CourtListener 10667849•In re J.C. CA2/6
Texte intégral
Filed 9/8/25 In re J.C. CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
In re J.C., a Person Coming 2d Juv. No. B336389
Under the Juvenile Court (Super. Ct. No. EL0563A)
Law. (Los Angeles County)
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
J.C.,
Defendant and Appellant.
J.C. appeals from an order adjudicating him a ward of the
court (Welf. & Inst. Code,1 § 602) after he pleaded no contest to
first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)). The juvenile
court committed J.C. to a secure youth treatment facility (SYTF)
1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
for a baseline term of five years. On appeal, J.C. contends the
juvenile court erred in committing him to an SYTF, the
maximum term of confinement must be modified, the degree of
murder was not specified and must be reduced to second degree
murder, his precommitment custody credits were incorrect, and
the restitution fine must be stricken. We modify the disposition
order to correct the precommitment custody credits and strike the
restitution fine. In all other respects, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2
In May 2022, J.C., M.E., and their cohorts committed a
robbery at a marijuana farm. J.C., who was then 16 years old,
and his older brother, S.C., were the youngest in the group. The
group traveled from Los Angeles County to Riverside County and
rented a home for one night for the robbery. Each was armed
with a firearm. They wore masks and had zip ties and two-way
radios.
Around 4:00 am, some of the perpetrators, including J.C.,
banged on the front door of the main trailer and announced they
were “DEA agents” before forcing entry. One of the participants
hit a resident in the face with his rifle and held him at gunpoint.
Another participant forced another resident to the living room
floor and attempted to zip tie his hands. Two participants
confronted a third resident and one of them hit the resident’s
head with a firearm.
M.E. was shot in the thigh by one of his coparticipants.
The bullet hit his femoral artery. After the gunshot, J.C. ran into
a bedroom to retrieve a PlayStation 4 gaming console before
2 Because J.C. pleaded no contest, the facts are taken from
the probation reports.
2
fleeing the scene of the crime. The participants left in their
vehicles, and M.E. died on the drive back to the rental home.
The police interviewed Edgar Gonzalez-Navarro, who
admitted his participation in the robbery. He said J.C. was in the
main trailer with him, but left the room to help another
coparticipant. He then heard “several gunshots.” When
Gonzalez-Navarro returned to the car, J.C. said he “ ‘let some
rounds off.’ ” Gonzalez-Navarro dumped M.E.’s body off the side
of a road.
After the robbery, J.C. sold the stolen PlayStation 4 to a
third party through an online platform. Law enforcement
reviewed J.C. and S.C.’s social media accounts. There were
messages between J.C. and S.C. about the sale of the PlayStation
4. Based on information from these accounts, a gang enforcement
officer believed that J.C. and S.C. were members of the Drew
Street clique within the Avenues criminal street gang.
J.C. and S.C. were arrested at their home. While S.C. was
in the holding cell, he identified himself as an associate of the
Avenues Street gang Drew Street clique. He said he and J.C.
were recruited for the robbery. S.C. was armed with a pistol and
forced entry into a “ ‘little cabin’ ” on the property where a mother
and four children were inside. J.C., M.E., Gonzalez-Navarro, and
another person went to the main trailer. There was an
altercation, and two participants fired their weapons. S.C. said
“ ‘one of the fools shot, and they thought they shot at us, and I
guess they hit the homie.’ ” Gonzalez-Navarro had the idea to
dump M.E.’s body. S.C. and J.C. left after the robbery to return
to Los Angeles County. J.C. later told S.C. that he shot one
round during the altercation.
The section 602 petition alleged that J.C. willfully and
unlawfully committed murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count
3
1), was a principal in that crime and that someone who was a
principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm and
proximately cause great bodily injury and death (Pen. Code
§ 12022.53, subds. (d) & (e)). The petition also alleged J.C.
committed robbery of an inhabited dwelling (Pen. Code, § 211;
count 2), burglary (Pen. Code, § 459; count 3), and robbery (Pen.
