
the JAMS baseball arbitration rules “deal with damages,” such
that the parties “were fitting [a] round peg in a square hole” by
selecting them to resolve their dispute. The incongruity between
the nature of the dispute and the rules framework the parties
chose required the arbitrator to determine the extent to and
manner in which the baseball arbitration rules would apply.
Again, these determinations are nonreviewable. (JAMS
rule 11(a); Greenspan, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 1440.)
However, we describe them for completeness and to demonstrate
that the arbitrator made a considered interpretation rather than
deliberately violating the rules as Marina claims.
i. Position Statements
In accordance with their settlement agreement and by
analogy to JAMS rule 33(a), the arbitrator required the parties to
submit their respective positions on the meaning of paragraph 25
only. She insisted they offer just one position and rejected
Marina’s attempt to submit alternative arguments, including
what Marina calls a “compromise position” based on a
hypothetical application of Civil Code section 718. The
arbitrator’s approach followed from the parties’ agreement to “file
and serve in the arbitration their respective positions o[n] the
scope of any rights and limitation[s] set forth in paragraph 25
. . . .” She had sole authority to interpret the scope and meaning
of the arbitration agreement. (JAMS rule 11(a); Greenspan,
supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1446–1447 [under JAMS rule 11,
“the arbitrator decides arbitrability issues at the outset, and his

13
decision is final”]; see also Kelly Sutherlin McLeod Architecture,
Inc. v. Schneickert (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 519, 529 [“ ‘ “ ‘ “Under
the [principle] of broad construction an arbitrator is authorized to
determine all questions which he needs to determine in order to
resolve the controversy submitted to him, and the arbitrator
himself decides which questions need to be determined.” ’ ” ’ ”].)
ii. Written Statement of Reasons
Notwithstanding JAMS rule 33(b), the arbitrator also
explained her award in a written statement of reasons. Rule 33(b)
provides that a baseball arbitration award shall be one of the
party’s proposed amounts of money damages, unaccompanied by
a written statement of reasons. This is an exception to the
general prescription of rule 24(h) that “the Award shall . . .
contain a concise written statement of the reasons for the award.”
The arbitrator invited argument on whether the rule 33(b)
exception applied under the circumstances. ABP thought not. Its
counsel argued a statement of reasons was justified because it
was “not a simple baseball arbitration” limited to choosing a
damages number. Marina, on the other hand, contended the
parties’ choice of baseball arbitration made rule 33(b) applicable
such that a statement of decision was not permitted. The
arbitrator agreed with ABP, explaining “the complexity of the
parties’ positions, the affirmative defenses asserted, and the
importance of the factual findings and legal support for the
Arbitrator’s Award” warranted issuing a statement of reasons.5

5 Marina notes that the arbitrator, when explaining in her
written statement of reasons why she thought a written statement
of reasons under rule 24(h) was appropriate, said “Rule 33”—
which contains the written statement exemption—“should be
followed.” The arbitrator plainly intended to say “Rule 24(h)
should be followed.” We therefore read her reference to rule 33 as
being to rule 24(h). (See Gen. Waiters v. Lee (2d Cir. 2017)

14
iii. Expression of Winning Position
Finally, Marina contends the arbitrator violated baseball
arbitration’s fundamental premise by choosing neither Marina’s
nor ABP’s position but “making her own findings as to what
Paragraph 25 meant.” This contention has no merit. It is
premised on Marina’s view that the arbitrator was bound to
“choose between two competing baseball positions without
altering a word.” This is found nowhere in the JAMS baseball
arbitration rules because JAMS baseball rules concern positions
expressed only in numbers. The settlement agreement only
required the arbitrator to “choos[e] one of the two positions.” In
substance, this is what she did. (See Mave Enters. v. Travelers
Indem. Co. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1408, 1424 [“argument
exalt[ing] form over substance . . . is disfavored”], citing Civ.
Code, § 3528.) The arbitrator’s explication of paragraph 25 begins
by rejecting Marina’s position and continues by adopting the
substance of ABP’s position with, as far as we can tell, only
stylistic changes. Certainly, Marina identifies no substantive
differences. Only on reply does Marina tease a distinction in a
footnote to its claim that the arbitrator’s award “wasn’t” ABP’s
position. There it says “ABP’s baseball position statement . . .

857 F.3d 466, 479, fn. 22 [declining to read literally a
typographical error that was obviously contrary to intent
established by context].) ABP offers the alternative explanation
that the arbitrator did mean “Rule 33 should be followed” but
was referring to rule 33(d) as overriding rule 33(b)’s exception to
rule 24(h)’s written statement requirement where money
damages are not at issue. Rule 33(d), which the arbitrator only
appears to have adopted in a separate order (albeit in an
analogous situation), says “[o]ther than as provided herein, the
provisions of Rule 24 shall be applicable.” In either event, the
arbitrator’s explanation and conduct unequivocally show she
interpreted the JAMS rules as allowing her to issue a written
statement.

