CourtListener 10669291•In re R.S. CA6
Texte intégral
Filed 9/9/25 In re R.S. CA6
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re R.S., a Person Coming Under the H052758
Juvenile Court Law. (Santa Cruz County
Super. Ct. No. 24JU0163)
SANTA CRUZ COUNTY HUMAN
SERVICES DEPARTMENT,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
M.S.,
Defendant and Appellant.
Under the Probate Code, a court may appoint a guardian for a child. (Prob. Code,
§ 1514.) Although a probate guardian becomes the child’s legal caretaker and is entitled
to many of the same rights as a parent (In re Merrick V. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 235,
249-250 (Merrick V.)), a probate guardianship may be terminated when it is in the child’s
best interest to do so. (Prob. Code, § 1601.) Moreover, in a dependency proceeding,
where a juvenile court considers whether to exercise jurisdiction because a child is in
danger or has been left without support, the Welfare and Institutions Code grants juvenile
courts express authority to terminate a probate guardianship. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 728,
subd. (a).) (Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.) This appeal concerns when that authority may be exercised in relation
to a dependency proceeding.
M.S. was appointed the probate guardian of R.S., a minor, in 2017. In 2024, R.S.
was hospitalized and treated for suicidal ideation. When R.S. was ready for discharge,
M.S. refused to pick him up or make alternative arrangements for him, and the Santa
Cruz County Human Services Department (Department) filed a dependency petition.
Later, R.S. filed a motion to terminate M.S.’s guardianship. After conducting a hearing
on the motion, the juvenile court terminated M.S.’s guardianship and scheduled a hearing
on whether to exercise dependency jurisdiction over R.S.
M.S. appeals, arguing that the trial court improperly terminated her probate
guardianship before establishing dependency jurisdiction over R.S. As explained below,
based on the plain language of section 728, the Judicial Council’s interpretation of that
section in the Rules of Court, and the uniform view of the decisions considering this
issue, we reject this argument and affirm the order terminating M.S.’s guardianship.
I. BACKGROUND
R.S. was born in March 2008 in Haiti and spent almost the first half of his life
there. His mother is deceased, and his father unknown. In 2016, M.S. brought R.S. to
California, and the following year, she was appointed his probate guardian.
A. Section 300 Petition
On August 29, 2024, the Department filed a petition under section 300 asking the
juvenile court to exercise dependency jurisdiction over R.S., who was then 16 years old.
The petition reported that from July 2020 through early August 2024, the Department
received over a dozen referrals regarding R.S., including allegations of physical and
emotional abuse, general neglect, and threats to return R.S. to Haiti, but each of these
were determined to be unfounded or evaluated out.
The petition also alleged that on August 22, 2024 M.S. told R.S. that she had
purchased a plane ticket to Haiti for him. Afraid of returning there, R.S. ran away from
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home, intending to jump off a bridge. However, after a car passed by him, R.S. contacted
911 and was hospitalized for suicidal ideation. R.S. reported that, in addition to
threatening to send him to Haiti, M.S. had said that she did not care if he died and that
she would be happy if he ran into traffic. R.S. also reported that on numerous occasions
M.S. had locked him out of the house and told him to sleep outside.
On August 24, 2024, R.S. was ready to leave the hospital, and the Department
notified M.S. of the anticipated discharge. However, M.S. refused to pick R.S. up or
make alternative arrangements for his care, stating that she could not handle his
behavioral issues and was contacting his extended family in Haiti in hopes of sending
R.S. there.
Five days later, the Department filed the dependency petition alleging that R.S.
should be treated as a dependent under section 300, subdivision (g) because he was left
without any provision for support and his legal guardian was unwilling or unable to
provide care and support for him.
B. The Detention Hearing
On August 30, 2024, a day after the petition was filed, the juvenile court held an
initial detention hearing. It found that the Department had made a prima facie showing
that R.S. came within section 300 and detention was necessary. The Department then
placed R.S. in a short-term residential therapeutic program and set a jurisdiction and
disposition hearing. The hearing was originally set for October 1, 2024, but was
continued until later that month.
C. The Jurisdiction Report
On September 18, 2024, the Department filed a jurisdiction/disposition report. In
the report, the Department requested that the juvenile court declare R.S. a dependent of
the court, continue R.S. in his residential therapeutic program, and offer reunification
services to M.S. The Department reported that R.S. did not wish to see or speak with
M.S and that M.S. continued to threaten to return R.S. to Haiti on various grounds.
