CourtListener 10670077•People v. Earley CA2/7
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Filed 9/11/25 P. v. Earley CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B338402
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23CJCF00650)
v.
LARRY EARLEY,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Kevin P. Stennis, Judge. Affirmed.
Christina Vanarelli, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez and Michael C. Keller, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
Larry Earley appeals from the judgment entered after his
conviction by a jury of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211)
and attempted carjacking (§§ 664, 215, subd. (a)).1 Earley’s sole
contention is that the trial court abused its discretion by denying
his motion to represent himself under Faretta v. California (1975)
422 U.S. 806 (Faretta). We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Offense and Charges
On December 7, 2023, Earley approached Blanca Santiago’s
car outside her home, as she sat in the driver’s seat sending text
messages. Earley opened the driver’s side door, and Santiago
asked in Spanish if she could help him. Earley reached inside the
car, and attempted to take Santiago’s keys out of the ignition.
When she grabbed the keys, Earley hit Santiago in the face
several times and then took her cellphone out of her hand.
Santiago honked her horn and yelled for help. Santiago’s sister
and brother-in-law were nearby, and her brother-in-law
responded and pulled Earley away from the car. Santiago’s sister
asked Earley to give the phone back, and he did. Santiago
sustained swelling to her face from Earley’s punches to her face.
The district attorney filed a felony complaint charging
Earley with one count of second degree robbery (§ 211), one count
of attempted carjacking (§§ 664, 215, subd. (a)), and alleging
several prior felony convictions.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
B. Competency Proceedings
Earley’s pretrial probation report noted an
“indication/claim of significant physical/mental/emotional health
problem,” explaining: “According to [the Justice Data Interface
Controller system], on May 12, 1993, the defendant was admitted
to Patton State Hospital. According to [the Consolidated
Criminal History Reporting System], the defendant is classified
as ‘mentally disturbed.’”
On December 13, 2023, Earley was a “miss-out” at his
scheduled arraignment.2 The minute order reflects the court
ordered an “[e]xtraction and safety chair.”
On January 2, 2024, in advance of the preliminary hearing,
Earley’s attorney declared a doubt regarding Earley’s competence
to stand trial, and the trial court set a competency hearing in
mental health court.
On January 16, Dr. Dustin Stephens evaluated Earley and
concluded that Earley was not presently competent to stand trial
but that treatment with antipsychotic and mood stabilizing
medication would likely make him competent to stand trial.
Dr. Stephens reported Earley demonstrated “unwarranted
irritability and rigid, inflexible thinking” during the interview.
Dr. Stephens also noted Earley disclosed a history of “‘a few’ prior
psychiatric hospitalizations” due to a “history of ‘hearing voices
and depression.’” Earley also complained to Dr. Stephens about
the medication he received in jail, stating it was not working and
he “need[ed] to get back on my Seroquel and Wellbutrin like I
usually take.”
2 “Miss-out” refers to a defendant who is in custody but is not
brought to court for a hearing or other proceeding. (See People v.
Howze (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1389.)
3
The prosecutor requested a second opinion, and on
January 24, psychiatrist Sharon Guo evaluated Earley. Dr. Guo
concluded Earley met “DSM-5 criteria [for] various substance use
disorders (related to alcohol, PCP, stimulants, and/or other
psychoactive substance)” but was competent to stand trial.
Dr. Guo stated, “The acute withdrawal period has passed but he
still has some emotional and behavioral difficulties.” She lacked
sufficient information to diagnose him with a psychotic disorder,
but reported he complained of “suicidal ideation and auditory
hallucinations,” including daily voices that encouraged him to
harm himself or others, or to “cuss people out.” Dr. Guo noted
Earley said he wanted to go to trial and potentially represent
himself. She stated Earley presented with “irritability and some
behavioral problems,” poor impulse control, difficulty with
enunciation due to missing teeth, and his “insight and judgment
were limited,” but she concluded “it is likely that he can also
conform to expected behavior in the courtroom.”
On February 15, 2024, Earley’s attorney submitted on
Dr. Guo’s report, and the mental health court found Earley
competent to stand trial. Criminal proceedings were reinstated
in Department 35, where the case remained through completion
of the preliminary hearing.