15
conspicuously avoids using the term right of first refusal . . . .”
While the natural implication of Marina’s footnote is that the
arbitrator’s award did use that term, this is not the case. The
following operative language appears in both ABP’s position and
the final award: “if” ABP “wants to sign a lease with someone
other than [Marina]” to begin “within . . . one-year . . . after the
March 19, 2039, term end date,” ABP must first “offer to [Marina]
to accept or reject such a lease . . . .”
The arbitrator plainly interpreted the JAMS rules and the
parties’ agreement as permitting her to express ABP’s position in
her award as she did. (See Starr v. Mayhew (2022)
83 Cal.App.5th 842, 850 [“ ‘ “[E]very reasonable intendment must
be indulged in favor of the award.” ’ ”].) That interpretation is
final. (JAMS rule 11(a); Greenspan, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1440.)
b. Rules of Evidence
Marina argues JAMS rule 22(d) prevented the arbitrator
from excluding material evidence under evidentiary rules. The
arbitrator repeatedly said the circumstances underlying the
dispute compelled her to be particularly attuned to hearsay
issues and that she interpreted the JAMS rules as allowing her to
exclude evidence that would be inadmissible in court. Rule 22(d)
is undoubtedly susceptible to this interpretation.
In relevant part, rule 22(d) provides that “[s]trict
conformity to the rules of evidence is not required . . . . The
Arbitrator shall consider evidence that he or she finds relevant
and material to the dispute, giving such weight as is
appropriate.” (Ibid.) According to Marina, this means the
arbitrator was prohibited to rely on traditional admissibility
principles to exclude material evidence. Marina is wrong, and its
own conduct shows it.
As an initial matter, that strict conformity is “not required”
under rule 22(d) does not amount to a prohibition on resort to the

16
rules of evidence to control what is admitted. (Cf. Cacho v.
Boudreau (2007) 40 Cal.4th 341, 354 [absence of requirement not
equivalent to prohibition]; see also Campaign for Accountability
v. Consumer Credit Research Found. (Ga. 2018) 815 S.E.2d 841,
844–845; see also id. at p. 845 [“[i]f a teacher tells his students
that an extra credit assignment is not required, a student who
completes the work would be quite annoyed if the teacher
rejected it as prohibited”].) Moreover, even if “strict” conformity
were prohibited by the rules, such prohibition would not extend
to some lesser fidelity to evidentiary principles.
The arbitrator made clear from the outset that evidentiary
rules would have currency. Her first scheduling order, issued
more than a year before the hearing began, established the
expectation of evidentiary objections. It directed the parties to
prepare a joint exhibit list that “indicates any Party’s objection to
the introduction of any exhibit and the basis therefor.”
Two weeks before the start of the hearing the arbitrator
announced she would be specifically alert to hearsay issues.
Because the case “[went] back to 1972 and [there would be]
witnesses who wouldn’t have been able to testify, were they still
alive,” she said she would “be kind of careful about hearsay.” She
disclosed that, even without an objection, she would be
“internally careful about [it] in [her] head,” and if she “fe[lt] that
testimony is not credible, because it is hearsay upon hearsay
upon hearsay, [she] would make that analysis regardless of
whether an objection is made.” In short, she informed the parties
that she anticipated hearsay-based objections and would reject
hearsay testimony if she felt it was insufficiently reliable.
On the first day of the hearing, the arbitrator reiterated
that the case went “back to the ‘70[’]s, and issues are going to
arise with respect to hearsay . . . .” She went on to “reserve the
right to rule [on a hearsay objection] in the context of the
presentation.” Going forward, the arbitrator repeatedly explained

17
her rulings excluding hearsay were driven by fairness: “We are
dealing with [events in the] 1970’s and most people are dead. . . .
[I]t’s not fair to bring in statements that can’t be tested or cross-
examined.”
Marina relies heavily on Harvey Aluminum v. United
Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO (C.D.Cal. 1967)
263 F.Supp.488 to argue the arbitrator’s exclusion of evidence on
hearsay and other traditional grounds warrants vacatur. In that
case, the arbitrator excluded testimony of a rebuttal witness on
the grounds that he should have been offered as part of the
petitioner’s case-in-chief. (Id. at p. 493.) The federal district court
held such exclusion denied the petitioner a fair hearing: “The
refusal by the Arbitrator to hear all of the [rebuttal testimony] or
to consider [such] testimony in making his Award turned on a
rule of evidence which the court concludes should not have been
binding on petitioner in the absence of some warning by the
Arbitrator as to the evidentiary rules to be followed.” (Ibid., italics
added.)
But, as set forth above, the arbitrator did offer “some
warning” before the start of the hearing that traditional rules of
evidence—and particularly hearsay—would have force. Marina’s
conduct demonstrates it understood this. By its own count,
Marina made 169 evidentiary objections. Before the hearing
began, Marina asserted objections to exhibits included on ABP’s
exhibit list, including on the grounds of hearsay and other
specific provisions of the Evidence Code. Once the hearing began,
Marina immediately objected to a witness whose testimony was
offered by declaration—i.e., a hearsay declaration. The arbitrator
ordered the witness be made available in person because Marina
“obviously” was entitled the opportunity to cross-examine him.
The arbitrator also sustained other hearsay objections interposed
by Marina. Indeed, when the arbitrator explained JAMS rule 22
was for “[her] guidance in terms of fairness” and while

