Manuel Q. v. Bowman CA2/1

CourtListener 10658927Calctapp22 août 2025

Texte intégral

Filed 8/22/25 Manuel Q. v. Bowman CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

MANUEL Q., B341106

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24WHRO01418)
v.

KANDIS BOWMAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Maria Puente-Porras, Judge. Reversed.
Decker Law, James Decker and Chris Jones, for Defendant
and Appellant.
No Appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Kandis Bowman appeals the issuance of a restraining order
against her pursuant to the Domestic Violence Prevention Act
(DVPA; Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.).1 Bowman argues the trial
court abused its discretion by refusing to allow her to testify in
opposition to the restraining order request. We agree the
evidentiary hearing was improperly one-sided and reverse.
BACKGROUND
On July 3, 2024, Manuel Q.2 filed a request for a domestic
violence restraining order (DVRO) against Bowman, his former
girlfriend, based on her allegedly abusive behavior. The trial
court issued a temporary restraining order that same day and set
a hearing on the issuance of a permanent restraining order for
July 24, 2024. On July 15, 2024, Bowman’s counsel filed a
response to the DVRO request. The response included a sworn
declaration from Bowman disputing Manuel’s claims of abuse
along with attached exhibits in support of her position.
The July 24, 2024 hearing occurred during a ransomware
attack that made it impossible for the trial court to view the
electronic case file containing the parties’ pleadings. The trial
court kept the temporary restraining order in place, continued
the hearing on the issuance of a permanent order to September 4,
2024, and ordered the parties to exchange witness lists, exhibit
lists, and exhibits pertinent to the hearing no later than
August 23, 2024. Bowman timely filed and served a witness list

1 Unspecified statutory references are to the Family Code.

2 As a person seeking protection from alleged domestic
violence, we refer to Manuel Q. initially by his first name and last
initial (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(1)), and thereafter by his
first name only for ease of reference. No disrespect is intended.

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naming herself and Manuel, along with an exhibit list that
attached copies of the identified exhibits. Manuel did not file
anything.
Manuel and Bowman both appeared at the September 4,
2024 hearing. Bowman was represented by counsel3 who
appeared telephonically; Manuel was self-represented. Manuel
asked for a continuance to gather more evidence, and the court
denied the request. After having both parties sworn in, the court
explained the process it would employ to resolve Manuel’s DVRO
request. The court said it would first ask Manuel questions
about what he contended had occurred, and then Bowman’s
counsel could cross-examine Manuel. Once that was finished,
“whomever is [Manuel’s] next witness, whether it is [Bowman] or
if the attorney calls [Bowman], [Manuel] will have the same
opportunity to ask her questions.”
The court questioned Manuel to elicit his version of what
occurred. Bowman’s counsel then cross-examined Manuel; the
cross-examination was at times contentious, with the court
cautioning counsel about his tone, admonishing counsel not to
interrupt, and sustaining its own objections to irrelevant
questions. When the questioning of Manuel concluded, Manuel
stated he had no further witnesses. The court then asked
Bowman’s counsel if he had any witnesses, and he responded
“No.”
The court proceeded to grant a five-year DVRO in Manuel’s
favor and orally set forth its prohibitions. As the court was
stating its ruling, Bowman attempted to interject, saying “I have

3 The counsel who represented Bowman before the trial
court is not her appellate counsel in this matter.

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a --.” The court did not acknowledge Bowman’s interruption and
continued speaking until it had completed making its orders.
After the court said it was done, Bowman objected that she did
not get a chance to tell her side of the story before the DVRO was
issued. The court said Bowman did not have such an opportunity
because “[y]our attorney indicated there [were] no other
witnesses. . . . [W]e are done.” Bowman’s counsel said he had
understood from the court’s introductory remarks that it would
question Bowman in the first instance; Bowman indicated she
had the same understanding. The court explained that was not
what it had said, and if Bowman and her counsel thought that
“[t]hen you thought wrong” and “we’re done. You made a choice.”
Bowman’s counsel continued to state he did not intend to make
any such choice and to ask that the court hear from Bowman,
with the court responding “we’re done” on multiple occasions, at
which point counsel blurted “[y]ou said we’re done” and hung up
the phone. The court then told Bowman to consult with her
attorney and ended the hearing.
Bowman timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Bowman asserts we should reverse and remand for a new
evidentiary hearing because the trial court denied her due
process, including a fair opportunity to present evidence in her
defense. We agree.
“Generally, we review a trial court’s decision to grant or
deny a restraining order under the DVPA for an abuse of
discretion. [Citation.] However, ‘ “[a]ll exercises of discretion
must be guided by applicable legal principles . . . which are
derived from the statute under which discretion is conferred.
[Citations.] . . . [A] discretionary order based on an application

