Ulloa v. SASCO CA2/3

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Filed 8/29/25 Ulloa v. SASCO CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

ANTONIO ULLOA, B331169

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 20STCV14710)
v.

SASCO,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Robert B. Broadbelt, Judge. Affirmed.
Employee Justice Legal Group, Kaveh S. Elihu, and
Matias N. Castro for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Jackson Lewis and Dylan B. Carp for Defendant and
Respondent.

‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Plaintiff Antonio Ulloa appeals from a judgment entered
after the trial court granted summary adjudication for his former
employer, defendant SASCO, on a variety of discrimination,
retaliation, and wage-and-hour claims. On appeal, Ulloa does not
challenge the trial court’s order with regard to Ulloa’s wage-and-
hour claims (eleventh through fifteenth causes of action), but he
contends there were triable issues of material fact with regard to
causes of action alleging age and disability discrimination,
retaliation, failure to accommodate, failure to engage in the
interactive process, and wrongful termination (first through
tenth causes of action). We conclude that Ulloa has not
demonstrated triable issues as to any cause of action, and thus
we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Background.
A. SASCO.
SASCO is an electrical contractor based in Fullerton,
California. SASCO’s construction-related work is divided into
office and field work. On the office side, SASCO is organized by
groups, each of which is headed by a project manager and project
engineer who determine staffing needs. On the field side, each
job is managed by a foreman, who reports to a general foreman.
The general foreman reports to a superintendent, who reports to
the director of field operations. As relevant to the present
litigation, Mark Smith was the project manager, April Benson
was the project engineer, Jack Ivy was the superintendent, and
Smokey Stanton was the director of field operations.
SASCO hired electricians through the local electrician’s
union, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,

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Local 11 (electrician’s union). The electrician’s union maintained
a “book”—i.e., a list of union members seeking work—and sent
union members out to jobs based on the length of time they had
been out of work. If SASCO had more electricians than it needed,
it would terminate them and send them back to the union to sign
up for new work.
B. Ulloa’s employment by SASCO.
Plaintiff Ulloa is a journeyman transportation system
electrician (journeyman electrician) and a member of the
electrician’s union. SASCO hired Ulloa through his union in
August 2013, when Ulloa was 51 years old. The terms of Ulloa’s
employment were controlled by the Electrician Union’s Collective
Bargaining Agreement in effect from July 1, 2014 to June 30,
2019 (CBA). As a journeyman electrician, Ulloa was qualified to
work on outside wiring jobs only.
In 2013, Ulloa worked on replacing city streetlights. That
job involved digging about five feet down, pouring cement, setting
up anchor bolts, assembling the light poles, and then connecting
the light poles to the electric grid.
In 2016 and 2017, Ulloa worked primarily on two projects:
the Ameron project and the Mobilitie project. The Ameron
project involved installing and replacing streetlights, and it was
managed by acting foreman Frank Niels and general foreman
Angel Marquez. The Mobilitie project involved installing small
cell towers (antennas) on streetlights, and it was managed by
foreman Andres (Andy) Contreras and general foreman
Angel Marquez. Both projects were renewed on a yearly basis,
and were some of the few jobs SASCO did that involved outside
wiring.

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C. Ulloa’s heart attack, return to work, and
termination.
Ulloa had a heart attack in October 2018. He had surgery
to implant a heart stent and was out of work on a medical leave
of absence for about two months, returning to work on
December 9, 2018.
Prior to Ulloa’s return to work, project engineer
April Benson told Ulloa that SASCO was “slow right now, so you
won’t have full weeks until after the new year.” Benson inquired:
“Do you want to stay on disability until after the new year? So
you get full pay? [¶] It [d]oesn’t matter to us. It’s up to you.”
Ulloa responded that he had already submitted his disability
paperwork and preferred to return to work December 9. Benson
said: “OK.[] Next week, we have an equipment install Monday,
Tuesday, and Wednesday. Right now Thursday and Friday no
work.”
Effective December 9, 2018, Ulloa’s doctor released Ulloa
back to work without limitations. Ulloa testified that he did not
request any accommodations when he returned to work because
he was able to perform all the work his job required and he “knew
the company doesn’t do any light duty work.” Project manager
Mark Smith similarly testified that SASCO did not offer light
duty work to field employees. Smith explained: “[U]nless the
field employee is a-hundred percent capable of performing their
job, we don’t really have any work for them. . . . [I]t’s – it’s a
safety concern, you know, that the guys need to be able to do
their task. We don’t want to have anybody get hurt or hurt
anyone else . . . by not being a-hundred percent capable.”
Ulloa was placed back on the Mobilitie project upon his
return to work, working on a two-person crew with electrician

