CourtListener 10660218•People v. Monroe CA2/8
Texte intégral
Filed 8/25/25 P. v. Monroe CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B334375
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. MA073532)
v.
JAMIE MONROE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Robert G. Chu, Judge. Affirmed.
Joanna McKim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Kathy S. Pomerantz, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________________
INTRODUCTION
In January 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg.
Sess.) amended murder law to ensure liability is not imposed on a
defendant who was not the actual killer, did not act with the
intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying
felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life. The
legislation also added what is now Penal Code1 section 1172.6,
which created a mechanism for defendants previously convicted
of a qualifying homicide offense under the former law to petition
for retroactive relief.
In April 2021, the People filed the operative information,
charging defendant Jamie Monroe with two counts of murder.
In January 2023, a jury convicted Monroe of one count of first
degree murder, and it found true a robbery-murder special
circumstance allegation. While her direct appeal was pending,
Monroe petitioned for resentencing under section 1172.6,
challenging her murder conviction. The court denied Monroe’s
petition without appointing counsel to represent her, finding she
failed to make a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief.
On appeal, Monroe contends the court erred by summarily
denying her petition without appointing counsel to represent her
or affording her a hearing and the opportunity to file additional
briefing. Because the People charged and tried Monroe well after
Senate Bill No. 1437 went into effect, she is ineligible for relief
under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. Any error in failing to
appoint counsel to represent Monroe or in denying her the
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2
opportunity to submit additional briefing was, therefore,
harmless. Accordingly, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
In April 2021, the People filed an information charging
Monroe and a codefendant with, among other crimes, two counts
of murder. The People alleged numerous firearm allegations, as
well as multiple-murder, lying-in-wait, and robbery-murder
special circumstance allegations.
In January 2023, a jury convicted Monroe of one count of
first degree murder, and it found true the robbery-murder special
circumstance allegation. The trial court sentenced Monroe to life
in prison without the possibility of parole.
In March 2023, Monroe appealed her conviction.2 That
appeal is still pending.
In August 2023, Monroe filed a petition for resentencing
under former section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6), challenging
her murder conviction. Monroe asked the court to appoint
counsel to represent her. The court denied Monroe’s petition
without appointing counsel, finding Monroe failed to make a
prima facie showing of eligibility for resentencing.
Monroe appealed the court’s order denying her
resentencing petition.
DISCUSSION
We independently review a trial court’s order denying a
section 1172.6 resentencing petition at the prima facie stage.
(People v. Reyes (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 292, 297 (Reyes).) In doing
so, we must interpret section 1172.6 in a way that effectuates the
2 We grant Monroe’s request for judicial notice of the record
from her direct appeal of her underlying conviction.
3
Legislature’s intent, while avoiding a construction of the statute
that would produce absurd consequences that the Legislature
could not have intended. (Ibid.)
For a petitioner to be eligible for resentencing under
section 1172.6, the following conditions must be met: (1) a
complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the
petitioner allowing the prosecution to proceed under a now-
invalid theory of murder; (2) following a trial, or the acceptance of
a plea offer in lieu of a trial, the petitioner was convicted of
murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter; and (3) the
petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or
attempted murder because of changes to section 188 or 189 made
effective January 1, 2019, by Senate Bill No. 1437. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a).)
Once a petitioner files a facially sufficient resentencing
petition, the trial court must, at the petitioner’s request, appoint
counsel to represent the petitioner. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b); see also
People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) Once the
court has appointed counsel and given the parties the
opportunity for briefing, it may consider the record of conviction
to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie
showing of eligibility for relief. (Lewis, at p. 957.) Although the
court may not engage in factfinding involving the weighing of
evidence or exercise of discretion at the prima facie stage, it may
deny a resentencing petition without issuing an order to show
cause if the record contains facts refuting the petition’s
allegations. (People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 563.)
We need not decide whether the trial court erred when it
denied Monroe’s petition at the prima facie stage without
appointing counsel to represent her or affording her the
4
opportunity to file additional briefing. Assuming there was error,
it was harmless because Monroe is ineligible for resentencing
under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. (See Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at pp. 973–974 [a petitioner “ ‘whose petition is denied
before an order to show cause issues has the burden of showing
“it is reasonably probable that if [she] had been afforded
assistance of counsel [her] petition would not have been
summarily denied without an evidentiary hearing” ’ ”].)
Here, the People filed the operative charging document—
the information—in April 2021, well after Senate Bill No. 1437
went into effect and eliminated the now-invalid theories of
murder. Thus, throughout the period in which Monroe was
charged, tried, and convicted, the prosecution was precluded from
proving she was guilty of murder under an imputed malice
theory. In other words, the record conclusively establishes that
Monroe is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of
law. (See Reyes, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 297–298
[concluding defendant was ineligible for relief under section
1172.6 because the defendant was charged, tried, and convicted
after Senate Bill No. 1437 went into effect].) Any error in the
court’s decision to summarily deny Monroe’s resentencing
petition without appointing counsel to represent her or affording
her the opportunity to file additional briefing was, therefore,
harmless.
5
DISPOSITION
The order denying Monroe’s resentencing petition is
affirmed.
VIRAMONTES, J.
WE CONCUR:
STRATTON, P. J.
WILEY, J.
6
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