People v. Ramirez CA2/2

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Filed 8/20/25 P. v. Ramirez CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B332035

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA093863)
v.

JOSE TRINIDAD RAMIREZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Richard M. Goul, Judge. Affirmed.

John P. Dwyer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Nikhil Cooper, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Jose Trinidad Ramirez (defendant) appeals from a
postjudgment order denying his petition for resentencing under
Penal Code section 1172.6 after the trial court held an
evidentiary hearing and determined there was evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant aided and abetted murder with
intent to kill.1 Defendant contends reversal is required because
the trial court denied his request for a continuance, made for the
first time orally on the day of the evidentiary hearing, to
substitute appointed counsel with private counsel. We find no
error and affirm the order.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In July 2015, a jury convicted defendant of first degree
murder in violation of section 187, subdivision (a), with true
findings the crime was gang related (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)),
and a principal (codefendant and defendant’s brother John
Ramirez) personally and intentionally discharged a firearm
causing death to the victim (§ 12022.53, subds. (d) & (e)(1)).2
Defendant was sentenced to 25 years to life for murder and a
consecutive firearm enhancement of 25 years to life. The court
stayed the remaining firearm enhancements. Defendant
appealed, and we affirmed the judgment in People v. Ramirez
(Nov. 9, 2018, B280623) (nonpub. opn.), but remanded to the trial
court to give that court an opportunity to exercise its discretion
under section 12022.53, subdivision (h) to strike or dismiss the

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2 We will refer to defendant’s brother John Ramirez and his
father Miguel Ramirez by their first names to avoid confusion.

2
firearm enhancement. In 2019, the California Supreme Court
denied defendant’s petition for review in case No. S252899.
In June 2019, defendant filed a petition for resentencing
pursuant to former section 1170.95 (hereafter section 1172.6),
which the superior court denied at the prima facie stage after
considering trial evidence that defendant directly aided and
abetted a first degree murder with intent to kill. (People v.
Ramirez (Mar. 3, 2022, B309519) [nonpub. opn.] (Ramirez).)
In 2021, after hearing arguments of counsel, the trial court
exercised its discretion to reimpose the firearm enhancement.
(Ramirez, supra, B309519.) Defendant filed appeals from both
orders, and the cases were consolidated. (Ibid.) In 2022, this
court affirmed the trial court’s imposition of the firearm
enhancement, but reversed the denial of the section 1172.6
petition because the trial court had engaged in factfinding at the
prima facie stage, and it remained possible, as a matter of law,
that defendant was convicted of murder without the intent to kill
under theories of conspiracy or as an aider and abettor under the
theory of natural and probable consequences. (Ramirez, supra,
B309519.) This court remanded the matter to the superior court
to issue an order to show cause and to hold an evidentiary
hearing. (Ibid.)
On remand, in June 2022, Attorney Carol Ojo was
appointed to represent defendant. There is a conflict between the
parties as to whether the parties submitted papers in February
2023. The papers are not in the record, although the trial court
stated the parties filed briefs in February 2023.3 Appointed

3 The clerk’s transcript contains no filings by Attorney Ojo.
On December 13, 2023, appellate counsel submitted a letter to
the superior court pursuant to rule 8.340(b) of the California

3
counsel represented defendant at status conferences held on
February 9, 2023, and April 11, 2023. Defendant was not present
in court for the April 11, 2023 status conference. However, Ojo
informed the court defendant wanted to be present for the
evidentiary hearing.
At the June 15, 2023 evidentiary hearing, the trial court
denied as untimely defendant’s oral request to replace appointed
counsel with retained counsel. Neither party submitted new
evidence. The court reviewed the record of the 2015 trial and
heard the parties’ arguments, then found defendant, beyond a
reasonable doubt, was guilty of murder “as an aider and abettor
[who] possessed the intent to kill.” The petition was denied.
On July 3, 2023, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

Rules of Court seeking any prosecution or defense briefs filed in
February or March 2023. The clerk’s office responded on
December 29, 2023, stating that such briefs were not located after
a thorough search and that such briefs were not mentioned in the
June 15, 2023 minute order. There is also no mention of any
such briefs in the minutes for the February and April 2023 status
conferences. However, at the evidentiary hearing, the trial court
stated: “Ms. Ojo has thoroughly briefed this case and argued this
case and submitted documents on this case.” The court later
specified, “The motions were . . . submitted months ago back in
February.” Defendant arguably acknowledged the existence of a
motion by stating in court, “I don’t even know why she even
submitted a motion.”