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apprentice Edgar Alvarez. One other crew was assigned to the
Mobilitie project, staffed by an unidentified journeyman
electrician and electrician apprentice Alberto Paz.
In late February 2019, Smith decided to lay off one of the
two crews assigned to the Mobilitie project because the project
was nearly finished. It was left to superintendent Jack Ivy and
general foreman Angel Marquez to determine which crew would
be laid off. Marquez chose Ulloa and Alvarez for termination, in
consultation with their direct supervisor, foreman Andres
Contreras. Ivy testified that Ulloa and Alvarez were terminated
because there were just a few Mobilitie sites left to finish and
“the crew that [Ulloa] and [Alvarez] were on, their crew, the poles
that they were doing in their area were finished and there was no
more work for them. The other crew was going to finish the other
sites and the [Mobilitie] project was then ended.” Contreras
similarly testified that he recommended Ulloa and Alvarez for
termination because the Mobilitie project was ending and
because Ulloa had been insubordinate by seeking work from
other divisions of the company without Contreras’s permission.
Ulloa and Alvarez were notified of their termination on
February 28, 2019, approximately two and a half months after
Ulloa’s return from medical leave. At the time of their
termination, Ulloa was 56 years old and Alvarez was 35 years
old. Ulloa’s termination notice said Ulloa was terminated due to
a reduction in force and was “[e]ligible for rehire.”
After Ulloa was terminated, the other Mobilitie crew spent
a few weeks completing the remaining installations. Those crew
members then were transferred to other projects.
Ulloa’s last day of work was February 28, 2019. He left his
union in about October 2019.

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II. The present action.
In April 2020, Ulloa filed a sixteen-count complaint against
SASCO, alleging: (1) discrimination based on age and disability
in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA;
Gov. Code, § 12940 et seq.); (2) retaliation in violation of FEHA;
(3) failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation in violation of
FEHA; (4) failure to provide reasonable accommodation in
violation of FEHA; (5) failure to engage in the interactive process
in violation of FEHA; (6) retaliation in violation of the California
Family Rights Act (CFRA; Gov. Code, § 12945.2); (7) declaratory
relief; (8) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; (9–
10) retaliation in violation of Labor Code sections 98.6 and
1102.5; (11–15) wage and hour violations; and (16) waiting time
penalties.
In brief, the complaint alleged that prior to Ulloa’s medical
leave, his work performance had never been called into question.
After Ulloa returned to work in December 2019, his supervisors
would tell him, “ ‘You are too slow,’ ” “ ‘You are like an old
timer,’ ” and “ ‘You need to work faster.’ ” Ulloa was terminated
less than three months later. Ulloa learned after his termination
that he had been replaced by someone significantly younger. The
complaint also alleged that Ulloa was not paid overtime, was not
allowed to take meal and rest breaks, and was not furnished
wage statements.
III. SASCO’s motion for summary judgment.
A. SASCO’s motion.
SASCO filed a motion for summary judgment or
adjudication in May 2021. As to Ulloa’s discrimination and
retaliation claims, SASCO asserted that it had a legitimate,

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nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Ulloa—namely, that
the Mobilitie project was ending and SASCO needed fewer
outdoor electricians. SASCO further asserted that Ulloa could
not establish that its asserted reason for terminating him was a
pretext for age or disability discrimination because (1) Ulloa was
51 years old when he was hired, and thus his termination at
age 56 was not probative of age discrimination; (2) Alberto Paz,
the employee Ulloa claimed replaced him, was hired in 2017,
nearly two years before Ulloa’s termination, and Paz was an
electrician apprentice, not a journeyman; (3) any stray remarks
about Ulloa’s age were not causally connected to his termination;
(4) Ulloa was granted medical leave after his heart attack and
was able to do his job without accommodations when he returned;
and (5) Ulloa never requested an accommodation or engaged in
the interactive process. As to Ulloa’s wage and hour claims,
SASCO asserted that it paid Ulloa all the overtime he was due,
provided Ulloa with required meal and rest break and itemized
wage statements, and did not owe Ulloa any waiting time
penalties. Finally, SASCO asserted that no evidence supported
Ulloa’s punitive damages claim.
In support of its motion for summary judgment, SASCO
submitted the following evidence:
● Most of SASCO’s work involved inside wiring, which
Ulloa was not licensed to do. The Ameron and Mobilitie projects,
which were renewed on a yearly basis, were some of the few jobs
that involved outside wiring.
● In 2018 and 2019, SASCO’s outdoor wiring work was
seasonal. Projects typically were paused at the end of the
calendar year and did not pick up again until late spring.

7
● SASCO hired electricians through the local union hall.
Once a job was completed, employees were either moved to other
jobs, put on unpaid leave, or given reduction-in-force termination
slips that would allow the employees to go back to the union hall
and “sign the book”—i.e., get on a list for new jobs. If a work
slow-down was temporary, SASCO generally would allow an
employee to choose between unpaid leave or termination. But if a
work slow-down was more permanent because a job was ending,
employees would be terminated without being given the choice to
take unpaid leave.
● At the end of 2018, there were three journeymen
electricians working on the Mobilitie project: foreman Andres
Contreras, Ulloa, and an unnamed journeyman. Other
journeymen electricians were working on the Ameron project and
the SCE LED replacement project. After Ulloa’s termination,
SASCO retained about 10 journeymen electricians to work on
those projects. The journeymen included Juan Olivos, who was
about Ulloa’s age, and Daniel Rios, who was in his mid-thirties.
The company also retained electrician apprentice Alberto Paz,
who was later promoted to journeyman.
● The Mobilitie project was completed in about
March 2019. Once the Mobilitie project was completed, SASCO
needed fewer outdoor electricians.
● Ulloa admitted at his deposition that when he returned to
work after his heart attack, he was able to do all the work his job
required and he did not request an accommodation. Further,
Ulloa’s doctor’s note said Ulloa was eligible to return to work at
full capacity.
● Ulloa’s termination notice or “pink slip” said Ulloa was
terminated due to a reduction in force and was eligible for rehire.