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of improper criteria or incorrect legal assumptions is not an
exercise of informed discretion and is subject to reversal.
[Citation.]” [Citation.] “The question of whether a trial court
applied the correct legal standard to an issue in exercising its
discretion is a question of law [citation] requiring de novo review
[citation].” ’ ” (Jan F. v. Natalie F. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 583,
592-593.) Likewise, “ ‘[w]e independently review due process
claims “because ‘the ultimate determination of procedural
fairness amounts to a question of law.’ ” ’ ” (In re Marriage of
D.S. & A.S. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 926, 933.)
Permanent restraining order “hearings are subject to
section 217” (In re Marriage of D.S. & A.S., supra, 87 Cal.App.5th
at p. 934), which requires that courts “receive any live, competent
testimony that is relevant and within the scope of the hearing.”
(§ 217, subd. (a).) “Apart from the provisions of the statute
applicable to this proceeding, it is the general rule that the right
of a party to testify in his own behalf is fundamental.”
(Guardianship of Waite (1939) 14 Cal.2d 727, 729-730.)
“ ‘Denying a party the right to testify or to offer evidence is
reversible per se.’ ” (In re Marriage of Carlsson (2008) 163
Cal.App.4th 281, 291.)
Both parties here sought to present live testimony. Manuel
testified; Bowman filed a witness list before the hearing that
included herself. Bowman and her counsel both stated they
understood the court would question Bowman as it had
questioned Manuel and that they did not intend to waive their
right to present any evidence in opposition to the DVRO request.

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This belief was neither feigned nor unreasonable.4 Before the
evidentiary hearing began, the court addressed how it would
receive testimony. The court told Bowman’s counsel that it would
either let Manuel “tell [the court] from the beginning what [his]
basis” was for seeking a restraining order, or the court would
“ask questions to get the information” before “open[ing] it up for
the opposing side to cross-examine.” Counsel stated he was fine
doing it either way, and the court indicated its preference for
asking questions first.
The court did not separately explain how it would address
Bowman’s testimony. But the court’s statements created the
impression that at some point the court was going to hear from
Bowman, and one can understand how Bowman thought the
court’s preference was similarly to question her in the first
instance. The court did tell Manuel that “whomever is your next
witness, whether it is [Bowman] or if the attorney calls
[Bowman], you will have the same opportunity to ask her
questions.” We decline to find the passing reference to “if the
attorney calls [Bowman]” in a colloquy with Manuel about the
presentation of his evidence an undeniably clear directive that
the court would not employ the same process it had used with
Manuel when it was Bowman’s turn, or to mean that Bowman
and her counsel knowingly and intentionally waived their right to
present any defense evidence at all—despite Bowman listing

4 If the actions of Bowman and her counsel demonstrated
gamesmanship—for example, a knowing waiver of the right to
present evidence that was reconsidered only upon learning the
court had ruled against Bowman—we would of course analyze
this matter differently. As that is not the case here, we express
no opinion on such a situation.

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herself as a witness on her witness list, despite her submitting an
affidavit before the hearing outlining her testimony, despite filing
a list of exhibits she intended to introduce at the hearing, and
despite promptly clarifying that she intended no such waiver
once the misunderstanding became apparent.
The court’s refusal to reopen the evidentiary hearing and
let Bowman testify in these circumstances was an abuse of
discretion. Compounding the prejudice from the court’s refusal to
hear Bowman’s testimony is that the court did not consider her
declaration in opposition to the DVRO request while nevertheless
relying on the supporting affidavit filed by Manuel. We know the
court relied on Manuel’s declaration because the court ordered
Bowman to pay $600 for damages suffered by Manuel from the
alleged abuse. The only evidence of this $600 figure is in
Manuel’s sworn DVRO request; he did not testify to that amount
(or any other) during the hearing.
Although the DVPA provides that a court “may issue” a
DVRO based on “the affidavit . . . of the person requesting the
restraining order” (§ 6300, subd. (a)), it does not provide for the
automatic admission into evidence of declarations at a permanent
restraining order hearing conducted pursuant to section 217. (Cf.
In re Marriage of Shimkus (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1270-
1271 [discussing § 217 hearings generally].) The court did not
say anything suggesting it was going to consider the parties’
declarations as evidence. “To the contrary: the trial court gave
every indication at the hearing that it intended not to consider
the [parties’ d]eclaration[s] in issuing its ruling.” (In re Marriage
of Swain (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 830, 842.) It stated that Manuel
would need to testify “from the beginning what [his] basis is for
the court [to] consider[] granting a protective order” independent

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of the facts set forth in his declaration; the court cannot have
considered Bowman’s declaration as it did not permit Manuel to
cross-examine her about its contents. (Id. at p. 842 [§ 217
requires the court to provide “the opportunity to cross-examine”
an opposing party “concerning statements in her [d]eclaration on
which the trial court might rely”].) The trial court therefore erred
in relying on Manuel’s declaration when ruling (ibid.), adding to
the unfairly one-sided nature of the proceeding.
The trial court, needing to manage a busy family law
calendar, was understandably frustrated with how Bowman’s
counsel conducted himself during the September 4, 2024 hearing.
That said, “[t]he conduct of the hearing in this matter fell far
short of providing [Bowman] a meaningful opportunity to be
heard.” (In re Marriage of D.S. & A.S., supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at
p. 935.) The trial court abused its discretion by not reopening the
hearing to permit Bowman to present evidence in her defense,
and deciding the case based solely on evidence from Manuel.

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DISPOSITION
The September 4, 2024 restraining order is reversed, and
the matter is remanded for a new evidentiary hearing. In the
interest of justice, the parties are to bear their own costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

WEINGART, J.

We concur:

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

M. KIM, J.

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