People v. Villa CA2/3

CourtListener 10657599Calctapp20 août 2025

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Filed 8/20/25 P. v. Villa CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B337627

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA081790)
v.

AUGUSTINE RICKY VILLA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Jacqueline H. Lewis, Judge. Affirmed and
remanded with direction.
Unite The People and Crystal A. Morgan for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Michael J. Wise,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Augustine Ricky Villa appeals from an order recalling his
sentence and resentencing him pursuant to Penal Code section
1172.75.1 The trial court struck Villa’s two prior prison term
enhancements under the statute, but refused to further reduce
his sentence. On appeal, Villa argues that the trial court erred in
considering Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats.
2021, ch. 441, § 1) to be discretionary, rather than mandatory,
and in punishing him through multiple sections of the Penal
Code in violation of section 654. We find no abuse of discretion
and therefore affirm the judgment. However, we agree with Villa
that the abstract of judgment fails to accurately reflect the
custody credits he earned prior to his original sentencing date.
We therefore remand for the trial court to correct the abstract of
judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Underlying Conviction and Sentence
By an information filed in March 2008, the People charged
Villa with home invasion robbery (§ 211; count 1), first degree
burglary (§ 459; count 2), and grand theft auto (§ 487, subd.
(d)(1); count 3). The information also alleged that Villa had a
prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–
(d)), a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and
served two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Villa’s 2002
robbery conviction served as the basis for both the prior strike
conviction and the prior serious felony conviction enhancement.

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

2
In June 2008, a jury convicted Villa on all counts. Villa
waived his right to a jury trial on the remaining allegations, and
the trial court found those true. In July 2008, the court
sentenced Villa to the upper term of nine years on count 1,
doubled to 18 years pursuant to the prior strike conviction.
(§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1).) The court also imposed a consecutive
five-year enhancement for the prior serious felony conviction
(§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) and two consecutive one-year enhancements
for each of Villa’s prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), for a
total term of 25 years. The court sentenced Villa to four years on
count 2 and two years on count 3, but stayed those terms
pursuant to section 654. Villa was awarded 217 days of custody
credit (189 days actual custody credit and 28 days of local conduct
credits).
On direct appeal, this court reversed the conviction on
count 3, but otherwise affirmed the judgment. (People v. Villa
(Mar. 24, 2010, B210891) [nonpub. opn.].)
The Resentencing Proceedings
Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020
Reg. Sess.) amended section 667.5, subdivision (b), to limit the
one-year prior prison term enhancements to convictions for
certain sexually violent offenses, as defined in Welfare and
Institutions Code section 6600, subdivision (b). (Stats. 2019,
ch. 590, § 1; People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1054 [one-
year prior prison term enhancements eliminated for all prior
crimes except certain sexually violent offenses].) Effective
January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 483 (2012–2022 Reg. Sess.)
applied that change retroactively by adding former section
1171.1, now section 1172.75. (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, §§ 1, 3; Stats.
2022, ch. 58.)

3
Section 1172.75 directs the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to identify eligible
persons serving a term that includes an enhancement for a prior
prison term under section 667.5, subdivision (b), and to provide
the name and case information of such persons to the sentencing
court that imposed the enhancement. (§ 1172.75, subd. (b).) The
statute requires sentencing courts to resentence eligible
defendants and to impose “a lesser sentence than the one
originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed
enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public
safety.” (Id., subd. (d)(1).)
In March 2023, the CDCR identified Villa as eligible for
possible resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75, as Villa’s prior
prison term enhancements were not based on sexually violent
offenses.2 Villa requested full resentencing on all charges and
enhancements.
In opposition to Villa’s resentencing motion, the People
argued that a lesser sentence would endanger public safety. In
the alternative, the People argued that, should the trial court
resentence Villa, it should only strike the two prior prison term
enhancements imposed under section 667.5, subdivision (b).
In response, Villa maintained that section 1172.75 required
the court to strike the two prior prison term enhancements and to
reduce his sentence by at least two years. Villa further argued
that section 654 prohibited the court from using the same 2002

2 Villa’s prior prison terms were served for a vehicle theft
(Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) and receiving stolen property
(§ 496, subd. (a)).