8
● Ulloa never complained to SASCO about any kind of
harassment, discrimination, retaliation, or unsafe work
conditions.
● Ulloa testified at his deposition that he believed he was
discriminated against based on his age and disability because he
was replaced by Paz, who was younger than Ulloa. In fact, no
one was hired to replace Ulloa: Paz was hired as an apprentice in
August 2017, more than 18 months before plaintiff was
terminated, and he became a journeyman electrician through the
union’s apprenticeship program more than three months after
Ulloa was terminated.
● Ulloa was properly paid for all of his work, including
overtime, was provided with required meal breaks, and received
accurate itemized wage statements. He never complained
otherwise.
● Ulloa was chosen for termination because the Mobilitie
project was ending and because when he was told to stay home
because there was no work, he would work in another division
without his supervisor’s permission.
B. Ulloa’s opposition.
Ulloa opposed the motion for summary judgment. In
support, he submitted his own declaration and deposition
testimony, in which he said as follows:
● From 2013 until his termination in 2019, foreman Frank
Niels “harassed, discriminated, and retaliated against [Ulloa] due
to his age” by telling Ulloa he was “ ‘super slow’ ” and “ ‘ had to
pick up the pace’ ” or SASCO would lay him off and “ ‘bring in
somebody faster.’ ” Niels retaliated against Ulloa by requiring
him to do manual labor, including jack hammering concrete, that
was outside his job description.

9
● Ulloa began working under foreman Andres Contreras in
about 2017. In 2017 or 2018, SASCO hired Paz, who was much
younger than Ulloa. At about that time, Contreras started giving
Paz more work and cutting back Ulloa’s hours. Contreras also
started pressuring Ulloa to work faster. Contreras would tell
Ulloa he was “too slow” and should “ ‘pick up the pace’ ” or he
would be fired. Ulloa complained to Angel Marquez, but nothing
was done. Contreras also told Ulloa that he was “too old” and
was “an old-timer and too slow.”
● Ulloa’s hours were reduced substantially when he
returned to work after his heart attack. In the two-and-a-half
months between Ulloa’s return to work and his termination,
there was only one week in which he worked 40 or more hours.
When Ulloa complained to Contreras, Contreras would say,
“ ‘[T]here is no work right now.’ ”
● When Ulloa returned to work after his heart attack, he
told Contreras that he was “not the same as before and that
because of [his] heart condition [he] would need to work at a
slower pace.” Ulloa also told Contreras that he “[did] not have
the same endurance or strength . . . so [he would] need to take
some additional time to complete tasks and that [his] health
comes first.” Instead, Contreras “began to put additional
pressure on [him] by telling [him] that [he is] too slow and that
[he] need[s] to work faster. [Ulloa] would complain to him and
would remind him that [he] just had a heart attack and that [he]
need[s] to take [his] time to perform [his] tasks. In response,
Andres Contreras would tell [him] ‘Go with the flow. If you don’t
like it go find another job.’ ”
● There had been slowdowns and fluctuations in work
throughout Ulloa’s tenure at SASCO, but during previous

10
slowdowns, SASCO would send Ulloa home and have him wait
until there was more work. In February 2019, however, SASCO
terminated Ulloa without giving him the opportunity to take
leave without pay, and his termination documents stated that he
was not eligible for rehire.
● The CBA provided that when laying off employees due to
lack of work, employers should lay off employees in order of
seniority, with the most senior electricians being laid off last.
Ulloa was a Group I electrician, and thus he should have been
among the last to be laid off due to lack of work.
● The allegations of insubordination were false. The only
times Ulloa came to work when it was raining was prior to his
heart attack, that only happened a couple of times, and no one
ever told him not to come to work under those circumstances.
● Based on Albert Paz’s age, Contreras’s statements to
Ulloa, and Contreras’s “indifference” to Ulloa’s complaints, Ulloa
believed his hours were reduced, his work assigned to Paz, and
he was terminated because of his age, heart attack, “ongoing
heart condition and disability,” his “need to work slower,” and his
medical leave.
Contreras admitted in his deposition that he might have
called Ulloa an “old timer” once or twice “in the aspect of not
fitting with the work habits. In other words, if I could put it this
way, that generational gap between the way the old time people
used to work, meaning back in the days, the days that they would
work, meaning it was a different breed[.] I guess if you could put
it that way where, not to get too much into it, but, you know,
today’s generation of workers aren’t like the workers were back
in the day.”

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C. Order granting summary adjudication.
The trial court granted SASCO’s motion for summary
adjudication as to each cause of action except the sixteenth cause
of action for waiting time penalties. The trial court found as
follows:
First, as to the causes of action for age and disability
discrimination, retaliation, wrongful termination, and
declaratory relief, SASCO articulated a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Ulloa—namely, that
the Mobilitie project was ending, Ulloa’s crew would be finished
with its work by the end of February 2019, and Ulloa had been
insubordinate. In response, Ulloa did not raise a triable issue
that he was subjected to an adverse employment action because
of his age or disability.
Second, as to the failure to accommodate and interactive
process claims, the evidence was undisputed that Ulloa did not
seek an accommodation and was able to perform all of the tasks
assigned to him without accommodations. Thus, there were no
triable issues as to SASCO’s duty to reasonably accommodate
Ulloa or to engage in the interactive process with him.
Third, as to the wage and hour claims, there were no
triable issues that SASCO failed to pay Ulloa overtime, failed to
provide meal and rest breaks, failed to pay wages due, or failed to
furnish wage and hour statements.
Finally, there were no triable issues that SASCO acted
with fraud, malice, or oppression.
Ulloa voluntarily dismissed the sixteenth cause of action
for waiting time penalties on April 20, 2023, and the trial court
entered judgment for SASCO on May 22, 2023. Ulloa timely
appealed from the judgment.

