CourtListener 10665444•In re L.M. CA4/1
Texte intégral
Filed 9/3/25 In re L.M. CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re L.M. et al., Persons Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
D085812
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES
AGENCY, (Super. Ct. No. EJ3832)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
S.M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Mark T. Cumba, Judge. Affirmed.
Megan Turkat Schirn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Appellant S.M., Father.
Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy
County Counsel, and Natasha C. Edwards, Deputy County Counsel for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
S.M. (Father) appeals from a March 10, 2025, jurisdictional finding and
dispositional order involving his daughter, L.M., and separately appeals a
March 19, 2025, jurisdictional finding and dispositional order involving his
remaining three children, G.H., S.M., 1 and M.M. The juvenile court assumed
jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code 2 section 300, subdivision (b)
as to all four children and subdivision (d) as to G.H. and L.M. The children’s
mother (Mother) has not appealed.
Father challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
court’s jurisdictional findings related to sexual abuse under section 300,
subdivision (d) for L.M. and G.H. The San Diego County Health and Human
Services Agency (the Agency) counters that Father’s appeals are not
justiciable because they do not contest the court’s findings related to domestic
violence and parental substance abuse under section 300, subdivision (b),
which independently provide a basis for jurisdiction over the children. We
conclude that the appeals are justiciable and that the record contains
substantial evidence justifying the court’s assertion of jurisdiction under
subdivision (d). Accordingly, we affirm the court’s orders.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Agency first interacted with Mother and Father in 2014 when
Mother tested positive for methamphetamine after giving birth to G.H. G.H.
was reunified with her parents in 2016, and the court terminated jurisdiction
in 2023.
1 Father and son share the same initials. All further references to “S.M.”
refer to the son.
2 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
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A. Evidence Supporting Original Section 300 Petition
At the time of the relevant incidents, Mother and the children lived in a
home adjacent to the paternal grandparents, and Father lived in a trailer at
the back on the property. On July 3, 2024, Mother was giving L.M., then age
five, a bath when L.M. complained the bath water was causing a burning
sensation on her genitals. According to Mother, when she asked how L.M.
was injured, L.M. responded, “daddy scratched me.” Mother checked L.M.’s
vaginal area and saw that it was red, swollen, and irritated but believed it
could have resulted from L.M. swimming at a public pool all day. Mother
confronted Father and the paternal grandmother about the disclosure, but
both denied knowing anything about it.
On July 15, 2024, Mother told the children Father would be coming
home soon. Mother reported that L.M. responded that she did not want
Father to return to the house, explaining, “daddy touches me, I don’t want
him here.” She told Mother she was in bed when Father removed her
underwear and rubbed her “privates.” L.M. said “it hurt” and she “didn’t like
it.”
Mother called the police the next day to report child sexual abuse.
Responding deputies conducted a minimum facts interview with L.M., who
said Father had touched her “privates” with his hand one time and that it
“hurt me.” She told officers it occurred “on my mom’s bed.” An emergency
protective order was issued protecting Mother and L.M. from Father.
Later that day, an Agency social worker contacted a detective involved
in the investigation. According to the detective, Mother stated that L.M. told
her on July 3 that it “hurt to pee” and that Father had touched her “privates.”
Mother said L.M. indicated this by pointing to her vagina and doing a
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“rubbing” motion. The detective said he was informed that the paternal
grandmother called L.M. a “liar” in Spanish.
The social worker then spoke with Mother. Mother stated that on July
3, L.M. told her Father “scratched” her private area and touched her there
“all the time.” Mother said that when she and Father confronted L.M. and
Father asked if Mother had told her to say it, L.M. responded, “Yes mom told
me to say it.” Mother told the social worker the paternal grandmother
accused her of “putting that in her head,” and called L.M. a “dirty little girl”
and a “liar.” As to L.M.’s July 15 reporting, Mother said L.M. told her Father
took her underwear off and made a circular motion with his hands on her
private area. L.M. explained that she was in Mother’s bed, and S.M. was
asleep on the couch.
The social worker separately interviewed the children. G.H., age 9, told
her L.M. said Father had touched her privates, but that she believed L.M.
lied. She confirmed the paternal grandmother called L.M. a “dirty little girl”
and said the grandmother attempted to hit L.M. G.H. denied ever witnessing
or knowing of any inappropriate touching or interaction in the home between
Father and her siblings. She indicated her private areas are her “breasts and
vagina” and denied anyone touching or bothering her in those areas.
However, she stated that she did not feel safe and that it was “scary” to see
her parents fight because she does not know if Father will hit Mother.
S.M., age 7, also confirmed that L.M. had told him Father touched her
privates, and added, “daddy made [L.M.] say it was mommy so it was
definitely daddy.” When the social worker said, “tell me more about that,” he
responded, “I don’t want to talk about it.” He denied anyone touching him in
his private area or knowing if his siblings’ rules for their privates had been
broken.
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L.M. asserted that Father touched her vagina and placed her hand on
her vagina to indicate. She then stated that she did not want to talk about it
and asked to skip the question.
M.M., then only three years old, said “I don’t know about that” when
asked if he had ever seen adults argue in the home and about the police
coming to the house.
A new report was made to the Child Abuse Hotline on July 17, 2024.
The caller reported Mother had been using methamphetamine every night
and had a bag of drugs. The individual further relayed that Mother told a
family member on July 4 that L.M. pointed to her buttocks and vagina when
asked where Father touched her. The caller indicated that L.M. appeared to
be coached as she had wide eyes, appeared fearful, and kept looking at
Mother before answering.
The next day, the social worker spoke with the paternal grandmother,
who expressed concern regarding Mother’s substance abuse based on what
Father had told her and commented that Mother “was chubby and is now
skinny.” In her view, Mother was manipulating L.M. to lie and was “going to
send an innocent man to jail.” The paternal aunt told the social worker
Mother hit, yelled at, and medicated the children with sleeping pills. She
said Mother made L.M. say that Father touched her “in the front and the
back.” According to the aunt, L.M. recanted upon questioning, and G.H. said
L.M. saw it on television.
