CourtListener 10669283•People v. Jackson CA6
Texte intégral
Filed 9/10/25 P. v. Jackson CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H052549
(Monterey County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. Nos. 20CR010362,
23CR004930)
v.
CLINTON JACKSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
Clinton Jackson appeals from a judgment after pleading no contest to two counts
of inflicting corporal injury on spouse or cohabitant with one great bodily injury
enhancement, and kidnapping, and waiving his appellate rights at the time of the plea.
The trial court sentenced Jackson to five years. On appeal, Jackson’s counsel has filed a
brief which states the case but raises no issues, under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d
436 (Wende). We advised Jackson of his right to submit written argument on his own
behalf within 30 days and he has not done so. Having independently reviewed the
record, we conclude that there is no arguable issue on appeal.
I. BACKGROUND
In case No. 23CR004930, the Monterey District Attorney charged Jackson with
attempted premeditated murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a); count 1),1 four counts
1
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
of corporal injury to spouse or cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a); counts 2, 5–7), two counts
of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); counts 3 &
8), kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a); count 4), and dissuading a witness by force or threat
(§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1); count 9). All counts pertain to the same victim, Jane Doe. With
respect to counts 2, 3, 7, and 8, the district attorney alleged that Jackson personally
inflicted great bodily injury under circumstances involving domestic violence.
(§ 12022.7, subd. (e).)
In case No. 20CR010362, the district attorney charged Jackson with torture
(§ 206; count 1), kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a); count 2), corporal injury to spouse or
cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a); count 3), and false imprisonment (§ 236; count 4). All
counts pertain to the same Jane Doe as in case No. 23CR004930, but involve different
incidents. With respect to count 3, the district attorney alleged that Jackson personally
inflicted great bodily injury under circumstances involving domestic violence.
(§ 12022.7, subd. (e).)
The parties entered into a negotiated plea agreement encompassing both cases. In
case No. 20CR010362, Jackson pleaded no contest to the kidnapping charge alleged in
count 2, and in case No. 23CR004930, the corporal injury to spouse or cohabitant charge
with great bodily injury enhancement alleged in count 2, and the corporal injury to
spouse or cohabitant charge without the great bodily injury enhancement alleged in
count 5. The parties agreed that the aggregate statutory maximum sentence was 11 years
8 months. At the change of plea hearing, the court indicated a likely sentence of four
years but emphasized that this was neither a promise nor a guarantee.
As a part of his plea, Jackson entered into a written “appeal and plea withdrawal
waiver,” (some capitalization omitted) in which he agreed to “waive and give up all
rights regarding state and federal writs and appeals. This includes, but is not limited to,
the right to appeal my conviction, the judgment, and any other order previously issued by
this court. I agree not to file any collateral attacks on my conviction or sentence at any
2
time in the future. I further agree not to ask the Court to withdraw my plea for any reason
after it is entered.”2
The trial court sentenced Jackson to five years in prison. The court reached the
sentence as follows: In case No. 20CR010362, the court imposed the 5-year middle term
for the kidnapping charge (count 2), and in case No. 23CR004930, the middle term of
three years for the first corporal injury charge (count 2) plus three years for the great
bodily injury enhancement, and another three years for the second corporal injury charge
(count 5).3 The court stayed the three-year term for the enhancement and ran the
sentence imposed in count 5 concurrent to that in count 2. The court further ran the
entirety of the sentence imposed in case No. 23CR004930 concurrent to that in
20CR010362.
In addition, the court ordered Jackson to pay a restitution fee in each case, as well
as court operations and court facilities assessment fees. The court entered a general order
of restitution and issued a 10-year criminal protective order under section 273.5,
subdivision (j). Jackson timely appealed from the judgment but did not request a
certificate of probable cause.
II. DISCUSSION
Following Wende guidelines, we have reviewed counsel’s brief and the appellate
record. (Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 441–442.) In entering his plea, Jackson agreed
2
The plea form included the option for a more limited appellate waiver, which
provides: “I hereby waive and give up all rights to appeal, writ, litigate, challenge or
contest in the future any order issued by this court made before the date indicated next to
my signature below. I give up the same rights concerning all contents of this waiver of
rights form and conditions of my entry of plea and conviction as stated herein. I further
agree not to ask the court to withdraw my plea for any reason after it is entered.” This
more limited waiver was not initialed as part of the parties’ agreement.
3
The trial court initially indicated it intended to impose the upper term for count 2
of case No. 23CR004930 (four years, per section 273.5, subdivision (a)) but ultimately
imposed the middle term for that count.
3
to waive “all rights regarding state and federal writs and appeals,” including any direct
appeal from the conviction or judgment and “any collateral attacks” on the conviction,
judgment, or sentence. Without a certificate of probable cause, we cannot review
challenges to the validity of the plea, including the enforceability of the appellate waiver.
(§ 1237.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b); People v. Becerra (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th
178, 192 (Becerra); but see § 1016.8, subd. (a)(4) [“A plea bargain that requires a
defendant to generally waive unknown future benefits of legislative enactments,
initiatives, appellate decisions, or other changes in the law that may occur after the date
of the plea is not knowing and intelligent”].)
Neither the waiver nor the omission of a certificate of probable cause, however,
wholly forecloses Jackson’s right to our independent review of the record under Wende:
“[A] certificate of probable cause is not required for the issue of whether [an] appellate
claim falls within the scope of an appellate waiver.” (Becerra, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at
p. 188.) So we have reviewed the record for arguable issues that would exceed the scope
of the waiver and therefore be cognizable despite the waiver. (Ibid.; see, e.g., People v.
Barton (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1145, 1153–1154 [holding that under § 1016.8,
defendant’s agreement to waive her right “ ‘to appeal from [the trial court’s] sentence’ ”
did not preclude her from seeking retroactive application of ameliorative sentencing
statute].) We have found none.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
4
_____________________________________
LIE, J.
WE CONCUR:
_____________________________________
GREENWOOD, P. J.
_____________________________________
GROVER, J.
People v. Jackson
H052549
Vous vous demandez comment ce texte s’applique à votre situation ?
Consultation gratuite, sans engagement
Décrivez votre situation. Notre équipe vous recontactera par e-mail pour votre consultation.
Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude
Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.