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DISCUSSION
Below, Ulloa opposed SASCO’s motion for summary
judgment or adjudication as to each cause of action. On appeal,
however, Ulloa has challenged the judgment only as to his
discrimination and retaliation claims (first through tenth causes
of action) and his request for punitive damages.1
Summary judgment or summary adjudication is properly
granted when there is no triable issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (c), (f)(1).) A defendant moving
for summary judgment or adjudication bears the initial burden of
showing that one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of
action cannot be established or there is a complete defense. (Id.,
§ 437c, subd. (p)(2).) If the defendant meets this burden, the
plaintiff must then demonstrate a triable issue of material fact.
(Ibid.)
We review the trial court’s summary adjudication ruling
de novo. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826,
860 (Aguilar).) In performing our review, we view the evidence in
the light most favorable to Ulloa, liberally construing his
evidence while strictly scrutinizing SASCO’s showing and
resolving any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in Ulloa’s favor.
(Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768–769.)

1 Because plaintiff does not assert error as to the eleventh
through fifteenth causes of action, we deem those claims
abandoned. (Kabat v. Department of Transportation (2024)
107 Cal.App.5th 651, 661, fn. 4 [theories advanced in opposition
to summary judgment at trial level that are not raised on appeal
are deemed abandoned].)

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Nonetheless, Ulloa’s evidence “remains subject to careful
scrutiny. [Citation.] We can find a triable issue of material fact
‘if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact
to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the
motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.’
(Aguilar, at p. 850.)” (King v. United Parcel Service, Inc. (2007)
152 Cal.App.4th 426, 433 (King).)
I. Preliminary issues.
We begin by addressing SASCO’s contention that Ulloa
forfeited his appellate claims by failing to include record citations
throughout his opening brief, instead relying on defined terms.
SASCO also moves to strike Ulloa’s Notice of Errata, filed on
October 24, 2024, which added embedded record citations to
previously defined terms.
We share SASCO’s frustration with Ulloa’s counsel’s
reliance on defined terms and string cites to the record, which
significantly complicated our review of Ulloa’s briefs, evidence,
and arguments. We therefore admonish Ulloa’s counsel not to
use this format in any future appeals. Nonetheless, we will deny
the motion to strike and reject SASCO’s request that we deem
Ulloa’s contentions forfeited. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.204(e)(2)(C).)
Separately, we reject Ulloa’s contention that the trial court
erred by denying his request for judicial notice of a three-page
summary of an article discussing the characteristics of a non-ST-
elevation myocardial infarction—that is, a heart attack caused by
the partial blockage of a coronary artery. (See NSTEMI: Non-ST-
Elevation Myocardial Infarction (Heart Attack)
<https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/diseases/22233-nstemi-
heart-attack> [as of Aug. 28, 2025], archived at

14
<https://perma.cc/4CMM-QK2F >.) Ulloa has not explained why
he believes the article summary was relevant to any of the legal
issues raised by SASCO’s motion for summary judgment, and
thus he has not demonstrated that it was a proper subject of
judicial notice. (See California Healthcare & Rehabilitation
Center v. Baass (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 553, 558, fn. 3 [judicial
notice is confined to those matters that are relevant]; Jordache
Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) 18 Cal.4th
739, 748, fn. 6 [denying requests for judicial notice where “the
requests present[ed] no issue for which judicial notice of these
items [wa]s necessary, helpful, or relevant”].) Further, Ulloa
made no showing that the exclusion of this document was
prejudicial. We therefore find no reversible error. (See
We Advocate Thorough Environmental Review v. City of Mount
Shasta (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 629, 638 [exclusion of documents
requires reversal only if the exclusion is prejudicial].)
Having resolved these preliminary issues, we now consider
whether there are triable issues of material fact as to the first
through tenth causes of action.
II. FEHA discrimination and retaliation claims (first,
second, and sixth causes of action).
Ulloa’s first cause of action alleges discrimination on the
basis of age and disability in violation of FEHA. The second and
sixth causes of action allege retaliation for taking medical leave
in violation of FEHA and CFRA. We find no triable issues as to
these causes of action, as we discuss.
A. Legal standards.
FEHA prohibits an employer from discriminating against
an employee because of age and physical disability and from

15
retaliating against an employee for engaging in protected
activity, such as requesting medical leave. (Gov. Code, § 12940,
subds. (a), (m)(2).) Similarly, the CFRA prohibits retaliation
against an employee for exercising the right to take protected
medical leave. (Id., § 12945.2, subd. (k)(1).)
To establish a claim for discrimination under FEHA or for
retaliation under FEHA or the CFRA, a plaintiff must prove that:
(1) he was a member of a protected class or engaged in protected
activity; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and
(3) the employer acted with a discriminatory or retaliatory
motive. (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 355
(Guz) [FEHA discrimination claim]; Choochagi v. Barracuda
Networks, Inc. (2020) 60 Cal.App.5th 444, 460 [FEHA retaliation
claim]; Rogers v. County of Los Angeles (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th
480, 491 [CFRA retaliation claim].) A plaintiff need only
demonstrate that discrimination was a substantial motivating
factor in the adverse employment decision, not the sole motive.
(Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 232.)
A defendant moving for summary judgment has an initial
burden to make a prima facie showing that the plaintiff cannot
establish one or more elements of his causes of action or that
there is a complete defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (f)(1),
(o), (p)(2); Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850–851.) In an
employment discrimination or retaliation case, an employer
moving for summary judgment can meet its initial burden by
introducing evidence either that one or more elements of
plaintiff’s case is lacking or that the adverse employment action
was based upon legitimate, nondiscriminatory factors. (Zamora
v. Security Industry Specialists, Inc. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1, 32
(Zamora).) If the employer satisfies its initial burden, “it ‘ “ ‘will