C. Earley’s Faretta Motions
On February 16, 2024, Earley was in lockup at the
courthouse before his scheduled preliminary hearing, and “there
was repeated loud banging coming out of the lockup.” The trial
court asked a sheriff’s deputy attending to Earley whether it was
“a danger” to bring Earley out from lockup. The deputy stated
“yes,” based on Earley’s behavior. The trial court decided not to
4
bring him out, and noted the court was aware Earley wanted to
represent himself.
On February 29, 2024, Earley and his attorney appeared
for the preliminary hearing, and Earley requested to represent
himself. Earley’s counsel asked the trial court to “revisit the pro
per issue so [Earley] can be pro per if he’d like to be on the next
court date and make that decision then.” Earley interjected
unsolicited comments into the hearing several times, interrupting
counsel and the court, resulting in the court admonishing him:
“Please stop.” “Hold on a second, please.” “Please stop. Not yet.”
The court told Earley, “I’m just giving you a warning you can’t
have outbursts in court,” and explained that was “one of the
things I take into account” in determining whether Earley could
represent himself at trial. When the court told Earley he would
need to fill out a Faretta form and the hearing would be put on
that afternoon, Earley expressed frustration that his Faretta
hearing would have to take place later in the same day stating,
“No, I don’t want to come back at 1:30 [p.m.]. I don’t want to stay
here all day.” The court explained Earley’s counsel was needed in
another courtroom, but Earley interrupted again. The court then
stated, “Stop. Remember I told you, you can’t have outbursts . . .
[T]hat’s the second warning.”
Earley then requested a new attorney instead of proceeding
to a Faretta hearing. The court held a hearing under People v.
Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden) and denied the motion.
During the Marsden hearing, the court continued to warn Earley
to stop interrupting defense counsel and the court. The court
noted it was keeping track of the number of times it had warned
Earley to refrain from speaking. After the Marsden hearing, a
sheriff’s deputy stated for the record that Earley “was taken out
5
of court due to his outbursts. He could not follow basic court
rules, and, for safety reasons, he’s going to be transported back to
custody.” The court continued the preliminary hearing.
On March 1, 2024, Earley and an attorney standing in for
his appointed counsel appeared for Earley’s continued
preliminary hearing. The hearing proceeded without Earley
renewing his previous Faretta motion. Although he was
represented by counsel, Earley personally objected several times,
resulting in the court warning: “[W]hat I need you to understand
is that you have an attorney representing you. . . . You need to
remain silent. And if you continue to state things, as you are
doing, you could be subject to removal from the courtroom. So
I’m marking this down as warning number one.” When Earley
continued objecting, the court stated, “You need to stop. That’s
warning number two.” Earley responded by stating a witness
was “lying,” pointed at the witness on the stand, and stated “I’m
going to bite your ass into the fire.” The court repeated, “Sir, you
need to stop right there, and there’s certainly not going to be any
threats . . . I’m going to give you one more warning.” The trial
court concluded the preliminary hearing and held Earley to
answer on both charges, at which Earley commented, “This is
bullshit, man.”
Earley was arraigned on March 22, 2024 and pleaded not
guilty. A pretrial conference was set for April 10 in
Department 128, where the case remained until trial.
At the pretrial conference, Earley initially indicated he
wanted to keep his attorney and try to do an unspecified
treatment program instead of prison, then Earley stated he
wanted to represent himself after counsel said the treatment
program would not apply to him. The trial court provided Earley
6
with the written form for his Faretta request and commenced a
Faretta hearing the following day.
At the Faretta hearing on April 11, 2024, Earley submitted
a written waiver of his right to counsel, and the trial court
continued the hearing to review the previous competency reports.
The court explained that although Earley may have been found
competent to stand trial, it needed to separately determine
whether he was competent to represent himself.
On April 16, 2024, the trial court initially stated it thought
the motion was “maybe . . . close, but it hasn’t gotten to that line,
so there is no basis for me to deny his request to represent
himself” due to Earley’s lack of competency to represent himself.
The court explained: “In this case, it’s clear that Mr. Earley has
significant mental health challenges, and he is on medications to
deal with those. And it’s also clear that he’s been irritable,
aggressive at times, easily angered, at times has poor impulse
control, and there are behavioral problems and rigid thinking.