4
robbery conviction to double his sentence under the Three Strikes
law (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)) and to also impose a consecutive five-
year enhancement for a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667,
subd. (a)(1)). Villa requested the court to sentence him on count
2 (which carries a shorter term of imprisonment than count 1),
stay the sentence on count 1, and strike the five-year
enhancement for the prior serious felony conviction.3
On March 6, 2024, after hearing argument, the trial court
struck Villa’s two one-year prior prison term enhancements,
pursuant to section 1172.75. The court declined to further reduce
Villa’s sentence. In support of its ruling, the court cited Villa’s
extensive record of criminal conduct while in custody, stating:
“The court is striking the two [section] 667.5
enhancements. . . . I certainly see nothing here that
would be in the interest of justice to strike any
additional time. [¶] June 14, 2022, battery with a
deadly weapon. After being beaten by several
inmates, Villa approached the battered inmate and
stabbed him with a series [sic]. He was found guilty.
[¶] 5/18/22, fighting. One of two inmates beating
another inmate in the day room. Plead guilty. [¶]
10/25/21, battery on a prisoner. Pushed an inmate
using a wheelchair off of it using both hands. Plead
guilty. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] 6/16/20, battery causing
serious injury. Struck an inmate causing him to lose
consciousness. Plead guilty. [¶] 9/7/19, fighting.
One-on-one fight in the yard. Plead guilty. [¶]

3 Villa raised additional arguments at his resentencing
hearing that are not relevant to any issue on appeal.

5
2/26/19, battery on a prisoner. Upon entering a new
cell, Villa assaulted his new cell mate with his fists.
Plead guilty. [¶] I could go on. There’s – another
four and a half pages that look like that one in
regards to rules violations, but those are only the
most recent. [¶] So the court certainly does not find
that it’s in the interest of justice here to strike
anything further than the legally invalid
enhancements of the two [section] 667.5
[enhancements].”4
The court sentenced Villa to the upper term of nine years
on count 1, doubled to 18 years pursuant to the prior strike
conviction (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)), and imposed a consecutive
five-year enhancement for the prior serious felony conviction
(§ 667, subd. (a)(1)). The court sentenced Villa to four years on
count 2, and again stayed that sentence pursuant to section 654.5
Villa timely appealed.

4 During the sentencing hearing, Villa’s counsel raised the
argument that the court could not double the sentence under the
Three Strikes law and also impose the enhancement for the prior
serious felony conviction based on the same conviction, because to
do so would result in double punishment. The court specifically
rejected the argument, advising counsel she could “bring that up
to the appellate court.”
5 The trial court also inadvertently sentenced Villa to a
concurrent term of two years on count 3, the conviction previously
reversed by this court on March 24, 2010. The trial court
subsequently discovered its error, and on March 19, 2024,
vacated the sentence on count 3.

6
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Resentencing Villa
Villa does not dispute that the trial court complied with
section 667.5, subdivision (b) and section 1172.75 in striking his
two prior prison term enhancements. He instead argues that the
court erred by declining to further reduce his sentence. We
disagree.
a. Standard of review
“ ‘Where . . . a discretionary power is statutorily vested in
the trial court, its exercise of that discretion “must not be
disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court exercised
its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd
manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.
[Citations.]” ’ ” (People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 270–
271; see also People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 156 [trial
court abuses its discretion when it relies on “impermissible
factors . . . or on an incorrect legal standard”].)
“Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume that the trial
court knew the law and followed it.” (People v. Ramirez (2021) 10
Cal.5th 983, 1042 (Ramirez).) Thus, “ ‘ “[t]he burden is on the
party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing
decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of
such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to
achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary
determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set
aside on review.” ’ ” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367,
376–377 (Carmony).)

7
b. Villa has not established any abuse of discretion
under section 654
Relying on section 654, Villa first argues that the trial
court abused its discretion by imposing multiple punishments for
the same conduct under more than one section of the Penal Code.
Villa cites to his robbery and burglary convictions, as well as the
sentencing for his strike conviction and the additional
enhancement for his prior serious felony conviction.6
Villa asserts that his convictions for robbery and burglary
“stem[ ] from the same transaction” and “resulted in a double
punishment” in violation of section 654. (People v. Hester (2000)
22 Cal.4th 290, 294–295 [“Section 654 precludes multiple
punishments for a single act or indivisible course of conduct.”].)
Villa, however, was not punished for both the robbery conviction
in count 1 and the burglary conviction in count 2. The trial court
properly stayed Villa’s sentence as to count 2. “ ‘[S]ection 654
proscribes double punishment, not double conviction.’ ” (People v.
Ortega (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 659, 666.)
Villa also asserts that the trial court violated section 654
when it used the same prior conviction to double his sentence
pursuant to the Three Strikes law and to also impose the five-
year enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a)(1). But
“section 654 does not bar dual use of a prior conviction both as
the basis for three strikes sentencing and as an enhancement.”
(People v. Danowski (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 815, 823; see also