16
be entitled to summary [judgment or adjudication] unless the
plaintiff produces admissible evidence which raises a triable issue
of fact material to the defendant’s showing.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) To raise a
triable issue, the plaintiff may establish discriminatory motive
either by direct evidence or by attacking the employer’s proffered
reasons as pretexts for discrimination. (Ibid.) Summary
judgment is properly granted only “if all the papers submitted
show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)
B. Analysis.
Below, SASCO presented evidence that Ulloa was
terminated because the Mobilitie project was ending and the
company needed to lay off a crew; Ulloa and Alvarez had
completed their scope of work, while the other Mobilitie crew had
a few jobs left to finish; and Ulloa had been insubordinate. These
are legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the termination
and were sufficient to shift the burden back to Ulloa to
demonstrate unlawful discrimination. (See Foroudi v. The
Aerospace Corp. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 992, 1008 (Foroudi)
[evidence that employer instituted a company-wide reduction in
force after learning it faced potentially severe cuts to its funding
and used standardized criteria to select employees for
termination was sufficient to satisfy employer’s summary
judgment burden]; Martin v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.
(1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1718, 1731–1732 [employer met its
summary judgment burden by producing evidence that employee
was terminated as part of a company-wide reduction-in-force].)
In response, Ulloa points to evidence that he contends
suggests a discriminatory motive for his termination. None of

17
plaintiff’s evidence raises a triable issue of material fact, as
follows.
First, Ulloa asserts that a younger, nondisabled employee,
Alberto Paz, was brought in to replace him. The record does not
support this contention. Paz was hired in August 2017, more
than a year and a half before Ulloa was terminated. Paz was
hired in a different job classification—as an apprentice, not a
journeyman electrician. While Paz ultimately was elevated to a
journeyman electrician, this did not occur until many months
after Ulloa was terminated, and it happened under the union’s
auspices, not SASCO’s. Further, the record does not support
Ulloa’s contention that his hours were reduced when Paz was
hired. The only evidence that Ulloa’s hours were reduced was
Ulloa’s own testimony that after Contreras “brought in the young
kid,” Contreras “started taking work away from [Ulloa].” But
Ulloa’s testimony is inconsistent with his time sheets, which
showed that he worked approximately 40 hours nearly every
week between August and December 2017; he worked fewer than
40 hours per week in January, February, and March 2018; and he
worked at least forty hours per week during most weeks between
April and October 2018. On this record, Ulloa’s unsupported
observations do not raise a triable issue. (See Foroudi, supra,
57 Cal.App.5th at p. 1010 [plaintiff’s “limited personal
observations” that he had never observed an employee over
60 years of age being promoted “have minimal probative value
and are far too weak to raise an inference of discrimination”];
King, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 433 [plaintiff’s subjective
beliefs in an employment discrimination case do not create a
genuine issue of fact].)

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Second, Ulloa asserts that SASCO violated the CBA’s
reverse layoff policy, which dictated that he, a Group I
journeyman electrician, “should have been among the last to be
laid off or terminated.” Not so. Although it is undisputed that
Ulloa was a Group I journeyman electrician and that the CBA
provided that Group I employees should be laid off after
employees in Groups II thru IV, there is no evidence of the
classifications of any of the journeymen electricians whom
SASCO retained when it terminated Ulloa. Specifically, there is
no evidence that any of the journeymen electricians SASCO
retained had less seniority than Ulloa within the meaning of
CBA’s reverse layoff policy. In any event, Ulloa’s opposition to
SASCO’s motion for summary judgment expressly disclaimed any
reliance on the CBA as a basis for liability under FEHA, stating:
“Plaintiff clarifies that none of his causes of action are based on
the CBA or require this Court to interpret the CBA.”
Third, Ulloa asserts the Mobilitie project continued after
his termination and other journeymen electricians were hired to
complete it. In fact, SASCO witnesses consistently testified that
when Ulloa was terminated, the Mobilitie project was nearly
completed; there were just a few sites left to do, all in the
geographical region where the other crew was working; and the
project was completely finished just a few weeks later. There
was, moreover, no evidence that any electricians were hired to
work on the Mobilitie project after Ulloa was terminated. To the
contrary, SASCO’s witnesses testified that no electricians worked
on the Mobilitie project after about March 2019. Further, while
Jack Ivy testified at his deposition that SASCO was planning to
hire more journeymen electricians, he gave this testimony in
April 2021, more than two years after Ulloa was terminated.