Code, § 211; count 4). For counts 2 through 4, it was alleged that
J.C. committed the crimes for the benefit of a criminal street
gang (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(B)). The juvenile court
denied the district attorney’s motion to transfer J.C. to an adult
criminal court.
J.C. admitted a violation of Penal Code section 187,
subdivision (a), a felony. The juvenile court dismissed the
remaining counts and the firearm and gang allegations.
Thereafter, the case was transferred from Riverside County
Superior Court to Los Angeles County Superior Court.
At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court declared J.C.
to be a ward of the court under section 602 and ordered him
committed to an SYTF with a baseline term of five years and a
maximum confinement term of 25 years to life. The court ordered
J.C. to pay victim restitution and a restitution fine of $100.
DISCUSSION
SYTF
J.C. contends the juvenile court erred in committing him to
an SYTF because the evidence did not support its finding that an
SYTF met his needs. We disagree.
“ ‘ “We review a juvenile court’s commitment decision for
abuse of discretion, indulging all reasonable inferences to support
its decision.” [Citation.] “ ‘[D]iscretion is abused whenever the
court exceeds the bounds of all reason, all of the circumstances
being considered.’ ” [Citation.] We will not disturb the juvenile
4
court’s findings when there is substantial evidence to support
them. [Citation.] “ ‘In determining whether there was
substantial evidence to support the commitment, we must
examine the record presented at the disposition hearing in light
of the purposes of the Juvenile Court Law.’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘A trial
court abuses its discretion when the factual findings critical to its
decision find no support in the evidence.’ ” (In re Khalid B. (2015)
233 Cal.App.4th 1285, 1288.)
Pursuant to section 875, subdivision (a), a court may order
a ward who is 14 years of age or older to be committed to an
SYTF if they meet the following criteria: (1) They are found to be
a ward of the court based on an offense listed in Section 707,
subdivision (b) that was committed when they were 14 years of
age or older, (2) the adjudication is their most recent offense, and
(3) the court has made a finding on the record that a “less
restrictive, alternative disposition” for the ward is unsuitable.
The third criteria is at issue here. In making this finding,
the juvenile court “shall consider all relevant and material
evidence, including the recommendations of counsel, the
probation department, and any other agency . . . . The court shall
additionally make its determination based on all of the following
criteria: [¶] (A) The severity of the offense . . . including the
ward’s role in the offense, the ward’s behavior, and harm done to
victims. [¶] (B) The ward’s previous delinquent history . . . . [¶]
(C) Whether the programming, treatment, and education offered
and provided in a[n] [SYTF] is appropriate to meet the treatment
and security needs of the ward. [¶] (D) Whether the goals of
rehabilitation and community safety can be met by assigning the
ward to an alternative, less restrictive disposition that is
available to the court. [¶] (E) The ward’s age, developmental
maturity, mental and emotional health, sexual orientation,
5
gender identity and expression, and any disabilities or special
needs affecting the safety or suitability of committing the ward to
a term of confinement in a[n] [SYTF].” (§ 875, subd. (a)(3)(A)–
(E).)
Section 875 does not require equal weight be given to each
of the five criteria. (Compare Kevin P. v. Superior Court (2020)
57 Cal.App.5th 173, 186 [the weight given to each factor under
section 707 is within the juvenile court’s discretion, as nothing in
the statute indicates the court must give equal weight].)
The juvenile court here considered each of the five criteria
under section 875, subdivision (a)(3). It acknowledged the
severity of the offense, J.C.’s role, and the harm caused by his
conduct. It found SYTF programming and treatment was
appropriate, and that a less restrictive alternative was
unsuitable. It also found that J.C. did not have a prior
delinquent history with the court and that nothing regarding
J.C.’s age, developmental maturity, mental health, special needs,
gender/sexual orientation or otherwise would affect the safety or
suitability of an SYTF.
Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that
SYTF placement was appropriate because of the severity of the
offense. J.C. was involved in an armed robbery, M.E. was shot in
the leg and died, and J.C. fired one round from his weapon. The
court emphasized that “there’s no more serious charge than this”
and found, in reference to the murder, the “extent of the harm is
incalculable.” As to J.C.’s role and behavior in the crime, the
court noted that he wore a mask, was armed, and left Los
Angeles County for a “very nefarious purpose.” The court also
considered the planned nature of the robbery, that there were
children on the property, and that one of the coparticipants was
shot, died, and “dump[ed] . . . on the side of the road somewhere.”
6
Substantial evidence also supports the court’s finding that
an SYTF was the “only reasonable, appropriate alternative” and
that less restrictive alternatives were unsuitable. Probation
recommended SYTF commitment, reporting that the SYTF will
“work with the minor’s . . . individual needs and develop a
programming centered around what would best meet his
rehabilitative goals.” Probation noted J.C. was “in need of
intensive services and should be considered a potentially deadly
and high risk threat to the community.” Probation also described
the services an SYTF would provide J.C., including therapy,
college level courses, and mentoring that would “appropriately
meet the minor’s treatment and security needs.”
Moreover, the juvenile court found other less restrictive
alternatives were unsuitable because they “would not be in the
best interest of the community” and “would lack services needed
to achieve the rehabilitative goals that will support [J.C.’s]
eventual integration back into the community.” With respect to
Dorothy Kirby Center and Rites of Passage, J.C. was rejected for
these alternative placements, in part, because he had already
earned his high school diploma and “his current reported
symptoms and behaviors do not warrant placement at [Dorothy
Kirby Center].” Probation noted that an SYTF “would be [the]
appropriate setting to address [J.C.’s] needs given his age and his
high school graduate status.” The juvenile court found
alternative placements unsuitable, noting that it was also “not
inclined . . . to send him directly to Pine Grove,” a youth
conservation camp. The court also found the Dorothy Kirby
Center was not “appropriate due to the nature of the issues that
were presented here that [J.C.] needs to have treated before he is
able to be released,” and that camp was unsuitable because it did
not “provide the therapeutic part of a program that . . . [J.C.]
7
needs.” Because these findings are supported by substantial
evidence, there was no abuse of discretion.
J.C. also contends the juvenile court abused its discretion
because it did not properly consider that the Board of State and
Community Corrections (the Board) found the Barry J. Nidorf
SYTF out of compliance with the minimum standards for juvenile
facilities and not suitable for confinement pursuant to section
209, subdivisions (a)(4) and (d). He also relies on dicta in In re
Carlos J. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1, 14, to argue that the
prosecution did not counter the Board’s finding.
We are not persuaded. The commitment order did not
specify that J.C. would be committed to the Nidorf facility. But
even if it did, the Board did not state this facility was unavailable
for placement. Instead, the Board’s notice states that
“commencing 60 days following this notice [dated February 16,
2024] or by April 16, 2024 the facilities shall not be used for the
confinement of juveniles until the Board finds, after reinspection
of the facilities, that the conditions that rendered the facility
unsuitable have been remedied, and the facility is a suitable
place for confinement of juveniles.” (Italics added, underlining
omitted.) Thus, the Board’s notice does not state Nidorf was
unavailable for placement before April 16, and it indicates the
facility could be reinspected and deemed suitable for confinement
at a future date.
In considering the appropriateness of an SYTF, the juvenile
court expressly considered all the statutory criteria under section
875, subdivision (a)(3) and found that no lesser alternative
dispositions were suitable. There was no abuse of discretion.
Maximum time of confinement
J.C. contends the juvenile court erred in imposing a
maximum term of confinement that exceeded his 25th birthday.
8
The Attorney General contends the disposition order should be
clarified to set a maximum term of confinement to when J.C.
reaches 25 years old. We conclude the order was correct and no
modification is necessary.
