CourtListener 10662715•Formby v. Haubold CA1/3
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Filed 8/28/25 Formby v. Haubold CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
DOUGLAS FORMBY et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
A168815
v.
PETER HAUBOLD et al., (Marin County
Super. Ct. No. CIV2103050)
Defendants and Appellants.
INTRODUCTION
If good fences make good neighbors, a fence that misrepresents a
property line risks the opposite result. Defendants Peter and Cynthia
Haubold appeal from a judgment quieting title to a portion of a residential lot
owned by their immediate neighbors, plaintiffs Douglas and Heather
Formby.1 Although surveys show that plaintiffs own the area in question, it
lies on defendants’ side of a fence between the properties, and defendants
have long used it as a patio. The trial court rejected defendants’ claim to an
equitable easement, as well as their defense of unclean hands. Finding no
abuse of discretion, we affirm.
1 Because the two plaintiffs share the same last name, as do the two
defendants, we occasionally refer to them by first name for the sake of clarity.
We intend no disrespect to the parties.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendants’ Use of Plaintiffs’ Property
Defendants bought a property at 20 Olive Avenue in Larkspur (20
Olive) in 2012 and have lived there ever since. When they bought their
home, a fence ran along what they assumed was the boundary between 20
Olive and an adjacent property, 16 Olive Avenue (16 Olive). Defendants’
backyard featured a gravel patio abutting the fence between the properties.
Defendants later replaced the gravel with pavers, placed furniture there, and
repaired the retaining wall on the edge of the patio.
Plaintiffs bought 16 Olive in February 2021, intending to use the
property as a “legacy home” for their family. Their property is narrow and
deep and, when they bought it, contained a main residence that needed
extensive repairs, a detached garage, and a dilapidated building in the rear.
Around April of the same year, plaintiffs hired an architect who advised them
that it would be very expensive to repair the house, and it would make more
“ ‘economic sense’ ” to rebuild it.
The architect also showed plaintiffs a survey indicating that a portion
of their property extended past the fence they shared with 20 Olive.
Specifically, rather than running in a straight line, the boundary between the
two properties has a roughly rectangular “cut-out” area in the middle,
protruding from defendants’ property into plaintiffs’. Rather than tracing all
the right angles of this property line, the fence runs diagonally from one
corner of the “cut-out” almost to Olive Avenue, creating a triangular section
of approximately 482 square feet that belongs to plaintiffs but is on
defendants’ side of the fence. This is the area that defendants used as their
patio, and it is the area in dispute.
2
Plaintiffs’ architect testified that, even within the true property lines, it
would be “challenging” to design a house for plaintiffs’ long, narrow, and
steep lot. The fence line narrows the property further, and the architect
opined the additional width would be “critical” to the success of the project
design. When Heather Formby saw a proposed design from an architect
hired by defendants, using the existing fence line as the boundary, she found
the design unacceptably narrow.
This Action
After a brief and unsuccessful effort to resolve the matter amicably,
plaintiffs brought this action against defendants. It appears plaintiffs
alleged causes of action for trespass, nuisance, quiet title, and declaratory
and injunctive relief, and defendants asserted the affirmative defenses of
equitable easement and unclean hands.2 These defenses underlie defendants’
arguments on appeal.
Equitable Easement
As to the alleged equitable easement, defendants argued as follows:
They bought their property in the reasonable belief that the patio area
belonged to them, and their family has used it continuously ever since as
their outdoor space; plaintiffs were looking for a family home rather than a
“fixer upper,” according to their real estate agent, which meant plaintiffs did
not originally intend to expand their existing house; plaintiffs could build a
larger house than they propose without using the disputed area; and
defendants’ property value would diminish by roughly $160,000, while
2 The appellant’s appendix contains neither the complaint, the answer,
nor the register of actions. (Cf. Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.122(b)(1)(F),
8.124(b)(1)(A) & (B).)
3
plaintiffs would face little to no hardship from losing the disputed area. We
will discuss this evidence, as well as contrary evidence, in more detail below.
Unclean Hands
To support their defense of unclean hands, defendants relied heavily on
a series of disputes between the parties that arose after the property-line
discrepancy was discovered. For instance, plaintiffs initially suggested a
“land swap” with defendants, only to withdraw the offer a few days later.
