CourtListener 10666305•Wall v. Pekarovic CA2/6
Texte intégral
Filed 9/4/25 Wall v. Pekarovic CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
RICHARD WALL et al., 2d Civ. No. B339739
(Super. Ct. No. 56-2020-
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 00540946-CU-PN-VTA)
(Ventura County)
v.
JOHN A. PEKAROVIC,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appellant John A. Pekarovic appeals from an order denying
his motion to vacate a void judgment. He contends the trial court
erred when it construed his motion as one for reconsideration.
We dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In March 2020, respondents Richard Wall and Margaret
Wall (the Walls) filed a lawsuit against Pekarovic. The Walls
alleged that Pekarovic, a licensed civil and structural engineer,
was professionally negligent in his design of a second story to the
Walls’ residence.
After seven unsuccessful attempts to personally serve
Pekarovic, the Walls filed a proof of service indicating Pekarovic
was served via substitute service in June 2020, at a residence in
Coronado (the Coronado property). The process server stated
that service was made upon a “ ‘John Doe’, refused to give full
name, friend.” Pekarovic did not file a responsive pleading.
Default was entered against him in August 2020. In June 2023,
the trial court entered judgment by default against Pekarovic in
the amount of $200,634.
Over six months later, in February 2024, Pekarovic filed a
“motion to set aside default judgment” (Code Civ. Proc.,1 § 473.5).
Pekarovic claimed he did not reside at the Coronado property at
the time of service, had not resided at the Coronado property “for
over three and a half years,” and had sold the Coronado property
in April 2021. He became aware of the Walls’ lawsuit “because
the person residing at [the Coronado property] in June of 2020
forwarded me a copy of the proof of service by mail.” Pekarovic
asserted substitute service was improper and claimed he lacked
actual notice of the lawsuit.
In opposition, the Walls’ attorney Mark B. Plummer
declared that after several unsuccessful attempts to personally
serve Pekarovic, he mailed a copy of the summons, complaint,
and accompanying cover letter to Pekarovic at the Coronado
property in June 2020. Plummer obtained the address from
Pekarovic’s licensing details with the Board for Professional
Engineers, Land Surveyors, and Geologists. Pekarovic called him
thereafter, they discussed the lawsuit, Pekarovic “confirmed his
address,” and Pekarovic informed Plummer that he had lived in
1 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure unless otherwise noted.
2
Dubai for several years. Pekarovic and Plummer also exchanged
an email. Substitute service was effected one day later, on June
17, 2020.
In March 2024, the trial court denied the motion to set
aside default judgment (March 2024 order). The court found that
Pekarovic failed to submit a proposed responsive pleading as
required and that he had actual notice of the lawsuit. On April
25, Pekarovic filed a “motion to vacate void judgment” (§ 473,
subd. (d)). Pekarovic argued that service was not properly
effectuated on him, rendering the judgment void. The trial court
characterized the motion to vacate as one for reconsideration of
the March 2024 order. In an order dated May 30, 2024, it denied
the motion because Pekarovic failed to meet the requirements of
a motion for reconsideration (§ 1008).
DISCUSSION
Pekarovic contends the trial court erred when it deemed
the second motion as a motion for reconsideration and declined to
reach the merits. The Walls contend the trial court properly
construed the motion as a motion for reconsideration, and that an
order denying a motion for reconsideration is not appealable.
(§ 1008, subd. (g).) We agree.
The “name of a motion is not controlling, and, regardless of
the name, a motion asking the trial court to decide the same
matter previously ruled on is a motion for reconsideration under
. . . section 1008.” (Powell v. County of Orange (2011) 197
Cal.App.4th 1573, 1577.) “The principle that a trial court may
consider a motion regardless of the label placed on it by a party is
consistent with the court’s inherent authority to manage and
control its docket. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 128, subd. (a)[(3)], 187.)”
(Sole Energy Co. v. Petrominerals Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th
3
187, 193.) We review the trial court’s power to deem a motion
one for reconsideration for abuse of discretion. (California
Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. Virga (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th
30, 42.)
