CourtListener 10666949•In re Andrew M. CA4/3
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Filed 9/5/25 In re Andrew M. CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re Andrew M., a Person Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL
SERVICES AGENCY,
G065335
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 21DP1437)
v.
OPINION
S.M. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Orange County, June
Jee An, Judge. Affirmed.
Marisa L.D. Conroy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant S.M.
Jacob I. Olson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant A.M.
Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Debbie Torrez and Chloe R.
Maksoudian, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
No appearance for the Minor.
* * *
In a prior appeal in this dependency matter, we concluded the
dependency court had erroneously applied the parental benefit exception
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)).1 We directed the court to hold
a new hearing pursuant to section 366.26 (permanency planning hearing)
“forthwith, and, absent an appropriate showing under section 388 that
changed circumstances justify different orders, [to] terminate parental rights
and order a permanent plan of adoption.” (In re Andrew M. (2024) 102
Cal.App.5th 803, 820 (Andrew M.).)
On remand, after conducting a thorough joint permanency
planning hearing and hearing on the parents’ section 388 petitions, the court
ultimately terminated parental rights as to Andrew M. (Andrew). The
parents (A.M. and S.M., referred to individually as the mother and the
father) offer multiple reasons as to why this was error, including purported
denials of due process, error in denial of the section 388 petition, abuse of
discretion in the court’s ruling that the parental benefit exception did not
apply, and error as to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). We conclude
none of these arguments have merit, and therefore, we affirm the juvenile
court’s orders.
1 Subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
2
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The history of this case can be found in our prior opinion, Andrew
M., supra, 102 Cal.App.5th 803 at pages 809–814. The rationale for our
reversal is discussed at length in that opinion as well. (Id. at pp. 814–820.)
Accordingly, our discussion of the facts is limited to the events on remand.
A. Reopening of the Case
Our prior opinion ordered the juvenile court to hold a new
permanency planning hearing. Accordingly, the court reopened the case and
set a review and permanency planning hearing.
At a hearing on August 30, 2024, the mother requested an expert
to observe two visits between Andrew, the parents, and his siblings. On
September 5, the court granted the request for a bonding study to take place
over eight hours of supervised visits, with one visit observed with the parents
and one with Andrew’s siblings.
B. September 2024 Interim Report
In September 2024, Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA)
received a declaration from Andrew’s visitation monitor. The monitor had
been supervising visits since January 2024. In total, there had been nine
visits, although the court’s order authorized 23 visits. For some visits, the
parents had been late, and for others, they had confirmed and canceled
shortly before a visit was to start. The parents were also inconsistent in
paying for the monitor. The monitor reported that during the “few” visits they
had, the parents engaged and interacted with Andrew “in a caring way.”
SSA reported that overall, between January and September 2024,
the parents visited with Andrew 11 times despite the court order allowing 35
visits. Between March 30 and June 29, they did not visit at all. Again after
3
July 13, the parents did not visit for another two month period. As of the date
of the September 5 interim report, the parents had not visited since July 13.
C. Permanency Planning Hearing Report and Addenda
SSA filed its report in December 2024. By this time, Andrew had
turned three years old. The parents were authorized for two-hour visits four
times a week. Approximately five visits were cancelled because the parents
did not provide the social worker with the required 48-hour notice or did not
appear on time for the visit. The parents otherwise attended visitation as
scheduled. The visits appeared to go well, with the parents actively engaged
with the child. They brought snacks and toys and engaged in meaningful
activities.
SSA’s recommendation in the December report was to terminate
parental rights and free Andrew for adoption.
D. Section 388 Petitions
On December 18, the mother requested a continuance of the
permanency planning hearing, stating she would file a section 388 petition by
January 7, 2025. The father also indicated his intent to file a section 388
petition by that date. The court granted the motion to continue the hearing,
noting no further continuances would be granted.
The mother’s section 388 petition requested the court to either
reinstate reunification services or apply the parental benefit exception and
order guardianship as Andrew’s permanent plan. The father requested legal
guardianship as the permanent plan. Both parents referred to the evaluation
of psychologist Jay Slosar, who assessed, on behalf of the mother, whether
Andrew had a positive emotional attachment and bond to the parents and
whether terminating that bond would be detrimental to him. Slosar observed
two visits, the first on November 21 and the second on December 30. Slosar
4
opined that interactions between the parents and Andrew were “reciprocal”
and he observed signs of “mirroring,” which was important in attachment
theory. His evaluation was that Andrew has a substantial positive bond with
the parents and his siblings, and that “a separation or disruption of the
relationship from his biological parents and siblings would be an adverse
childhood experience that would be detrimental to him.”