But I am not able to conclude that those problems constitute
severe mental illness to the point that he can’t carry out the basic
tasks needed to present a defense without help of counsel.”
The trial court nevertheless urged Earley to “see if there’s a
way to come up to a solution” with his current attorney. Earley
became agitated during the ensuing discussion and again
interrupted the court. The court cautioned him that it had not
yet ruled on his Faretta motion, and “if you are not going to obey
the court rules . . . , then I don’t know if that is going to work
out.” After Earley interrupted the court twice more, the court
told him: “Sir, I’m going to cut you off right now. Stop raising
your voice at me, and don’t interrupt me when I’m speaking to
you or when others are speaking in the courtroom, or frankly, sir,
7
I’m increasingly concerned about whether Faretta works for
you. . . . I don’t know. I’m not convinced that you’re able to abide
by the court’s rules if you represent yourself. . . . You need some
time to cool down a little bit, sir.” The court stated it would
continue the hearing to the next day, which apparently upset
Earley. Earley raised his voice and told the court twice he would
“file a 170.6 on your ass”—i.e., a peremptory challenge under
Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6. The court noted for the
record that Earley verbally resisted being removed from the
courtroom by the bailiff, continued to “speak out of turn,” and
that his raised voice could still be heard through the closed door
to the lockup after Earley left the courtroom.
Earley refused transportation to court the next day. The
court issued an extraction order and continued the case to
April 18, 2024. On April 18, the bailiff reported Earley was
becoming agitated in the courthouse lockup, so he was not
brought into the courtroom, and the court again continued the
matter.
On April 23, 2024, the trial court denied the Faretta
motion. The court observed “[t]his is the third or fourth hearing
date we’ve set for the Faretta,” and expressly incorporated by
reference “each of the previous hearing dates that we’ve had on
this matter so any reviewing court could review each of those, not
just today’s hearing alone.” The court explained it “was leaning
towards granting the request until I saw the in-court
appearance.” The court stated that both competency reports
noted Earley had “problems of a significant nature” with rigidity
and inflexible thinking, “above and beyond just the severe mental
illness that he suffers from.” The court noted Earley’s repeated
outbursts and speaking over the court “when the issues were not
8
going his way,” his “screaming even through the closed door”
when he was taken back to lockup, his refusal of orders to come
to court, and the way “the first hearing devolved into a screaming
match with Mr. Earley repeatedly interrupting me and resorting
to highly rigid, inflexible thinking” on a factual issue. The court
concluded “[t]his problem seemed to me to be from severe to
extreme in the inflexible thinking when things were not going his
way.” The court also observed it could understand less than half
of Earley’s words when he became upset, “which is frequently.”
Earley’s counsel noted for the record that Earley had
“asked to go pro per since the moment I had met him.” His
counsel stated that Earley’s “colloquy with . . . Department 35
would tend to lead a reasonable person to believe that while it
might be a little bit daunting to give him his pro per status,”
Earley did coherently answer questions about the criminal
process, exhibiting traits “that go towards going to pro per.”
Counsel further stated that although “the court is well within its
purview to recognize the things he’s doing physically in the
courtroom,” Earley’s “trigger” is when “things aren’t going his
way,” and “if he was to be pro per, the outbursts might be less.”
The court ultimately ruled as follows: “I have given this a
fair amount of thought, and I think that the problems exhibited
in the courtroom of which there was kind of an early foretelling of
them in the two psychiatrists’ reports do trigger People vs.
Johnson . . . . He suffers, as . . . the psychiatrists have described,
from severe mental illness. And barring [sic] from their comment
and also what I’ve seen in the courtroom, that these severe
problems are to the point that he cannot carry out the basic tasks
needed to present a defense without help of counsel.”
9
D. Trial and Sentencing
Before trial, Earley requested and received a new attorney,
then subsequently made another Marsden motion, which was
denied.
The case was tried before a jury in May 2024. Earley
renewed his Faretta motion on the first day of trial, and it was
denied. The jury found him guilty of second degree robbery
(§ 211) and of attempted carjacking (§§ 664, 215, subd. (a)).