Shortly afterward, Douglas Formby sent his father an email saying, “I don’t
see any way that this ends without [Peter Haubold] being super bitter,” to
which his father suggested he “[t]each [Peter] a lesson,” an exchange that,
according to defendants, shows plaintiffs designed their new home with the
“express purpose” of making defendants bitter. Defendants pointed to face-
to-face disputes, including evidence that Douglas Formby—who they assert is
younger and stronger than Peter Haubold—told Peter he could simply tear
down the fence and charge them for replacing it, and that he “could come
through your gate at any time and walk up your steps and have a drink on
your patio area, and that would be completely in my legal right.” Defendants
drew the trial court’s attention to evidence—in the form of pictures and
observations made when the judge visited the site—that plaintiffs in fact
removed a portion of the fence. And they showed that in February 2022,
Heather Formby contacted the police and sought to have Peter Haubold
arrested for removing survey monuments, an offense allegedly punishable
under Penal Code section 605. Finally, unrelated to the disputed area,
plaintiffs had carried out unpermitted work in their back yard.
The Trial Court’s Ruling
After a bench trial, the court ruled against defendants on all three
elements of an equitable easement, concluding that (1) they were negligent in
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believing they owned the disputed area; (2) an easement would cause
plaintiffs “irreparable harm” because of the limitations it would place on the
design of the new house they planned to build; and (3) the resulting harm to
plaintiffs would “significantly outweigh[]” the harm defendants would face by
removing their patio. Without providing additional detail, the court also
rejected the unclean hands defense, finding it “not supported by the record.”
The court ruled in plaintiffs’ favor on their causes of action for quiet title and
declaratory relief, and ordered the encroachments removed, with plaintiffs to
bear the costs of removal.
DISCUSSION
I. Appealability
We first address a threshold matter. Defendants tell us their appeal is
authorized by section 904.1, subdivision (a)(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure
because it is from a final judgment. The notice of appeal in this case is from a
document filed August 9, 2023, entitled “Final Statement of Decision and
Judgment.” (Capitalization and boldface omitted.) Despite its title, the
document by its terms contemplates further action by the parties and the
court. That is, it orders the parties within 15 days either to submit a joint
proposed judgment or, if unable to agree on a joint proposed judgment, each
to submit their own proposed judgment and any objections to that of the
other parties. (See Dana Point Safe Harbor Collective v. Superior Court
(2010) 51 Cal.4th 1, 5 [decree is not final if it requires anything further in the
nature of judicial action].) However, plaintiffs have informed us, and
defendants do not dispute, that no subsequent judgment was entered, and
plaintiffs urge us to treat the August 9, 2023 statement of decision as
appealable so as to avoid delay in resolving this appeal.
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Our high court has explained that “[r]eviewing courts have discretion to
treat statements of decision as appealable when they must, as when a
statement of decision is signed and filed and does, in fact, constitute the
court’s final decision on the merits,” and no formal judgment is later entered.
(Alan v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 894, 901.) The
statement of decision does not appear to leave any unresolved questions on
the merits of this action. In the circumstances, we exercise our discretion to
treat the August 9, 2023 document as a final judgment and proceed to
consider the appeal.
II. Equitable Easement
Defendants argue that the trial court abused its discretion by declining
to grant them an equitable easement. According to defendants, the court
failed to consider factors favoring such an easement, including evidence that
defendants encroached on the land innocently and that plaintiffs would not
be harmed by the loss of the disputed area, while defendants would suffer the
loss of their outdoor space and diminution in the value of their property.
Legal Standards
In limited circumstances, a court has discretionary authority to “deny a
landowner’s request to eject a trespasser and instead force the landowner to
accept damages as compensation for the judicial creation of an easement.”
(Shoen v. Zacarias (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 16, 19 (Shoen).) To establish an
equitable easement, a party must show three things: “the trespass was
‘ “ ‘innocent’ ” rather than “ ‘willful or negligent’ ” ’; the easement will not
cause irreparable injury to the public or the property owner; and the
hardship to the trespasser from denying the easement is ‘ “ ‘ “greatly
disproportionate” ’ ” ’ to the property owner’s from continuance of the
easement.” (Wang v. Peletta (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 478, 491 (Wang).) A
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court does not have the discretion to grant an equitable easement unless all
three prerequisites have been established. (Ibid.) Courts approach equitable
easements “with ‘[a]n abundance of caution’ [citation], and resolve all doubts
against their issuance.” (Shoen, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 21.)
We review the trial court’s findings of fact for substantial evidence and
its decision whether to grant an easement for abuse of discretion. (Wang,
supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 491.) Under this standard, “we resolve all
evidentiary conflicts in favor of the judgment and determine whether the
court’s decision ‘ “falls within the permissible range of options set by the legal
criteria.” ’ ” (Hirshfield v. Schwartz (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 749, 771
(Hirshfield).)