6 The People argue that the contention is forfeited, as Villa
did not raise the issue in the trial court. To the contrary, Villa
did raise the argument of multiple punishments at the time of
sentencing.

8
People v. Green (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1087–1088; People v.
Wilson (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 561, 566 [statutory prohibition
against multiple punishment for crimes arising from an
indivisible course of conduct applies to sentence enhancements
which arise from circumstances of the crime, but not to sentence
enhancements which arise from nature of the offender].) The
trial court was thus permitted to use the same conviction in
sentencing Villa under the Three Strikes law and to the
additional five-year enhancement.
Villa next argues that the trial court abused its discretion
by failing to consider imposing the shorter term of imprisonment
on count 2, the burglary conviction, and staying the longer term
of imprisonment on count 1, the robbery conviction, as section
654 now permits. We disagree.
At the time of Villa’s original sentencing in 2008, because
the two charges were based on the same acts, “the sentencing
court was required to impose the sentence that ‘provide[d] for the
longest potential term of imprisonment’ and stay execution of the
other term.” (People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 379
(Mani).) Effective January 1, 2022, Assembly Bill No. 518
amended section 654, which now provides that “[a]n act or
omission that is punishable in different ways by different
provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions,
but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more
than one provision.” (§ 654, subd. (a), italics added.)7 Thus,

7 The parties agree that the amendments to section 654
apply retroactively. (See In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740,
744–745 [where statute does not indicate otherwise, ameliorative
statutes apply to cases in which judgment is not yet final].)

9
when Villa was resentenced in March 2024, the court had
discretion to impose either the shorter term of imprisonment on
count 2 or the longer term on count 1.
Villa has not identified any evidence in the record
affirmatively demonstrating that the court abused its discretion
by declining to impose the shorter of the two sentences.
(Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 376–377.) He argues only
that the court failed to consider this possibility. But the record is
to the contrary.
Assembly Bill No. 518 took effect more than two years
before Villa’s resentencing. In his briefing in support of his
motion for resentencing, Villa cites to section 654 and requests
the court to impose a sentence on his burglary conviction and
stay the sentence on his robbery conviction. There is nothing in
the record to suggest that the trial court was not aware of its
sentencing discretion. (See People v. Coleman (2024) 98
Cal.App.5th 709, 724 [assuming trial court was aware of and
followed applicable law under amendments made effective four
months before sentencing].) Although the court did not expressly
state that it considered imposing the lesser of the two sentences,
in the absence of any showing to the contrary, we presume the
trial court understood and properly exercised its discretion.
(Ramirez, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 1042.)8 “[Villa’s] citation to a

8 Villa has cited to no authority, and we find none, to suggest
that the trial court had a mandatory duty to sentence him on the
lower term pursuant to Assembly Bill No. 518. The law is to the
contrary. (Stats. 2021, ch. 441, § 1; Mani, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th
at p. 379 [Assembly Bill No. 518 amended section 654 to afford
sentencing courts the discretion to impose shorter or longer term
of imprisonment].)

10
silent record is insufficient to meet his burden to demonstrate an
abuse of discretion.” (Coleman, at p. 725.)
c. Villa has not established any abuse of discretion
under section 1385
Villa also cites to section 1385, subdivision (c), in arguing
that the trial court abused its discretion by declining to strike his
prior serious felony conviction enhancement. We again find no
abuse of discretion.
Section 1385, subdivision (c)(1) provides: “Notwithstanding
any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in
the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that
enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.” Section
1385, subdivision (c)(2), in turn, provides: “In exercising its
discretion under this subdivision, the court shall consider and
afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove
that any of the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to
(I) are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of these
circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the
enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety.” (See People v.
Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1032 (Walker) [no rebuttable
presumption in favor of dismissing enhancement that can only be
overcome by finding that dismissal endangers public safety].)
The parties argued the mitigating and aggravating factors
in their sentencing briefs. The trial court noted it had read the
briefing and, after hearing argument from both parties stated, “I
certainly see nothing here that would be in the interest of justice
to strike any additional time.” The court then went on to recount
Villa’s extensive history of violence while incarcerated in state
prison before stopping and stating, “I could go on. There’s –