On July 19, a forensic interviewer met with L.M. L.M. told her that
she informed Mother that Father touched her privates and added, “I hate
him when he touch my private.” L.M. explained that she was sleeping on
Mother’s bed while Mother was at the store. She stated, “[h]e touched me
right here (pointed to genital area) and right here (pointed to her buttock)”
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with his hands and said that she told him to “stop touching” her private.
Although G.H. was sleeping in the same room, L.M. said her siblings did not
believe her. L.M. told the interviewer, “[t]hey said, I was lying, but I’m not
lying. That make me sad.” She denied any other incidents had occurred.
A social worker called Mother a little over a week later to follow up on
missed drug testing, and Father answered the phone. When the worker
asked what led to Father returning, Mother said she learned that L.M. had
watched an inappropriate cartoon on YouTube about “how to make babies”
that led her to say Father touched her. Mother also explained that they took
L.M. for a physical exam at Rady Children’s Hospital, which revealed no
signs of sexual abuse. In following up with the hospital, the social worker
learned that Mother was adamant they examine L.M. even though staff
informed her that an exam would not be able to confirm or deny whether
sexual abuse occurred.
In early August 2024, Mother said she found out G.H. and L.M. had
watched pornographic videos on G.H.’s iPad in which the girl made the same
circular motions L.M. had demonstrated and said “daddy.” Father and
Mother questioned L.M. again and reported that she admitted scratching
herself and accusing Father because she did not want to get in trouble for
“scratching herself.” For the remainder of the month, the social worker had
difficulty reaching the parents, and both parents told her to contact their
attorneys.
B. Original Section 300 Petition and Detention Hearing
On August 28, the Agency filed a petition on L.M.’s behalf under
section 300, subdivision (d) alleging Father sexually abused her by touching
her genital area and buttocks with his hand while she lay in bed, causing her
pain in her genital area. At the detention hearing, the court ordered L.M.
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removed from Father and detained with Mother on the conditions that (1)
Father not be on the property; and (2) Mother allow unannounced and
announced visits by the Agency and minor’s counsel. The court allowed
Father supervised visitation so long as Mother was not the supervisor.
C. Evidence Supporting Jurisdiction and Disposition as to
L.M.
On the evening of September 9, Mother left social worker Sanchez a
voicemail informing her she had contacted law enforcement. She explained
that, after she told the children they would be seeing Father again, G.H. said
he touched her inappropriately and S.M. claimed Father made him give
Father oral sex. Mother later left another voicemail saying she had “jumped
the gun” by calling the police because the children subsequently reported
their allegations were not true and they only said it because Father made
them do chores.
Sanchez met with Mother on September 10, and Mother apologized for
the messages. Mother admitted she had started drinking alcohol again and
had taken her sons’ Ritalin three days prior. Sanchez also spoke with L.M.
and observed that she was generally happy. L.M. said she wanted Father to
return, but when the social worker asked why, L.M. stated, “move on to the
next question.” Sanchez noted that Father called Mother multiple times
during the interview.
On September 23, police responded to a domestic violence report from
the home. Mother told an officer that on September 3, Father banged on the
door and then punched her in the face when she opened it. She fell and hit
her head on the floor, and she said Father threatened to kill her if she called
the police.
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The next day, Sanchez met with the family again. L.M. denied that
anyone ever touched her private parts and said she wanted Father to move
back into the house. She mentioned that she saw Father punch Mother, but
after Mother said L.M. was not present and had heard it from her sister, L.M.
agreed she did not see the incident. G.H. explained that she, S.M., and L.M.
were all in a king-sized bed when Father barged into the house and punched
Mother on the chin. She said L.M. was asleep but may have heard. G.H.
denied ever watching videos that showed private parts and said no one had
touched hers. As to L.M., she reported, “[L.M.] says dad touched her, but we
don’t know yet.” G.H. thought L.M. was lying because “[her] dad wouldn’t do
that.” S.M. also confirmed seeing Father punch Mother. When asked if
anyone had ever touched his private parts, S.M. became quiet and replied, “I
don’t want to answer.” He acknowledged he was worried about answering,
but eventually shook his head no when asked about being touched and said
no one had ever told him to say something that was not true. He then
expressed that he was worried about going to foster care. Nonetheless, all
three children indicated they enjoyed visiting with Father (M.M. refused to
be interviewed). The investigation of G.H. and S.M.’s sexual allegations was
eventually closed as unfounded.
Meanwhile, Mother admitted Father came into the home on
September 3, punched her in the face, and knocked her to the ground. She
did not initially report it because she was afraid the children would be
removed. It is not clear if the Agency discussed this incident with Father, but
he did admit to drinking alcohol again. Mother sought a restraining order
protecting herself and the children from Father. After a hearing, the court
denied the request, finding Mother not credible and Father credible.
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Throughout September and October 2024, Mother and Father made
numerous allegations against each other and paternal grandmother sought a
restraining order, claiming Mother had hit her. When interviewed about the
various allegations, paternal grandmother reported that after Mother told
her about L.M.’s claim, she questioned L.M. in front of the grandmother, and
L.M. said Father touched her. But the grandmother said L.M. appeared
scared, had wide eyes, and otherwise stayed quiet. She further related that
G.H. denied Father touched her and told her L.M. was lying.
Social worker Sanchez also spoke with Mother’s ex-husband, who
reported she was abusive toward him, their two children, and her disabled
sister and appeared to be under the influence of alcohol or other substances
during court proceedings. He claimed she made false rape allegations
against him and falsely claimed his brother molested their children. Nothing
came of the accusations, and he was awarded full custody of the children. He
said Mother recently asked his daughter to pick her up and stated that her
daughter had been raped.