18
“arbitrators can consider lots of things [courts cannot],” “with
50 years [passed] and so many people no longer alive, it simply
isn’t fair to allow hearsay,” Marina’s counsel responded, “I agree
with you.”
c. Discovery
The parties’ settlement agreement provided they would
have “time . . . for reasonable discovery prior to the initiation of
the arbitration hearing.” They did not further elaborate on what
that meant.
Marina concedes it was allowed all discovery permitted by
JAMS rule 17, as well as expert depositions and “third party
subpoenas . . . agreed to [or allowed by the arbitrator].” However,
it complains it was allowed “only those few subpoenas to which
ABP did not object” and that the arbitrator declined to direct
ABP to search for e-mails of Lynch and another individual.
Marina’s complaints amount to a request that we review
the arbitrator’s discovery orders. The parties vested the
arbitrator with control over discovery when they agreed JAMS
rules would govern their arbitration. (See JAMS rule 17(d)
[arbitrator to decide discovery disputes].) Our review would
betray that bargain. (See Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992)
3 Cal.4th 1, 10 (Moncharsh) [“[A]n arbitration decision is final
and conclusive because the parties have agreed that it be so. By
ensuring that an arbitrator’s decision is final and binding, courts
simply assure that the parties receive the benefit of their
bargain.”].)
Moreover, because an arbitrator’s discovery order is not
reviewable, such orders “should not provide a basis for vacating
an award unless the error substantially prejudiced a party’s
ability to present material evidence in support of its case.”
(Schlessinger v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman (1995)
40 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1110.) Marina makes a passing attempt at
satisfying this standard, claiming lack of access to Lynch’s e-

19
mails deprived Marina the right to a fair hearing because the
award “relied on” Lynch’s testimony.
We do not agree. The award mentioned Lynch’s testimony
by way of background but did not rely on it. The arbitrator’s
mode of decision made clear Lynch’s testimony was immaterial to
her analysis6 when she concluded paragraph 25 was susceptible
to “only [one] reasonable interpretation.” Put another way, she
found paragraph 25 unambiguous. (See Arechiga v. Dolores Press,
Inc. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 567, 575 [ambiguity arises only
where contract is reasonably susceptible to more than one
meaning].) Thus, she had no occasion to rely on Lynch’s
statements validating ABP’s interpretation. (See PV Little Italy,
LLC v. MetroWork Condominium Assn. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th
132, 156 (PV Little Italy) [where contract is unambiguous, “resort
to extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent is unnecessary and
even inappropriate”]; see also Jameson v. Chanslor-Canfield
Midway Oil Co. (1917) 176 Cal. 1, 8 [“where the terms of the
contract are clear and explicit, where the meaning is not doubtful
and there is no latent ambiguity, it cannot be varied by the
subsequent conduct of the parties or surrounding
circumstances”].)
d. Acts Argued to Have Exceeded the
Arbitrator’s Powers for the First
Time on Reply
On reply, Marina argues the arbitrator exceeded her
powers by referring to Civil Code section 718 in her award and by
awarding ABP attorney fees and costs. Marina refers to its

6 Cf. Hall v. Superior Court (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 427, 439
(“To find substantial prejudice the court must accept, for
purposes of analysis, the arbitrator’s legal theory and conclude
that the arbitrator might well have made a different award had
the evidence been allowed.”).

20
opening brief when arguing these points in its reply, but we find
they were not adequately raised and are therefore forfeited.
As to the reference to Civil Code section 718, Marina made
the bare assertion in the introduction to its opening brief that the
arbitrator exceeded her power by “basing her decision on the very
legal principle she had just stricken” from Marina’s position
statement. However, Marina did not revisit this assertion in its
excess of power argument. At best, it cross-referenced a
statement in its background section that, after “hold[ing] that
Section 718 was outside the scope of the arbitration,” “the
Arbitrator later rested her decision on a (mis)application of that
very statute.” No cases were cited nor was any analysis provided
beyond those conclusory sentences.
As to the fee and cost award, Marina asserted in its
introduction that attorney fees and costs were “not even allowed
by the arbitration agreement,” but its excess of power discussion
made no argument about them at all. At best, one of the pages of
the opening brief cross-referenced in that discussion contained a
footnote contending the lease provision permitted fees only in
“actions over damages or breaches of contract” and the
arbitration involved neither.
“We will not ordinarily consider issues raised for the first
time in a reply brief. [Citation.] An issue is new if it does more
than elaborate on issues raised in the opening brief or rebut
arguments made by the respondent in respondent’s brief.
Fairness militates against allowing an appellant to raise an issue
for the first time in a reply brief because consideration of the
issue deprives the respondent of the opportunity to counter the
appellant by raising opposing arguments about the new issue.”
(American Indian Model Schools v. Oakland Unified School Dist.
(2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 258, 275–276.)
The arbitrator’s reference to Civil Code section 718 and
award of attorney fees were not adequately raised as acts in