On January 17, 2025, the court found the parents had met the
low burden of proof on the section 388 petitions to proceed to an evidentiary
hearing. The court decided to hold a joint permanency planning hearing as
well as a hearing on the section 388 petitions. On the same day, the court
began the combined hearing. Numerous exhibits were received into evidence.
E. Testimony at Combined Hearing
We have reviewed the complete testimony given at the combined
hearing. In the interests of brevity, we confine our discussion of the testimony
to matters relevant to this appeal.
Several social workers testified. Social worker Noemi Maeshiro
had been supervising visits three times a week since September 2024. She
testified that Andrew told his daycare provider he was “excited to see his
mommy and daddy” before visits, and would ask her every day if he was
going to see the parents that day. During visits, Andrew was affectionate
with the parents, running to greet them, hugging and kissing them and
telling them that he loved them. He was also happy and excited when he saw
his siblings. The parents were late to visits “more often than not.”
When visits were over, sometimes Andrew wanted to stay, but
Maeshiro had no trouble redirecting him. He did not cry when visits were
over. Maeshiro had not observed any issues when returning to the caregivers’
5
home after visits. Andrew was generally a happy child who got along well
with most people.
Social worker Jennifer Alvarado served as a visitation monitor
once a week. Her testimony was generally consistent with Maeshiro’s.
Andrew was excited during the start of visits with the parents, used
affectionate language such as “‘I love you,’” and positively engaged with the
parents.
The parents were late to numerous visits. At the conclusion of
visits, Alvarado had seen Andrew “a little sad,” as if “he still wants to keep
playing” with the parents and “doesn’t want to let go.” Nonetheless, Andrew
always seemed happy to return to the caregivers’ home.
Social worker Jennifer Heidari had been Andrew’s case worker
since 2022. She did not personally observe visits but had reviewed the notes
of those who did. She had not recommended legal guardianship because the
caregivers were willing to provide permanency through adoption, which
would be the “most permanent plan” for him.
With respect to the bonding study, she testified that Slosar had
only observed Andrew twice and she did not think his opinions about the
bond between Andrew and the parents outweighed the permanency of
adoption. Andrew was adoptable and the caregivers were prepared to adopt
him.
Heidari testified that she considered termination of parental
rights detrimental if the child’s emotional well-being or mental state would
suffer as a result. She testified that during periods without visitation, such as
between April 4 and June 29, 2024, she did not see any emotional instability
in Andrew. She agreed that did not necessarily mean the child would not
suffer detriment if a parental bond was severed.
6
Two of Andrew’s half-siblings testified about their enjoyable
visits. Andrew was affectionate with them and the parents.
Slosar testified about his bonding study. He had been retained by
the public defender’s office. He based his report on documents he reviewed
and his observations of two two-hour visits, one with the parents and
Andrew, and one that included Andrew’s maternal half-siblings. He testified
that “reciprocity” was important to a child’s development. He defined this as
“The give-and-take, the exchange, whether the child goes up to the parents
and wants things, seeks them out, asks for help, and the way the parents
interact verbally, which in this case I pointed out the father’s very good at
role playing, imaginary play, and games and, you know, facilitating what the
child was doing.” He also discussed “mirroring, where the parents or the
adult mirror back to the child, the emotions, or even hold them close so they
can see that aspect. It’s very important in development.”
Slosar believed there was a positive and significant bond between
Andrew and his siblings. He also observed a positive bond between Andrew
and the parents. Slosar believed Andrew would benefit from a continued
relationship with the parents. He opined termination of the parental bonds
would be detrimental to Andrew.
Both parents testified. As relevant to the issues on appeal, the
mother spoke about the positive nature of their visits.
The mother also testified that the missed visits in 2024 were due
to issues paying the monitor. She did not agree with termination of her
parental rights.
The father testified that Andrew was very important to him. He
testified consistently with others about the positive nature of their visits. He
did not agree with the termination of his rights.
7
F. Court’s Findings
With respect to the section 388 petitions, the court denied both,
finding there were not changed circumstances.