On November 1, 2024, L.M. told social worker Sanchez her parents
fought a “long time ago” about “something I lied, but I didn’t lie” and said she
did not know yet why they thought she lied. When asked if someone touched
her private parts, L.M. initially said no, but then added, “only my dad.” She
reported it was “a long time ago,” that it happened “a lot of times,” and that
“[she] didn’t like it.”
In late November, the paternal grandmother told Sanchez Father was
very depressed from being away from the children and told her he no longer
wanted to live.
Throughout this time, the parents engaged in some services but not
others and only sporadically drug tested. On November 13, Father testified
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positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine and then cancelled his next
five visits with L.M.
D. New Allegations and Detention from Mother
On January 2, 2025, Mother confronted Father about a new allegation
S.M. made that Father had sexually abused all the children. When he denied
the allegations, she threatened to kill him if he touched the children and
struck him on the leg with a beer bottle. Father pushed Mother onto a bed in
the trailer, got on top of her, pulled her hair, and bit her finger. All four
children came to the trailer, and Mother yelled to them to call the police.
Father fled, but a police officer arrested him upon his return.
When interviewed, S.M. told an officer Father took his pants off and did
“weird stuff” with him that made him uncomfortable. Mother provided the
officer with the shorts S.M. was wearing when the assault occurred on
December 31, 2024, which she said she found in the van. The officer observed
a dried white mucus-like substance on the hem. S.M. also told the officer
Father had tried to take him into the van again that day, but that he feared
going in the trailer because he thought he would be raped. When asked, S.M.
said he did not know what it meant to be raped, but that he was scared of it.
Finally, S.M. said Father took him to a hotel room at an unknown time where
they met a man named Gonzalo who was laughing at him and touching him.
The officer said S.M. started crying after making this statement and did not
elaborate.
S.M. and M.M. were drug tested the next day. S.M. tested positive for
Clonidine, and M.M. was positive for Clonidine and methamphetamine.
Neither child had a prescription for Clonidine.
The Agency gathered information from the family. Father denied the
sexual allegations and asserted that Mother was putting them in the
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children’s minds. He said they did hang out with a paternal aunt and her
friend, Gonzalo, once but that Gonzalo never touched S.M. Both parents
accused each other of using methamphetamine. Mother admitted scratching
Father and hitting him with a glass bottle, although this time she said it was
on the head.
S.M. reported during a forensic interview that Father hit him and,
after pulling M.M.’s pants down, hit M.M. on the buttocks. He also conveyed
that he did not like when paternal grandmother dried him because he could
see in her eyes that she wanted to rape him. When asked what happened
when he went to bed, S.M. said he did not want to talk about it. The
interviewer asked what Father did that scared him, and S.M. said he did not
want to talk about it because it was scary and begged the interviewer not to
send him to foster care. He mentioned the hotel incident and indicated that
he did not like when Gonzalo touched his feet.
L.M. reported that Father yelled at S.M. not to lie during the January 2
altercation. She added, “My dad also touched my privates, long time ago. I
already told my social worker Melissa and my dad was not supposed to be in
the home, but he was nice sometimes but then he was not and he hurt my
mom.” G.H. said Father had been in the home for about three days.
On January 10, 2025, G.H., now 10 years old, underwent a forensic
interview. She reported multiple incidents that began about two years prior
when they visited Father in his trailer. She said, “He touched [S.M.] first and
me second. He made me and [S.M.] touch each other.” Specifically, she
explained that Father made her touch her brother’s “private/balls” with her
hand and told S.M. “[l]et her do it or I’m going to kill. . . .” She said he also
threatened to kill her, Mother, and S.M. if she did not do it, and she
recounted that his private “felt like a ball and it was wet.” G.H. said Father
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laughed at them while they did it and called them “[s]tupid ass kids.” She
reported Father also pulled down his pants and made them both touch him.
On another occasion, she said Father took S.M. into the bathroom and she
heard S.M. crying and Father threatening him. The last incident involved
Father taking her into the bathroom and having “sex” with her. When asked
what she meant by having sex, G.H. explained that Father put his penis in
her mouth and rubbed it all over her. She described it as feeling round and
wet and tasting like a substance. She said he also touched her bust and
vaginal area with his hands and that the touching made her vaginal area and
back hurt. According to G.H., S.M. told her Father also had sex with M.M.
She said Father also made her and S.M. watch him have sex with prostitutes
and his attorney, and she described the women’s appearance. At some point,
she claimed Father got into her room through her window. G.H. ended by
expressing fear about going to foster care and being sexually assaulted there.
On January 6, the court granted a temporary restraining order
protecting Mother and the children. The Agency subsequently learned
Mother had tested positive for methamphetamines on January 3. Social
workers removed the children from Mother’s care on January 10.
E. Petitions as to all Four Children
The Agency filed an amended petition for L.M. and new petitions for
her siblings, alleging under section 300, subdivisions (b) that all four children
were exposed to violent confrontations between the parents and that Mother’s
untreated substance abuse placed the children at substantial risk of serious
physical harm. It later added to M.M.’s petition that he tested positive for
methamphetamines on January 3, 2025. The petition for G.H. contained a
subdivision (d) allegation detailing her sexual abuse allegations against
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Father. The Agency originally included a sexual abuse allegation as to S.M.
as well but dismissed it at the beginning of the March 19, 2025 proceeding.
F. Evidence Supporting Jurisdiction and Disposition
During several subsequent visits with the children at Polinski
Children’s Center (Polinski), the children told social worker Sanchez they did
not want to visit Father. G.H. understood that she was at Polinski because
there was something dangerous at her house—her dad. L.M. explained that
she was at Polinski because “[her] dad touched [her] a long time ago.”