21
excess of the arbitrator’s powers in Marina’s opening brief.
Marina’s bare cross-reference to background facts does not satisfy
its obligation to “supply the reviewing court with some cogent
argument supported by legal analysis . . . .” (City of Santa Maria
v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 286–287.) And even if the
footnote in the procedural background addressing legal fees
amounted to legal argument, it would not preserve the point for
our review. (See People v. Crosswhite (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 494,
502, fn. 5 [deeming forfeited argument raised “only in a footnote
under an argument heading which gives no notice of the
contention”].)
Though unnecessary to our decision, we note these forfeited
points lack merit. The arbitrator referenced Civil Code
section 718 in her award to illustrate that Marina’s position—
that the ground leases afforded the lessee the right to at least
130 years of possession—was not reasonable. This is a different
purpose than that for which Marina had tried to use it. Despite
the settlement agreement providing the arbitration would
address only the “rights and limitations set forth in paragraph 25
of the Ground Leases,” Marina asked the arbitrator to first adopt
its 130-year-plus position and then consider the issue not
submitted of how that would fare in the face of section 718. The
arbitrator only considered section 718 as a means of performing
the task she understood the parties to have put before her:
interpreting paragraph 25.7

7 As noted, Civil Code section 718 provides that no real
property lease may extend beyond 99 years. A lease in excess of
that, or any lesser restricted term, is illegal by statute. (Tufeld
Corp. v. Beverly Hills Gateway, L.P. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 12,
28.) Under general rules of contract interpretation, “[a] contract
must receive such an interpretation as will make it lawful,
operative, definite, reasonable, and capable of being carried into

22
Marina’s attorney fee and cost argument is similarly
misguided. First, Marina misrepresents the terms of the attorney
fee clause in the ground leases. The clause is not limited to
“actions over damages or breaches of contract.” Rather, it also
applies to actions “to enforce any provision [of the ground
leases].” The Court of Appeal in Harbour Landing-Dolfann v.
Anderson (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 260, 263, held such a provision
embraces actions for the interpretation of a lease provision: “[The
appellant] argues attorney fees are only available in an action
brought ‘to enforce’ a lease provision, but its declaratory relief
action was brought ‘seeking an interpretation of the [lease]’ . . . .
We reject [the appellant’s] assertion.”
B. The Arbitrator Did Not Refuse to Hear
Evidence Material to the Controversy Within
the Meaning of Section 1286.2,
Subdivision (a)(5)
Section 1286.2 requires vacatur of an arbitration award
when “[t]he rights of the party were substantially prejudiced by
. . . the refusal of the arbitrators to hear evidence material to the
controversy . . . .” (§ 1286.2, subd. (a)(5).) Vacatur under this
provision “must rest on more than a simple error in applying the
rules of evidence.” (Heimlich, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 368.)
“Instead, [the provision] was designed as a ‘safety valve in
private arbitration that permits a court to intercede when an
arbitrator has prevented a party from fairly presenting its case.’
[Citation.] It comes into play, for example, when an arbitrator,

effect, if it can be done without violating the intention of the
parties.” (Civ. Code, § 1643.) “Pursuant to this rule, [a contract
will not be construed] in a manner that will render it unlawful if
it reasonably can be construed in a manner which will uphold its
validity.” (People v. Parmar (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 781, 802.)

23
without justification, permits only one side to present evidence on
a disputed material issue.” (Ibid.)
We preliminarily note that much of the evidence Marina
complains was excluded was, in fact, admitted. For example,
Marina said it was prevented from showing the property was still
in tidelands in 1972. But the arbitrator recited this fact in the
award. Marina said it was prevented from showing contemporary
treatises described the right of renewal as the preferred option to
extend leases beyond the limitations imposed by Civil Code
section 718; rights of renewal were the preferred option of the
eponymous officer of Hahn, Inc.; and the law firm that prepared
the leases followed one of these treatises as a matter of course.
But the arbitrator received testimony largely to this effect from
Craig Edgecumbe. Marina said it was prevented from showing
the leases had multiple provisions it considered complementary
and intended to effect a right of renewal. But the entire leases
were in evidence.
Other evidence Marina says was refused was never
proffered. For example, Marina contends, without record citation,
it was prevented from showing “one of ABP’s representatives
admitted that Paragraph 25 provided extension rights to the
Lessee.” (Italics added.) Marina’s reply brief reveals this
purported exclusion refers to the arbitrator’s refusal of hearsay
testimony to relay a purported statement by a deceased principal
of Watt Cos. According to Marina’s offer of proof, the Watt Cos.
principal “acknowledged [Marina] had some rights” under
paragraph 25 (italics added) and said he would discuss with his
partners—a noncontroversial statement that is a far cry from
what Marina now claims it was. Indeed, upon hearing the offer of
proof, the arbitrator commented “even assuming he said it, I
don’t know how relevant it is.”
And some of the evidence Marina claims was wrongly
refused was refused because the arbitrator found it immaterial—

24
a finding she was expressly allowed to make under JAMS
rule 22(d). For example, Marina contends it was prevented from
showing a third party appraiser recently interpreted
paragraph 25 in the way Marina was advocating. But the
arbitrator said “[the appraiser] made that determination, but it’s
not something that is . . . important for my determination.”8 The
reason for this is obvious: it was for the arbitrator, not a third
party appraiser, to determine whether Marina’s interpretation
was reasonable. (See Indus. Indem. v. Superior Court (1990)
224 Cal.App.3d 828, 831 [“Whether a contract is ambiguous is a
question of law.”]; see also Muzzi v. Bel Air Mart (2009)
171 Cal.App.4th 456, 463 [“ ‘[d]isagreement concerning the
meaning of a phrase’ ” does not make it ambiguous].)
Those issues aside, the fundamental point is this: the
arbitrator did not arbitrarily refuse the evidence Marina
contends she should have considered. She considered it and
rejected it based on rules of evidence she determined were
applicable. To the extent there was any error in the arbitrator’s
evidentiary rulings, it is not a ground for vacatur. (Heimlich,
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 368.)
The arbitrator also excluded the testimony of Robert
Rocchi, a former employee of the defunct Hahn, Inc., on the
ground that Marina had been dilatory in identifying him. Marina
announced its desire to call Rocchi on the fourth day of the
arbitration and attempted to present him on the fifth day. The
scheduling order did not allow this without leave of the arbitrator
upon a showing of good cause. After hearing evidence that
Rocchi’s name was in discovery produced to Marina nine months