As to the permanency planning hearing, the court read our
disposition in Andrew M. The disposition directed the court, absent changed
circumstances, to “terminate parental rights and order a permanent plan of
adoption.” The court remarked that absent a change of circumstances, “I
don’t have a lot of wiggle room.” Nonetheless, the court ruled on all three
factors relevant to the benefit exception.
The court found regular and consistent visitation and found
sufficient evidence to find a substantial positive emotional attachment. But
the court continued: “I don’t find that that is enough to outweigh the benefits
of adoption. Therefore, I am terminating your parental rights today.” The
court went on to discuss in detail the facts of the case and to apply them to
the relevant law: “So the Court notes, as discussed, and as discussed by the
Court of Appeal[], Andrew was very, very young. He was detained at birth.
He never lived with the parents. Throughout his life, the only interactions
with his biological parents were during hour-long visits, almost all of which
were monitored and/or supervised.
“Although he shared an affectionate connection with the parents
during visits, and sometimes indicated a reluctance to leave—and the Court
described it as a tight hug or reaching out from his car seat, there is no
evidence that he ever showed distress or was upset from separating from
them.
“I do note, obviously, that he is getting older. It’s more difficult
for the visits to end. It takes longer to get him to the car. There was
testimony that he sits on the floorboard and doesn’t want to get into his car
8
seat. But, again, there was a note by the Court that a child of this age would
enjoy all of the attention and love that he is receiving during these visits.
That, to me, would be the catalyst for not wanting these visits to end.
“Outside of the visits, there is no evidence that the parents
played a meaningful role in Andrew’s life. They did not attend medical
appointments I believe, aside from the one that mother testified to, which I
believe was over a year ago. They had no understanding of his health
circumstances or any of the additional services that he was receiving from the
Regional Center, I believe, for speech.
“The circumstances, unfortunately, point to a relative weakness
of the relationship, and indicate no meaningful detriment that would flow
from terminating parents’ rights.
“Regarding the report by Dr. Slosar, specifically Dr. Slosar, I
think, wrote and also testified that he observed a positive bond between
Andrew and his parents, and Andrew and his half-siblings. In Dr. Slosar’s
opinion, a separation or disruption of the relationship from his biological
parents and siblings would be an adverse child experience that would be
detrimental to him.
“The Court was not very persuaded by Dr. Slosar. The Evidence
Code does allow the juvenile court to appoint any expert to study the bond
between a parent and the child; however, the Court is not required to accept
that expert’s opinion at face value.”
After discussing a recent case about the helpfulness of expert
opinion, the court continued: “I combed through Dr. Slosar’s report, looking
for any specific detail, any specific conclusion of how Andrew would be
affected by the Court terminating parental rights, and any detriment he
9
would face. That sentence that I read earlier was the extent of Dr. Slosar’s
conclusion.
“I don’t show any specific facts or opinion by Dr. Slosar on how
Andrew, specifically, would be affected by a termination of parental rights
and no longer seeing his biological parents.”
The court ultimately found by clear and convincing evidence that
Andrew was likely to be adopted, and ordered parental rights terminated,
and the child placed for adoption. The parents now appeal.
DISCUSSION
I.
DUE PROCESS AND THE SECTION 388 PETITIONS
The parents’ first argument is that requiring them to prevail on a
section 388 petition “as a condition precedent to proceeding” with
consideration of the parental benefit exception deprived them of due process.
They contend that prevailing on a section 388 petition “was an impossibility”
because the order sought to be changed had previously been vacated by this
court. (Boldfacing omitted.)
This argument is somewhat perplexing. It sounds more like a
criticism of this court’s disposition in Andrew M. than taking issue with
anything the lower court did. To the extent it is such a criticism, our opinion
is long since final, and the parents cannot complain about it now.
To the extent the parents are criticizing how the court
implemented our prior disposition, we find no denial of due process, which
requires notice and the opportunity to be heard. (Calvert v. County of Yuba
(2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 613, 631–632.) The parents had both. Indeed, the
court bent over backwards to give the parents more time to conduct a bonding
10
study. It found they had met their prima facie burden on the section 388
petitions and granted an evidentiary hearing on their petitions.