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D. Termination of the Probate Guardianship
In early October 2024, represented by counsel, R.S. filed a motion to terminate
M.S.’s probate guardianship pursuant to section 728. The Department joined in his
motion and submitted a memorandum attaching letters from three of R.S.’s mental health
providers. One letter observed that M.S. often addressed misbehavior by R.S. with
“significant and seemingly disproportionate consequences,” such as threatening to send
R.S. to Haiti, which M.S. actually did twice. Another letter reported observing M.S.
make statements about sending R.S. back to Haiti and delaying his application for U.S.
legal residency or citizenship due to his rebellious behaviors.
The juvenile court scheduled a hearing on R.S.’s motion to terminate the probate
guardianship at the end of October. At the hearing, which began on October 29 and
concluded on November 4, 2024, R.S. testified that he did not want to return to M.S.’s
custody and that he wanted the court to end the guardianship. He recounted that in
August 2024 M.S. told him that she was sending him back to Haiti permanently. Because
this scared him, the night before he was supposed to go to the airport he ran away and
eventually went to ask for help at a house and the police were called.
R.S. also described two prior occasions on which M.S. actually sent him to Haiti.
The first was in 2023. During a trip to Los Angeles, M.S. told R.S. that she would be
dropping him at the airport and sending him to Haiti. Although R.S. was afraid of gang
violence in Haiti, he went and stayed there with an aunt for three or four weeks. During
that time, he was terrified because there were gun fights at night only a few blocks from
his aunt’s house. Although R.S. told M.S. this, in January 2024, M.S. again sent R.S. to
Haiti, this time telling him that she was sending him back permanently. Because it was
too dangerous to stay with his aunt this time, R.S. stayed with a family friend. Although
this was a “slightly . . . bit safer,” R.S. still heard gunshots, and he feared gangs would be
looking for him because he had left his California school ID at the airport. Three weeks
or so later, after seeing news that gang violence was worsening, that the Port-au-Prince
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airport had closed due to gangs overtaking it, and that the president of Haiti had been
assassinated, M.S. made arrangements for R.S. to return to the United States via an
armored vehicle to the Dominican Republic.
For her part, M.S. submitted approximately 100 pages of exhibits, consisting of
her own written statement and unsigned letters from friends, but did not testify at the
hearing or offer any live testimony. M.S. asserted that the trips to Haiti were not
intended to be punitive or disciplinary, but rather to maintain R.S.’s connections to his
biological family members and home country. In addition, while M.S. conceded that
section 728 allowed the juvenile court to terminate her guardianship, she asserted that
doing so before the dependency jurisdiction hearing was putting “the cart . . . before the
horse.”
At the close of the hearing the juvenile court stated that it could terminate legal
guardianship prior to the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, and that the standard for
doing so was the best interests of the minor. It then determined that terminating the
guardianship was in R.S.’s best interest. The court noted that the testimony of R.S. and
the statements provided by the Department were “very persuasive.” The court also
summarized R.S.’s testimony regarding his two trips to Haiti, and the threatened third
trip, emphasizing the danger that R.S. felt during those trips in light of the gangs and the
gunfire. The court concluded that these incidents, “in addition to all of the other things,”
resulted in emotional and placement instability and that terminating the guardianship
would provide an opportunity to stabilize R.S.’s mental health. R.S., the court explained,
“feels scared,” “[h]e can’t trust his guardian,” and “he’s not in a stable home
environment.” The court also observed that R.S. was thriving in his therapeutic
placement. Consequently, while the court recognized that terminating the guardianship
would cut off contact with M.S.’s family, including R.S.’s “[n]ana” and dog, it concluded
that terminating M.S.’s guardianship was in R.S.’s best interests.
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On November 6, 2024, the juvenile court entered an order terminating the
guardianship. M.S. timely noticed an appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
M.S. does not dispute that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s
finding that terminating her guardianship over R.S. was in his best interests. Nor does
she contend that in reaching this conclusion the juvenile court misapplied law or abused
its discretion. Instead, M.S. argues that the juvenile court failed to establish jurisdiction
in this case. Because this argument raises issues “involving the interpretation and proper
application of the dependency statutes,” we review it de novo. (In re M.F. (2022) 74
Cal.App.5th 86, 100.)
The term jurisdiction “ ‘embraces a large number of ideas of similar character,’ ”
including fundamental or subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and the
authority to make particular rulings. (In re Angel S. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1209
(Angel S.).) For the most part, M.S. appears to be using the term jurisdiction in the last
sense of authority to act. However, M.S. also questions both fundamental jurisdiction
and personal jurisdiction. Accordingly, we begin by addressing those issues.