8 The arbitrator similarly concluded a prospectus prepared
by a third party containing an interpretation of paragraph 25 was
irrelevant.

25
prior,9 the arbitrator rejected his testimony.10 As the parties
agreed that the arbitrator would have the final say about the
“conduct of the Arbitration Hearing,” we cannot second-guess her
orders applying or interpreting her own scheduling order. (JAMS
rule 11(a); Greenspan, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 1440.)
This case bears no semblance to Royal Alliance Associates,
Inc. v. Liebhaber (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1092, “the paradigmatic
example of when a refusal to hear evidence will justify vacation of
an award.” (Heimlich, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 369.) “The Royal
Alliance arbitration panel allowed a securities broker to ‘speak,
unsworn and at length,’ but ‘denied the former client the
opportunity to cross-examine the broker or to speak herself’
because the panel apparently ‘felt itself too busy to allow each
side the opportunity to present evidence.’ [Citations.] The panel
then issued a decision that ‘relied on the former client’s failure to
dispute the broker’s account or to offer evidence of financial
losses.’ [Citations.] In vacating the decision, the appellate court in
Royal Alliance concluded the arbitration panel’s refusal to hear
from the former client ‘was not fair.’ ” (Plantations at Haywood 1,

9 Marina complains the arbitrator did not hear testimony
from Ryan Stearns, the son of the named partner of the Barrett
Stearns firm that counted Hahn, Inc., as a client, regarding
Marina’s diligence in finding Rocchi. It is impossible to assess the
prejudice of excluding this testimony because Marina’s own
counsel admitted she was unable to give an offer of proof as to
what Stearns would say. (Cf. People v. Anderson (2001)
25 Cal.4th 543, 580 [“the reviewing court must know the
substance of the excluded evidence in order to assess prejudice”].)
10 The arbitrator did so after carefully reviewing a declaration
by Rocchi submitted as an offer of proof and concluding it was
entirely unreliable hearsay, speculation and disguised expert
testimony about what the defunct Hahn, Inc.’s deceased principal
“would have” done or said in connection with Marina’s
predecessor in interest’s negotiation of the ground leases.

26
LLC v. Plantations at Haywood, LLC (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 803,
812.)
By contrast, here, the arbitrator made repeated, deliberate
decisions that accepting untestable hearsay would not be fair to
ABP or persuasive to her and concluded the scheduling order
permitted her to exclude Rocchi’s testimony proffered midway
through the hearing. A review of the entire transcript reveals she
did not refuse wholesale to hear any of Marina’s evidence and
indeed she frequently overruled ABP’s objections to Marina’s
evidence as well. To second-guess her determinations would be to
supplant the role of the arbitrator.
C. The Record Does Not Show the Arbitration
Award Was Procured by Fraud Within the
Meaning of Section 1286.2, Subdivision (a)(1)
Section 1286.2 requires vacatur of an arbitration award
when “[t]he award was procured by corruption, fraud or other
undue means.” (§ 1286.2, subd. (a)(1).) Fraud by the prevailing
party during an arbitration may warrant vacatur under
section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(1). (Comerica Bank v.
Howsam (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 790, 825.) The party seeking
vacatur under this provision must show: (1) by clear and
convincing evidence that the fraud occurred; (2) that it lacked an
opportunity to discover and reveal the alleged fraud at the
arbitration hearing; and (3) that the fraud had a substantial
impact on the arbitrator’s decision. (Pour Le Bebe, supra,
112 Cal.App.4th at pp. 830, 833, 837.)
Marina offers two theories of fraud. First, that ABP
discussed in briefing, and the arbitrator mentioned in her award,
two exhibits to which Marina had objected and, according to

27
Marina, the arbitrator said she would not consider.11 These
exhibits, identified in the arbitration as 201 and 206, contained
correspondence between the original parties to the leases prior to
the execution of the 1972 lease and the 1976 lease. In her award,
the arbitrator referenced these exhibits to support her
observation that “notes on drafts and letters from 1972 do not
reflect any change to the 65-year term” in the 1972 lease. Setting
aside conflict in the record as to whether the exhibits were
actually admitted (the arbitrator thought at least one was), there
can be no prejudice as a matter of law. As noted above, resort to
parol evidence is necessary only to establish or resolve an
ambiguity. (PV Little Italy, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 156.) The
arbitrator found paragraph 25 was unambiguous. She therefore
had no occasion to rely on ABP’s parol evidence about lack of
negotiation of a point (i.e., a term different than 65 years) not
reflected in the plain terms of the lease.
The second purported fraud was that ABP avoided
producing “emails needed to cross-examine [Lynch] based on