Mother acknowledged during an interview in January 2025 that she
started using methamphetamine in December 2024 because “[t]he Ritalin
wasn’t cutting it.” With regard to the sexual allegations, she reported that
G.H. told her Father would put her in the trailer closet and pull his clothes
down and also that Father sexually abused her in December 2024 when he
drove her to a dentist appointment. A social worker had observed G.H. and
Father leaving alone together that day.
The social worker did not receive a response from Father and was not
able to interview him about the new allegations.
During a subsequent forensic interview, G.H. clarified that when she
previously mentioned Father having sex with his attorney and strippers, she
meant “mouth all over” and was referring to kissing with a tongue and
kissing a woman’s chest area. She reported multiple instances when Father
climbed in their window, threatened her and S.M. not to tell, and hid in the
attic.
The forensic interviewer opined that G.H. and L.M. were not coached.
She said when a child is coached, the information is very limited to what
someone did, and no further details are given. She noted that L.M. was clear
on what occurred and volunteered information on her own. G.H., being older,
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had more communication skills and provided details such as location, people
present, and things that were around, suggesting she likely was not coached.
S.M.’s interviewer indicated she could not provide an opinion.
In February, Mother alleged that a staff member at Polinski
inappropriately let S.M. use his cell phone. S.M. and the visitation monitor
contradicted her view of events. Neither Mother nor the Agency expressed
concerns about G.H. and L.M., who both reported feeling safe at Polinski and
said they did not want to visit with Father.
Sanchez met with Father who admitted he bit Mother. She expressed
concern about his lack of drug testing and engagement in services. He asked
about visits, and she explained that the children had declined to see him.
Father said he would not do anything, including drug test, until he got his
visits.
Counsel for L.M. and Father provided the court with L.M.’s stipulated
testimony. Therein, L.M. stated that she did not feel like living with her dad
“[b]ecause him was touching me. My private parts” (pointing to “her crotch”).
She said he did not touch her anywhere else, it did not hurt, and he only
touched her one time. L.M. testified that Father pushed her into the
bathroom and touched her there while the rest of the family was taking care
of M.M.’s bloody nose in another room. According to L.M., no one told her to
say these things, and she only disclosed the touching to Mother.
In a subsequent meeting, Sanchez explained to Father that even
though he did not agree with the sexual abuse allegations, he could
participate in substance use treatment, drug testing, and parenting classes.
Father agreed to a drug test, but not a hair follicle test, and requested a
therapy referral. He did not appear for the drug test. Separately, the
paternal relatives reported that the allegations against Father began after
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they told Mother she could not keep the paternal grandparents’ home. They
also requested the children undergo hair follicle tests because they believed
Mother drugged them. The family stated that Father was feeling depressed
and hopeless, which is why he had not been responding to the Agency.
G. Jurisdictional and Dispositional Hearing Regarding L.M.
At the March 10 hearing, counsel for the Agency stressed that, although
Mother alleged numerous times that L.M. recanted, made excuses for
potential exposures through YouTube videos and a sibling’s iPad, and exerted
pressure on L.M. so that Father could return home, L.M. never recanted
when speaking to social workers, medical professionals, or law enforcement. 3
To the contrary, L.M. continued to spontaneously mention the sexual abuse
on her own. The Agency acknowledged that L.M.’s statements about where
the abuse occurred and what her family was doing at the time have varied
but argued that she was consistent in saying that Father touched her
privates and that no one told her to make that allegation. Given that she was
only six years old, counsel argued it was reasonable for L.M. to confuse some
of the details of something that happened over seven months before her
stipulated testimony occurred.
As to the section 300, subdivision (b) allegation, the Agency pointed out
that the children witnessed the September 2024 incident when Father
punched Mother in the face, and that the parents admitted the description of
the January 2025 domestic violence incident when Mother struck Father
with a bottle and Father bit Mother’s finger. It also highlighted that both
parents tested positive for methamphetamine and admitted to using
methamphetamine and alcohol.
3 Counsel also pointed out that Mother never provided any evidence of
the videos or apps, and that G.H. denied every watching such things.
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Father’s attorney argued Mother coached the children to make these
allegations against Father and that L.M. kept changing the facts because she
was having trouble keeping the story she had been fed straight. Counsel
requested that the court dismiss the subdivision (d) count because the Agency
had failed to meet its burden of proof. Alternatively, she asked the court to
amend the allegation to conform to proof by striking everything except the
allegation that he “touched the child’s genital area.” Counsel also objected to
the first component of the case plan under the service objective entitled “do
not sexually abuse your children,” which required Father to understand how
his actions placed the children at risk, arguing this required Father to admit
sexual abuse, which he vehemently denied. She submitted that the law does
not require a parent to admit to a crime.
L.M.’s counsel echoed the Agency’s arguments and pointed out that
L.M.’s basic claim stayed the same even though her siblings said they did not
believe her and the paternal grandmother tried to hit her and called her a
liar and a dirty little girl.
The court asked if Mother adamantly requesting a physical
examination indicated she was concerned about the allegations. The Agency
responded that Mother and Father’s use of the physical exam appeared more
geared toward attempting to exonerate Father, even though medical
professionals had told them an examination would neither prove nor disprove
sexual assault. The court also expressed its concern about all the
inconsistencies regarding L.M. In response, the Agency pointed out that the
siblings disclosed abuse as well and that even when L.M. was very conflicted
and wanted Father back in the home, she still confirmed the allegations.
Ultimately, the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the
subdivision (b) and (d) allegations were true. What “tipped the scales for the
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court” were L.M.’s consistent statements that this had happened even after
her relatives and siblings called her a liar. The court did, however, amend
the petition to conform to proof by striking the language indicating Father
touched L.M.’s “buttocks with his hand while she was lying in bed causing
her to have pain in her genital area.” As amended, the petition alleged
Father “touched the child’s genital area.” The court found the case plan
appropriate as initially proposed.
