CourtListener 10657466•Body Source Technology v. Szeto CA4/1
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Filed 8/20/25 Body Source Technology v. Szeto CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
BODY SOURCE TECHNOLOGY D085169
CO., LTD,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. CIVDS1822994)
GENE SZETO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Stephanie E. Thornton-Harris, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Shun C. Chen and Shun C. Chen, for Defendant and
Appellant.
DGW Kramer and Ronghua Guan, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 2022, plaintiff Body Source Technology Co., Ltd. (Body Source or the
company) obtained a judgment in its favor after prevailing on its claim that
defendant Gene Szeto failed to pay for products he ordered more than four
years earlier. Following its entry, Szeto offered to satisfy the judgment by
returning the unsold inventory. Body Source’s counsel eventually informed
him that the offer had been rejected. Szeto nonetheless demanded that the
company file an acknowledgement that the judgment had been fully satisfied.
After Body Source refused, Szeto moved the trial court to deem the
judgment satisfied. He maintained that the company’s attorney lacked
authority to reject his offer and that silence from the company itself meant
that his offer had been accepted. The trial court disagreed. It found Body
Source had in fact rejected the offer and there was no evidence from which to
infer that the company’s mere silence signaled acceptance. Because these
findings are supported by substantial evidence, we affirm the order denying
Szeto’s motion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Body Source is a vendor of portable massage devices. In 2017 and
2018, Szeto, a distributor of the company’s products, ordered 1.2 million
dollars’ worth of hand, neck, and face massagers that he planned to sell to
a retailer.1 Szeto, however, did not pay for these products. Accordingly,
Body Source sued Szeto in 2018 for breach of contract and other claims.
1 The equipment was purchased by Gentek Media, Incorporated, a
company Szeto owned. Gentek, Szeto, and another entity he owned—OBM
Distribution, Inc.—were the defendants in Body Source’s underlying lawsuit
and were all held jointly and severally liable for damages. For clarity, we will
only refer to Szeto.
2
In March 2022 following a court trial, a judgment of $1.2 million plus pre-
and postjudgment interest was entered in favor of the company.
This appeal concerns Szeto’s attempt to satisfy the judgment. A money
judgment may be satisfied by either a cash or a noncash payment. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 724.010, subds. (a), (c).)2 The creditor must file an acknowledgment
after a judgment has been satisfied.3 (§ 724.030.) If the creditor fails to do
so after a debtor believes that a judgment has been satisfied, the debtor may
demand that the creditor file or provide an acknowledgment. (§ 724.050,
subd. (a).) If the creditor does not comply with such a demand within 15
days, the debtor may move the court for an order requiring compliance. (Id.,
subds. (c), (d).)
Attempting to satisfy the judgment with a noncash payment, in April
2022 Szeto offered to return his unsold inventory to Body Source (the offer).4
Although he represented during the underlying litigation that the unsold
massage devices were “obsolete and worthless,” Szeto claimed in his offer
that his inventory had a retail value of nearly $3 million. At the same time,
he requested that Body Source acknowledge that the judgment had been
satisfied.
In December 2023, having received no response to his offer, Szeto e-
mailed Body Source, saying, “I did not receive any response from anyone.
2 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
3 For simplicity, we will use “creditor” and “debtor” to refer to judgment
creditor and judgment debtor, respectively.
4 The parties’ communications were by and through their respective
counsel.
3
The goods are still in the warehouse and ready to go. Please let me know
when you like [sic] the goods delivered[.] To your office?”
Roughly one month later, Body Source responded by stating it was
“obvious” that Szeto’s “offer to return old and outdated equipment” had been
rejected. As to the satisfaction of the judgment, the company reminded Szeto
that it had filed a memorandum of costs as recently as December 2023. In
subsequent communications concerning his offer, Body Source mentioned
that Szeto’s wife, a third-party judgment debtor, had sat for a judgment
debtor examination pursuant a request the company made in November
2023. Body Source’s correspondence did not remind Szeto of other steps it
had taken after the entry of judgment, such as that it had obtained an order
authorizing the liquidation of his and his wife’s bank accounts to pay down
the interest accruing on the judgment and that it had filed a memorandum
of costs in November 2022 as well.
In February 2024, Szeto served a formal demand under section
724.050, subdivision (a) that Body Source acknowledge satisfaction of the
judgment. After the company refused and reiterated that it was seeking a
monetary payment in full, Szeto moved the court for an order that the
judgment had been satisfied. He argued that Body Source’s attorney’s
communications rejecting his offer were ineffective for lack of authority to
act on the company’s behalf. Szeto also argued that the parties had a “close
relationship and extensive previous course of dealing” that allowed him to
treat Body Source’s silence as an acceptance of an offer. Thus, he concluded,
his offer had been accepted because no one who worked for the company had
rejected it.
Body Source countered that its attorney had expressly rejected the offer
on its behalf and that it was entitled under subdivision (c) of section 724.010
4
to refuse a noncash payment. This statute provides that a noncash payment
that the creditor must “honor[]” does not trigger an obligation to file or give
an acknowledgment unless the noncash payment “has actually been
honored,” which Body Source contended did not occur here. Body Source
also maintained that Szeto failed to identify any evidence supporting an
inference that the company’s silence was an acceptance of his offer.