4
FACTUAL BACKGROUND UNDERLYING THE 2015
CONVICTION4
Shortly after midnight on April 20, 2012, defendant, his
father Miguel and others were drinking at a bar they frequented.
Defendant argued with the victim, Martin Contreras, mentioning
the Westside Longo gang several times and telling Contreras and
his companions they were in his neighborhood, and they should
show respect. When Contreras and his three friends (Julio V.,
Orlando M., and Christian L.) left the bar, defendant followed
them out and began to fight with Contreras. Miguel came
outside and saw defendant and Contreras struggling on the
ground. Miguel hit or kicked Contreras, who then hit Miguel,
causing him to fall to the ground and lose consciousness. A
security guard dispersed the group by pepper spraying the air
around them.
Contreras and his friends left and met up a short time later
in front of Contreras’s house, just before defendant arrived and
parked his white truck behind the friends’ car. Defendant got out
of the truck holding a steel pipe about the size of a baseball bat.
He told Julio not to move and said such things as, “You mother
fuckers, you’re going to pay; this is not going to end like this.”
Defendant’s brother John arrived in a black Dodge Ram pickup
truck, which he parked behind defendant’s truck. Orlando, who
later identified John as “Johnny,” ran off when he saw John
emerge from his truck. Orlando heard a gunshot when he was
about 40 feet away from the scene. Julio remained in the driver’s
seat of his car while being threatened by defendant. He also

4 This factual summary is taken from the prior opinion in
Ramirez, supra, B309519.

5
heard a gunshot from close behind him. When Julio could no
longer see Contreras, he drove away.
Erika, the mother of Contreras’s children, was inside the
house when she woke up at around 1:16 a.m. to the sounds of
people arguing and a gunshot. When Contreras came inside
bleeding from his waist, Erika called 911 and was directed to ask
Contreras who had shot him. Erika told the 911 operator that he
named “Johnny.” Later, as he lay wounded on the couch,
Contreras told a police officer that “Johnny Ramirez,” shot him
and left in a black Dodge Ram pickup truck. Erika did not know
John but knew defendant. Defendant’s cell phone records for the
night of the shooting showed calls to John’s phone at 12:56 a.m.,
12:57 a.m., 12:58 a.m., and 1:14 a.m., and one call from John at
1:01 a.m., all answered. The location of the cell tower used for
the calls was consistent with both phones being at the scene of
the shooting at the time of the shooting.
When defendant and John’s cousin told John later that
afternoon that Contreras had been so gravely injured that he was
going to die, John replied the shot was not enough for him to die.
Contreras died about 20 hours after the shooting. An autopsy
determined that a large caliber bullet entered Contreras’s body
from behind, consistent with an attempt by Contreras to turn
away upon seeing a gun. The fatal bullet damaged an artery and
two veins.
Sometime after the night of the shooting Julio, Christian,
and another friend were parked at a liquor store when defendant
drove up, blocked their car, and told them that what happened to
Contreras was nothing compared to what would happen to them
if they said anything. John then arrived in another car and said
this was his “hood,” to remain quiet about what had happened,
and all would be fine.