H. Jurisdictional and Dispositional Hearing for G.H.
At the March 19 hearing, Agency counsel restated the evidence
supporting the domestic violence and substance abuse allegations. She then
highlighted that G.H.’s sexual abuse disclosures during her forensic
interviews were very graphic and detailed. While acknowledging that G.H.
recanted her prior accusations and previously denied abuse, Agency counsel
pointed out that her delay and recantation could be explained by her
statements that Father threatened to kill her and Mother if she told Mother
about the abuse. Counsel further emphasized that the forensic interviewer
opined that G.H. had not been coached.
As to the sexual abuse count, Father’s attorney pointed out that G.H.
denied that anyone touched her private parts on January 3, 2025, just seven
days before making her January 10 allegations. Counsel also questioned
G.H.’s perception of reality, assuring the court that, contrary to G.H.’s claim,
she did not have sex with Father in front of G.H. and found it very unlikely
any other attorney did so. Should the court sustain the petition, counsel
again asked that the court strike the requirement in the case plan that
required Father to admit sexual abuse. Counsel argued Father could not be
forced to choose between incriminating himself and pursuing reunification.
Father further requested that any requirement of taking sexual abuse or
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domestic violence classes be stricken from his case plan, submitting that at
the very least, he should be in the victim’s domestic violence class.
The court asked what it should make of the fact that the subdivision (d)
count for G.H. included allegations that S.M. was involved in some of the acts
when the subdivision (d) count had been stricken for S.M. The Agency
responded that the case was very complicated and, while there was a lot of
information that could have been pled, it believed sufficient evidence
supported a subdivision (d) jurisdictional finding as to G.H.
In response to Father’s concerns about admitting abuse, the Agency
proposed adding “court-ordered therapy” to the challenged case plan
requirement so that his statements in therapy would be given statutory
immunity, and no explicit admission would be required.
The court sustained jurisdiction as to all three children under
subdivision (b) and as to G.H. under subdivision (d). The court granted the
request to modify the case plan.
II. DISCUSSION
Father argues insufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s
jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (d) for L.M. and G.H. 4
4 Father’s notices of appeal included claims he has not pursued on
appeal. Specifically, he appealed from the court’s March 10 denial of his
request to modify the case plan and the March 19 order as applied to M.M.
Because Father does not raise arguments regarding the case plan or M.M. in
his opening brief, these issues are forfeited on appeal. (See People v.
Freetown Holdings Co. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1195, 1218; Tisher v.
California Horse Racing Bd. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 349, 361.)
Additionally, Father argues in his opening brief that insufficient
evidence supports the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding under section
300, subdivision (d) as to S.M. But because the court ultimately dismissed
the section 300, subdivision (d) allegation as to S.M., this portion of the
appeal challenging the March 19 order is not justiciable. Accordingly, we
need not further address this claim.
18
The Agency contends that Father’s appeals are not justiciable because they
do not challenge the court’s jurisdictional findings under section 300,
subdivision (b), which independently provides a basis for jurisdiction over the
children.
A. Justiciability
“As a general rule, a single jurisdictional finding supported by
substantial evidence is sufficient to support jurisdiction and render moot a
challenge to the other findings.” (In re M.W. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1444,
1452.) This is because the primary concern of dependency proceedings is “the
protection of [the] children.” (In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1491
(I.A.).)
Appellate courts only entertain appeals presenting justiciable issues or
those that “concern a present, concrete, and genuine dispute as to which the
court can grant effective relief.” (I.A., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1489.)
Courts do not “ ‘ “give opinions upon moot questions or abstract
propositions” ’ ” because when a case is moot, the court cannot grant effective
relief. (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276.) For relief to be effective, “the
plaintiff must complain of an ongoing harm” and “the harm must be
redressable or capable of being rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks.”
(Ibid.) In the dependency context, a juvenile court’s finding may result in
ongoing harm where it continues to affect a parent’s legal status, such as by
limiting the parent’s right to custody or visitation, or results in dispositional
orders that otherwise adversely affect the parent going forward. (Id. at
pp. 276–278.) Complaints that the jurisdictional finding resulted in stigma,
without more, are not sufficient to sustain an appeal. (Id. at p. 277.)
In this case, the unchallenged jurisdictional findings as to Father under
section 300, subdivision (b) will continue to support dependency jurisdiction
19
over L.M. and G.H. regardless of the outcome of these appeals. Nevertheless,
Father contends this does not moot his appeals because the challenged
jurisdictional finding regarding sexual abuse affected the dispositional
orders. Specifically, he asserts he was directly and adversely impacted by the
subdivision (d) findings because the children were removed from his custody,
his visitation is supervised, and he was ordered to engage in sexual abuse
treatment that will require him to accept responsibility for conduct he denies
as a measure of his case plan progress. He further contends the finding that
he sexually abused his children may foreseeably have severe and unfair
consequences on future visitation and custody orders in “family law [or]
dependency proceedings.”
The court did not draw a distinction between the subdivision (b) and (d)
allegations in ordering removal of the children from Father’s custody and
supervised visitation. Thus, it is not clear that reversing the subdivision (d)
findings would have any immediate impact on custody and visitation issues.
But the court also ordered Father to comply with his case plan, which
requires him to participate in a sexual abuse offenders’ group. The plan
further obliges Father to “understand how his [sexual abuse-related] actions
place the children in the home at risk and understand how these actions may
cause secondary trauma to his children.” 5
5 For his case plan pertaining to G.H. only, the court modified this
language to specify that “in court-ordered treatment,” Father will understand
how his actions place the children in the home at risk and understand how
these actions may cause secondary trauma to his children. This addition
responded to Father’s concerns about having to admit to sexually abusing his
children to progress in his case plan. It affords the protection of section
355.1, subdivision (f), which provides that “[t]estimony by a parent, guardian,
or other person who has the care or custody of the minor made the subject of
a proceeding under Section 300 shall not be admissible as evidence in any
other action or proceeding.”
