CourtListener 10662629•Lee v. Kim CA2/2
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Filed 8/28/25 Lee v. Kim CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
ROBERT SANG LEE, B341327
Plaintiff and Appellant, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22STCV12924
v.
LORNA KIM et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Rolf Michael Treu, Judge. (Retired judge of the
L.A. Sup. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI,
§ 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed.
Robert Sang Lee, in pro. per., and Ki Hyon Kim for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
Hanger, Steinberg, Shapiro & Ash, Marc S. Shapiro and
Christopher G. Kerr for Defendant and Respondent Lorna Kim.
Law Offices of Jayan Hong and Jayan Hong for Defendant
and Respondent Eun Zoo Lee.
Ropers Majeski and Susan J. Welde for Defendant and
Respondent Leonard Lee.
_______________________________
Plaintiff Robert Sang Lee appeals the trial court’s judgment
in favor of defendants Lorna Kim, Eun Zoo Lee, and Leonard
Lee1 following the imposition of terminating sanctions against
Plaintiff. Plaintiff contends reversal is warranted because (i) the
terminating sanctions were an abuse of discretion; and
(ii) unbeknownst to Plaintiff, his attorney was ineligible to
practice law at the hearing on the terminating sanctions.
We find the record is inadequate to conclude the trial court
abused its discretion in granting the motion for terminating
sanctions. Even if we were to consider the record provided, we
would find no abuse of discretion because Plaintiff flouted the
trial court’s orders and other legal obligations to appear for
depositions. We find Plaintiff’s argument based on his attorney’s
ineligibility forfeited because it was never raised to the trial
court. In any event, the record provided does not show error. We
affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff and his late brother, Ben Hang Lee, worked
together in one or more real estate ventures. Ben suffered a
debilitating stroke in 2017. Litigation involving the family and/or
its assets followed. At the time of an unsuccessful consolidation
motion Plaintiff filed, there were four lawsuits bearing at least
some tangential relationship to this one. The only other lawsuit
1 As the defendants, former and current, share common
surnames, we refer to them by their first names. We intend no
disrespect.
2
relevant here is captioned Jong Soo Park v. Ben Hang Lee
(Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. 22STCV03583) (Park v. Lee). Park v.
Lee is relevant only because of what Plaintiff claims happened
during a deposition of Ben’s widow, Eun, in that case.
The present case is based on claims that, beginning in April
2021, defendant Lorna (Plaintiff’s niece) and her husband
William spread false rumors that Plaintiff molested her as a
child. Plaintiff sued Lorna and William in April 2022. Plaintiff
dismissed William six months later and, by amendment to the
fictitious names, added Eun, Lorna’s mother, and Leonard,
Lorna’s brother, as defendants at the end of January 2024.
After Lorna answered Plaintiff’s first amended complaint,
the trial court entered a case management order in September
2022. Among other things, it set a trial date in September 2023
and reflected the parties’ stipulation to mediate, with a mediator
to be selected by December 2022. The initial discovery cutoff date
was therefore in August 2023.
In July 2023, the parties filed a stipulation to continue the
trial date. They recited that they had not complied with their
earlier stipulation to schedule a mediation. They explained that
this was because both sides “wish[ed] to complete important
discovery before mediating.” They further noted, without seeking
judicial intervention, a discovery dispute: “In May 2023, the
parties sought to arrange [Lorna’s] deposition. However, they
became involved in a dispute regarding whether [her] deposition
must take place in person. This dispute is yet to be resolved.
[Lorna] and her counsel are discussing a potential resolution of
this matter.”
The trial court continued the trial date to February 5, 2024.
As a result, the discovery cutoff was extended to January 6, 2024.
3
In August 2023, Eun was deposed in Park v. Lee. The
deposition was conducted over Zoom. Lorna was present in the
room where Eun sat for the deposition. Plaintiff was also noted as
present at that deposition. Plaintiff contends that Lorna coached
Eun during the deposition, including, as the transcript shows, by
passing Eun notes such as “ ‘don’t understand.’ ”
Later in August 2023, Jack Karpeles substituted in as
Plaintiff’s attorney in this action.