19
This testimony does not reasonably suggest that SASCO hired
someone to replace Ulloa in February 2019.
Fourth, Ulloa asserts that in February 2019, there was “no
reduction in force in real terms.” The only evidence Ulloa cites in
support is Jack Ivy’s testimony about the number of people Ivy
personally supervised in late 2018 and early 2019. This
testimony facially addressed Ivy’s supervisory responsibilities,
not SASCO’s workforce, and it therefore does not support the
conclusion that SASCO did not reduce the size of its workforce in
February 2019.
Fifth, Ulloa asserts that his termination was not a true
reduction in force because a Field Check Information Request
dated February 27, 2019 identified Ulloa as ineligible for rehire.
We do not agree that this document raises a triable issue that
Ulloa’s termination was not part of a reduction-in-force.
Project manager Mark Smith testified that when plaintiff was
terminated, plaintiff and the union were given the signed
termination notice dated February 28, 2019 that stated Ulloa was
eligible for rehire, not the unsigned February 27 request that said
he was not. Smith testified, moreover, that Ulloa “was eligible
for rehire.” Ulloa provided no evidence to suggest that he was not
eligible for rehire or that SASCO gave him or the union the
February 27 Field Check Information Request. To the contrary,
Ulloa testified that he was put back on “roll call” with the union
after SASCO terminated him.
Sixth, Ulloa asserts that none of the younger electricians
assigned to the Mobilitie project were terminated when the
project ended, but instead were moved to the Ameron project. In
fact, the undisputed evidence was that in February 2019, five
electricians were assigned to the Mobilitie project: (1) foreman

20
Andres Conteras (age unknown); (2) Ulloa (age 56);
(3) an unidentified journeyman electrician (age unknown);
(4) apprentice Edgar Alvarez (age 35); and (5) apprentice Alberto
Paz (age 35). Ulloa and Alvarez were laid off, while Contreras,
Paz, and the unidentified journeyman were kept on. SASCO’s
decision to terminate a 35-year-old and a 56-year-old, while
retaining another 35-year-old and two other employees whose
ages are unknown, manifestly is not evidence of age
discrimination. (See Foroudi, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 1010
[plaintiff who was laid off as part of a company-wide reduction in
force “would have to show that younger employees with
comparable issues, and who were otherwise similarly situated,
were not selected for the RIF” to demonstrate a triable issue as to
age discrimination]; Beale v. GTE California (C.D. Cal. 1996)
999 F.Supp. 1312, 1323 [plaintiffs failed to establish prima facie
case of age discrimination; although there was evidence that most
of the employees who were laid off were over 40 years old, there
was no evidence of the ages of the employees who were not laid
off].) Nor is there evidence that all of the journeymen electricians
who were retained after Ulloa was terminated were younger than
Ulloa. The only journeymen electricians identified in the record
who continued to work at SASCO after Ulloa was terminated
were Juan Olivos, who was about Ulloa’s age, and Daniel Rios,
who was in his mid-thirties. The retention of these electricians
when Ulloa was laid off does not raise an inference of
discrimination. (See Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th 317 at p. 368
[although it is not dispositive that plaintiff’s duties were assigned
to an older worker after plaintiff’s termination, “that fact
significantly undermines any suspicion that chronological age
influenced [plaintiff’s] dismissal”].)

21
Seventh, Ulloa asserts that Contreras provided
inconsistent explanations for recommending Ulloa’s termination,
and that Contreras’s suggestion that Ulloa was insubordinate
was pretextual because no SASCO rule prevented Ulloa from
working in another division when there was no field work. We
see no inconsistency in Contreras’s testimony: Contreras
testified that he recommended Ulloa for termination because
there was a need to lay off one crew and because Ulloa had been
insubordinate. The relevant issue, therefore, is not whether
Ulloa’s alleged insubordination would have supported a
termination for cause, but rather whether, in light of SASCO’s
need to reduce its work force, Contreras properly considered
Ulloa’s alleged insubordination in deciding whom to lay off. (See,
e.g., Foroudi, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 1010 [“because
[plaintiff] was laid off as part of a company-wide reduction in
force, the fact that he was terminated for minor issues alone does
not raise an inference of age discrimination”].) Ulloa cites no
authority for the proposition that under the circumstances,
Ulloa’s alleged insubordination was an improper consideration,
and the law is to the contrary. (See Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at
p. 358 [“if nondiscriminatory, [employer’s] true reasons need not
necessarily have been wise or correct”]; Horn v. Cushman &
Wakefield Western, Inc. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 798, 807 [“Nor can
the employee simply show the employer’s decision was wrong,
mistaken, or unwise. Rather, the employee ‘ “must demonstrate
such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies,
or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons
for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find
them ‘unworthy of credence’ ” ’ ”].)

22
Eighth, Ulloa asserts that his layoff was inconsistent with
SASCO’s general practice of allowing employees to opt for unpaid
time off rather than termination during work slow-downs. But
there was no evidence that employees were always allowed to
make such a choice. To the contrary, Jack Ivy testified that while
employees were sometimes given the choice to take unpaid time
off during a work slow-down, that choice was not offered when
projects were ending. He said: “When [a] project’s over and
there’s no future work in that project, those people are
terminated.” Ulloa offered no evidence to the contrary.
Ninth, Ulloa asserts that foreman Frank Niels retaliated
against Ulloa by requiring him to do extensive manual labor,
including jackhammering concrete, that was outside his job
description. But Ulloa testified at his deposition that the
concrete work began in 2017 as part of a job that required
electricians to do “intensive labor.” Ulloa did not request medical
leave until October 2018, more than a year after he was allegedly
assigned to the concrete work. That work thus could not have
been in retaliation for Ulloa’s “protected activit[y] of taking
medical leave during his employment with [SASCO].”
Finally, Ulloa asserts that statements made by foremen
Frank Niels and Andres Contreras constitute direct evidence of
age-related bias. With regard to foreman Frank Niels, Ulloa
testified that Niels frequently criticized the speed at which Ulloa
worked, telling Ulloa that he was “ ‘super slow’ ” and had to
“ ‘pick up the pace’ ” or SASCO would “ ‘bring in somebody
faster.’ ” There is no evidence that Niels ever suggested that
Ulloa worked slowly because of his age, nor is it reasonable to
assume, in the absence of any evidence, that Niels believed
workers in their fifties work more slowly than younger workers.