20
We conclude these dispositional orders will adversely affect Father
such that the appeals are justiciable. The offenders’ group requires a
significant amount of time and, because the court did not modify Father’s
case plan as to L.M., it is possible he will be required to admit sexually
abusing L.M. to avoid losing custody for failure to comply with his case plan.
Notably, our high court found a case challenging a jurisdictional finding that
the father molested his child not moot even after the court permitted the
father to return home and dismissed the dependency proceedings. (See In re
I.C. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 869, 884 (I.C.).) For these reasons, we conclude a
favorable ruling would provide effective relief.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
A parent may seek review of both the jurisdictional and dispositional
findings on an appeal from the dispositional order. (Cynthia D. v. Superior
Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 249.) The burden of proof for jurisdictional
findings is preponderance of the evidence (§ 355, subd. (a)); for removal, it is
clear and convincing evidence. (§ 361, subd. (c); Cynthia D., at p. 248.) We
review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders
for substantial evidence. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773 (I.J.).) When
applying the substantial evidence standard of review, we make all reasonable
inferences from the evidence and assess whether the facts are sufficient to
uphold the dependency court’s findings and orders. (Ibid.) We review the
record in the light most favorable to the court’s decisions and do not reweigh
the evidence or make independent judgments. (Ibid.)
1. L.M.
As a threshold matter, Father argues L.M.’s statements that he
touched her privates, without any further contextual detail, do not support a
finding of sexual abuse sufficient to support jurisdiction. A child comes
21
within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court if “[t]he child has been sexually
abused, or there is a substantial risk that the child will be sexually abused,
as defined in Section 11165.1 of the Penal Code, by the child’s parent.”
(§ 300, subd. (d).) Penal Code section 11165.1’s definition of sexual abuse
incorporates sexual assault, which includes, but is not limited to, the
intentional touching of a child’s genitals “for purposes of sexual arousal or
gratification.” (Id., subds. (a), (b)(4).) Father contends L.M.’s statements do
not support a reasonable inference that Father intentionally touched her
genital area for sexual arousal.
Father forfeited this argument by not objecting on this basis during the
jurisdictional hearing. (See In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [“a
reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an
objection could have been but was not made in the trial court” and
“[d]ependency matters are not exempt from this rule”]); In re S.F. (2023) 91
Cal.App.5th 696, 724–725 (S.F.).) Furthermore, absent evidence of any other
explanation such as that the touch was inadvertent, it is reasonable to infer
from L.M.’s assertion that Father touched her genital area that the touching
was for sexual arousal.
In addressing the sufficiency of L.M.’s statements of sexual abuse as
the sole basis supporting the jurisdictional finding, Father contends this case
is analogous to I.C., supra, 4 Cal.5th 869, in which our high court found a
three-year-old’s hearsay statements insufficient to support the jurisdictional
finding. I.C.’s mother had found her in bed with an eight-year-old neighbor
boy named Oscar. (Id. at p. 877.) When she asked what was going on, I.C.
said they were kissing. (Ibid.) Her five-year-old brother started crying and
added that Oscar “put a train in her.” (Ibid.) A social services report
22
indicates Oscar also “ ‘stuck his penis into [I.C.’s] vagina.’ ” (Ibid.) A
subsequent child protective services investigation was inconclusive. (Id. at
p. 878.) Meanwhile, the mother explained that she had many discussions
with I.C. after the incident about “ ‘good touches and bad touches’ ” and used
the words “ ‘penis’ ” and “ ‘vagina’ ” during those talks. (Ibid.)
Two months later, I.C. spontaneously said to her mother, “ ‘My dad put
his penis on me.’ ” (I.C., supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 878.) Her brother corrected
her, saying it was Oscar who did that to her, but I.C. kept repeating the
allegation. (Ibid.) The next morning, she told her mother she was “ ‘just
kidding.’ ” (Ibid.) A child welfare worker spoke to I.C. at preschool and noted
that I.C. was not able to tell the difference between the truth and a lie.
(Ibid.) Nonetheless, the worker recorded I.C.’s claim that her father touched
her vagina with his penis in her brother’s room. (Ibid.) During a forensic
interview, I.C. said her father had put his penis, then a train and a flower on
her five times and pointed to her vagina. (Id. at p. 879.) She also said he did
it to the father’s 21-year-old daughter from a previous marriage, and that
she, her babysitter, and her babysitter’s sister were there. (Id. at p. 880.)
The older daughter denied this ever occurred. (Id. at p. 881.)
The juvenile court asserted jurisdiction, and the appellate court
affirmed. (I.C., supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 881, 883.) In reversing, our high court
expressed concern that the case was an “unusual situation” in which the child
was previously molested and then made “strikingly similar” allegations
against her father. (Id. at p. 896.) It cited the plurality’s reasoning in In re
Lucero L. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1227 (Lucero) that “ ‘relying too heavily on the
hearsay statements of incompetent minors to make jurisdictional findings
when there has been no opportunity for cross-examining the minor’
[citation]—and, in particular, when the minor ‘has been determined to be
23
incompetent to distinguish between truth and falsehood’ [citation]—raises a
substantial risk of erroneously depriving parents of their substantial interest
in maintaining custody of their children.” (I.C., supra, at p. 887.) For this
reason, the court agreed with Lucero that “due process requires a showing
that ‘ “the time, content and circumstances of the statement provide
sufficient indicia of reliability” ’ before a juvenile court may rely exclusively
on such a statement in making its jurisdictional findings.” (Ibid.) It
confirmed that, in assessing the reliability of the child’s statements, the court
may consider factors including: “ ‘(1) spontaneity and consistent repetition;
(2) the mental state of the declarant; (3) use of terminology unexpected of a
child of a similar age; and (4) lack of motive to fabricate.’ ” (Id. at p. 891.)
The court may also consider whether the child is truth competent and any
other factor bearing on reliability. (Ibid.)