Earley admitted one prior “strike” conviction. (§ 667(b)-(i).) The
trial court sentenced him to state prison for four years on the
robbery and three years for the attempted carjacking, but stayed
the attempted carjacking sentence under section 654.
Earley timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
A criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to self-
representation at trial if he or she “voluntarily and intelligently”
waives the right to assistance of counsel. (Faretta, supra,
422 U.S. at p. 807; 835-836; accord, People v. Joseph (1983)
34 Cal.3d 936, 943.) Faretta and its progeny establish that, upon
a timely motion, a defendant has the “right to conduct his own
defense, provided only that he knowingly and intelligently
forgoes his right to counsel and that he is able and willing to
abide by rules of procedure and courtroom protocol.”
(McKaskle v. Wiggins (1984) 465 U.S. 168, 173 (McKaskle);
accord, People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 734 (Welch).)
But “[t]here are limits on the right to act as one’s own
attorney, and “‘Faretta itself and later cases have made clear that
10
the right of self-representation is not absolute.’” (People v. Butler
(2009) 47 Cal.4th 814, 825; see Indiana v. Edwards (2008)
554 U.S. 164, 171-172.) A trial court has “discretion to deny self-
representation to gray-area defendants” who are competent to
stand trial but “lack the mental health or capacity to represent
themselves at trial.” (People v. Johnson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 519,
523, 528 (Johnson); see Edwards, at p. 178 [courts may deny self-
representation “for those competent enough to stand trial . . . but
who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they
are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves”].)
A trial court also has discretion to deny or terminate self-
representation if “a defendant is and will remain so disruptive,
obstreperous, disobedient, disrespectful or obstructionist in his or
her actions or words as to preclude the exercise of the right to
self-representation.” (Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 735.)
“To minimize the risk of improperly denying self-
representation to a competent defendant, ‘trial courts should be
cautious about making an incompetence finding without benefit
of an expert evaluation, though the judge’s own observations of
the defendant’s in-court behavior will also provide key support for
an incompetence finding and should be expressly placed on the
record.”’ (Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 530-531.)
“The trial court possesses much discretion when it comes
to terminating [or denying] a defendant’s right to self-
representation and the exercise of that discretion ‘will not be
disturbed in the absence of a strong showing of clear abuse.’”
(Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 735.) “The trial court’s
determination regarding a defendant’s competence must be
upheld if supported by substantial evidence,” with deference to
the trial court’s discretion “especially appropriate” when “the
11
same judge has observed the defendant on numerous occasions.”
(Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 531-532.) The erroneous
denial of a Faretta motion is reversible per se. (See People v.
Becerra (2016) 63 Cal.4th 511, 520; People v. Best (2020)
49 Cal.App.5th 747, 756 (Best).)
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying
Earley’s Faretta Motion
Earley contends the trial court abused its discretion by
denying his motion to represent himself at trial because he
satisfied the requirements for a Faretta waiver, the record does
not support the conclusion that he suffered from a “severe mental
illness,” and his courtroom behavior did not justify the trial
court’s denial of his Faretta motion.3
We conclude Earley’s belligerent and disruptive behavior
was a sufficient basis to deny his motion for self-representation
at trial. As noted, Faretta requires that a defendant both
“knowingly and intelligently forgoes his right to counsel” and be
“able and willing to abide by rules of procedure and courtroom
protocol.” (McKaskle, supra, 465 U.S. at pp. 173-174.) The
California Supreme Court has held that denial of a motion for
self-representation at trial is appropriate “when a defendant’s
conduct prior to the Faretta motion gives the trial court a
reasonable basis for believing that his self-representation will
create disruption.” (Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 734.) In
Welch, the high court concluded the trial court did not abuse its
3 Earley’s opening brief argues, “The trial court erred in
denying Mr. Earley’s Faretta motion on April 16, 2024,” but the
trial court actually ruled on his Faretta motion on April 23 due to
Earley’s behavior during the proceedings.
12
discretion by denying the Faretta motion of a defendant who
“belligerently denied awareness of a calendar date that was set in
his presence”; “turned his back on the trial court when
addressing it”; “interrupted the trial court several times to argue
what the court had declared to be a nonmeritorious point”;
“accused the court of misleading him”; “refused to allow the court
to speak”; and “refused several times to follow the court’s
admonishment of silence.” (Id. at p. 735.) The trial court in
Welch considered not only the defendant’s conduct in preliminary
proceedings before it, but also his conduct in pretrial hearings
before two other judges. (See id. at pp. 730-731.)