Lorna noticed Plaintiff’s deposition via Zoom for
December 5, 2023. Plaintiff did not object but still refused to
appear. Karpeles waited until late the night prior to tell Lorna’s
counsel that Plaintiff would not appear. His rationale was that,
some weeks earlier, Leonard (not then yet a defendant) had
interfered with Plaintiff’s efforts to move papers out of Plaintiff’s
former office. According to Karpeles, this resulted in Plaintiff’s
records being “in shambles, if not total disarray, posing personal
risk and personal danger.” Karpeles also asked for dates when
they could “collectively do[] back-to-back depositions for
[Plaintiff], Lorna Kim, and Co-Trustee Eun Zoo Lee.” Eun was
not yet a defendant to this action, nor was she represented by
Lorna’s counsel. At no time prior to the discovery cutoff did
Plaintiff ever serve a notice of deposition for Lorna.
In response to Plaintiff’s failure to appear for the
December 2023 deposition, Lorna filed a motion to compel
Plaintiff’s deposition and for monetary sanctions. The earliest
date available for a hearing on the motion was April 2024.
Because that date was after the scheduled trial date, Lorna also
filed an ex parte application to continue the trial or have the
matter heard on shortened notice.
4
The trial court advanced the hearing on the motion to
compel and heard the matter on January 22, 2024. It directed the
parties to meet and confer and continued the matter for four
days. Their meet and confer efforts were unsuccessful. Although
Lorna offered to be deposed via Zoom despite “never [having]
received a timely notice of deposition,” Plaintiff refused to sit for
a deposition unless Lorna would undergo a deposition “back-to-
back” on the same date. On January 26, the continued hearing
date on the motion to compel (at which neither Plaintiff nor his
counsel appeared), the court ordered Plaintiff to sit for a
deposition within 10 days, and, by Lorna’s agreement, for Lorna
to sit for a deposition within the 10 days thereafter. The court
denied Lorna’s request for sanctions. It further continued the
trial date to April 2024 to accommodate the depositions.
Following the trial court’s order, Lorna noticed a deposition
of Plaintiff, via Zoom, on February 6, 2024 and offered dates for
her own deposition via Zoom. Plaintiff then served, on
February 1, a deposition of Lorna to be taken, in person, on
February 8. Plaintiff’s notice also included 71 categories of
document requests. On the eve of Plaintiff’s scheduled February 6
deposition, Lorna objected to being deposed in person on
February 8 and to Plaintiff’s attempt to obtain documents
through the deposition despite the passage of the discovery cutoff
date. Lorna nevertheless committed to attending a Zoom
deposition on February 8, if Plaintiff first sat for his February 6
deposition.
In response to Lorna’s objection, on February 5, 2024,
Karpeles declared “all depositions and deposition notices are in
suspension until the court rules again on its [January] 26, 2024
minute order.” (Boldface omitted.) Yet his e-mail did not cite any
5
reason why Plaintiff could not appear for his deposition; he only
complained about Lorna’s response to Plaintiff’s deposition
notice. Plaintiff did not appear for his deposition on February 6.
Instead, through Karpeles, he filed an ex parte application for a
further discovery hearing. The trial court denied that application
on February 7, 2024.
Also on February 6, 2024, Lorna filed a motion for
terminating and monetary sanctions based on Plaintiff’s repeated
failures to appear for deposition. She set the hearing for the date
then first available—July 9, 2024. In light of the looming trial
date, she filed an ex parte application to continue the trial date or
have her sanctions motion considered on shortened time.
The trial court denied Lorna’s ex parte application on
February 8, 2024. At the same time, the court also stated it
“expect[ed] counsel to comply with the court order and get the
depositions completed forthwith.” Lorna noticed another
deposition of Plaintiff for February 20, 2024, but Plaintiff again
failed to appear. Plaintiff never sat for a deposition by Lorna.
Plaintiff also failed to sit for depositions noticed by Eun and
Leonard. Plaintiff served Eun and Leonard with summonses and
the pleadings at the end of January 2024. Eun obtained a further
continuance of the trial date to August 2024 to permit discovery
by the new defendants. Eun, in turn, sent Plaintiff a notice of
deposition for March 29, 2024. Plaintiff failed to appear after
having complained that Eun had objected to his deposition notice
and that Lorna had refused to sit for an in-person deposition.
Likewise, Leonard sent Plaintiff a notice of deposition on May 16,
2024—a date pre-agreed by Plaintiff and later moved, by
agreement, to the following day. Nonetheless, after complaining
6
about Leonard’s objections to Plaintiff’s discovery demands,
Plaintiff refused to appear for that deposition, too.