Because the juvenile court failed to take adequate account of the prior
molestation, the mother’s discussions with I.C. using the words “penis” and
“vagina,” and I.C.’s demonstrated “tendency to interweave fantasy with
truth,” our high court determined that the spontaneity and details of I.C.’s
allegations were less compelling than they otherwise would have been. (I.C.,
supra, 4 Cal. 5th at pp. 892–894.) Accordingly, the I.C. court concluded the
child’s statements were not sufficiently reliable to support the jurisdictional
finding. (Id. at p. 896.)
Here, three initial factors alleviate some of the due process concerns
that were relevant in I.C. First, counsel for L.M. demonstrated L.M.’s ability
to distinguish between the truth and a lie, at least at the time she gave her
stipulated testimony, and Father does not challenge this fact. Second,
Father’s counsel had an opportunity to ask L.M. questions during this
testimony. Finally, while there was no direct evidence corroborating I.C.’s
24
allegations against Father, the fact that G.H. and S.M. subsequently
disclosed sexual abuse by Father corroborates L.M.’s claim. 6
In otherwise contending L.M.’s story is unreliable, Father focuses
heavily on statements made by Mother, and argues the court glossed over
these discrepancies. However, during the hearing, the Agency highlighted all
the reasons for questioning Mother’s credibility. In response, the court
observed that the Agency was arguing that the only credible person was L.M.
It was for this reason that the court focused primarily on allegations made by
L.M. to individuals other than Mother. Notably, Father acknowledges in his
opening brief that Mother was an unreliable reporter.
Substantial evidence in the record supports a conclusion that Mother
lacked credibility. She changed her stories when she wanted to reunite with
Father and claimed without any proof that the children learned sexual
information from videos and cartoons. None of the children ever said they
observed sexual content online, and Mother never showed any of the digital
content to the Agency even though she claimed to have taken the iPad away
from the children. Her ex-husband also explained that she made false
accusations against him and his brother. Accordingly, in evaluating the
reliability of L.M.’s statements, we focus on statements she and her siblings
made directly to social workers, forensic interviewers, and law enforcement,
as opposed to Mother’s various reports of L.M.’s statements.
On July 16, 2024, the day after L.M. first reported the touching to
Mother, L.M. told an officer Father had touched her “privates” with his hand
6 Although the Lucero court acknowledged that “ ‘corroboration is an
additional safeguard against the possibility of fabrication by very young
witnesses whose out-of-court statements are insulated from the rigors of
cross-examination,’ ” it concluded corroboration is not mandated by due
process. (Lucero, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 1248–1249.)
25
one time, on her mom’s bed, and that it “hurt me.” She then told a social
worker that Father touched her vagina and placed her hand on her vagina to
indicate. G.H. and S.M. both confirmed L.M. had told them Father touched
her privates. G.H. also said she believed L.M. lied and that the paternal
grandmother called L.M. a “dirty little girl” and tried to hit L.M.
Three days later, L.M. informed a forensic interviewer that she had
told Mother that Father touched her privates while she was on Mother’s bed.
She pointed to her genital and buttocks areas and added, “I hate him when
he touch my private.” She again only claimed it occurred one time and
expressed that it made her sad that her siblings did not believe her.
According to L.M., G.H. was asleep in the same room and Mother was at the
store.
The only time L.M. directly denied abuse was on September 24, when
she told Sanchez she wanted Father to move back into the house. This was
after G.H. and S.M. first alleged Father molested them. Mother told a social
worker the children recanted and then all three children denied abuse when
speaking with Sanchez. L.M. denied ever viewing videos or pictures of
private parts.
On November 1, 2024, L.M. told Sanchez she did not lie and said “only
[her] dad” touched her private parts. She reported it was “a long time ago,”
that it happened “a lot of times,” and that “[she] didn’t like it.” Nonetheless,
she said she loved her dad and wanted to continue visiting him.
On January 3, 2025, while discussing Father biting Mother’s hand and
G.H. and S.M.’s new sexual abuse allegations, L.M. said Father was yelling
at S.M. not to lie by saying Father touched his privates. She then
volunteered: “My dad also touched my privates, long time ago. I already told
26
my social worker Melissa and my dad was not supposed to be in the home,
but he was nice sometimes but then he was not and he hurt my mom.”
On February 3, L.M. explained that she was at Polinski because “[her]
dad touched [her] a long time ago.” She said she did not want visits with him
because of the touching.
Finally, on February 11, 2025, L.M. said in her stipulated testimony in
response to Father’s counsel’s questioning that Father touched her private
parts (pointing to her genital area), that he only touched her once with his
hands, and that it did not hurt. She denied that he touched her anywhere
else and said she only told Mother. This time, she told counsel Father
pushed her into the bathroom and that Mother and her siblings were helping
Max with his bloody nose in a different room. She denied that anyone told
her what to say that day or at any time regarding Father touching her
privates.
The juvenile court could reasonably conclude that this evidence
demonstrating that L.M. told professionals on seven different occasions that
Father touched her privates, in addition to telling her siblings and Mother,
was consistent and supported asserting jurisdiction by a preponderance of the
evidence. Additionally, on at least one of these occasions, L.M. appears to
have spontaneously volunteered information about the abuse when a social
worker was inquiring about something else. Moreover, although Father
claims she was coached by Mother to say these things, the forensic
interviewer opined there was no indication she had been coached, and L.M.
said no one ever told her what to say.
Particularly given that L.M. was only five years old when the incident
occurred, it also was reasonable for the court to be persuaded by the fact that
L.M. repeated the allegation even though her siblings and relatives accused
27
her of lying and even though that made her feel sad. 7 L.M. understood that
Father was not allowed in the house because of her allegations, and she said
she still loved him. As such, any motivation she had to lie would have
favored recanting. Although L.M. denied abuse one time, it notably was the
same day when both of her siblings also recanted. The Agency explained that
“it is common for children to recant sexual abuse allegations due to fear,
shame, and confusion.” But, at all other times, she continued to assert that
he touched her and that she did not like it.