6
After defendant was arrested he was placed in a cell with
an informant. Their conversations were recorded. Among other
things, defendant told the informant that his brother was a
“rider,” and defendant had telephoned his brother “to have this
fool hit” and to tell him “this fool needs to go down” and “be gone.”
Defendant indicated his brother was the shooter, but then said it
was someone else. Defendant said the gun used was a revolver,
which had been disposed of by his brother. The gun was never
found.
Gang expert Detective Chris Zamora opined in response to
a hypothetical question mirroring the facts in evidence that in his
opinion the hypothetical crime was committed for the benefit of
and in association with the Westside Longo criminal street gang.
Detective Zamora was familiar with John and defendant and was
of the opinion they were both members of the Westside Longo
gang. He testified that “rider” meant an active gang member who
would put in work for the gang. The defense presented the
testimony of Martin Flores, a gang expert who opined that rather
than showing a gang-related crime, the facts indicated a family
dispute and a shooting to benefit the family name, not a gang.
He also noted it was common for jail inmates to lie or exaggerate
the reasons for their arrest and incarceration, but he did not
discern bragging in defendant’s conversations. Flores also
testified that “rider” can have many meanings, including the
more benign meaning of “buddy.”

DISCUSSION
Defendant argues he was denied his right to retained
counsel, was denied legal representation, and should have been
granted a continuance at the June 15, 2023 evidentiary hearing.

7
I. The June 15, 2023 evidentiary hearing
In 2019, defendant filed his section 1172.6 petition through
retained counsel, James M. Crawford, who also filed a reply to
the People’s opposition to the petition. The superior court denied
the petition, but this court reversed and remanded for an
evidentiary hearing. The remittitur issued on May 12, 2022. On
June 20, 2022, Carol Ojo was appointed to represent defendant.
About two months before the June 15, 2023 evidentiary
hearing, Ojo met with defendant. Defendant told her, “Look, I
got counsel coming. She’s going to replace you. Do not submit
anything in court.”
On February 9, 2023, Ojo appeared as appointed counsel
for defendant and, according to the trial court, filed at least one
motion related to the evidentiary hearing.5 Ojo requested, and
the court agreed, to hold the next status conference on April 11,
2023. At the April 11, 2023 status conference, the court set the
evidentiary hearing for June 15, 2023, and granted defendant’s
request, made through Ojo, to be present at the evidentiary
hearing.
At the outset of the evidentiary hearing through Ojo,
defendant requested the court permit an unspecified private
counsel substitute in and handle the case. The request was
denied. The following colloquy occurred at the hearing:
“Ms. Ojo: Your Honor, Mr. Ramirez indicated to me that he
would like to have private counsel handle his case.
“The Court: The court finds that request untimely. This
has been in this court for a number of years now and Ms. Ojo has
thoroughly briefed this case and argued this case and submitted
documents on this case. The court denies any appointment of

5 As set forth above, no such motion is in the record.

8
counsel at this stage of the proceedings. He has been appointed
counsel and he has adequate counsel, so the request is denied as
untimely.
“Ms. Ojo: Your Honor, [defendant] is indicating that he
would still like to have private counsel address this.
“The Court: That is denied.
“[Defendant]: What was the reason for why?
“The Court: It’s untimely.
“[Defendant]: You guys had me sitting over there in prison
for almost a year.
“The Court: No. The court has made its ruling. [¶] . . . [¶]
“[Defendant]: Your Honor, I don’t agree with that because
she hasn’t even talked to me about anything about the case.
Nothing at all. She has not talked to me anything about the case,
what was going to be done. [¶] I been told her, I came last time, I
have a letter right here when she was—I was going to come down
June 20th. I have a letter in my pocket.
“The Court: Mr. Ramirez, the court’s made its ruling . . . .
[¶] . . . [¶]
“Ms. Ojo: Your Honor, I did try to speak to Mr. Ramirez.
He indicated to me that he would prefer to have private counsel.
I did indicate to him that I would not do anything else on the case
because he wanted private counsel and so that is where we are.
“[Defendant]: We haven’t done anything.
“The Court: Ms. Ojo has submitted the motions and the
court—
“[Defendant]: We haven’t done any type of research,
anything that—
“The Court: Mr. Ramirez—
“[Defendant]: She has not talked to me.