The court denied Szeto’s motion in May 2024.5 It agreed with Body
Source’s interpretation of section 724.010, subdivision (c) as giving it the
right to reject a noncash payment offered as satisfaction. The court found
that Szeto restated his offer in December 2023 and that Body Source
expressly rejected it through counsel’s communications. As for Szeto’s
theory that Body Source’s silence indicated acceptance of his offer, the court
observed that “silence in the face of an offer can constitute acceptance if the
relationship exists between the parties or a previous course of dealings . . .
where silence can be understood as acceptance.” But it found no evidence of
a “prior business dealing between Body Source and [Szeto] that . . . equated
to acceptance of that offer where . . . Body Source was typically silen[t]” that
could support ignoring the general rule that “silence or inaction in the face
of an offer will not amount to acceptance.”
DISCUSSION
A debtor who believes a creditor has unreasonably refused to honor its
demand to acknowledge satisfaction of a judgment may move for the court to
intervene. Szeto appeals the trial court’s refusal do so here. He renews his
claims that Body Source’s attorney’s express rejection of his offer in January
2024 was not effective and that, as a result, it was accepted because no one
5 This order is appealable under section 904.1, subdivision (a)(2).
5
from the company responded to it. Body Source disagrees, adopting the trial
court’s rationale for finding that it rejected his offer.
When resolving a motion under subdivision (d) of section 724.050,
“[i]f the court determines that the judgment has been satisfied and that the
judgment creditor has not complied with the demand, the court shall either
(1) order the judgment creditor to comply with the demand or (2) order the
court clerk to enter satisfaction of the judgment.” (§ 724.050, subd. (d), italics
added.) This section “require[s] the trial court to first determine whether the
judgment has been satisfied in fact before ordering entry of satisfaction of
judgment.” (Schumacher v. Ayerve (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1860, 1863.)
“[W]e will uphold the factual findings supporting the trial court’s
decision on a motion for satisfaction of judgment if the findings are supported
by substantial evidence.”6 (Jhaveri v. Teitelbaum (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th
740, 748.) This standard requires us to “presume the existence of every fact
the finder of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence in support of the
judgment or order.” (Ibid.) “[A]ll intendments and presumptions must be
indulged to support the judgment or order on matters as to which the record
is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.” (Id. at p. 749.) “The
ultimate test is whether it is reasonable for a trier of fact to make the ruling
in question in light of the whole record.” (Roddenberry v. Roddenberry (1996)
44 Cal.App.4th 634, 652.)
6 The court “shall” order the entry of a satisfaction of judgment when the
judgment was “in fact” satisfied, which means it lacks discretion to refuse
such an order in that circumstance. (§ 724.050, subd. (d).) The abuse of
discretion standard urged by Body Source, therefore, does not apply. Nor
does de novo review, as proposed by Szeto on the theory that the facts are
undisputed. Whether the judgment was satisfied was a factual question that
the parties disputed. In any case, we would reach the same result under
either of these alternative standards.
6
Body Source was authorized by statute to demand that Szeto fully
satisfy the judgment with a cash payment. (§ 724.010, subd. (a) [“A money
judgment may be satisfied by payment of the full amount required to satisfy
the judgment or by acceptance by the judgment creditor of a lesser sum in full
satisfaction of the judgment”]; Wertheim, LLC v. Currency Corp. (2019) 35
Cal.App.5th 1124, 1132 [“a judgment creditor has the right to demand
payment in cash”].) Accordingly, the trial court properly focused on whether
the company accepted Szeto’s offer to satisfy the judgment with an “in-kind”
payment. The record amply supports the court’s finding that Body Source did
not, as Szeto renewed the offer in December 2023 and the company, through
counsel, rejected it shortly thereafter. In addition, Body Source took steps
in the superior court consistent with an intent to accept nothing other than
full satisfaction in cash after it received Szeto’s offer, such as filing two
memoranda of costs, liquidating Szeto’s and his wife’s bank accounts, and
subjecting Szeto’s wife to a judgment debtor examination.7
Szeto’s contrary contentions fail primarily because they are based on
pure speculation. He fails to cite any evidence that rebuts statements made
by Body Source’s counsel to the superior court that the decision to reject the
offer was made by the client. (See People v. Sullivan (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th
524, 549 [“Pursuant to Evidence Code section 664, ‘Court and counsel are
presumed to have done their duty in the absence of proof to the contrary’ ”].)
7 Body Source’s reliance on section 724.010, subdivision (c) as a basis to
decline Szeto’s offer was misplaced. This statute refers to a payment the
creditor “honored,” a term which relates to the acceptance of a negotiable
instrument. (Black’s Law Dict. (11th Ed. 2019) p. 884, col. 1.) To the extent
the court adopted the company’s reading of this provision, that error was not
prejudicial. (Anderson v. Davidson (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 136, 144 [“ ‘There
can be no prejudicial error from erroneous logic or reasoning if the decision
itself is correct’ ”].)
7
As for Szeto’s claim that Body Source’s silence signaled it had accepted his
offer, “[s]ilence in the face of an offer is not an acceptance, unless there is a
relationship between the parties or a previous course of dealing pursuant
to which silence would be understood as acceptance.” (Southern California
Acoustics Co. v. C. V. Holder, Inc. (1969) 71 Cal.2d 719, 722.) We find no
basis in the record to conclude that either condition was met here.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Szeto’s motion is affirmed. Body Source shall
recover its costs on appeal.
DATO, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
BUCHANAN, J.
KELETY, J.
8
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