On June 28, 2024, Plaintiff, through Karpeles, filed an
opposition to Lorna’s motion for sanctions against Plaintiff for
failure to sit for a deposition.
On July 2, 2024, Karpeles was rendered “[n]ot eligible to
practice law in CA” by the California State Bar.
(<https://apps.calbar.ca.gov/attorney/Licensee/Detail/134478> [as
of Aug. 5, 2025], archived at <https://perma.cc/26Z4-TP2Z>.)2
According to the California State Bar’s official website, the
reason for this was “Admin Inactive/CTAPP noncompliance.”
(Ibid.) “CTAPP” refers to the State Bar’s “Client Trust Account
Protection Program,” administrative requirements for licensees
pertaining to accounts holding client funds.
In advance of the July 9, 2024 hearing on Lorna’s motion
for sanctions, the trial court issued a tentative ruling denying the
terminating sanctions but granting monetary sanctions.
However, after hearing argument from Karpeles and each
defendant’s counsel, the court reversed tack and granted
terminating sanctions. The hearing was not reported and the
record contains no settled statement of the proceedings. The
2 We grant Plaintiff’s unopposed request for judicial notice of
Karpeles’s attorney profile page on the California State Bar’s
official website. (See Evid. Code, § 459, subd. (a)(2), § 452,
subd. (h).) We do so notwithstanding Plaintiff’s failure to comply
with California Rules of Court, rule 8.252(a). Not only do
Defendants not oppose Plaintiff’s request; they rely extensively
on the information that is the subject of the request such that it
would be impossible to assess either side’s arguments without
acknowledgement of Karpeles’s July 2, 2024 inactive status.
7
minute order states as follows: “The Court finds that Plaintiff
willfully failed to appear at his deposition at least twice following
a Court Order to do so, and for reasons that are not legally
supported. It does not appear, in view of Plaintiff’s argument,
that lesser sanctions would produce compliance. The motion for
terminating sanctions is GRANTED.”
Plaintiff, through Karpeles, moved for reconsideration on
July 16, 2024.
The trial court entered judgment on August 2, 2024.
On September 30, 2024, Plaintiff filed, in propria persona,
a notice of appeal of the judgment.
On November 22, 2024, the trial court denied the motion
for reconsideration on the ground that Plaintiff’s notice of appeal
divested it of jurisdiction. Plaintiff appeared in propria persona
at that hearing.
DISCUSSION
I. Order for Terminating Sanctions
“Disobedience of a court order constitutes an abuse of
discovery for which the court may dismiss the action. [Citation.]
‘In choosing among its various options for imposing a discovery
sanction, a trial court exercises discretion, subject to reversal
only for manifest abuse exceeding the bounds of reason.’
[Citation.] ‘ “The power to impose discovery sanctions is a broad
discretion subject to reversal only for arbitrary, capricious, or
whimsical action. . . . Only two facts are absolutely prerequisite
to imposition of the sanction: (1) there must be a failure to comply
. . . and (2) the failure must be willful.” ’ [Citation.] ‘[T]he issue
before us is not what sanction we would have imposed, but
whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering dismissal
as a sanction.’ ” (Miranda v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2004)
8
117 Cal.App.4th 913, 928–929.) We cannot find an abuse of
discretion here.
First, the record is inadequate to conclude the trial court
abused its discretion because it does not include a reporter’s
transcript of the hearing on Lorna’s motion. “ ‘[I]t is the
appellant’s burden to provide a reporter’s transcript if “an
appellant intends to raise any issue that requires consideration of
the oral proceedings in the superior court . . . .” . . . .’ Although in
certain instances a reporter’s transcript may not be necessary,
including if an appeal involves a legal issue requiring de novo
review, on issues such as the instant one involving the abuse of
discretion standard of review, a reporter’s transcript or an agreed
or settled statement of the proceedings is indispensable.” (Hood v.
Gonzales (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 57, 79–80, citations omitted.)
The reason for this is clear: “In the absence of a transcript
the reviewing court will have no way of knowing in many cases
what grounds were advanced, what arguments were made and
what facts may have been admitted, mutually assumed or
judicially noticed at the hearing. In such a case, no abuse of
discretion can be found except on the basis of speculation.”