In declaring J.C. a ward of the court, the juvenile court
stated that he “is committed based upon the most recent offense
listed in . . . section 707 [subdivision (b)] which is [Penal Code
section] 187 with a maximum term of 25 years to life. However,
. . . because [J.C.] is a minor, 25 years to life does not apply.” In
selecting the baseline term, the court “deviate[d] downward to
five years for the baseline term” based in part on J.C.’s progress
in the programming he was offered and graduation from high
school. (Cal. Rules of Court,3 rule 5.806.) The commitment order
and minute order from the disposition hearing reflect the court
selected five years for the baseline term and 25 years to life for
the maximum period of confinement.
Pursuant to section 875, the juvenile court, in making its
order of commitment to an SYTF, must set a baseline term for
confinement based on the “most serious recent offense for which
the ward has been adjudicated.” (§ 875, subd. (b)(1).) Upon
expiration of the baseline term, the court must discharge the
ward to probation supervision absent certain findings. (Id., subd.
(e)(3).)
The court shall “additionally set a maximum term of
confinement . . . based upon the facts and circumstances of the
matter or matters that brought or continued the ward under the
jurisdiction of the court and as deemed appropriate to achieve
rehabilitation. The maximum term of confinement shall
3 Further unspecified rule references are to the California
Rules of Court.
9
represent the longest term of confinement in a facility that the
ward may serve subject to the following: [¶] (A) A ward committed
to a secure youth treatment facility under this section shall not
be held in secure confinement beyond 23 years of age, or two
years from the date of the commitment, whichever occurs later.
However, if the ward has been committed to a secure youth
treatment facility based on adjudication for an offense or offenses
for which the ward, if convicted in adult criminal court, would
face an aggregate sentence of seven or more years, the ward shall
not be held in secure confinement beyond 25 years of age, or two
years from the date of commitment, whichever occurs later. [¶]
(B) The maximum term of confinement shall not exceed the
middle term of imprisonment that can be imposed upon an adult
convicted of the same offense or offenses. . . . [¶] (C)
Precommitment credits for time served must be applied against
the maximum term of confinement.” (§ 875, subd. (c)(1), italics
added.)
The parties suggest that the maximum term of confinement
should be set to when J.C. turns 25 years old. We disagree.
Recently, in In re L.H. (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 591, 606 (L.H.),
our colleagues in the First District concluded that the “age limits
found in section 875, subdivision (c)(1)(A) constitute a cap on the
length of a ward’s physical confinement separate from the
maximum term of confinement set by the juvenile court in its
order of commitment.” (See also In re M.B. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th
435, 450 [maximum term of confinement set at 22 years, which
was beyond the statutory age cap].) Jurisdictional age limits
“should not be construed as limiting the length of the maximum
term of confinement.” (L.H., at p. 601.) If we were to interpret
section 875 to limit the maximum term of confinement by
jurisdictional age limits, there could be instances where, after the
10
application of precommitment credits for time served, the
“maximum term of confinement” is less than the baseline term,
despite no intention by the court to do so. For instance, if a
minor is 18 years old at the time of the commitment order, the
baseline term is six years, the minor is awarded 550 days of
precommitment credits, and the minor’s maximum time of
confinement is set at the jurisdictional age limit (seven years
until minor is 25 years old), the result would be a confinement
term shorter than the baseline term once precommitment credits
are applied against the maximum term of confinement (§ 875,
subd. (c)(1)). In our view, such an interpretation of “maximum
term of confinement” in section 875 “would not render it
reasonable, fair and harmonious with the purpose of the statute”
to rehabilitate the juvenile and protect the public. (L.H., at pp.
605–606.)
In setting the maximum term of confinement here, the
juvenile court correctly treated the maximum term of
confinement separate from the jurisdiction age cap. The court set
the maximum term of confinement at 25 years to life, but it also
correctly acknowledged that this term will be “subject to” the
jurisdictional age limit. (§ 875, subd. (c)(1); L.H., supra, 110
Cal.App.5th at p. 600 [interpreting “subject to” in section 875,
subd. (c)(1) “as more broadly governing the ward’s actual length
of confinement instead of the juvenile court’s discretion to set a
maximum term of confinement”].) We will not disturb the order
setting the maximum term of confinement.
