People v. Perez CA6

CourtListener 10661887Calctapp27 août 2025

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Filed 8/27/25 P. v. Perez CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, H052417
(Monterey County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. SS111071A)

v.

PEDRO PEREZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

In 2013, defendant Pedro Perez pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter and
admitted gang and firearm allegations. The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of
41 years in state prison. In 2024, Perez filed an “Invitation to Recall Sentence” under
Penal Code section 1172.1.1 Based on subdivision (c) of that section, the trial court
declined to take any action on the motion, and Perez appealed.
At issue is whether a trial court’s decision not to act on a defendant’s request for
resentencing under section 1172.1 constitutes an appealable order. For the reasons
below, we conclude the trial court’s order in this case did not affect Perez’s substantial
rights under section 1237, subdivision (b). We therefore lack jurisdiction, and we must
dismiss the appeal.

1
Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
In 2013, in exchange for a stipulated sentence of 41 years in prison, Perez pleaded
no contest to voluntary manslaughter. (§ 192, subd. (a).) He admitted allegations that he
personally used a firearm in the commission of the offense (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)); that he
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)); and that the
crime was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a
criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). The trial court imposed the agreed-upon
term of 41 years, equal to the upper term of 11 years for manslaughter, plus consecutive
terms of 10 years for the gang enhancement and 20 years for the firearm enhancement
under section 12022.53, subdivision (c). The court stayed a 10-year term for the firearm
enhancement under section 12022.5, subdivision (a). Perez did not appeal.
In December 2023, Perez filed a pro se petition for recall and resentencing under
section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) and People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608 (denial
of the opportunity to petition for resentencing by juvenile offenders sentenced to the
functional equivalent of life without parole violates equal protection). In a written
opposition to the petition, the prosecution argued Perez was ineligible for resentencing
because he had not yet been incarcerated for 15 years. Perez also filed a pro se “Request
for Appointment of Counsel to Motion the Court for Relief Under the California Racial
Justice Act.” Perez’s request alleged a violation of the California Racial Justice Act
(RJA) as codified in part at section 745, subdivision (a). The trial court appointed
counsel to represent Perez in these matters and scheduled a hearing on them.
In February 2024, counsel for Perez filed an “Invitation to Recall Sentence” under
section 1172.1, seeking the benefit of various ameliorative changes in sentencing laws
enacted after his judgment had become final. Counsel also filed a “Motion for Relevant
Data” under section 745, subdivision (d), seeking discovery under the RJA.

2
The facts of the offense are immaterial to our analysis.

2
In August 2024, the trial court held a hearing on the above matters. Perez moved
to withdraw the petition for resentencing under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) without
prejudice to refiling it upon his fifteenth year of incarceration. The court granted the
motion. The court then dismissed the discovery motion under section 745, subdivision
(a), ruling that the court lacked jurisdiction under that section because Perez’s judgment
was final, such that he was required to file a habeas petition to obtain relief under the
RJA.
As to the invitation to resentence under section 1172.1, the trial court stated,
“[P]ursuant to 1172.1 subdivision (c), the Court respectfully declines to entertain this
motion and will not take any action on this motion pursuant to that provision.”
Perez timely filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s decision not to take
action on the invitation under section 1172.1. We ordered Perez to show cause why the
appeal should not be dismissed as taken from a nonappealable order. After Perez
responded, we deferred the question of appealability for consideration with the appeal
and requested the parties to fully brief the question in their opening and responsive briefs.
II. DISCUSSION
Perez contends the trial court’s order declining to take action on his request for
resentencing under section 1172.1 constitutes an appealable order under section 1237,
subdivision (b). The Attorney General argues Perez has no right to appeal the trial
court’s decision because it did not affect his substantial rights under section 1237.
A. Legal Principles
In 2023, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 600 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.),
amending section 1172.1 to grant trial courts the jurisdiction to initiate resentencing on
the court’s own motion at any time, if the applicable sentencing laws have changed since
the defendant’s original sentencing. (Stats. 2023, ch. 446, § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2024.) As
amended, section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1) provides in part: “When a defendant, upon
conviction for a felony offense, has been committed to the custody of the Secretary of the