9
“The Court: Mr. Ramirez, not now. The court’s made its
ruling on the issue of representation.”
The court and the prosecutor discussed the trial record and
the court’s finding was defendant remained liable for murder as a
direct aider and abettor. Just as Ojo began to argue, defendant
interrupted.
“Ms. Ojo: Your Honor, may I be heard just briefly?
“The Court: Yes.
“Ms. Ojo: Your Honor, the court needs to be satisfied that
he acted with reckless disregard for human life.
“[Defendant]: Your Honor, she had never spoke to me
about anything, Your Honor. I don’t even know why she even
submitted a motion. I got here in court last—two months ago. I
told her, look, I got counsel coming in. I got a letter right here
coming from her that you guys wouldn’t bring me down until
June 20th. I have the letter right here. Okay? [¶] And I told
her, look, I got counsel coming. She’s going to replace you. Do
not submit anything in court. I don’t even know why she would
submit anything.
“The Court: The motions were actually submitted months
ago back in February.
“[Defendant]: Okay. Back—Okay. She never—I have
never talked to her. I think she took my case back in June,
June 20th of 2022. I didn’t hear from her until barely last year at
the beginning of the year. That’s when I told her, look—and she
said I’m going to bring you down for June 20th of this year. And I
told her do not submit anything without me. Okay? When I
talked to her, she said she only had the transcripts.
“The Court: This was completely briefed previously by a
previous private lawyer, James Crawford, back in 2019. This has

10
been briefed completely. The court has read and considered
everything.
“[Defendant]: Yes, but I could bring you new evidence.
“The Court: You were found guilty of murder under a still
viable theory of homicide. [¶] We are done today. Thank you.
“[Defendant]: I can bring you new evidence. You’re not
giving me a chance to bring you new evidence.
“Ms. Ojo: Your Honor, I will file a notice of appeal.”
II. Applicable law
In 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.)
(Senate Bill 1437) limited accomplice liability under the felony-
murder rule and eliminated the natural and probable
consequences doctrine as it relates to murder, to ensure that a
person’s sentence is commensurate with his or her criminal
culpability. (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843,
superseded by statute on another ground as stated in People v.
Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 869.) It amended section 188 by
adding a requirement that, except as stated in section 189,
subdivision (e), all principals to murder must act with express or
implied malice to be convicted of that crime. (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).)
It amended section 189 by adding a requirement to the felony-
murder theory that defendants who were not the actual killer or
a direct aider and abettor to the felony with intent to kill must
have been a major participant in the underlying felony and acted
with reckless indifference to human life. (§ 189, subd. (e).)
Senate Bill 1437 also created former section 1170.95,
currently codified as section 1172.6, which, in relevant part,
established a procedure for defendants already convicted of
murder under the old law to seek resentencing in the trial court if
they believe they could not be convicted of that crime given the
amendments to sections 188 and 189. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.)

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At the prima facie stage of the petition process, the court may not
engage in factfinding about a defendant’s culpability, but should
deny the petition if it is meritless as a matter of law. (People v.
Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971–972 (Lewis).)
If the defendant makes a prima facie case for relief under
section 1172.6, the court must issue an order to show cause why
relief should not be granted. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) The People
may either concede that relief should be granted or participate in
an evidentiary hearing where they have the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner is guilty of murder
or attempted murder under sections 188 or 189 as amended by
Senate Bill 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
“A petition under former section 1170.95 is not a criminal
prosecution.” (People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, 588
(Mitchell).) “It is the opposite of a criminal prosecution.” (Ibid.)
“Many constitutional protections that characterize burdensome
criminal prosecutions thus do not apply in this ameliorative
process.” (Ibid., quoting People v. James (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th
604, 610 [“we agree with the many courts that have held that a
convicted person litigating a section 1170.95 petition does not
enjoy the rights that the Sixth Amendment guarantees to
criminal defendants who have not yet suffered a final
conviction”]; People v. Anthony (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1102, 1156
[“the Legislature’s changes constituted an act of lenity that does
not implicate defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights”].) “Absent
some effect of challenged conduct on the reliability of the trial
process, the Sixth Amendment guarantee [of counsel] is generally
not implicated.” (United States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648,
658.)
Defendants seeking resentencing have a “purely statutory
right to counsel that attaches before the issuance of an order to