A. Fundamental Jurisdiction
“Fundamental jurisdiction is, at its core, authority over both the subject matter and
the parties.” (People v. Chavez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 771, 780.) In California, “fundamental
jurisdiction over juvenile dependency cases such as this is governed by Welfare and
Institutions Code section 300 . . . .” (In re J.W. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 347, 357.)
Section 300 states that a child “is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court” if the child
falls within one of ten listed categories, including that the child “has been left without any
provision for support” or his custodian was “unwilling or unable to provide care or
support for the child.” (§ 300, subd. (g).) Here, the Department filed a petition alleging
that R.S. had been “left without provision for support” and M.S. was “unwilling and /or
unable to provide care and support” for him. Accordingly, the trial court had subject
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matter jurisdiction. (Angel S., supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 1209 [“Because the minor . . .
was also the subject of a dependency petition, the juvenile court had fundamental
jurisdiction to exercise its power to terminate the probate guardianship.”].)
B. Personal Jurisdiction
The trial court also had personal jurisdiction over M.S. In a dependency
proceeding, the juvenile court obtains personal jurisdiction over a parent or guardian
when the parent or guardian is properly noticed. (See, e.g., In re Daniel S. (2004) 115
Cal.App.4th 903, 916 [“Personal jurisdiction over a parent in dependency proceedings is
obtained when the parent is properly noticed . . . .”].) M.S. received such notice. In
addition, she appeared at the termination hearing, which provides further grounds for
exercising personal jurisdiction over her. (See, e.g., Kern County Dept. of Human
Services v. Superior Court (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 302, 311.) As a consequence, the
juvenile court had personal jurisdiction over M.S.
C. Authority to Terminate Probate Guardianship
M.S.’s primary argument on appeal is that the juvenile court lacked authority to
terminate her guardianship because it attempted to do so “pre-adjudication of the minor
as a dependent” and therefore before establishing dependency jurisdiction. This
argument conflicts with the plain language of section 728, the statute that grants juvenile
courts the authority to terminate probate guardianships, and well-settled interpretation of
that section.
Although probate guardianship is somewhat broader and has greater rights than
dependency guardianship (see Dora V. v. Superior Court (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 987,
1002; Merrick V., supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 250), section 728 authorizes the juvenile
court to terminate a probate guardianship if a dependency petition under section 300 has
been filed. Specifically, section 728 provides that “[t]he juvenile court may terminate or
modify a guardianship of the person of a minor previously established under the Probate
Code, or appoint a coguardian or successor guardian of the person of the minor, if the
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minor is the subject of a petition filed under Section 300, 601, or 602.” (§ 728, subd. (a).)
Here, as noted above, R.S. was the subject of a petition filed under section 300. As a
consequence, under section 728, the juvenile court had authority to terminate the
guardianship of M.S. over R.S. previously established under the Probate Code even
though it had not yet determined R.S. to be a dependent under section 300.
This conclusion is supported by the California Rules of Court. The rules expressly
recognize that “[a]t any time” after filing of a dependency petition under section 300 and
before the petition is dismissed or dependency is terminated, a juvenile court may
terminate a probate guardianship: “At any time after the filing of a petition under
section 300 and until the petition is dismissed or dependency is terminated, the court may
terminate or modify a guardianship of the person previously established under the
Probate Code.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.620(e).) Thus, according to the Rules of
Court, the juvenile court had authority to terminate M.S.’s probate guardianship before
adjudicating whether R.S. was a dependent. Moreover, the Rules of Court are
promulgated by the Judicial Council, which includes appellate and trial judges, and its
process for promulgating rules include procedures that ensure their reliability. (Sara M.
v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 998, 1013.) Accordingly, as the Supreme Court has
recognized, where a Rule of Court interprets a statute, that interpretation is “entitled to
great weight.” (Id. at p. 1014.)
Courts, albeit in dictum, have long interpreted section 728 in the same fashion.
Because section 728 becomes operative once a petition under section 300 is filed
concerning a child, courts have interpreted the section 728 to “give[] the juvenile court
the authority to terminate a Probate Code guardianship at any stage in the dependency
proceeding, including at the detention hearing or the jurisdictional hearing.” (Merrick V.,
supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 253, italics added; see also A.H. v. Superior Court (2013)
219 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1388 [“when a minor who is a ward under an existing probate
guardianship becomes subject of dependency proceedings, the juvenile court has
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jurisdiction under section 728 to terminate the probate guardianship”]; In re Xavier R.
(2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1414 (Xavier R.) [“section 728 gives the juvenile court the
authority to terminate a probate guardianship at any stage in the dependency
proceeding”].) “Thus, there is no time limit . . . on when a section 728 motion to
terminate a probate guardianship may be made.” (Xavier R., at p. 1415.)