11 The arbitrator stated she was not considering the content
of these documents at the time they were first identified, before
any foundation had been laid. It is not clear she intended to
foreclose consideration of the documents ever. In the broader
context of advising the parties of how to assert objections to
documents, and in response to an objection that a different
exhibit (200) lacked foundation and constituted hearsay, she
stated: “Your job, when something comes up, is to voice your
objection. I will then . . . make a determination as to whether I’ll
consider it or not.” After Marina’s counsel asked whether the
arbitrator would consider its objections to exhibits 201 and 206 at
that time, she responded: “Well, 201 and 206, so far all I know
about them is that these were the files that [ABP] obtained when
the property was purchased. That’s all I know. [¶] I’m not even
considering anything that’s in them. So far nothing has been said.
So I think we need to move on.” (Italics added.)

28
ABP’s assertion that the emails were held by a third party over
whom ABP had no control.” ABP’s invoices, submitted in the fee
award phase—after issuance of the interim award but before
issuance of the final award—reflected legal work performed by
ABP pertaining to the processing of Lynch’s e-mail files prior to
the arbitration hearing.
ABP unhelpfully gives this issue scant attention. We
nevertheless must consider whether the record supports Marina’s
contentions.12 We find Marina fails to make a clear and
convincing showing of fraud.
The billing records show ABP had possession of some
“A. Lynch email files” not later than February 2, 2023. However,
there were two subpoenas for her e-mails at issue: one to Lynch
herself, which ABP agreed to, and a second to Watt Cos., a third
party, which ABP did not agree to. Marina asked the arbitrator to
order the subpoena, asserting that ABP claimed Watt Cos.
records were not under its control. ABP opposed the subpoena on
the grounds that the requested records were not relevant, that
Marina was engaged in a “fishing expedition,” and that Marina
was acting in bad faith “as a vehicle for further litigation.”
The arbitrator denied Marina’s request, finding Marina had
established neither the relevance of the documents as required by
a prior discovery order nor met the standard under a prior
discovery stipulation of showing the e-mails it sought were on the
Watt Cos. server, despite having explored the issue in a
deposition.

12 Contrary to Marina’s repeated contentions in its reply brief,
“a respondent does not concede contentions asserted in an
appellant’s opening brief by failing to address them.” (Planning &
Conservation League v. Castaic Lake Water Agency (2009)
180 Cal.App.4th 210, 227, fn. 9.)

29
Marina’s claim of fraud has a similar problem. To accept
Marina’s premise of fraud in ABP saying it did not have control
over or custody of Watt Cos. e-mails (a position apparently never
taken to the arbitrator),13 we would have to have evidence that
the e-mails ABP reviewed in February 2023 were from the Watt
Cos. server. The record does not so reflect. Indeed, it is equally
plausible that the e-mails ABP had were different e-mails,
including those embraced within the subpoena issued to Lynch
personally. Marina’s evidence of fraud is therefore not clear and
convincing. (See Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989,
998 [clear and convincing standard “ ‘requires a finding of high
probability’ ”].)
We note Marina failed to avail itself of one, if not two,
opportunities to further develop a record on this issue. First, it
could have raised it substantively with the arbitrator. It
discovered the purported fraud after she issued her interim
award but before she issued her final award. (See Lonky v. Patel
(2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 831, 846 [statutory limitations on
arbitrator’s authority to modify award inapplicable to interim
award that contemplated further proceedings on attorney fees
and costs].) However, it only complained about the issue in a
footnote opposing ABP’s fee and cost request. Second, there is
authority that may have supported a request for discovery in
connection with its motion to vacate. (See Bouton v. USAA
Casualty Ins. Co. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 412, 428.) Marina made
no such request.

13 Cited record evidence of the “no custody and control” claim
exists only in statements by Marina’s counsel, not by ABP’s.

30
D. The Record Does Not Show Misconduct by the
Arbitrator Within the Meaning of
Section 1286.2, Subdivision (a)(3)
In relevant part, section 1286.2 requires vacatur of an
arbitration award when “[t]he rights of a party were
substantially prejudiced by misconduct of a neutral arbitrator.”
(§ 1286.2, subd. (a)(3).) “ ‘Misconduct’ in this context includes
actions that create a reasonable impression of possible bias.”
(FCM Investments, LLC v. Grove Pham, LLC (2023)
96 Cal.App.5th 545, 553 (FCM), citing Betz v. Pankow (1995)
31 Cal.App.4th 1503, 1507–1508 (Betz).) “ ‘An impression of
possible bias in the arbitration context means that one could
reasonably form a belief that an arbitrator was biased for or
against a party for a particular reason.’ ” (Haworth v. Superior
Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 372, 389 (Haworth), quoting Betz, supra,
at p. 1511.)
The test for bias-based misconduct is “whether a
hypothetical reasonable person (i.e., a disinterested, well-
informed, thoughtful member of the public) would form an
impression of possible bias on the part of the arbitrator.” (FCM,
supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 555.) “ ‘The “reasonable person” is not
someone who is “hypersensitive or unduly suspicious,” but rather
is a “well-informed, thoughtful observer.” ’ [Citations.] ‘[T]he
partisan litigant emotionally involved in the controversy
underlying the [arbitration] is not the disinterested objective
observer whose doubts concerning the [arbitrator’s] impartiality
provide the governing standard.’ ” (Haworth, supra, 50 Cal.4th at
p. 389 [addressing arbitrator’s failure to disclose facts which
might have cast doubt on his impartiality].)
Betz involved an allegation of bias based on what the court
called “[a] frequent cause for an impression of possible bias”—
“the existence of a present or past business relationship between
the arbitrator and a party, its counsel or a witness.” (Betz, supra,