(Lemelle v. Superior Court (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 148, 156–157.)
Such speculation would contravene the rule that “ ‘ “[a] judgment
or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments
and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to
which the record is silent.” ’ ” (Vo v. Las Virgenes Municipal
Water Dist. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 440, 447.)
The necessity of a transcript to permit review in this case is
manifest. The trial court made the finding that lesser sanctions
would not procure compliance based explicitly on “Plaintiff’s
9
argument,” presumably one made at the hearing because the
tentative had been in Plaintiff’s favor.
Second, even if we were to ignore our obligation to presume
the missing transcript would have contained all matter necessary
to support the judgment, we would still find no abuse of
discretion. Although “ ‘a terminating sanction should generally
not be imposed until the court has attempted less severe
alternatives and found them to be unsuccessful and/or the record
clearly shows lesser sanctions would be ineffective,’ ” courts
nevertheless have “ ‘authority to order terminating sanctions as a
first measure’ ” in “ ‘extreme cases.’ ” (J.W. v. Watchtower Bible &
Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 1142,
1169.) “[T]here is no question of the power of the court to apply
the ultimate sanction of default against a litigant who persists in
an outright refusal to comply with his discovery obligations.”
(Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 787.)
We think the trial court acted within the bounds of reason
in issuing terminating sanctions in this case. Before Lorna
brought her sanctions motion, Plaintiff twice refused to appear
for depositions both before and after being ordered to do so. He
also failed to formally object to Lorna’s deposition notices,
waiting to the last minute to assert explanations casting blame
on third parties or seeking to take various depositions together,
and bearing little or no relation to his ability to appear. Those
issues he did raise in his meet and confer e-mails and in his
opposition to the motion for sanctions relating to the terms of a
deposition of Lorna may have furnished grounds for court
intervention with respect to Lorna’s deposition, but he never
sought an order compelling those conditions. At best, he filed an
ex parte application for a further discovery hearing (after being a
10
no-show at the last one held just days prior) merely alluding to
the issue.
To be clear, Plaintiff’s failure to appear for deposition was
not justified by the opposing party’s failure to respond in his
preferred way to a deposition notice. To the extent Plaintiff had a
bona fide objection to Lorna’s wish to appear remotely for her
deposition, or to any other issue with Lorna’s response to
deposition subpoenas, the onus was on him to move to compel,
not refuse to cooperate with otherwise valid—and court-
ordered—discovery. Simply refusing to appear, without
simultaneously moving the court for an order on one’s own
discovery, constitutes the precise kind of failure to cooperate that
invites sanctions.
In response to Plaintiff’s repeated failures to appear, on
February 6, 2024, Lorna brought her sanctions motion and
related request to have it heard sooner or continue the trial date.
In considering the scheduling matters on an expedited basis two
days later,3 the court reiterated its expectation that Plaintiff
would comply with its prior order to undergo a deposition and
that he would do so “forthwith.”
Not only did Plaintiff thereafter refuse to appear when
Lorna noticed (for a third time) his deposition, but he also refused
to sit for depositions by Eun and Leonard. All told, by the time of
3 Plaintiff incorrectly asserts that the trial court denied the
underlying terminating sanctions motion on February 8, 2024.
The court considered only the scheduling issues and decided not
to advance the hearing on the substantive motion from its
scheduled July 9, 2024 hearing date.
11
the hearing Plaintiff had failed to appear without valid excuse for
at least five depositions and attended zero.
We reject Plaintiff’s argument that the trial court
improperly considered evidence of his noncompliance after the
motion was filed because the evidence was not presented until
Lorna’s reply. A court considering sanctions is entitled to look to
the totality of the circumstances. (Creed-21 v. City of
Wildomar (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 690, 702.) Certainly, the trial
court was just as justified in considering Plaintiff’s continued
noncompliance with discovery obligations as it would have been
in considering evidence that Plaintiff had complied.
Plaintiff’s conduct, including ignoring trial court orders and
engaging in consistently disingenuous meet and confer
communications, reflected a staunch unwillingness to comply
with court orders or discovery obligations. It is reasonable to infer
Plaintiff’s conduct was willful and a lesser sanction would not
have prompted a change in attitude.4
II. Karpeles’s Suspension
For the first time on appeal, Plaintiff argues the judgment
is a “nullified result” because Karpeles was ineligible to practice
on the date of the hearing on Lorna’s sanctions motion, and
neither Plaintiff nor the trial court had notice of this fact. In
4 Plaintiff’s post-hearing e-mail to counsel offering Plaintiff’s
deposition on 48 hours’ notice within the next 10 days was not
before the trial court. In any event, it tellingly continues to
subject Plaintiff’s availability for deposition to reciprocation of
unilaterally imposed conditions (e.g., in person, with document
production) that the trial court found “not legally supported.”