We conclude there was no abuse of discretion here.
Pekarovic contends the second motion could not be construed as
one for reconsideration of the first because the first motion relied
on section 473.5 and the second relied on section 473, subdivision
(d). But section 473, subdivision (d) was not “new” law
contemplated by section 1008. It was merely a different legal
theory that was available to Pekarovic when he filed his first
motion. “If a trial court has no jurisdiction to reconsider a prior
order on the basis of ‘different facts’ in the absence of a
satisfactory explanation for the failure to present them earlier, it
cannot have jurisdiction to reconsider on the basis of ‘different
law’ absent the same showing of diligence, because there is no
basis for any distinction.” (Baldwin v. Home Savings of America
(1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1200 (Baldwin).) Pekarovic has not
explained why he omitted section 473, subdivision (d) from his
first motion. Thus, we reject Pekarovic’s argument that he was
absolved from raising section 473, subdivision (d) in his first
motion to set aside the default judgment.
As to the facts in Pekarovic’s second motion to vacate, those
were no different than those offered in his first motion.
Pekarovic contended he was improperly served because he did
not reside at the Coronado property and did not maintain an
office at that property. But those arguments were made in his
first motion. Pekarovic also sought the same relief in both
motions—to set aside the judgment and permit him to defend
against the action.
4
In our view, the trial court reasonably concluded that the
facts and law offered in support of Pekarovic’s second motion
were known to him at the time of his first motion. “[T]he
diligence requirement applicable to motions to reconsider on the
basis of different facts is also applicable to motions to reconsider
on the basis of different law.” (Baldwin, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1200.) Because we conclude the court did not abuse its
discretion in construing the second motion as a motion for
reconsideration, we turn to whether we have jurisdiction to
consider an appeal from an order denying a motion for
reconsideration. We conclude we do not.
An order denying a motion for reconsideration is not
appealable. (§ 1008, subd. (g).) But “if the order that was the
subject of a motion for reconsideration is appealable, the denial of
the motion for reconsideration is reviewable as part of an appeal
from that order.” (Ibid.) The underlying order here—the March
2024 order—is appealable. (Manson, Iver & York v. Black (2009)
176 Cal.App.4th 36, 42.) But Pekarovic’s notice of appeal did not
identify the March 2024 order. While we must liberally construe
the notice of appeal, “the policy of liberal construction ‘does not
apply if the notice is so specific it cannot be read as reaching a
judgment or order not mentioned at all.’ ” (In re J.F. (2019) 39
Cal.App.5th 70, 78, quoting Filbin v. Fitzgerald (2012) 211
Cal.App.4th 154, 173.)
Because Pekarovic’s notice of appeal “defines the scope of
the appeal” (Morton v. Wagner (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 963, 967),
it cannot be read as reaching the March 2024 order. That notice
unambiguously states Pekarovic is only appealing the May 30,
2024, order. Thus, Pekarovic’s appeal of the motion for
reconsideration is unappealable and must be dismissed.
5
Even if we construed the notice of appeal as encompassing
the March 2024 order, the outcome would not change. A trial
court’s decision to grant or deny relief under section 473.5 is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Rios v. Singh (2021) 65
Cal.App.5th 871, 885.) Here, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Pekarovic’s first motion to set aside.
Pekarovic failed to include his proposed pleading with his motion
to set aside, as required by section 473.5, subdivision (b). And in
his own declaration he confirmed he spoke with the Walls’
attorney, evidencing his awareness of the lawsuit.
Because Pekarovic failed to appeal the default judgment,
the only way he can attack that judgment is to appeal the order
denying the first motion to set aside. However, Pekarovic only
appealed the order denying his second motion to vacate, which
the trial court properly deemed a motion for reconsideration.
Because that order is not appealable, we must dismiss the
appeal.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Respondents shall recover costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J. YEGAN, J.
6
Randy Rhodes, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
Tesser Grossman, Brian M. Grossman and Alec Pierce
Schulman for Defendant and Appellant.
Law Offices of Mark B. Plummer and Mark B. Plummer for
Plaintiffs and Respondents.
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