3
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation . . ., the court may, on its own motion,
within 120 days of the date of commitment or at any time if the applicable sentencing
laws at the time of original sentencing are subsequently changed by new statutory
authority or case law . . . . recall the sentence and commitment previously ordered and
resentence the defendant in the same manner as if they had not previously been
sentenced . . . .”
Section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1) further provides that a trial court may recall a
sentence and resentence the defendant “at any time upon the recommendation of the
secretary or the Board of Parole Hearings in the case of a defendant incarcerated in state
prison, the county correctional administrator in the case of a defendant incarcerated in
county jail, the district attorney of the county in which the defendant was sentenced, or
the Attorney General if the Department of Justice originally prosecuted the case, recall
the sentence and commitment previously ordered and resentence the defendant in the
same manner as if they had not previously been sentenced . . . .”
Finally, section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1) provides: “Recall and resentencing
under this section may be initiated by the original sentencing judge, a judge designated
by the presiding judge, or any judge with jurisdiction in the case.” (Ibid.) However, “[a]
defendant is not entitled to file a petition seeking relief from the court under this section.
If a defendant requests consideration for relief under this section, the court is not required
to respond.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (c).)
The right of appeal is statutory, and a judgment or order is not appealable unless
expressly made so by statute. (Teal v. Superior Court (2014) 60 Cal.4th 595, 598 (Teal).)
Subdivision (d) of section 1172.1 refers to an appeal from a ruling “on a referral
authorized by this section,” but the statute is silent on the appealability of a trial court’s
decision whether to act on a defendant’s request for resentencing in the absence of a
referral. Under section 1237, however, a defendant may appeal from “any order made
after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the party.” (§ 1237, subd. (b).) “[A]

4
postjudgment order ‘affecting the substantial rights of the party’ [citation] does not turn
on whether that party’s claim is meritorious, but instead on the nature of the claim and
the court’s ruling thereto.” (Teal, at p. 600.)
B. The Trial Court’s Order Did Not Affect Perez’s Substantial Rights
Perez requested resentencing under section 1172.1 to obtain the benefit of various
ameliorative changes in the sentencing laws enacted after his judgment became final—
e.g., amendments to section 1170 effected by Senate Bill No. 567 (2020-2021 Reg.
Sess.), which made the middle term of a sentencing triad the presumptive term, among
other changes. (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3, eff. Jan. 1, 2022.) The Attorney General does
not dispute that the sentencing laws applicable at the time of Perez’s sentencing were
subsequently changed by new statutory authority or case law within the meaning of
section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1). Nor does the Attorney General argue that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to resentence Perez on the court’s own motion under section
1172.1. Rather, the Attorney General contends subdivision (c) statutorily forecloses a
defendant’s right to request resentencing under section 1172.1, such that a court’s
decision not to act on a request does not affect the defendant’s substantial rights under
section 1237, subdivision (b). The Attorney General argues the trial court’s decision is
therefore not appealable.
Perez acknowledges, as he must, that under section 1172.1, subdivision (c) he was
not entitled to file a petition for resentencing under that section. But he distinguishes
between the filing of a petition and a defendant’s “invitation” to the court to initiate
resentencing, and he asserts nothing in the statute prohibits the latter. Section 1172.1,
subdivision (c) refers to a defendant “request[ing] consideration for relief,” and the plain
language of the statute does not expressly deprive a defendant of the right to do so. But
that subdivision also provides that “the court is not required to respond” to such a request,
raising the question whether the trial court’s decision not to act on Perez’s request
constituted an order affecting his substantial rights under section 1237, subdivision (b).