The parents complain they could never have prevailed on their
section 388 petitions because this court had vacated the prior order, leaving
nothing to “change, modify, or set aside.” The parents did not raise this issue
or take this position below, where the mother agreed that “everyone’s opinion
here is that we have to file a 388.” Further, the court did not deny the section
388 petitions because there was no order to modify. It denied them because of
a lack of changed circumstances.
In ruling on the section 388 petitions, the court noted: “I found
myself reviewing the records and asking, ‘What exactly is the changed
circumstance?’ Is it the fact that we had an expert opinion by Dr. Jay Slosar?
Is it the daily visitation notes from the supervisor? Is it that Andrew is now
three, almost four, I believe—excuse me, three years and three months, and
that he’s older, more verbal? Is it that the parents are sober? [¶] Considering
all of the new evidence in front of me, particularly the expert opinion by Dr.
Jay Slosar, the Court, unfortunately, cannot find that there is a changed
circumstance in this case.”
We find the parents had ample due process here, and further, any
claim of “impossibility” of prevailing on their section 388 petitions was
irrelevant. The court never reached the issue of what modification it might
make to a prior order because it found the parents had not established
changed circumstances. We find no due process violation occurred.
II.
NO ERROR IN DENIAL OF SECTION 388 PETITIONS
We review the court’s decision to grant or deny a section 388
petition for abuse of discretion. “We must uphold the juvenile court’s denial of
11
appellant’s section 388 petition unless we can determine from the record that
its decisions ‘“exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences
can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no
authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.”’” (In re Brittany
K. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1505.)
To justify granting a section 388 petition, the petitioning party
must show both a genuine change in circumstances and that modifying a
prior order would be in the child’s best interests. (In re S.J. (2008) 167
Cal.App.4th 953, 960.) The party requesting the change in order has the
burden of proof to demonstrate both elements by a preponderance of the
evidence. (In re L.S. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1194 & fn. 4.) After
reunification services have been terminated, a child’s best interests with
respect to a section 388 petition includes the child’s need “‘for permanency
and stability.’” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317.) The request for
a modification must be viewed in the context of the entire dependency
proceeding. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 307.)
The mother2 argues that merely presenting “‘new evidence’”
triggers the requirement for the court to consider the second prong of section
388, and she contends Slosar’s report was “‘new evidence.’” But the court
rejected the contention that Slosar’s report constituted new evidence. The
court did not find Slosar’s report to be persuasive, and the court further
mentioned that Slosar’s opinion relied upon the same facts referenced in our
prior opinion. There, we noted that “during their visits, the parents would
2 The parents joined in each other’s arguments. We agree with
the father that his failure to identify the section 388 petition in his notice of
appeal does not preclude him from raising it in this appeal.
12
care for Andrew and play with him, and they were loving and affectionate
toward him. The parents’ testimony supported findings that Andrew called
them mommy and daddy, greeted them with excitement, was affectionate
with them (particularly with Mother), and sometimes indicated reluctance to
leave visits . . . .” (Andrew M., supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 816.) Nothing in
Slosar’s report was substantively “new.” He merely relied upon facts
previously in evidence to provide what the court found to be an unpersuasive
expert opinion.
The father contends that Andrew’s increased ability to speak and
Slosar’s report constituted a change of circumstances. With respect to Slosar’s
report, we reject this contention for the same reasons we noted as to the
mother’s argument. As to Andrew’s increased ability to speak, in our prior
opinion, the “Mother testified that Andrew would run up to her and Father
with excitement when he saw them and that he referred to them as
‘“Mommy”’ and ‘“Daddy.”’ According to Mother, during visits, Andrew would
grab her face, kiss her, and rub his nose with hers. He was a ‘mama’s boy’
because he always wanted to be with her. Andrew did not cry at the end of
visits, but he would hold Mother more tightly, ‘like he want[ed] to stay with
[her].’ . . . [¶] Father testified that at the beginning of visits, Andrew would
notice Mother first, run to her, and say ‘“Mama, mama.”’ . . . At the end of
visits, Andrew would reach out to him because he wanted Father to take him
out of the car seat.” (Andrew M., supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 812.)