Degree of murder
J.C. contends the juvenile court failed to specify the degree
of murder and must be deemed second degree murder pursuant
to Penal Code section 1192 and rule 5.778(f)(9). We conclude
otherwise.
11
Penal Code section 1192 provides that upon “a plea of
guilty . . . of a crime . . . distinguished or divided into degrees, the
court must, before passing sentence, determine the degree. Upon
the failure of the court to so determine, the degree of the crime or
attempted crime of which the defendant is guilty, shall be
deemed to be of the lesser degree.” (Pen. Code, § 1192.) Penal
Code section 1192 is applicable to juvenile ward proceedings. (In
re Andrew I. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 572, 580–581 (Andrew I.).) In
the context of section 602 proceedings, on an admission or plea of
no contest, the court must make a finding of “the degree of the
offense and whether it would be a misdemeanor or felony had the
offense been committed by an adult.” (Rule 5.778(f)(9), see also
rule 5.780(e)(5) [if the court finds, in a § 602 matter, the
allegations of a petition true, the court must make findings on
the “degree of the offense and whether it would be a
misdemeanor or felony”].)
The court’s finding as to the degree may be satisfied in two
ways: “(1) by a finding that specifically refers to the degree of the
crime by its statutory numerical designation; and (2) by findings
that encompass the statutory factual predicates of the degree of the
crime.” (In re C.R. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1391, italics
added.) The court may make this finding at the end of a
jurisdiction hearing or during the disposition hearing. (Rule
5.778(f)(9); Andrew I., supra, 230 Cal.App.3d at p. 581.)
In People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896 (Mendoza), our
Supreme Court considered the applicability of a similar statute,
Penal Code section 1157, where the defendants were charged
with special circumstances murder because the defendants
allegedly committed murder while they were engaged in
committing robbery and burglary (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd.
(a)(17)). (Mendoza, at p. 900.) Because the prosecution’s only
12
murder theory at trial was that the defendants shot and killed
the victim during the perpetration of a robbery and burglary, the
juries were instructed on first degree felony murder and did not
receive instruction or verdict forms on second degree murder or
any other form of homicide. (Id. at pp. 901–902, 904–906.) The
juries found the defendants guilty of murder, robbery, and
burglary and found the special circumstances true. (Id. at pp.
903–904, 907.) Our high court held that Penal Code section 1157
did not apply because the defendants were convicted of felony
murder, which was deemed to be first degree murder as a matter
of law under Penal Code section 189. (Mendoza, at p. 908.)
In Sanchez v. Superior Court (2022) 102 Cal.App.4th 1266,
1273, we applied the rationale of Mendoza to conclude that Penal
Code section 1192 did not apply to a guilty plea where the
indictment specifically charged first degree murder. There, a
defendant sought a writ “to compel the trial court to accept his
guilty plea to murder without specifying its degree and to conduct
a hearing under section 1192 to determine the degree of the
murder.” (Sanchez, at p. 1268.) We denied the writ and
concluded that “[w]hen the language of the charge can only be
first degree murder, an accusatory pleading does not charge a
crime ‘distinguished or divided into degrees’ and, therefore,
section 1192 does not apply.” (Id. at pp. 1269–1270.) We also
cautioned against a “strict and literal interpretation” of degree-
setting statutes, “where neither logic nor the accusatory pleading
leave any doubt as to the degree of the murder charged.” (Id. at
p. 1273.)
Here, like the indictment in Mendoza, supra, 23 Cal.4th at
page 900, the juvenile petition alleged murder under Penal Code
section 187, subdivision (a), but did not specify a degree of
13
murder. Nevertheless, we conclude the record here leaves no
doubt that J.C. admitted to committing first degree murder.
