People v. Clark-Ganas CA3

CourtListener 10666325Calctapp4 sept. 2025

Texte intégral

Filed 9/4/25 P. v. Clark-Ganas CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Nevada)
----

THE PEOPLE, C101082

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. F21000238A)

v.

TERI ELLEN CLARK-GANAS,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Teri Ellen Clark-Ganas challenges a probation condition requiring her
to “enter into and continue such education, psychological, psychiatric, drug, alcohol, or
other rehabilitation programs as directed by probation.” On appeal, she claims the
condition improperly delegates judicial authority to the probation department in violation
of the separation of powers doctrine. The People agree the condition’s overbreadth may
improperly delegate judicial authority to the probation department as the condition is not
limited to outpatient, nonresidential treatment programs. We accept the People’s

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concession and shall remand for the trial court to clarify the nature of the requirements
imposed for the challenged probation condition.
I. BACKGROUND
In August 2021, defendant and codefendant Susan Knight stole a generator from a
pumphouse located on the property of the Joan and Paul (the victims) while Joan was
home. The victims had recently listed their house for sale. Officers detained defendant
and Knight a short time later and found the victims’ generator in the back of the truck
defendant was driving. Officers also located mail and a checkbook, among other things,
belonging to a nearby resident who had also listed his home for sale. Several other real
estate listings were also found in the truck, including the victims’ home.
A jury found defendant guilty of second degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459)1 and
conspiracy to commit second degree burglary (§§ 182, subd. (a)(1), 459). As to both
counts, the jury found true the aggravating factor that the manner in which the crimes
were carried out indicated planning, sophistication, or professionalism (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 4.421(a)(8)). In a subsequent court trial, the court found true the aggravating
factor that defendant’s convictions were increasing in seriousness (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(b)(2)), but not that she had previously performed unsatisfactorily on probation
or supervision (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(5)).2
The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on formal
probation for two years with various terms and conditions, including serving 180 days in
jail. The probation conditions also included the one challenged here, which provides:
“After completion of their jail commitment, the defendant shall enter into and continue
such education, psychological, psychiatric, drug, alcohol, or other rehabilitation program

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 The court granted the prosecution’s motion to dismiss the aggravating factor regarding
the monetary value of the stolen generator.

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as ordered by the court directed by probation.” The condition continues: “Such program
shall consist of: . The defendant shall not leave said program without
permission from __court __ probation officer.” The spaces identifying the type of
program or who defendant had to obtain permission from before leaving a program were
left blank. Defendant timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
The parties agree, as do we, that the rehabilitative programming condition, which
could conceivably include residential treatment programs, is overly broad and
impermissibility delegates judicial authority to the probation department in violation of
the separation of powers doctrine.
“Under the separation of powers doctrine (Cal. Const., art. III, § 3), judicial
powers may not be delegated to nonjudicial officers.” (People v. Smith (2022)
79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902 (Smith).) It is the trial court’s “duty to determine the nature of
the requirements imposed on [a] probationer,” though the court may allow the probation
department to “specify the details necessary to effectuate the . . . conditions.” (Ibid.) For
example, the court may “mandate[] treatment for substance abuse based on [an]
assessment while leaving the probation officer to oversee the details.” (Id. at p. 903.)
Appellate courts have also “disapproved provisions purporting to completely
delegate the setting of a condition to the probation department” based on overbreadth.
(In re D.N. (2022) 14 Cal.5th 202, 209, fn. 4; see People v. O’Neil (2008)
165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1357-1359.) While “[t]he court may leave to the discretion of the
probation officer the specification of the many details that invariably are necessary to
implement the terms of probation,” the court’s order “cannot be entirely open-ended.”
(O’Neil, supra, at pp. 1358-1359.) Instead, to avoid being overly broad, a probation
condition must establish some “standard by which the probation department is to be
guided.” (Id. at p. 1359.)

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The condition challenged here fails to meet these requirements. The trial court
ordered defendant to “enter into and continue such education, psychological, psychiatric,
drug, alcohol, or other rehabilitation program as directed by probation.” While the
written condition includes a space for identifying the requirements of any such programs,
the space was left blank, and the trial court itself did not orally identify the programming
requirements during the sentencing hearing. Thus, the condition is entirely open-ended
and does not specify whether any treatments will be based on an assessment of
defendant’s individualized needs. Moreover, it leaves the probation department, rather
than the court, to identify various rehabilitative programs, which could potentially
include a residential treatment program.
A residential treatment program, however, “can impose far greater burdens on a
person’s liberty interests than an outpatient program.” (Smith, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at
p. 903 [unlike outpatients, participants in residential programs may be confined to the
treatment facility for the duration of the program, separated from family, friends, and
often unable to work].) Given the significant liberty interests at stake, a court—and not a
probation officer—must decide whether to require a defendant to attend residential
treatment. (Ibid.; see also U.S. v. Esparza (9th Cir. 2009) 552 F.3d 1088, 1091.)
Here, as written, and as orally imposed by the trial court, the condition
impermissibly delegates to the probation officer the determination of what type of
treatment program defendant will be ordered to complete, including whether the program
will be residential or outpatient. (Smith, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 903.) And, as the
parties agree, the condition fails to illuminate for defendant the nature and extent of
psychiatric, psychological, or educational programs that the court deems appropriate.
Accordingly, we shall remand the matter for the trial court to determine the nature
of the requirements imposed under the rehabilitative programming condition based on an
assessment of defendant’s specific rehabilitative programming needs.

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III. DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to clarify and tailor the
probation condition that defendant “enter into and continue such education,
psychological, psychiatric, drug, alcohol, or other rehabilitation program” consistent with
this opinion. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

/S/

RENNER, J.

We concur:

/S/

DUARTE, Acting P. J.

/S/

FEINBERG, J.

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