To support a section 388 petition, the change in circumstances
must be “substantial,” meaning of such a significant nature that setting aside
or modifying a prior order is required. (In re J.M. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 833,
845.) A child’s normal development typically does not qualify. Andrew’s
speech demonstrating affection toward his parents may have been more
13
developed than his prior speech, and it was noted by the court, but it was not
a significant change of circumstances. The record at both the time of our prior
opinion and the combined hearing reflects the same facts. Andrew enjoyed
the visits, and he was affectionate with his parents, but was never overly
upset or distressed when the visits ended. The parents have not established
an abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to deny the petitions for
modification.
III.
NO ERROR IN FINDING THE PARENTAL BENEFIT EXCEPTION DID NOT APPLY
“If the court cannot safely return a dependent child to a parent’s
custody within statutory time limits, the court must set a hearing under
section 366.26.” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 630 (Caden C.).) The
purpose of the section 366.26 hearing is to select a permanent plan for the
child. (Id. at pp. 630–631.) Section 366.26 lists permanent plans in order of
preference, and adoption is the preferred permanent plan. (§ 366.26, subd.
(b)(1); In re Edward R. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 116, 121–122.) The court must
first find by clear and convincing evidence that the child is likely to be
adopted. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) If the court does so, and services have
already been terminated, the court then terminates parental rights to permit
adoption. (Caden C., at pp. 630–631.)
The exception to this rule is if the parent shows that one of
several statutory provisions applies. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)–(vi),(c)(4)(A).)
“[I]f the parent shows that termination would be detrimental to the child for
at least one specifically enumerated reason, the court should decline to
terminate parental rights and select another permanent plan.” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 630–631.) The parent bears the burden of
14
establishing the exception applies. (In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th
1411, 1418–1419.)
One of these is the parental benefit exception. “From the statute,
we readily discern three elements the parent must prove to establish the
exception: (1) regular visitation and contact, and (2) a relationship, the
continuation of which would benefit the child such that (3) the termination of
parental rights would be detrimental to the child.” (Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at pp. 631–632.) This is a high standard to meet on appeal. The
beneficial relationship exception to the termination of parental rights “may
be the most unsuccessfully litigated issue in the history of law.” (In re Eileen
A. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1248, 1255, fn. 5, disapproved on other grounds by
In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 413–414.)
The first two elements of the court’s analysis are reviewed for
substantial evidence. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639–640.) “[W]e
presume in favor of the order, considering the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing party the benefit of
every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the order.”
(In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.)
“In reviewing factual determinations for substantial evidence, a
reviewing court should ‘not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of
witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.’” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p.
640; In re L. Y. L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.) “The [court’s]
determinations should ‘be upheld if . . . supported by substantial evidence,
even though substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and the trial
court might have reached a different result had it believed other evidence.’”
(Caden C., at p. 640.)
15
The final step, determining whether termination of parental
rights would be detrimental to the child is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 641.) “Review for abuse of discretion is
subtly different [than substantial evidence review], focused not primarily on
the evidence but the application of a legal standard. A court abuses its
discretion only when ‘“‘the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal
discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd
determination.’”‘“ (Ibid.) “[T]he practical difference between the standards is
not likely to be very pronounced.” (Ibid.) “At its core, the hybrid standard . . .
simply embodies the principle that ‘[t]he statutory scheme does not authorize
a reviewing court to substitute its own judgment as to what is in the child’s
best interests for the trial court’s determination in that regard, reached
pursuant to the statutory scheme’s comprehensive and controlling
provisions.’” (Ibid.)
As relevant here, the court found both regular and consistent
visitation and a substantial positive emotional attachment. But the parents
contend the court erred by finding they had not established the third
element, which focuses on “whether ‘termination would be detrimental to the
child due to’ the relationship — the court must decide whether it would be
harmful to the child to sever the relationship and choose adoption.” (Caden
C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) In doing so, “the trial court must decide
whether the harm from severing the child’s relationship with the parent
outweighs the benefit to the child of placement in a new adoptive home.”
(Id. at pp. 631–632.) The court decided the relationship with the parent did
not outweigh the benefit of adoption.
At the center of this case is a three-year-old child who has been
the subject of dependency proceedings since he was born. He has never lived
16
with the parents or interacted with them outside of supervised visitation. He
has been living with the caregivers, who have de facto parent status, since he
was released from the hospital after birth. Andrew was generally and
specifically adoptable, and the caregivers stood ready to adopt him and
provide him with a permanent home. While Andrew enjoyed the visits with
the parents and showed them affection, there was no evidence he showed
distress upon separating from them or returning home. The court found that
Andrew enjoyed the attention he received at the visits, and that was the
catalyst for not wanting the visits to end. There was no evidence at all that
Andrew was negatively impacted by long breaks in visitation.