At the jurisdictional hearing, the prosecutor clarified before
J.C.’s admission that “this is a first-degree murder.” The juvenile
court also admonished J.C. that “the law says . . . 25 to life is the
maximum confinement time . . . . [¶] Do you understand?” J.C.
responded, “Yes” and admitted the murder offense. At the
disposition hearing, the court made findings establishing that the
murder was committed during the perpetration of a robbery. The
court stated that J.C. “was participating . . . with a group” with
zip ties, guns, masks, and a truck, and “it looks like he was going
to rob somebody.” The court continued to state that “during this
attempted home-invasion robbery, one of his confederates got
shot and . . . bled out.” “So based upon what we know he did do
in this case, leaving aside whether his shot, actually, was the
bullet that killed [M.E.], or not, he did admit a murder. He
certainly participated in the events that caused this event to
happen.” (Italics added.) The court committed J.C. to an SYTF
based on his plea to murder “which is [Penal Code section] 187
with a maximum term of 25 years to life.” (Italics added.)
Based on these findings, we conclude the juvenile court
sufficiently described a murder committed in the perpetration of
robbery that is first degree murder as a matter of law. (Pen.
Code, § 189, subd. (a)); Andrew I., supra, 230 Cal.App.3d at pp.
581–582 [court’s finding at the disposition hearing that minor
committed a “ ‘residential burglary’ ” was a sufficient
characterization of the offense “to support a first degree burglary
finding as required by statute”]; In re C.R., supra, 168
Cal.App.4th at p. 1391.)
14
Custody credits
J.C. contends and the Attorney General concedes that the
juvenile court should have awarded 548 days of precommitment
credits, and not 535 days. We agree.
A minor may not be held in physical confinement for a
period in excess of the maximum term of imprisonment which
could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the same offense.
(§ 726; In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 535–536.) A minor is
entitled to credit for the time spent in custody before the
disposition order is entered. (In re Eric J., at pp. 533–536; People
v. Bravo (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 729, 735.) Here, J.C. was
arrested on September 7, 2022, and remained detained to the day
of disposition on March 8, 2024. That is 548 days. Accordingly,
the commitment and disposition minute order shall be modified
to reflect 548 days of precommitment custody credits.
Restitution fine
J.C. contends the restitution fine should be stricken
pursuant to the recent amendment to section 730.6. We agree.
Here, the juvenile court imposed a $100 restitution fine. At
the time of J.C.’s disposition, the restitution fine was mandatory.
(Former § 730.6, subd. (a)(2)(A), (b)(1); Stats. 2015, ch. 131, § 1.)
However, effective January 1, 2025, the Legislature passed
Assembly Bill No. 1186 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.), which amended
section 730.6 to prohibit a court from “impos[ing] a separate and
additional restitution fine against a minor found to be a person
described in Section 602.” (§ 730.6, subd. (a)(2), as amended by
Stats. 2024, ch. 805, § 6.)
An adult or juvenile offender is generally entitled to benefit
from amendments that become effective while their case is on
appeal and not yet final. (People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264,
305 [applying a revised version of the statute in setting a
15
restitution fine]; In re N.D. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 885, 891 [rule
of retroactivity applies to juvenile delinquency judgments].)
“[W]here the amendatory statute mitigates punishment and
there is no saving clause, the rule is that the amendment will
operate retroactively so that the lighter punishment is imposed.”
(In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 748.) Because imposing a
restitution fine constitutes “punishment,” we conclude section
730.6 operates retroactively and precludes imposition of a
restitution fine here. (People v. Allen (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 312,
321.) Therefore, the $100 restitution fine should be stricken.
DISPOSITION
The commitment order and disposition minute order are
modified to award 548 days of precommitment custody credit and
to strike the $100 restitution fine. The juvenile court is directed
to prepare the amended orders to reflect these modifications. The
judgment is otherwise affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
YEGAN, Acting P. J.
CODY, J.
16
Christina L. Hill, Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
______________________________
Mary Bernstein, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Heidi Salerno, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Vous vous demandez comment ce texte s’applique à votre situation ?
Consultation gratuite, sans engagement
Décrivez votre situation. Notre équipe vous recontactera par e-mail pour votre consultation.
Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude
Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.