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As of the filing of this opinion, four courts of appeal have held that a trial court’s
decision not to act on a defendant’s request for resentencing under section 1172.1 was not
appealable. (People v. Brinson (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1040; People v. Roy (2025)
110 Cal.App.5th 991 (Roy); People v. Faustinos (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 687 (Faustinos);
People v. Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985 (Hodge).) All four courts concluded the
trial court’s decision did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights under section 1237,
subdivision (b).
Perez relies instead on People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367 (Carmony), in
which the California Supreme Court held the abuse of discretion standard of review
applies to a trial court’s decision not to dismiss or strike a sentencing allegation under
section 1385. (Id. at p. 376.) Under section 1385, subdivision (a), “The judge . . . may,
either on motion of the court or upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, and in
furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed.” At Carmony’s sentencing
hearing, he moved to dismiss two prior strike convictions under section 1385, but based
on his record, the trial court concluded that Carmony fell within the spirit of the Three
Strikes Law and declined to dismiss the strikes. (Carmony, at p. 373.)
On review, the Supreme Court rejected a lower court’s “faulty” reasoning that
because section 1385 does not give a defendant the right to make a motion, a trial court
has no obligation to rule on such a motion, and that a trial court’s decision not to grant
the motion is therefore not reviewable on appeal. (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 375.)
The Court held, “A defendant has no right to make a motion, and the trial court has no
obligation to make a ruling, under section 1385. But he or she does have the right to
‘invite the court to exercise its power by an application to strike a count or allegation of
an accusatory pleading, and the court must consider evidence offered by the defendant in
support of his assertion that the dismissal would be in furtherance of justice.’ [Citation.]”
(Id. at p. 375.) The Court characterized a trial court’s decision to dismiss a prior
conviction and the decision not to dismiss it as “flip sides of the same coin,” and the

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Court noted that the prosecution had the power to appeal a trial court’s decision to
dismiss a strike on its own motion. (Id. at pp. 375-376.) The Court concluded that “as a
matter of logic and fairness, the defendant should have the concomitant power to appeal a
court’s decision not to dismiss a prior under section 1385 even though he or she cannot
make a motion to dismiss.” (Id. at p. 376.)
Perez contends the same logic applies here. We are not persuaded. The issue in
Carmony was not whether a court of review would have jurisdiction over the trial court’s
decision. In referring to Carmony’s “power to appeal” the trial court’s decision, the
Court was addressing the reviewability of the decision on appeal, not its appealability as
a jurisdictional matter. Carmony had a statutory right to appeal his sentence as a “final
judgment of conviction” under section 1237, subdivision (a). Accordingly, the Carmony
Court had no occasion to consider whether the trial court’s decision affected Carmony’s
substantial rights under section 1237, subdivision (b) because the decision was not an
“order made after judgment.” “It is axiomatic that cases are not authority for
propositions not considered.” (People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250, 1268, fn. 10.)
Perez also relies on People v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155 (Loper). In Loper, the
Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the Secretary)
recommended to the trial court that Loper’s sentence be recalled under section 1170,
former section (e) and that he be granted compassionate release due to his medical
condition. (Id. at p. 1158.) The trial court denied the recommendation, and Loper
appealed but the Secretary did not. The Court of Appeal held the trial court’s order was
not appealable under section 1237, subdivision (b), reasoning that “because ‘a defendant
has no right to apply to the court for an order recalling the sentence on compassionate
release grounds,’ his ‘substantial rights are not affected by the trial court’s order denying
recall of his sentence.’ ” (Loper, at p. 1161.) On review, the California Supreme Court
recognized that the statutory scheme governing recall and resentencing for compassionate
release did not authorize a prisoner to initiate such a proceeding independent of prison or

7
parole authorities; only the Secretary or Board of Parole Hearings could do so. (Ibid.)
Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision, holding,
“We conclude that when the proceeding is properly initiated by prison or parole
authorities as required by law, the trial court’s decision produces an appealable order that
may be appealed by the prisoner.” (Id. at p. 1158.)
In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the assumption that one must be the
moving party in the trial court in order to acquire the right to appeal an adverse ruling.
(Loper, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 1161.) The Court observed that the plain language of
section 1237, subdivision (b) is not limited to appeals taken from orders denying a
defendant’s motion; the language allows criminal defendants to appeal from “any” order
made after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the party. (Id. at p. 1163.) The
Court then cited with approval several cases in which lower courts have “recognized a
defendant’s right to appeal in situations in which he was not, and could not be, the
moving party.” (Ibid.) The Court concluded these cases “demonstrate that a defendant
may appeal an adverse decision on a postjudgment motion or petition if it affects his
substantial rights, even if someone else brought the original motion.” (Id. at p. 1165.)
The Court also concluded that the trial court’s denial of the motion affected
Loper’s substantial rights. “Although defendant has no independent right to initiate
compassionate release proceedings in the trial court, the Secretary evaluated defendant’s
medical condition and made a recommendation for compassionate release on his behalf.
By providing a mechanism for releasing eligible prisoners from custody, [former] section
1170(e) implicates a prisoner’s substantial interest in personal liberty.” (Loper, supra,
60 Cal.4th at p. 1161, fn. 3.) Additionally, the compassionate release statute
“establishe[d] eligibility criteria [citation], suggesting that discretion is not unfettered
when evidence is presented satisfying the statutory criteria.” (Ibid.)
Under Loper, the first sentence of section 1172.1, subdivision (c) (“A defendant is
not entitled to file a petition seeking relief from the court under this section”) does not by