Innocence
It is generally thought that to satisfy the innocence requirement,
defendants’ use of the disputed area “ ‘ “must not be willful or negligent.” ’ ”
(Hansen v. Sandridge Partners, L.P. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1020, 1028
(Hansen).) There is some authority for the proposition that mere negligence
may not bar an equitable easement. (Linthicum v. Butterfield (2009) 175
Cal.App.4th 259, 266 (Linthicum); but see Hansen, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1028, fn. 10 [disagreeing with Linthicum and noting that “[m]ore recent
equitable easement cases have dropped the equivocal language”].) But even
if that is the case, whether “the quantum of the defendant’s negligence is so
great as to justify an injunction is a matter best left to the sound discretion of
the trial court.” (Linthicum, supra, at p. 267.)
In finding defendants’ use of the disputed area was not innocent, the
trial court relied on three facts indicating defendants had reason to believe
the fence might not reflect the property line. First, when defendants bought
their home in 2012, the sellers notified them of a boundary discrepancy with
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the property to the rear of 20 Olive, putting them on notice of at least one
boundary issue. Second, in the same year, defendants hired a sewer repair
company that prepared a map showing not only the sewer line but also the
boundary line between the two properties, complete with sharp right turns
inconsistent with the fence line. Third, defendants knew that survey
monuments were placed in the disputed area in 2019, when the prior owners
of 16 Olive carried out a survey. In addition, plaintiffs point to evidence that
a plat map attached to the preliminary title report, which Peter Haubold
reviewed when defendants bought the property, showed the true property
line.
Defendants argue these facts were insufficient to alert them to the
boundary problem, and they draw our attention instead to evidence
supporting their position. For instance, they and their rear neighbor split the
cost of repairing their shared fence, leaving it where it was; and after
completing the 2019 survey, the prior owners of 16 Olive did not notify
defendants of the boundary problem now before us. As to the anomaly in the
plat map, Peter Haubold testified he saw it but assumed that the sharp “jag-
out” in the property line represented the patio area. He also testified that he
saw the anomaly again on the sewer company’s map, but again assumed it
was the patio and thought little of it.
Defendants also cite cases, but their authority is of limited value
because the cases involve appellate courts finding no abuse of discretion
when a trial court has granted an equitable easement. For instance, in
Hinrichs, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion where the trial
court granted an equitable easement in favor of a landlocked landowner who
believed he had a right-of-way over a trail. (Hinrichs v. Melton (2017) 11
Cal.App.5th 516, 519, 523 (Hinrichs); see also Tashakori v. Lakis (2011) 196
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Cal.App.4th 1003, 1006–1007 (Tashakori) [affirming equitable easement
where prepurchase misrepresentations by real estate broker, prior owner,
and title report led landlocked landowner to believe a recorded easement
would allow use of shared driveway to access public road]; Hirshfield, supra,
91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 755, 772 [affirming equitable easement where parties
wrongly assumed chain-link fence marked property line].) But the question
we must address “is not whether the trial court could properly have granted
an equitable easement, but whether it acted within the scope of its discretion
in denying it, an inquiry in which we presume the judgment is correct and
resolve all ambiguities in favor of affirmance.” (Wang, supra, 112
Cal.App.5th at p. 492.) Even if the evidence is less than overwhelming that
defendants’ use of the disputed area was not innocent, we cannot say the trial
court’s finding on this issue was an abuse of its discretion.
In any event, as we shall explain, the trial court’s additional findings
were supported by the record and well within its discretion.
Irreparable Harm
The court found that plaintiffs would face irreparable harm from an
easement. Specifically, the court found plaintiffs had always planned to
improve the property and bought it in the hope of building a legacy property
for their family; that their plans would be “ ‘severely limited’ ” by not
including the disputed area in their design calculations; and that they would
not be able to realize their property’s highest and best use without that area.
In this context, the requirement of “ ‘[i]rreparable harm’ ” does not
refer to “ ‘injury beyond the possibility of repair or beyond possible
compensation in damages’ ”; rather, it may be satisfied by “ ‘ “[a] trespass of a
continuing nature, whose constant recurrence renders the remedy at law
inadequate,” ’ ” or to wrongs that cause damages “ ‘ “estimable only by
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conjecture and not by any accurate standard.” ’ ” (Donahue Schriber Realty
Group, Inc. v. Nu Creation Outreach (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1184; see
Nellie Gail Ranch Owners Assn. v. McMullin (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 982, 1006
(Nellie Gail) [in second step of analysis, court may consider whether
monetary damages would be adequate].)