12
show cause.” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 973.) Defendants
also have a due process right to counsel during a resentencing
proceeding where the defendant’s petition states a prima facie
case for relief. (Ibid.; People v. Rouse (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 292,
300 (Rouse).)
III. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying defendant’s request for a continuance
Defendant argues that although he did not expressly
request a continuance to allow him to retain counsel, he fairly
apprised the court that he needed one. (See People v. Scott (1978)
21 Cal.3d 284, 290.)6 A defendant’s request for a continuance to
seek private counsel is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People
v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 840; People v. Pigage (2003)
112 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1368.) A “‘“trial court has broad discretion
to determine whether good cause exists to grant a continuance.”’”
(People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 934.)
“‘There are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial
of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process. The
answer must be found in the circumstances present in every
case.’” (People v. Mungia (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1101, 1118.) “‘“‘[D]ue
process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands.’”’” (People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14
Cal.5th 216, 228 (Delgadillo).) In evaluating what due process
requires in a given situation, we consider “‘(1) the private
interests at stake; (2) the state’s interests involved; and (3) the

6 Defendant implies he had already retained counsel at the
time of the evidentiary hearing on June 15, 2023. Nothing in the
record confirms defendant had already retained private counsel
at that time.

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risk that the absence of the procedures in question will lead to an
erroneous resolution of the appeal.’” (Ibid.).
Defendant had a liberty interest at stake in the section
1172.6 proceedings. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 229.)
“The potential for relief under section 1172.6 from a prior
murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter conviction is a
‘significant’ interest.” (Ibid.)
However, appointed counsel are generally presumed to be
effective and act in the best interests of the client. (People v.
Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 566.) In addition, trial courts have
an interest in the efficient administration of section 1172.6
evidentiary hearings, which can require expenditure of
significant resources and considerable preparation by the parties.
Finally, there is no reason to believe that requiring a defendant
to rely on appointed counsel will lead to an erroneous resolution
of the case. (People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, 123
[defendant may not request to replace appointed attorney unless
the record clearly shows the first appointed counsel is not
adequately representing the accused].)
Balancing these considerations, under the circumstances of
this case, we find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in
denying defendant a continuance to work with private counsel.
Despite having informed Ojo two months prior that he intended
to retain private counsel, on the day of the hearing defendant did
not indicate he had already retained counsel or that any such
counsel had spent time preparing his defense. Nor did any
private counsel appear. While defendant made a general
reference to new evidence, he did not specify the new evidence,
nor did any private counsel submit any such evidence in advance
of the hearing. Instead the court relied on “the transcripts, the
jury instructions, the disk submitted by the People, the court

14
record, the appellate decisions related to this case.” The court
found it was “far beyond a reasonable doubt” that defendant was
convicted of first degree murder “under a still viable theory of the
law.”
Defendant argues he had a substantial, legitimate reason
for a short continuance. Defendant insists he had retained
counsel, but appointed counsel gave him the wrong date for the
hearing. If given a short continuance, he could have been
represented by his counsel of choice and permitted to introduce
new evidence at the hearing.
Preliminarily, defendant’s characterization of his request
for a continuance as a request for a “short” continuance is not
supported by the record. Defendant did not indicate that he had
already retained private counsel. Instead, defendant indicated he
told Ojo, “I got counsel coming in.” Ojo was also unaware of the
identity of any new counsel, stating instead that defendant
“indicated to me that he would prefer to have private counsel.”
Defendant never said he had retained counsel who needed only a
short continuance. Instead, he made a vague reference to an
intention to bring in private counsel. The trial court was not
required to grant an indefinite continuance for defendant to
obtain unspecified private counsel on the day scheduled for the
evidentiary hearing.
Further, the only evidence in the record that counsel gave
defendant the wrong date for the hearing are his statements in
court. Defendant’s comments were not confirmed by Ojo, and the
trial court was not required to credit them. At the April 11, 2023
status conference, Ojo informed the court defendant would like to
be present for the evidentiary hearing. The court stated, “We
probably need two months [to get him here] so I would pick a day
in June.” At that time, the date for the evidentiary hearing was