In arguing that the juvenile court lacked authority to terminate her probate
guardianship before establishing that R.S. was a dependent, M.S. cites no decisions or
other authority. Nor does she explain how this requirement of establishing dependency
can be found in section 728’s statement that a juvenile court may terminate a probate
guardianship “if the minor is the subject of a petition filed under Section 300 . . . .”
(§ 728, subd. (a).) Instead, M.S. relies upon a subsequent statement in section 728
regarding when a hearing on a motion to terminate guardianship may be held: “The
hearing on the motion may be held simultaneously with any regularly scheduled hearing
held in proceedings to declare the minor a dependent child or ward of the court, or any
subsequent hearing concerning the dependent child or ward . . . .” (Ibid.) M.S. asserts
that any “regularly scheduled hearing” in a proceeding to declare a minor a dependent
necessarily “occurs after jurisdiction is established and at the disposition hearing in the
juvenile dependency proceedings, or later.” Therefore, in M.S.’s view, under section 728
a motion to terminate a probate guardianship “can only be heard simultaneously to
adjudicating the minor a dependent” or at a subsequent hearing.
We disagree. In the first place, the statement on which M.S. relies does not
require that hearings on terminating probate guardianship occur at or after a particular
point: It simply states that such hearings “may be held simultaneously with any regularly
scheduled hearing held in proceedings to declare the minor a dependent child . . . or any
subsequent hearing concerning the dependent child . . . .” (§ 728, subd. (a), italics
added.) “It is a well-settled principle of statutory construction that the word ‘may’ is
ordinarily construed as permissive, whereas ‘shall’ is ordinarily construed as mandatory,
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particularly when both terms are used in the same statute.” (Common Cause v. Board of
Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432, 443.) This principle squarely applies here.
Section 728 states that a hearing on terminating probate guardianship “may” be held
simultaneously with regularly scheduled hearings in a dependency proceeding and then in
the next sentence directs that certain notice requirements “shall” apply. (§ 728,
subd. (a).) In addition, far from exempting its provisions from this principle, “the
Welfare and Institutions Code specifically provides the word [may] is permissive.”
(Victoria S. v. Superior Court (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 729, 733; see also § 15 [“ ‘may’ is
permissive”].) Consequently, we interpret section 728 to permit a juvenile court to hold a
termination hearing simultaneous with or subsequent to hearings on dependency, but not
to require that the termination hearing be held at any particular point relative to the
dependency proceedings.
In addition, the simultaneous hearings authorized by section 728 need not be at or
after the determination of dependency. M.R. assumes that the only “regularly scheduled
hearing held in proceedings to declare the minor a dependent child” is the jurisdictional
or dispositional hearing. In fact, dependency cases typically begin when a child is
removed from the home because a peace officer, probation officer, or social worker has a
reasonable belief that the child falls within section 300 and is in immediate danger; a
dependency petition is filed; and a detention hearing is held under section 315. (Merrick
V., supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 252; see also § 315 [if a child has been taken into
custody, “the juvenile court shall hold a hearing (which shall be referred to as a
‘detention hearing’) . . . not later than the expiration of the next judicial day after a
petition to declare the child a dependent child has been filed”].) Thus, a detention
hearing is a “regularly scheduled hearing” in a proceeding to declare a child dependent.
Consequently, even if section 728 were mandatory rather than permissive, it would be
naturally interpreted to authorize hearings on the termination of probate guardianship
after the detention hearing and before the jurisdictional or dispositional hearing. Indeed,
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if the Legislature had intended to require termination hearings to be conducted after
establishment of dependency jurisdiction, it could have done so in a much clearer fashion
than stating such hearings “may be held simultaneously with any regularly scheduled
hearing held in proceedings to declare the minor a dependent child.” (§ 728.)
We therefore conclude, consistent with the plain language of section 728, the
Rules of Court, and prior decisions, that section 728 does not prohibit a juvenile court
from terminating a probate guardianship over a child before determining whether that
child is a dependent of the court. In light of this conclusion, we need not address M.S.’s
argument that, as R.S.’s guardian, she was deprived of due process when she was not
allowed to participate in the hearing on dependency jurisdiction.
III. DISPOSITION
The order terminating the guardianship of R.S. is affirmed.
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____________________________
BROMBERG, J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________________
DANNER, ACTING P. J.
____________________________________
RODRIGUEZ, J.
In re R.S.; Santa Cruz County HSD v. M.S.
H052758
Judge of the San Diego County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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