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings. Heather
Formby testified that when she and her husband bought 16 Olive they
wanted a “legacy home” that they could pass on to their children. Douglas
Formby testified that the main house on the property was in poor condition
when they bought it, and they knew it would need repairs. Their architect
soon advised them it would make better sense to rebuild than to repair.
According to the architect, it would be challenging to design a house on the
narrow lot, even assuming plaintiffs could use the disputed area, and the
extra property width was “critical” to the success of the project.
In challenging the trial court’s finding, defendants point to other
evidence suggesting it would be possible to build a home within the existing
fence line that would be larger than the home plaintiffs’ architect designed.
They also point to plaintiffs’ real estate agent’s testimony that plaintiffs were
not looking for a “fixer upper,” which defendants argue shows that plaintiffs
originally planned to live in the existing house rather than build a new one.
But this evidence, even if credited, does not detract from the basic point that,
once plaintiffs decided to rebuild the home, being able to use the full extent of
their property would enable them better to design the home they wished to
build. To prevail on irreparable harm, defendants must do more than point
to evidence that bolstered their case at trial—they must show that there is no
substantial evidence for the court’s findings. (See Nellie Gail, supra,
4 Cal.App.5th at p. 1006.) Even without a dollar value on the harm to
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plaintiffs from not being able to build on the full extent of their property,
there is substantial evidence of irreparable harm to them here.
Balancing Hardships
The trial court also found that on balance, the harm to defendants from
removing the encroachments would not outweigh the harm plaintiffs would
suffer from losing the exclusive use of their property. In reviewing this
finding, we bear in mind that in this balancing, the hardships between the
trespasser and the landowner are not treated as starting out in “equipoise,”
but rather “they begin tipped in favor of the property owner[s] due to the
owner[s’] substantial interest in exclusive use of [their] property arising
solely from [their] ownership of [their] land.” (Shoen, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th
at p. 20.) Thus, courts should give “additional weight” to the inherent
hardship in an owner’s “loss of the exclusive use” of the property,
“independent of any hardship caused by the owner’s loss of specific uses in a
given case,” and deny the easement unless the hardship to the trespasser is
“greatly disproportionate” to that of the landowner. (Id. at p. 21.)
As the trial court acknowledged, defendants will lose the use of their
patio, and there is evidence that loss of the disputed area will diminish the
value of their property by $160,000. But “ ‘[d]eprivation of a substantial
benefit . . . falls short of the imposition of a substantial hardship’ ” (Shoen,
supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 22), and denial of the easement does not
interfere with defendants’ use of the property they actually own, nor does it
require the destruction of any building. (See ibid. [hardship to party who
would have to remove patio furniture was “nothing like the hardships to
trespassers who would be forced to move buildings or be airlifted to their
landlocked property”]; see also Hinrichs, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 524
[landlocked parcel]; Linthicum, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 265, 267 [same];
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Tashakori, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1005, 1009–1010 [same].) And the
trial court has ordered plaintiffs to bear the cost of removing the
encroachments and replacing the fence around the disputed area. We cannot
say that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to find that the harm
to defendants was not “greatly disproportionate” to the harm plaintiffs would
suffer from the loss of exclusive use of their property and the concomitant
restrictions on the house they wish to build. (See Shoen, supra, 237
Cal.App.4th at pp. 21–22.)
On appeal, defendants reassert the same points the court rejected at
trial: that loss of the disputed area would cause them significant hardship
through loss of use of the patio area and diminution in the value of their
property, while plaintiffs face no harm because they learned of the disputed
area only after buying their property. But the law on equitable easements
does not turn on whether a landowner was previously aware of the location of
a property line, nor on whether the landowner previously intended to repair,
rather than replace, an existing structure. And again, our inquiry is not
whether evidence might have supported a different decision; rather we
resolve all evidentiary conflicts in favor the judgment and determine whether
the court’s decision falls within the permissible range of options. (Wang,
supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 491; Hansen, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 1028;
Hirshfield, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 771.) We are satisfied that
substantial evidence supports the court’s findings, and that there was no
abuse of discretion in its balancing of the hardships.
III. Unclean Hands
Defendants also contend the trial court abused its discretion in
declining to apply the doctrine of unclean hands, which requires a plaintiff in
an equitable action to “come into court with clean hands,” or “be denied relief,
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regardless of the merits of [the] claim.” (Aguayo v. Amaro (2013) 213
Cal.App.4th 1102, 1110 (Aguayo).)