31
31 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1508–1509.) The Betz arbitrator was
“formerly a partner in a law firm during a period when the firm
represented a business entity in which one of the arbitrating
parties had a financial and/or leadership interest . . . .” (Id. at
p. 1505.) The Betz court found vacatur inappropriate on this
ground because the arbitrator “was not acquainted with the party
and unaware of the party’s representation by his former law
firm.” (Ibid.; see also id. at p. 1511.)
FCM was a contract dispute which turned on the credibility
of one witness—a principal of one of the contracting parties.
(FCM, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 555.) In the award, the
arbitrator found the witness not credible because she used an
interpreter at the arbitration hearing—something the arbitrator
called a “deceptive ploy,” given evidence the witness engaged in
sophisticated business transactions and had lived for decades in
the United States. (Id. at p. 547.) The appellate court determined
the award gave rise to a “reasonable impression of possible
language bias on the part of the arbitrator” and therefore had to
be vacated. (Id. at p. 560.)
Here, Marina does not identify any “ ‘particular reason’ ”
(Haworth, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 389, quoting Betz, supra,
31 Cal.App.4th at p. 1511) the arbitrator was purportedly biased
against it. Instead, it asks us to infer bias because, according to
Marina, “(i) . . . the Arbitrator acted in ways that would present
an impression of bias to any objectively reasonable person, and
(ii) the Arbitrator tacitly admitted to having prejudged the
outcome before the evidence was in.”
Starting with the latter, the statement purportedly
evidencing the arbitrator’s prejudgment was made on May 26,
2023, the fifth day (of seven) of the hearing. In the context of
explaining the problems with the declaration Marina had
submitted from Rocchi, the arbitrator said: “I have gone down
this path of ambiguity largely because of the differing aspects of

32
[paragraph 25’s heading] and the [paragraph] itself. And I have
allowed everybody to go down this path, and we have been here a
week going down that path. [¶] I will not tell you where I am
going with this because it’s not the appropriate time. I’m going to
let everybody put on the evidence that they think they need to
put on here.” (Italics added.)
This statement does not establish bias or impartiality
requiring vacatur. First, “the manner in which evidence was
weighed or the mental processes of the arbitrators in reaching
their decision are not subject to judicial review.” (Betz v. Pankow
(1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 919, 927.) Second, “opinions formed by [a]
judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the
course of [proceedings], do not constitute a basis for a bias or
partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or
antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Thus,
judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or
disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their
cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge.
They may do so if they reveal an opinion that derives from an
extrajudicial source; and they will do so if they reveal such a high
degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment
impossible.” (Liteky v. United States (1994) 510 U.S. 540, 555
(Liteky).)
To the extent the arbitrator’s statement reflected she had
formed a view of whether parol evidence would support Marina’s
interpretation of paragraph 25, she was already well-versed in
the language of the paragraph, understood the way Marina
wanted it interpreted,14 and had heard considerable evidence.

14 It bears noting Marina had “an uphill battle” on its
interpretation of paragraph 25. Marina’s counsel conceded as
much in the trial court. Marina’s initial litigation position tacitly

33
Even if she had become “hostile” to Marina’s case by this point,
she had already heard ample evidence and we think her
recognition that it was not yet appropriate to reach a judgment
and her commitment to hearing all the parties’ admissible
evidence show a fair judgment remained in prospect.
The assortment of other conduct Marina alleges shows bias
is as follows:
(1) the arbitrator refused to order ABP to revise its
witness list to include summaries of anticipated
testimony in accordance with JAMS rule 20(a) based
on the arbitrator’s satisfaction that ABP had
complied with her scheduling order;
(2) the arbitrator misconstrued her scheduling order to
allow her to entertain ABP’s objections to Marina’s
exhibits after the start of the hearing;
(3) the arbitrator ruled “unevenly” on objections to
exhibits and testimony, sustaining 80 percent of
ABP’s objections but only 28 percent of Marina’s;
(4) the arbitrator directed additional production by
Marina because it asserted affirmative defenses,
without requiring ABP (which had not asserted
affirmative defenses) to expand its production; and

recognized this when it claimed mutual mistake, in the absence
of which the parties would have specified a 99-year term. After
abandoning that in favor of its ultimate ambiguity theory,
Marina introduced its position—in its baseball arbitration
position statement—by claiming “[paragraph] 25 means exactly
what its heading states.” (Italics added.) Its primary reliance on
the heading revealed the weakness of its position in light of
paragraph 28A: “[Headings] shall not be considered or referred to
in resolving questions of interpretation or construction.” (Italics
added.)