23
In any event, nothing in the record suggests that Niels played a
part in the decision to terminate Ulloa.
Foreman Andres Contreras’s statements to Ulloa present a
closer case. Ulloa testified that Contreras told him on more than
one occasion that he was “ ‘too old’ ” and was “ ‘an old-timer and
too slow,’ ” and Contreras admitted that “might have” told Ulloa
he was “like an old timer . . . [i]n the aspect of not fitting with the
work habits.” While these comments arguably reveal some age-
related bias, they are actionable only if there is evidence of a
causal relationship between the asserted bias and the adverse
employment action. (DeJung v. Superior Court (2008)
169 Cal.App.4th 533, 550 (DeJung); Trop v. Sony Pictures
Entertainment, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1148.) Ulloa
proffered no such evidence.
Plaintiff contends the present case is analogous to DeJung,
supra,169 Cal.App.4th 533, but we disagree. In DeJung, the
plaintiff testified that he was told he was not offered a full-time
position because the hiring committee “ ‘want[ed] somebody
younger, maybe in their 40’s.’ ” (Id. at p. 540.) The Court of
Appeal concluded that this remark created a triable issue as to
age discrimination because it was evidence “of a causal
relationship between [age related] animus and the adverse
employment action.” (Id. at p. 550.) Here, in contrast, there is no
evidence linking Contreras’s alleged comments about Ulloa’s age
to the termination decision. At best, the comments were stray
remarks that are not sufficient to avoid summary adjudication.
(See Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 541 [“A stray
remark alone may not create a triable issue of age
discrimination”]; see also Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp.
(9th Cir. 1996) 113 F.3d 912, 918, 919 [supervisor’s “ ‘old timers’ ”

24
comment “is weak evidence and not enough to create an inference
of age discrimination”].)
For all the foregoing reasons, we conclude there were no
triable issues of fact as to plaintiff’s claims for discrimination and
retaliation based on age and disability. We therefore affirm the
grant of summary adjudication of the first, second, and sixth
causes of action.
III. Failure to prevent FEHA discrimination and
retaliation (third cause of action).
Ulloa’s third cause of action alleges failure to prevent
discrimination or retaliation in violation of Government Code
section 12940, subdivision (k). The elements of this claim are:
(1) the plaintiff was subjected to discrimination or retaliation;
(2) the defendant failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent
discrimination or retaliation; and (3) this failure caused the
plaintiff harm. (Caldera v. Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 31, 43–44 (Caldera);
CACI No. 2527.)
There can be no liability for failing to prevent
discrimination or retaliation “unless actionable [discrimination or
retaliation] occurred.” (Caldera, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 44;
see also Jumaane v. City of Los Angeles (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th
1390, 1410 [predicate for failure to prevent discrimination,
retaliation, or harassment “is substantial evidence of
discrimination, retaliation and harassment”].) Accordingly,
because there are no triable issues as to actionable
discrimination or retaliation under FEHA, Ulloa’s cause of action
for failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation also
necessarily fails.

25
IV. Failure to accommodate and to engage in the
interactive process (fourth and fifth causes of
action).
FEHA requires employers to provide reasonable
accommodation for an employee’s “known physical or mental
disability” unless doing so would produce undue hardship.
(Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (m)(1).) Employers must also engage
in a timely, good faith interactive process to determine effective
reasonable accommodations for known disabilities. (Gov. Code,
§ 12940, subd. (n).)
We agree with the trial court that there are no triable
issues of fact as to Ulloa’s reasonable accommodation claim. As
defined by FEHA, a physical disability is a “physiological disease,
disorder, [or] condition” that affects one or more enumerated body
systems (neurological, immunological, musculoskeletal,
respiratory, cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive,
genitourinary, hemic, lymphatic, skin, or endocrine) and limits a
major life activity. (Gov. Code, § 12926, subd. (m)(1).) “ ‘The
term ‘major life activity’ is broadly construed, and includes
physical and social activities and working. (§ 12926,
subd. (m)(1)(B)(iii).)’ ” (Allos v. Poway Unified School District
(2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 822, 836.)
Here, it is undisputed that Ulloa suffered from heart
disease, which can constitute a disability under FEHA. (See
Gov. Code, § 12926.1, subd. (c) [physical disabilities include heart
disease].) But while Ulloa’s heart disease unquestionably was
disabling for a period of time after his October 2018 heart attack,
Ulloa presented no evidence that his heart disease continued to
limit any major life activity after his heart surgery and recovery.
To the contrary, it is undisputed that Ulloa’s doctor released him