12
support, Plaintiff relies primarily on Code of Civil Procedure5
section 286 and Russell v. Dopp (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 765, 775,
777–778 (Russell). Plaintiff forfeited his argument by failing to
raise it in the trial court.
“ ‘As a general rule, theories not raised in the trial court
cannot be asserted for the first time on appeal.’ ” (Nellie Gail
Ranch Owners Assn. v. McMullin (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 982, 997.)
One exception to this rule is where the appellant challenges the
trial court’s subject matter, or fundamental, jurisdiction. (Wilson
v. Southern California Edison Co. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 123,
143–144.) We read Plaintiff’s argument—including citation to
Russell, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at page 778, that the “general
rule” is a judgment obtained against a person represented by an
unlicensed attorney is “void”—as seeking the benefit of this
exception. We do so because “[a] judgment is void if the trial court
lacks jurisdiction in a fundamental sense, as where it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction, lacked personal jurisdiction over the
defendant, or granted relief the court had no power to grant.”
(W. Bradley Electric, Inc. v. Mitchell Engineering (2024)
100 Cal.App.5th 1, 13.) In contrast, “[i]f the court has
fundamental jurisdiction but exceeds its jurisdiction by acting
5 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
Section 286 provides: “When an attorney dies, or is
removed or suspended, or ceases to act as such, a party to an
action, for whom he was acting as attorney, must, before any
further proceedings are had against him, be required by the
adverse party, by written notice, to appoint another attorney, or
to appear in person.”
13
contrary to its statutory duties, the judgment is merely voidable,
not void.” (Ibid.)
Here, there is no dispute that the trial court had
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit and the parties.
The only question is whether the trial court lost that jurisdiction
when Karpeles was rendered “ineligible” to practice law for
failing to comply with CTAPP requirements but nevertheless
represented plaintiff at the hearing on Lorna’s sanctions motion.
As a matter of law, it did not.
“A lack of jurisdiction in its fundamental or strict sense
results in ‘ “an entire absence of power to hear or determine the
case, an absence of authority over the subject matter or the
parties.” [Citation.] On the other hand, a court may have
jurisdiction in the strict sense but nevertheless lack
“ ‘jurisdiction’ (or power) to act except in a particular manner, or
to give certain kinds of relief, or to act without the occurrence of
certain procedural prerequisites.” [Citation.] When a court fails to
conduct itself in the manner prescribed, it is said to have acted in
excess of jurisdiction.’ ” (People v. Lara (2010) 48 Cal.4th 216,
224–225 (Lara).) “ ‘[F]undamental jurisdiction cannot be
conferred by waiver, estoppel, or consent. Rather, an act beyond a
court’s jurisdiction in the fundamental sense is null and void’ ab
initio.” (Id. at p. 225.) “ ‘In contrast, an act in excess of
jurisdiction is valid until set aside, and parties may be precluded
from setting it aside by such things as waiver, estoppel, or the
passage of time.’ ” (Ibid.)
Accepting for the sake of argument that Plaintiff was
entitled to notice under section 286 before the trial court entered
judgment (even though there is no evidence defendants had
knowledge of the facts giving rise to the notice obligation), entry
14
of judgment was an “ ‘act without the occurrence of [this]
procedural prerequisite[],’ ” i.e., an act “ ‘in excess of jurisdiction’ ”
(Lara, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 224–225), not an act in a matter
where fundamental jurisdiction was absent. Plaintiff’s challenge
is therefore not to the trial court’s fundamental jurisdiction to
enter the judgment.
Aldrich v. San Fernando Valley Lumber Co. (1985)
170 Cal.App.3d 725, 730 (Aldrich), cited by Plaintiff, states that a
judgment entered in violation of section 286 is “void.” A closer
reading of Aldrich shows that the word “voidable” was intended.