34
(5) the arbitrator mishandled ABP’s fee motion in a
variety of ways.
Evaluating Marina’s various contentions would require us
to (i) review the arbitrator’s discovery rulings, evidentiary
rulings, interpretations of JAMS rules, and her own orders; and
(ii) conclude she erred. We decline to do so. First, this would
amount to a backdoor review of the arbitrator’s rulings, in
contravention of Moncharsh and Greenspan. (See Moncharsh,
supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 12 [“ ‘it is within the power of the arbitrator
to make a mistake either legally or factually’ ”]; Greenspan,
supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 1439.) Second, even if we were to
agree with Marina that the rulings described were erroneous,
erroneous rulings are not evidence of bias. (Cf. People v. Baker
(2021) 10 Cal.5th 1044, 1088 [“a court may be wrong, even
repeatedly, without revealing any partiality”]; Severson &
Werson, P.C. v. Sepehry-Fard (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 938, 952
[“A trial court’s rulings against a party, even if erroneous, do not,
by themselves, support a charge of bias.”].)
Nevertheless, it bears note that Marina paints a misleading
portrait of the arbitrator’s demeanor.
For example, Marina says the arbitrator was “partial to
ABP and hostile to Marina” because, after ABP raised the issue,
she admonished Marina’s counsel for their “ ‘improper and
insensitive’ ” filing on a religious holiday the night before a
hearing, even though the arbitrator filed her tentative on the
same holiday. What Marina fails to mention is that its
submission was responsive to a reply ABP had filed 10 days
earlier and that the arbitrator nevertheless carefully considered
the content of Marina’s submission. In any event, “[n]either
strained relations between a judge and an attorney for a party
nor ‘[e]xpressions of opinion uttered by a judge, in what he
conceived to be a discharge of his official duties, are . . . evidence
of bias or prejudice.’ ” (Roitz v. Coldwell Banker Residential

35
Brokerage Co. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 716, 724; see also Liteky,
supra,510 U.S. at p. 555 [“judicial remarks during the course of a
trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to,
counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a
bias or partiality challenge”].)
Further examples lie in its complaint that the arbitrator
did not give it opportunities to respond to adjustments to be made
to ABP’s fee award after a full hearing on the matter. A review of
the transcript shows the arbitrator gave reasoned responses to
Marina’s requests, evincing no bias or unfairness. The arbitrator
found Marina did not need an opportunity to oppose ABP’s
revised fee statements she ordered prepared because her
tentative called for a “simply mechanical” revision to its prior
submitted statements. Marina contends ABP thereafter “began
making filings urging the Arbitrator to reconsider and grant it
more fees,” but directs us to no such filings in the record. What
Marina does cite is the arbitrator’s final order that shows she
took seriously Marina’s objections to ABP’s fee request and made
significant adjustments. Among other things, the final order
substantially reduced increases to hourly rates charged by ABP’s
lawyers and took another $100,000 off ABP’s request due to block
billing.
Marina’s unsupported recitation of the instances it
purports show prejudice reflect its perspective as that of a
“ ‘partisan litigant emotionally involved in the controversy’ ” and
not a reasonable, disinterested observer. (See Haworth, supra,
50 Cal.4th at p. 389.) That perspective cannot support vacatur.
(Ibid.)
Marina’s characterizations notwithstanding, the arbitrator
was respectful towards and patient with Marina’s counsel, even
as counsel repeatedly pressed issues she had already ruled on
(e.g., the applicability of evidentiary rules) and addressed the
arbitrator in ways that made her feel personally attacked. She

36
helped Marina by admitting evidence objected to by ABP,
including by accepting some facts as “common sense” and
questioning witnesses herself to help break through ABP’s
objections. She consistently gave both sides due opportunity to
argue disputed issues. Yes, Marina was often on the losing side,
but allowing this to serve as prima facie evidence of bias would
create a ground for vacatur of every arbitral award and upend
the policy favoring finality embodied in section 1282.6. Using
relative success of objections as a proxy for arbitrator bias is a
nonstarter: any arbiter must rule on the merits every time, not
try to achieve parity in the parties’ objection outcomes.
Though stated in a different context, it applies with equal
force here: “The mere fact that a decision was reached contrary to
a particular party’s interest cannot justify a claim of bias, no
matter how tenaciously the loser gropes for ways to reverse his
misfortune. While this proposition may appear self-evident,
[Marina’s] enumerated contentions collapse to little more.”
(Marcus v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs,
U. S. Dept. of Labor (D.C.Cir. 1976) 548 F.2d 1044, 1051.)
III. ABP’s Attorney Fees and Costs on Appeal
ABP requests its fees and costs on appeal. Attorney fees, “if
recoverable at all—pursuant either to statute or parties’
agreement—are available for services at trial and on appeal.”
(Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 637.) Marina does not
contend the superior court erred in awarding ABP its fees and
costs below nor does it respond to ABP’s request for fees and costs
on appeal. We will remand for the limited purpose of determining
those reasonable fees and costs to which ABP is entitled pursuant
to paragraph 23 of the ground leases. (See Lindelli v. Town of
San Anselmo (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1499, 1517 [determination
of the amount of fees “is a factual issue more properly considered
in the first instance by the trial court on remand”].)

37
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs pursuant to California
Rules of Court, rule 8.278, are awarded to ABP. This matter is
remanded to the superior court for the limited purpose of
considering any request for contractual fees and costs ABP may
choose to file.

RICHARDSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.

GOORVITCH, J.

 Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

38

Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude

Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.