15
set for June 15 at Ojo’s request. The court responded, “We will
order him out . . . from prison and we will do the OSC hearing on
that date.” There was never any question of the date of the
hearing, and the court had no reason to believe Ojo was
misinformed as to the date.
Defendant further argues the continuance was particularly
important for defendant because Ojo did nothing to prepare for
the hearing or advocate for defendant at the hearing. Defendant
argues Ojo’s “sole contribution at the hearing” was to “completely
misstate the applicable law by telling the court that it ‘needs to
be satisfied that he acted with reckless disregard for human life.’”
Defendant argues this criterion is only applicable in a felony-
murder case. However, defendant effectively silenced Ojo by
interrupting her after she asked to be heard. Under the
circumstances, defendant cannot fault Ojo for articulating only
one sentence. It is impossible to know what further arguments
Ojo would have made or whether she would have corrected any
purported error of law.
Finally, defendant argues the court’s stated concern about
delay was unreasonable. In response to Ojo’s opening remark
that defendant had indicated he wanted to have private counsel
handle the case, the court responded, “The court finds that
request untimely. This has been in this court for a number of
years now and Ms. Ojo has thoroughly briefed this case and
argued this case and submitted documents on this case.
[Defendant] has been appointed counsel and he has adequate
counsel, so the request is denied as untimely.” Defendant
disagrees with the court’s statement that the matter had been in
the court for a number of years. Defendant admits he filed his
petition on June 13, 2019, but the remittitur following this court’s
reversal of the trial court’s summary dismissal did not issue until

16
May 12, 2022. Two status conferences had occurred in February
and April 2023. Thus, defendant argues, while the case had been
in the court for a number of years, the evidentiary hearing had
not been unreasonably delayed, and a short continuance would
not have caused unreasonable delay. Defendant insists his
request was not a result of gamesmanship or lack of due
diligence.
Defendant fails to consider the effort and resources
expended by the prosecution and the trial court in preparing for
the hearing. There is a burden on the prosecution to prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner was convicted
under a still viable theory. Further, there is a public interest in
the efficient administration of section 1172.6 hearings. In
addition, defendant exhibited a lack of due diligence. He had
informed counsel two months previously that he intended to get
private counsel, but failed to inform the court of new counsel and
failed to hire such counsel, who could have easily determined the
correct date of the hearing regardless of defendant’s
understanding.
People v. Trapps (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 265, cited by
defendant in support of this argument, is distinguishable. In
Trapps, the defendant sought a continuance of his sentencing
hearing to retain counsel. Thus, the matter did not concern a
petition for resentencing, which is an act of lenity. (People v.
Anthony, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 1156.) At the original
sentencing hearing, Trapps had been sent out for a diagnostic
study. Upon his return to court, counsel informed the court
Trapps wanted a continuance to retain a different lawyer.
Trapps indicated to the court there was a conflict of interest
between him and his attorney. (Trapps, at p. 270.) In reversing
the trial court’s denial of Trapps’s request for a continuance to

17
obtain new counsel, the Trapps court stated, “A reasonable
continuance would not have disrupted the orderly administration
of justice. This was a sentencing, not a trial. The sentencing
which took place was not a lengthy proceeding and no witnesses
were called.” (Id. at p. 271.) Further, Trapps was not dilatory as
he “had just returned from the [diagnostic] study” and made his
request right away. (Id. at p. 272.)
Here, in contrast, the parties appeared for an evidentiary
hearing. The court, and presumably the prosecution, had
invested time preparing. Defendant had notified his counsel two
months earlier he intended to obtain private counsel, but failed to
either inform the court or to obtain such counsel. Defendant
failed to provide any information suggesting new counsel had
drafted any briefing, intended to submit new evidence or even
intended to appear. Under the circumstances, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in declining to permit defendant an
indeterminate continuance on the day of the hearing. (People v.
Blake (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 619, 623–624 [“a defendant who
desires to retain his own counsel is required to act with diligence
and may not demand a continuance if he is unjustifiably dilatory
or if he arbitrarily desires to substitute counsel at the time of the
trial”].)
We further note that, even if there had been error,
defendant cannot demonstrate that, but for the error, it is
reasonably probable he would have obtained a more favorable
result. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836; People v.
Vance (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 706, 714.) As the trial court
indicated, the evidence that appellant aided and abetted the
murder with knowledge and intent was overwhelming, and there