26
to work at “full capacity” as of December 9, 2018. Further, Ulloa
testified at his deposition he did not need or request any
accommodations when he returned to work, and that he was
“able to do all of the tasks [he was] required to do” without any
accommodations.
On appeal, Ulloa urges that there are triable issues as to
his reasonable accommodation claim because he stated in his
declaration that when he returned to work in December 2018, he
told Contreras that he would need to work at a slower pace
because of his heart condition. But Ulloa’s statement in his
declaration flatly contradicts his prior deposition testimony that
he neither sought nor required any accommodations. A party
cannot create a triable issue of fact with a declaration that
contradicts his earlier deposition testimony. (Gharibian v.
Wawanesa General Ins. Co. (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 730, 739;
D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 21–
23.) Ulloa thus did not raise a triable issue as to his reasonable
accommodation claim.
We reach the same conclusion with regard to Ulloa’s
interactive process claim. To establish a claim for failure to
engage in the interactive process under FEHA, a plaintiff must
show: (1) the employee had a disability that was known to the
employer; (2) the employee requested accommodation or the
employer recognized the need for accommodation; (3) the
employer failed to engage in a good faith interactive process to
determine effective reasonable accommodations; and (4) the
employee could have been reasonably accommodated had the
employer engaged in the process. (Scotch v. Art Institute of
California (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 986, 1013; Nadaf-Rahrov v.
Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 952, 975.) As

27
we have said, Ulloa did not raise a triable issue that he had a
qualifying disability because there is no evidence that his heart
disease limited any major life activity. Further, Ulloa conceded
that he never requested an accommodation. Ulloa therefore did
not raise a triable issue as to his interactive process claim.
V. Declaratory relief and wrongful termination claims
(seventh and eight causes of action).
Ulloa’s seventh cause of action seeks a declaratory
judgment that SASCO terminated him due to his age, perceived
disability, and engagement in protected activities. Ulloa’s eighth
cause of action alleges wrongful termination in violation of the
public policies articulated in FEHA and the CFRA.
The seventh and eighth causes of action are wholly
derivative of Ulloa’s discrimination and retaliation claims
because both depend on evidence of unlawful discrimination and
retaliation. Specifically, to establish a declaratory relief claim, a
plaintiff must demonstrate an actual controversy relating to the
legal rights and duties of the respective parties. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1060.) Ulloa’s complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that
that SASCO violated its rights and duties under FEHA by
terminating him based on his age and disability. Our conclusion
that there are no triable issues as to Ulloa’s FEHA claims,
accordingly, are also dispositive of his declaratory relief claim.
The elements of a claim for wrongful termination in
violation of public policy are: (1) an employer-employee
relationship; (2) termination or constructive discharge; (3) the
termination violated public policy; and (4) the termination caused
harm. (Garcia-Brower v. Premier Automotive Imports of CA, LLC
(2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 961, 973.) A cause of action for wrongful
termination in violation of public policy, where based on alleged

28
FEHA violations, “rises and falls with those claims” on summary
judgment. (Zamora, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 62.) Because
there are no triable issues of material fact with respect to Ulloa’s
FEHA claims, summary judgment was properly granted as to
Ulloa’s claim for wrongful termination in violation of public
policy.
VI. Labor Code retaliation claims (ninth and tenth
causes of action).
The ninth and tenth causes of action allege retaliation in
violation of Labor Code sections 98.6 and 1102.5.2 Specifically,
these causes of action allege that Ulloa was terminated because
he “routinely complained to his supervisors that he was not able
to take meal and rest breaks and that he and his coworkers were
not being compensated all their overtime premiums.”
Ulloa challenges the grant of summary adjudication of the
ninth and tenth causes of action, but his appellate briefs do not
identify any evidence that he complained to supervisors that he
was not permitted to take meal and rest breaks or that he and his
coworkers were not compensated for overtime. He also does not
explain why such complaints would be actionable under Labor
Code sections 98.6 and 1102.5, nor does he identify any evidence
linking the alleged complaints to his termination.

2 Labor Code section 98.6 prohibits an employer from
retaliating against an employee for exercising a right under the
Labor Code. Labor Code section 1102.5 prohibits an employer
from retaliating against an employee for reporting a violation of
law to a government or law enforcement agency, a public
investigatory body, or a person with authority to investigate or
correct the violation.

29
“[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that
a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and
the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the
record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court
committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.”
(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609.) Consequently,
an assertion may be deemed forfeited where it is not supported
by any citation to the record. (WFG National Title Ins. Co. v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 881, 894.) “It is
not our role to scour the record to find evidence to support
[appellant’s] contention or create a triable issue of fact. (Helm v.
City of Los Angeles (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1228, fn. 5.)
Because Ulloa’s contention that the trial court erred by
summarily adjudicating the ninth and tenth causes of action is
not adequately supported by legal analysis and citations to the
record, we deem these contentions forfeited.
VII. Conclusion.
For all the foregoing reasons, there are no triable issues of
material fact precluding summary judgment as to any cause of
action alleged in the complaint. Further, in light of this
conclusion, it is unnecessary to address Ulloa’s claim for punitive
damages. (See Coleman v. Gulf Ins. Group (1986) 41 Cal.3d 782,
789, fn. 2 [court need not address claim for punitive damages if
there is no support for any substantive claim]; King, supra,
152 Cal.App.4th at p. 444 [claim for punitive damages moot when
summary judgment on underlying claims affirmed].) We
therefore affirm the judgment.

30
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent SASCO is awarded
its appellate costs.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

EGERTON, J.

KLATCHKO J.*

* Judge of the Riverside County Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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