There is no doubt L.M. made differing statements about the
circumstances surrounding the touching. However, in the two interviews
closest in time to the event, L.M. told essentially the same story of it
happening on Mother’s bed, one time. She only said it hurt the first time, but
she was not asked that question the second time. The one instance where she
said it happened multiple times, she described it as having happened “a long
time ago.” But four months is a long time in the lifespan of a young child. In
weighing L.M.’s credibility, the court reasonably noted her age and the
timing of her statements, and we may not reweigh the evidence on appeal.
(I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773 [confirming that evidence need not be
uncontradicted to constitute substantial evidence supporting the
jurisdictional finding].) For the same reason, the court could reasonably
discount the variance in L.M.’s stipulated testimony taken seven months
later when assessing L.M.’s overall credibility. Her testimony that Father
touched her in the bathroom does appear to incorporate facts from her
siblings’ disclosures. And although L.M. testified she did not tell her siblings
7 Notably, G.H. did not state that L.M. had told her otherwise—G.H.
only expressed her view at the time that “[m]y dad wouldn’t do that.” She
then subsequently alleged abuse herself.
28
after having earlier reported that she did, she consistently asserted they
thought she lied, suggesting they did discuss the touching. 8
Ultimately, on this record, we conclude there is substantial evidence to
support jurisdiction over L.M. under section 300, subdivision (d).
2. G.H.
Because G.H. was 10 years old when she described Father’s abuse, the
forensic interviewer did not ask questions to assess whether she could tell the
difference between the truth and a lie, as she had with L.M. Given the lack
of doubt that G.H. was truth competent, there is less of a due process concern
about relying on her hearsay statements from the Agency reports, absent a
showing of additional indicia of reliability. (C.f., I.C., supra, 4 Cal. 5th at
p. 887 [explaining the Lucero plurality conclusion that “[e]ven though the
hearsay statements of a truth incompetent child, contained in a social study,
are admissible, . . . they ‘may not be relied on solely as a basis for a
jurisdictional finding unless the court finds that they show special indicia of
reliability.’ ” (Italics added)].) Nonetheless, such indicia exist. G.H.
described the incidents in great detail, recounting such things as how her
brother’s privates felt, the taste of oral copulation, her Father’s specific
comments and threats, and the race of the prostitutes. According to the
forensic interviewer, this level of detail indicated it was less likely she was
coached. To the extent Father contends G.H. has not consistently claimed
abuse, she explained that she did not disclose Father’s sexual abuse earlier
because he repeatedly threatened to kill her and her family if she told
anyone. And when given the opportunity to say no, she consistently declined
8 And again, both G.H. and S.M. said L.M. told them that Father touched
her.
29
visits with Father, describing him as “dangerous.” These facts provide
substantial evidence supporting the court’s jurisdictional finding.
Father argues the forensic interviewer’s conclusions are not evidence of
G.H.’s veracity, and we agree that to the extent the record suggests she
opined G.H. could not have lied, the expert interviewer should not have
offered an opinion on whether G.H. was telling the truth. (See People v.
Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 82 [determinations of truthfulness
and credibility are left to the trier of fact].) But the court was entitled to
consider her opinion that coached statements generally lack detail in making
its own credibility determination. To the extent Father further challenges
the forensic interviewer’s purported statement, as summarized by a social
worker, on the grounds that it implies G.H. could not be coached or was
telling the truth because she has a speech and learning disability, we observe
that Father did not object to the court admitting the Agency’s report or
request to cross-examine the social worker. He therefore forfeited this
challenge on appeal. (See S.F., supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 724.) 9
Father further contends that, as in I.C., special circumstances make
her disclosures less compelling. We are not persuaded that these conditions
undermine the substantial evidence supporting the finding. Father points
out that G.H. was exposed for months to both her sister’s sexual abuse claims
and suggestive questions as to whether anyone touched her privates. But
9 It also is not evident from the social worker’s summary that the
forensic expert actually linked G.H.’s veracity to her disability. The social
worker may simply have recorded what she recalled from the conversation
when she wrote: “She [forensic interviewer] also reported that she had
learned that [G.H.] (10) had an IEP for speech and a learning disability and
that she believed that [G.H.] (10) could not be coached.” The forensic
interviewer’s actual report does not link the two, nor does the social worker’s
lengthier summary. Also, neither states that G.H. “could not” be coached.
Rather, they said she likely had not been.
30
any claim that these circumstances inspired an elaborate lie is merely
speculative. The same is true of Father’s contention that Mother saying in a
restraining order application that Father wanted to kill her may have
influenced G.H.’s claim that Father threatened to kill her. There is no
evidence G.H. ever saw the application. Nor is there evidence of Father’s
contention that G.H. knew that Mother accused Father of infidelity with his
attorney and was inspired by this information to accuse Father of having sex
with his attorney. Finally, Father asserts that G.H. viewed pornographic
videos, but only Mother ever made this allegation. G.H. and L.M. denied it,
and Mother never produced the children’s internet search history or the
videos.
To the extent Father otherwise challenges the credibility of G.H.’s
statements in the reports and S.M.’s lack of corroboration, these were issues
the court specifically probed with counsel before making its determination.
We will not disturb the juvenile court’s credibility determinations on appeal.
(I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.)
Accordingly, we conclude substantial evidence supported the court’s
jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (d) as to G.H. Because
Father challenged the dispositional orders only to the extent they were based
on the jurisdictional finding, we need not further address his appeals of these
orders.
31
III. DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s March 10, 2025, and March 19, 2025, jurisdictional
findings and dispositional orders are affirmed.
KELETY, J.
WE CONCUR:
O'ROURKE, Acting P. J.
RUBIN, J.
32
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