The Aldrich court concluded that the dismissal order in that case
was “void” because the trial court “act[ed] in excess of its
authority,” not without authority. (Id. at p. 743.) Moreover, the
court acknowledged that a party can waive the protections of
section 286. (Aldrich, supra, at p. 742.) Indeed, courts uniformly
hold that the notice provisions of section 286 may be waived.
(California Water Service Co. v. Edward Sidebotham & Son
(1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 715, 736; see also Gion v. Stroud (1961)
191 Cal.App.2d 277, 280; Raps v. Raps (1942) 20 Cal.2d 382, 386.)
That section 286 notice is waivable is incompatible with the idea
that section 286 can suspend a trial court’s fundamental
jurisdiction because “ ‘[f]undamental jurisdiction cannot be
conferred by waiver, estoppel, or consent.’ ” (Lara, supra,
48 Cal.4th at p. 225.)
The necessity of first raising this issue in the trial court is
underscored by the need for additional facts to support Plaintiff’s
position. Plaintiff cites two cases, Russell and Aldrich that
address the validity of a judgment against a party whose putative
counsel in the proceedings was unlicensed. In each case, it was
not enough to set aside judgment that the counsel was unlicensed
15
or a section 286 notice had not been given. Rather, the courts
performed extensive factual analyses before reaching their
conclusions. And, importantly, in each case there was a direct
causal link between the putative attorney’s unlicensed status and
the adverse outcome for the client. (See Russell, supra,
36 Cal.App.4th at pp. 778, 780 [trial court “comment[ed] on the
poor performance of the unlicensed person,” whose failure to
object to evidence “undoubtedly contributed to the adverse
verdict”]; Aldrich, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d at pp. 735–736, 739 [the
appellant was the victim of attorney’s “positive misconduct” by
“total[ly] fail[ing] . . . to represent his client” after he was
suspended, resulting in discovery defaults and, ultimately, a
terminating sanction].) Put another way, in each case the client
was prejudiced by the lack of licensure.
Here, the undeveloped record is insufficient to compel
reversal. Crucially, there is no evidence of a causal link between
Karpeles’s ineligibility to practice and the outcome of the hearing
on Lorna’s motion for terminating sanctions.6 Rather, the record
shows only that Karpeles appeared at the hearing shortly after
he was rendered ineligible for administrative reasons relating to
the State Bar’s CTAPP.
In People v. Ngo (1996) 14 Cal.4th 30, our Supreme Court
considered a similar fact pattern but in the criminal context
where the right to competent licensed counsel is constitutionally
6 We refer only to this event and not subsequent events
involving the ineligible Karpeles—particularly the motion for
reconsideration he filed—because Plaintiff, in propria persona,
mooted the motion for reconsideration Karpeles filed by filing a
notice of appeal.
16
guaranteed. (Id. at p. 32; see also Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) There,
the defendant had been represented by licensed counsel through
trial but, at the time of his sentencing hearing, counsel was
placed on inactive status to noncompliance with mandatory
continuing legal education (MCLE) requirements. (Ngo, supra, at
p. 32.) The trial court rejected the defendant’s attempts to
withdraw his plea and obtain new counsel, accepted the plea, and
sentenced the defendant to prison. (Id. at p. 33.) The Court of
Appeal reversed the defendant’s conviction “without examining
the quality of counsel’s representation or inquiring whether
prejudice resulted from counsel’s inactive status.” (Id. at p. 32.)
The Supreme Court concluded this was error. (Ibid.) After
examining the history and purpose of the MCLE requirement,
the administrative consequence of noncompliance, and the ease
with which an attorney may regain eligibility through
compliance, the court acknowledged that “although MCLE
requirements clearly do relate to professional competence, in the
sense they are intended to enhance the competence of attorneys
practicing law in this state, the inference is unwarranted that
any and all noncompliance with those requirements necessarily
establishes an attorney’s professional incompetence or
constitutionally deficient performance in representation following
enrollment on inactive status.” (Id. at p. 36.)
In short, an attorney’s ineligibility to practice is not per se
evidence of his incompetence and more must be shown before
such ineligibility will taint a judgment against his client.
Therefore, the bare fact of Karpales’s inactive status for CTAPP
noncompliance when he appeared at the hearing on the motion
for terminating sanctions is an insufficient basis on which to
invalidate the judgment.
17
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendants to recover their costs
on appeal.
RICHARDSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.
GOORVITCH, J.
Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
18
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