The court also found no evidence that the parents played any
meaningful role in Andrew’s life outside of visits. They did not, with one
exception, attend medical appointments. As we noted in our prior opinion,
there was no evidence presented that they understood his diagnosis of
nystagmus, nearsightedness, and optic nerve atrophy, which required him to
wear eyeglasses. (Andrew M., supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 819.) The record
reflects that nothing on this point had changed since our prior opinion. “The
parents’ lack of meaningful engagement or familiarity with Andrew’s medical
condition is not a marker of a strong parent-child relationship.” (Ibid.)
Indeed, nothing substantial appears to have changed since our
prior opinion. As we noted: “[T]he circumstances here do not support a
conclusion that the parents’ relationship with Andrew was ‘so important’ as
to outweigh the benefits of adoption. [Citation.] In other words, this case
cannot be deemed the kind of ‘“‘extraordinary case’”’ in which preservation of
parental rights prevails over the Legislature’s preference for adoptive
placement.” (Andrew M., supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 820.)
17
We conclude the court did not err by finding the parental benefit
exception did not apply.
IV.
THE COURT PROPERLY HELD A NEW PERMANENCY PLANNING HEARING AND
FULLY ASSESSED THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PARENTAL BENEFIT EXCEPTION
The parents also argue they had a due process right to a full
assessment of whether the parental benefit exception applies. The parents
received such an assessment, both in the initial hearing that led to Andrew
M. and on remand. On remand, the court held a new permanency planning
hearing and heard the testimony of 11 witnesses over the course of multiple
days. The parents make far too much of the court’s “wiggle room” comment,
which correctly noted that this court had ordered it to reverse its prior
decision absent a change in circumstances. The court nonetheless heard all
relevant and admissible evidence the parties wished to present and evaluated
the evidence fully on the record, providing the reasons for its decision. The
record does not support the mother’s assertion that the court substituted our
judgment, as reflected in our prior opinion, for the court’s own. Again, we find
no due process violation.
V.
ICWA NOTICE
The parents contend SSA and the court did not meet its duty of
inquiry under ICWA. We conclude this argument is without merit.
A. Standard of Review and Legal Framework
“In 1978, Congress enacted the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA;
25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) to ‘formalize[] federal policy relating to the
placement of Indian children outside the family home.’ [Citation.] Under
ICWA’s state analogue, the California Indian Child Welfare Act (Cal-ICWA;
18
. . .), courts and child welfare agencies are charged with ‘an affirmative and
continuing duty to inquire whether a child . . . is or may be an Indian child’ in
dependency cases. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2, subd. (a).) Child welfare
agencies discharge this state law duty by ‘asking the child, parents, legal
guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an
interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether
the child is, or may be, an Indian child and where the child, the parents, or
Indian custodian is domiciled.’” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1124–
1125 (Dezi C.).) Among other things, ICWA provides for notice of dependency
proceedings to a Native American child’s tribe and gives the tribe the right to
intervene in the case. (25 U.S.C. § 1912, subd. (a); § 224.1.)
“In 2016, new federal regulations were adopted addressing ICWA
compliance. [Citation.] The regulations are binding on state courts, are
intended to ‘improve ICWA implementation,’ and clearly identify what
actions state courts and agencies must undertake to ensure ICWA
implementation in child welfare proceedings.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 1130.) As a result of the new federal regulations, “California made
conforming amendments to Cal-ICWA, including portions of the Welfare and
Institutions Code related to ICWA inquiry and notice requirements.” (Id. at
p. 1131.) These amendments “‘revise[d] the specific steps a social worker,
probation officer, or court is required to take in making an inquiry of a child’s
possible status as an Indian child.’ [Citation.] As a result of this amendment,
‘“agencies now have a broader duty of inquiry and a duty of documentation.”’”
(Ibid.)
“Section 224.2 codifies and expands on ICWA’s duty of inquiry to
determine whether a child is an Indian child. Agencies and juvenile courts
have ‘an affirmative and continuing duty’ in every dependency proceeding to
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determine whether ICWA applies by inquiring whether a child is or may be
an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) This ‘duty to inquire begins with the
initial contact, including, but not limited to, asking the party reporting child
abuse or neglect whether the party has any information that the child may be
an Indian child.’” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1131-1132, fn. omitted.)