8
itself make the trial court’s decision nonappealable. (Roy, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at
p. 997; Hodge, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 996.) In Loper, however, the trial court was
required to consider whether to recall his sentence in response to the Secretary’s
recommendation: “Within 10 days of receipt of a positive recommendation by the
secretary or the board, the court shall hold a hearing to consider whether the prisoner’s
sentence should be recalled.” (§ 1170, former subd. (e)(3), italics added.) (See also Teal,
supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 600 [holding appealable a trial court’s determination that
petitioner was ineligible for resentencing under section 1170.126 where the trial court
was required to determine petitioner’s eligibility for resentencing upon the filing of the
petition].) Here, by contrast, the second sentence of subdivision (c) in section 1172.1
expressly provides that “the court is not required to respond” to a defendant’s request for
resentencing, and the statute provides no criteria by which a court should decide whether
to respond. Thus, Loper does not squarely answer the question at issue here.
The Attorney General argues Loper is inapposite because in Loper, “the trial
court’s jurisdiction had already been properly invoked by someone other than the
defendant under the relevant statute.” But under section 1172.1, a trial court’s
jurisdiction to recall a sentence does not necessarily depend on another party’s
invocation; a trial court has jurisdiction to act “on its own motion, within 120 days of the
date of commitment or at any time if the applicable sentencing laws at the time of
original sentencing are subsequently changed by new statutory authority or case law. . . .”
(§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1), italics added.)
Trial courts have long had “own-motion jurisdiction” to recall a defendant’s
sentence within 120 days of the date of commitment under section 1170, former
subdivision (d), and its predecessor statute, section 1168. (See Dix v. Superior Court
(1991) 53 Cal.3d 442, 464 (Dix).) Own-motion jurisdiction under these provisions did
not depend on the party or court taking any action; the trial court had jurisdiction to recall
a defendant’s sentence at any time during the 120-day period after commitment, and the

9
court only lost jurisdiction if it failed to recall a sentence within that period. (Id. at
p. 464.) (See also People v. Lockridge (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1752, 1757 [the 120-day
period specified in section 1170, subdivision (d) is jurisdictional; the court must recall the
sentence within the prescribed period].)
Furthermore, under section 1170, former subdivision (d), a trial court could recall
a sentence within the 120-day jurisdictional period “for any reason rationally related to
lawful sentencing.” (Dix, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 456.) This included the exercise of own-
motion jurisdiction to recall a sentence in response to an informal request from a party
who had no standing to make such a motion. “[A] recall does not exceed the court’s
‘own-motion’ jurisdiction simply because the court was approached with an informal
request to act.” (Id. at p. 465, fn. 18.) By the same token, the trial court necessarily had
jurisdiction to deny a defendant’s request for resentencing within the 120-period,
regardless of the defendant’s lack of standing to make such a request. (Portillo v.
Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1829, 1834.)
In 2021, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 1540 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.),
which moved the 120-day jurisdictional language from section 1170, former
subdivision (d) to section 1170.03, among other changes. (Stats. 2021, ch. 719, § 3.1, eff.
Jan. 1, 2022.) The Legislature then renumbered section 1170.03 as section 1172.1
without substantive changes in Assembly Bill No. 200 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.). (Stats.
2022, ch. 58, § 9, eff. June 30, 2022.) Finally, as noted above, the Legislature’s passage
of Assembly Bill No. 600 in 2023 amended section 1172.1, resulting in the version of the
statute at issue here.
Under the prior version of 1172.1, a trial court only had jurisdiction to recall a
sentence after the 120-day period “upon the recommendation” of certain authorized
parties, which “ ‘ “furnishe[d] the court with the jurisdiction it would not otherwise
possess to recall and resentence.” ’ ” (People v. E.M. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1075,
1082.) However, the most recent amendment expanded the trial court’s own-motion