The unclean hands defense applies only if the inequitable conduct
“occur[red] in the transaction to which the relief sought relates.” (O’Flaherty
v. Belgum (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1044, 1060.) That is, the connection
between “ ‘the misconduct and the claimed injuries’ ” must be direct, such
that the plaintiff “ ‘ “ ‘prejudicially affect[ed] . . . the rights of the person
against whom the relief is sought so that it would be inequitable to grant
such relief.” ’ ’ ” (Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1999) 76
Cal.App.4th 970, 979 (Kendall-Jackson Winery).) For example, in a quiet
title action based on adverse possession, relief was appropriately denied
where the plaintiff deceitfully recorded a “wild deed” intended to “interfere
with the true owner’s payment of property taxes” and allow the plaintiff to
satisfy one of the elements of adverse possession. (Aguayo, supra, 213
Cal.App.4th at p. 1112.)
To establish unclean hands, defendants rely on evidence they contend
shows plaintiffs behaved “aggressively” in asserting their claim to the
disputed area after the dispute between the parties arose—such as making
comments defendants construed as threatening and making a police report—
as well as evidence that plaintiffs performed unrelated work on their
property without a permit. But this behavior had no effect on the right
defendants assert, which, if it exists at all, is based on events that occurred
before plaintiffs bought the property at 16 Olive. Nor have defendants shown
plaintiffs’ behavior frustrated their efforts to mount a defense to this action.
They have not shown the allegedly inequitable behavior affected their rights
or their ability to protect those rights, and thus have not established an
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unclean hands defense. (See Kendall-Jackson Winery, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 978–979.)
We recognize the hostility that developed between plaintiffs and
defendants, but the “equitable easement doctrine is not a tool for penalizing
unneighborly conduct through the reassignment of property interests.”
(Shoen, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 22.) The trial court did not abuse its
discretion by rejecting the defense of unclean hands.
IV. Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Sanctions
Plaintiffs have moved to dismiss this appeal on multiple grounds: that
the appeal is frivolous and intended primarily to delay the loss of defendants’
patio; that defendants’ briefs contain misstatements of fact and refer to facts
not in the record; and that defendants’ briefs and appendix contain other
irregularities. Plaintiffs also point to defendants’ allegedly wrongful conduct
in continuing to use the patio during the pendency of this appeal without
having paid an undertaking. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 917.4.) Plaintiffs have
also requested sanctions against defendants and their counsel for bringing a
frivolous appeal, which has forced them to delay building their house and
resulted in substantial appellate attorney fees. Defendants did not file any
opposition to these motions. Nevertheless, we decline to grant them.
We have discretion to dismiss a frivolous appeal. (Kinney v. Clark
(2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 724, 732.) An appeal is frivolous only “ ‘when it is
prosecuted for an improper motive—to harass the respondent or delay the
effect of an adverse judgment—or when it indisputably has no merit—when
any reasonable attorney would agree that the appeal is totally and
completely without merit.” (Ibid.) An appeal’s “total lack of merit” may be
treated as evidence it was intended only for delay. (In re Marriage of
Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 649 (Flaherty).)
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We similarly have discretion to impose sanctions for bringing a
frivolous appeal. (Champlin/GEI Wind Holdings, LLC v. Avery (2023) 92
Cal.App.5th 218, 227.) However, “sanctions should be ‘used most sparingly to
deter only the most egregious conduct’ [citation], and that an appeal lacks
merit does not, alone, establish it is frivolous.” (In re Marriage of Gong &
Kwong (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 510, 518.)
We note the flaws in defendants’ briefing and appendix. Most
significantly, defendants engage only nominally with the stringent standard
of review here and instead seek to relitigate the facts. In addition,
defendants’ briefs lack record citations for many factual assertions, and some
assertions are not fully supported by the cited portions of the record. We
remind defendants’ counsel of his obligation to ensure that briefs and
appendices comply with the California Rules of Court (see Cal. Rules of
Court, rules 8.122(b)(1), 8.124(b)(1), 8.204(a)), but in the exercise of our
discretion, we decline to dismiss the appeal or impose sanctions. “ ‘[T]he
borderline between a frivolous appeal and one which simply has no merit is
vague,’ ” and we must police that line in a manner that avoids a “chilling
effect on the assertion of litigants’ rights on appeal.” (Flaherty, supra, 31
Cal.3d at p. 650.)
DISPOSITION
The motions to dismiss the appeal and to impose sanctions are denied.
The judgment is affirmed. Plaintiffs shall recover their costs on appeal.
TUCHER, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
PETROU, J.
RODRÍGUEZ, J.
Formby et al. v. Haubold et al. (A168815)
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