“Section 224.2, subdivision (b) specifies that once a child is placed into the
temporary custody of a county welfare department, the duty to inquire
‘includes, but is not limited to, asking the child, parents, legal guardian,
Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest in
the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is,
or may be, an Indian child.’” (Id. at p. 1132.) “When the agency has ‘reason to
believe’ that an Indian child is involved, further inquiry regarding the
possible Indian status of the child is required.” (Ibid.)
We review the juvenile court’s findings regarding ICWA under
the substantial evidence standard. “[W]here the facts are undisputed, we
independently determine whether ICWA’s requirements have been satisfied.”
(In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1051.)
B. SSA and the Court Met Their Respective ICWA Obligations
The record reflects that SSA asked numerous family members
about potential Native American heritage. In December 2021, both parents
denied Native American ancestry and completed ICWA-20 forms reflecting
this. The parents repeatedly denied any Native American heritage when
asked in 2022 and 2024.
The parents were ordered by the court to provide family contact
information for ICWA purposes on five occasions in 2023.
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The maternal aunt denied any Native American heritage twice,
in July 2022 and March 2023. The maternal uncle denied having any Native
American heritage in June 2023.
As to paternal relatives, the paternal grandmother told SSA her
family is Hispanic and has no Native American ancestry. The father advised
the social worker that the paternal grandfather had passed away. The
paternal uncle denied any Native American ancestry in June 2023. In August
2023, all five of father’s siblings denied any Native American ancestry.
The mother criticizes SSA for not inquiring of the maternal great-
grandmother and maternal grandfather. The court specifically inquired about
the maternal grandfather in November 2023. The mother confirmed that he
was deceased. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the maternal
grandfather was reasonably available for inquiries while he was alive. (Dezi
C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1140.)
As to the maternal great-grandmother, she was mentioned by the
maternal grandmother, Victoria H., as possibly having Native American
ancestry during SSA’s inquiries. The record reflects that SSA made an effort
to obtain contact information for the maternal great-grandmother from
Victoria H. Victoria H. refused to provide contact information because “she
does not want the maternal great-grandmother to know about this case.”
When SSA asked Victoria H. about ancestry on a later date, she indicated
“‘No American Indian that I know of.’” There was no claim of Native
American ancestry that would have allowed SSA to seek assistance from the
Bureau of Indian Affairs, despite the mother’s claim to the contrary. (In re
J.S. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 678, 689–690 [“Without the identity of a tribe, let
alone a federally recognized one, or at least a specific geographic area of
possible ancestry origin, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) could not have
21
assisted the Department in identifying the tribal agent for any relevant
federally recognized tribes”].)
Further, the mother had been ordered by the court to provide
contact information for relatives for ICWA purposes, but no contact
information for the maternal great-grandmother was provided to SSA. The
record does not reflect that SSA even had the maternal great-grandmother’s
full name.
SSA is not required to conduct an extensive independent
investigation for leads as to Native American ancestry. (In re Levi U. (2000)
78 Cal.App.4th 191, 198–199.) CAL-ICWA “‘does not require the agency to
“find” unknown relatives and others who have an interest in the child, merely
to make reasonable inquiries. The operative concept is those people who are
reasonably available to help the agency with its investigation into whether
the child has any potential Indian ancestry should be asked.’” (Dezi C., supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 1140.) There is no evidence the maternal great-grandmother
was “‘“reasonably available”’” to SSA.
We conclude that SSA conducted a sufficient inquiry in this case.
SSA acted on the information it had available to it, based on the family
members who were available for inquiry. The court appropriately inquired
and made orders.
The mother also claims that because we vacated the prior
permanency planning orders, the record was “silent” as to the applicability of
ICWA. We agree with SSA that the court previously made a finding that
ICWA did not apply in at the prior permanency planning hearing, that
nothing had changed, and therefore an implied finding that ICWA did not
apply is appropriate. (See In re Asia L. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 498, 506.)
There would be no point in remanding this matter for the sole purpose of
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adding an already evident ICWA finding to the record, and we do not find
that delaying Andrew’s adoption by even one more day is in his best interest.
We find no error.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
SANCHEZ, J.
GOODING, J.
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