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jurisdiction beyond the 120-day post-commitment period, allowing the trial court to recall
a defendant’s sentence “at any time if the applicable sentencing laws at the time of
original sentencing are subsequently changed by new statutory authority or case law. . . .”
(§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1).)
Because the Legislature appended this language to the preexisting language that
created own-motion jurisdiction during the 120-day period, the most natural reading of
the appended language is that it operates as a jurisdictional precondition in much the
same way—i.e., the trial court has own-motion jurisdiction to recall and resentence “at
any time” provided the applicable sentencing laws have changed. Such jurisdiction is not
contingent on the occurrence of any other event; as with own-motion jurisdiction during
the 120-day period, it exists as a matter of statute, regardless of whether any other party
does something—even if the court does nothing to exercise it. “Where the Legislature
has explicitly granted the trial court ‘jurisdiction to mitigate a prison sentence even after
execution of a sentence has commenced,’ the trial court necessarily retains the
jurisdiction to do so. [Citation.]” (People v. Talibdeen (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1151, 1157.)
Although the recent amendments to section 1172.1 also added subdivision (c),
clarifying that a defendant is “not entitled to file a petition seeking relief from the court,”
the plain language of the statute does not prohibit a defendant from making an informal
request. (Roy, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 997.) (See also Baker v. Superior Court
(Oct. 2, 2024, No. S286009) ____Cal.5th___[2024 Cal. LEXIS 5515] petn. for review
den. Oct. 2, 2024 (conc. statement of Evans, J.) (Baker)) [“Defendants, although not
expressly permitted to initiate recall and resentencing themselves, may nonetheless be
able to ‘invite’ the court to exercise its discretionary powers.”]) Furthermore, if the
applicable sentencing laws have changed in a given case, nothing in the language of
section 1172.1 prohibits a trial court from exercising its own-motion jurisdiction to recall
the defendant’s sentence following an informal request consistent with Dix, supra. (Roy,
at p. 998.)

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By the same token, although section 1172.1 provides that a trial court is not
required to respond to a defendant’s request for relief, a trial court obviously has
jurisdiction to expressly deny such a request. When the conditions for own-motion
jurisdiction under section 1172.1 are satisfied, we see no meaningful distinction between
an order expressly denying the request and a decision by the court declining to exercise
its own-motion jurisdiction in response to a request. (See Hodge, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th
at p. 994 [trial court’s decision declining to exercise its discretion to recall defendant’s
sentence constituted an “order” within the meaning of section 1237, subdivision (b)].)
Even if the trial court simply ignores a request with complete silence, doing so is within
the court’s jurisdiction, as section 1172.1 creates jurisdiction statutorily, whether the
court exercises it or not.
But the trial court having jurisdiction over whether to respond to an informal
request for relief under section 1172.1 does not make the trial court’s decision appealable
unless the decision affects the defendant’s substantial rights under section 1237,
subdivision (b). The Attorney General does not dispute that the trial court had own-
motion jurisdiction under section 1172.1 because the applicable sentencing laws had
changed. Nor does the Attorney General dispute that the trial court’s oral response on the
record constitutes an “order made after judgment” within the meaning of section 1237,
subdivision (b). We agree with the Attorney General, however, that the trial court’s order
in this case did not affect Perez’s substantial rights. Perez points to nothing in the record
showing otherwise. Instead, Perez relies solely on the language of section 1172.1 and the
relevant caselaw to support his argument, just as the Attorney General relies on these
sources for the contrary position.3

3
Perez relies primarily on People v. Chatman (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 650, but
that opinion has since been vacated.

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We see nothing in the record showing the trial court’s order affected Perez’s
substantial rights under section 1237, subdivision (b). Accordingly, we conclude we lack
jurisdiction, and we will dismiss the appeal.
III. DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.

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_______________________________
Greenwood, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

______________________________________
Grover, J.

______________________________________
Lie, J.

People v. Perez
H052417

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