Earley’s conduct throughout the pretrial proceedings
provided a reasonable basis for the trial court’s finding that his
self-representation would create disruption. Earley repeatedly
interrupted the proceedings and caused them to be continued due
to his uncooperative behavior. Earley interrupted counsel and
the court while they spoke, despite repeated admonitions from
the court to remain silent; he raised his voice in court and when
removed from the courtroom could still be heard “screaming”
behind a heavy door; he repeatedly delayed proceedings by
refusing to be transported to court and by causing a disturbance
in the courtroom lockup; and he threatened a witness on the
stand while testifying and told the judge he was going to “file a
170.6 on your ass.” “‘The right of self-representation is not a
license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom. Neither is it a
license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and
substantive law.’ [Citation.] . . . This rule is obviously critical to
the viable functioning of the courtroom. A constantly disruptive
defendant who represents himself, and who therefore cannot be
removed from the trial proceedings as a sanction against
13
disruption, would have the capacity to bring his trial to a
standstill.” (Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 734.) Further, we
recognize that “the extent of a defendant’s disruptive behavior
may not be fully evident from the cold record, and that one
reason for according deference to the trial court is that it is in the
best position to judge defendant’s demeanor.” (Id. at p. 735.)
Thus here, as in Welch, “while no single one of the above
incidents may have been sufficient by itself to warrant a denial of
the right of self-representation, taken together they amount to a
reasonable basis for the trial court’s conclusion that defendant
could not or would not conform his conduct to the rules of
procedure and courtroom protocol, and that his self-
representation would be unacceptably disruptive.” (Ibid.)
Earley argues that “the trial court did not base its denial on
[his] courtroom disruptions,” and thus the denial of his Faretta
motion cannot be upheld on that ground on appeal. (See Best,
supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 763 [“Because the trial court did not
deny defendant’s Faretta motion on grounds of disruptiveness, we
cannot here uphold the trial court’s ruling on this alternate
ground.”].) Earley is incorrect because the trial court expressly
based its ruling on “the problems exhibited in the courtroom” and
“what I’ve seen in the courtroom.” The court also expressly
incorporated the previous hearings and considered Earley’s prior
behavior before Department 35. And where a trial court bases its
Faretta ruling on both mental condition and on the ground that a
defendant was disruptive, the defendant’s “disruptive behavior he
had exhibited in the courtroom prior to making that motion” may
constitute sufficient basis alone for denial. (Welch, supra,
20 Cal.4th at p. 735; see Best, at p. 762.)
14
Further, here, unlike in Best, the trial court expressly
relied on Earley’s history of disruptive behavior throughout the
pretrial proceedings, not just evidence of his mental illness. The
court gave Earley several clear warnings before ruling that his
behavior compromised his right to self-representation, and the
court explained it “was leaning towards granting the request
until I saw the in-court appearance.” The court described
Earley’s outbursts in the courtroom and in lockup, his repeated
interruption of counsel and the court when things “were not going
his way,” and his refusal to abide by court orders and
admonitions. It concluded Earley had problems with rigidity and
inflexible thinking, “above and beyond just the severe mental
illness that he suffers from.” The trial court was well within its
discretion to conclude Earley “is and will remain so disruptive,
obstreperous, disobedient, disrespectful or obstructionist in his or
her actions or words as to preclude the exercise of the right to
self-representation.” (Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 735.) By
contrast, in Best the court stated that, based on the record in that
case, “[w]e might hesitate to find that the evidence here
supported a denial of the Faretta motion on grounds of
disruptiveness.” (Best, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 761.)
Because we conclude Earley’s disruptive behavior was
sufficient for the trial court to deny his motion for self-
representation, we need not also determine whether substantial
evidence supports a finding Earley was a “gray-area defendant”
competent to stand trial but “lack[ing] the mental health or
capacity to represent [himself] at trial.” (Johnson, supra,
53 Cal.4th at pp. 523, 528; see McKaskle, supra, 465 U.S. at
p. 173.)
15
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:
FEUER, J.
STONE, J.
16
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