11
another four and a half pages that look like that one in regards to
rules violations, but those are only the most recent.” The court
reiterated that it was not in the interests of justice to strike
anything further.
There is nothing in this record that establishes any abuse
of discretion by the trial court in declining to dismiss the prior
serious felony enhancement. Nor does Villa make any cognizable
argument on appeal to establish an abuse of discretion under
section 1385.9 (Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1036 [ultimately,
court must determine whether dismissal is in furtherance of
justice]; People v. Bravo (2025) 107 Cal.App.5th 1144, 1157 [no
particular language required for trial court to decline to dismiss
an enhancement].) We must therefore presume the court
“ ‘ “acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its
discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will
not be set aside on review.” ’ ” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at
p. 377.)

9 In his opening brief, Villa notes that section 1385 requires
the sentencing court to weigh evidence of certain mitigating
factors, but he does not assert that the trial court here failed to
do so, nor does he cite any part of the record that could support
such an assertion. In addition, Villa failed to object at the time of
resentencing to the trial court’s purported failure to consider any
mitigating factor. (See People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 352–
353 [party may not raise for first time on appeal trial court’s
failure to properly articulate discretionary sentencing choice];
People v. Sperling (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1094, 1100–1101 [claims
trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider mitigating
factors forfeited where no objection made at time of sentencing].)

12
II. The Abstract of Judgment Must Be Amended
Finally, Villa contends that the abstract of judgment must
be amended to accurately reflect his sentencing credits. We
agree.
Section 2900.1 provides that when a defendant has served
a portion of a sentence imposed based upon a judgment that is
subsequently modified during the term of imprisonment, the time
served “shall be credited upon any subsequent sentence he may
receive upon a new commitment for the same criminal act or
acts.” Thus, “when a prison term already in progress is modified,
. . . the sentencing court must recalculate and credit against the
modified sentence all actual time the defendant has already
served, whether in jail or prison, and whether before or since he
was originally committed and delivered to prison custody.”
(People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 29 (Buckhalter).)
However, once a defendant begins to serve his sentence, he
“is not eligible to earn additional credits for good behavior as a
presentence detainee.” (Buckhalter, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 29.)
As a result, the sentencing court must also calculate the conduct
credits for the period before the original sentencing date. (Id. at
p. 30; People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 673.) The agency
to which the defendant is committed is responsible for calculating
conduct credits following the original sentencing date.
(Buckhalter, at pp. 30–31, 37; Sek, at p. 673.)
Here, at the time of his original sentencing on July 21,
2008, Villa had accrued 217 total credits for time served,
comprised of 189 actual credits and 28 local conduct credits. At
his March 6, 2024 resentencing hearing, the court calculated that
Villa had accrued an additional 5,707 actual credits since his

13
original sentencing date. The court ordered the CDCR to
calculate Villa’s additional conduct credits.
The amended abstract of judgment, filed April 4, 2024,
reflects only that Villa has 5,707 actual credits and 5,707 total
credits. It does not include any of Villa’s time credits (actual
credits or local conduct credits) prior to his original sentencing
date. Upon resentencing, the trial court was required to award
Villa those time credits.
We therefore remand the matter and instruct the trial
court to recalculate Villa’s total sentencing credits, including the
217 credits earned prior to his original sentencing date, and to
amend the abstract of judgment accordingly.

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DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded for the trial court to prepare an
amended abstract of judgment reflecting Villa’s total sentencing
credits, to include his actual credits and local conduct credits
accrued prior to the original sentencing date on July 21, 2008,
and to forward a copy of the amended abstract of judgment to the
CDCR. In all other respects, the order on Villa’s petition for
resentencing is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

GAAB, J.*

We concur:

EGERTON, Acting P. J.

ADAMS, J.

* Judge of the Fresno Superior Court, assigned by the Chief

Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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