18
is no indication of any new rebuttal arguments or evidence a new
attorney could have used.7
IV. Constitutional claims
Defendant advances claims under both the Sixth
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment, arguing the trial court
violated these rights by ruling his request to replace counsel was
untimely.
A. Sixth Amendment
Defendant argues he had a Sixth Amendment right to be
assisted by counsel of his choice. Under a Sixth Amendment
analysis, defendant need not show prejudice from his deprivation
of counsel of his choice. (U.S. v. Gonzalez-Lopez (2006) 548 U.S.
140, 148 [“Where the right to be assisted by counsel of one’s
choice is wrongly denied, . . . it is unnecessary to conduct an
ineffectiveness or prejudice inquiry to establish a Sixth
Amendment violation.”].) Defendant cites People v. Foley (2023)

7 “‘[U]nder direct aiding and abetting principles, an
accomplice is guilty of an offense perpetrated by another [e.g.,
murder] if the accomplice aids the commission of that offense
with “knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent and
[with] an intent to assist in achieving those unlawful ends.”’”
(People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 463.) The evidence
showed that defendant called John after Contreras injured
defendant and their father, Miguel. Defendant called John “to
have this fool hit” and to tell him “this fool needs to go down.”
John agreed. Both defendant and John went to Contreras’s
house, where defendant wielded a steel pipe. Defendant made
threats indicating Contreras and his companions were “going to
pay.” After this last threat, John appeared and shot Contreras.
Thus, as the trial court indicated, there was overwhelming
evidence defendant was an aider and abettor who actually
possessed the intent to kill.

19
97 Cal.App.5th 653, 659–660 (Foley) and Rouse, supra, 245
Cal.App.4th 292, in support of his position that he had a Sixth
Amendment right to counsel at the evidentiary hearing.
We follow the majority of case authority in declining to find
defendant had a Sixth Amendment right to counsel in his
resentencing hearing. (See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972
[“There is no unconditional state or federal constitutional right to
counsel to pursue collateral relief from a judgment of
conviction.”]; People v. Silva (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 505, 520
[“‘The retroactive relief provided by section 1170.95 reflects an
act of lenity by the Legislature “that does not implicate
defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights.”’”]; People v. James (2021)
63 Cal.App.5th 604, 609 [same]; People v. Daniel (2020) 57
Cal.App.5th 666, 674 [“legislation ‘intended to give inmates
serving otherwise final sentences the benefit of ameliorative
changes to applicable sentencing laws . . .’ . . . does not implicate
the Sixth Amendment”].) To the extent Foley and Rouse state
otherwise, we disagree.8
Further, we note that regardless of the constitutional
analysis, defendant is not entitled to a continuance to retain
counsel of his choice if “bestowal of that benefit” would
“unreasonably disrupt the orderly administration of justice.”
(People v. Haskett (1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 852.) The trial court did
not abuse its discretion in determining that such a disruption
was unreasonable on the day of the evidentiary hearing.

8 We acknowledge People v. Grajeda (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th
829, 837–838, issued by Division Seven of this district, which
cites Rouse and Foley for the proposition that a criminal
defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a
resentencing hearing. We respectfully disagree.

20
B. Due process
A due process right to counsel applies after issuance of an
order to show cause. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 973; Foley,
supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 659–660.) However, as set forth
above in detail, due process is flexible and calls for a balancing of
the interests at stake. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 229.)
While defendant had an interest in selecting his own attorney, he
had an attorney present who was advocating for his interests.
Defendant failed to notify the court in advance of the hearing
that he intended to obtain private counsel and failed to request a
continuance for that purpose. The court was not required to
grant defendant’s last minute request, on the morning of the
evidentiary hearing, to continue the hearing so defendant could
obtain new counsel.
A court should not interfere with a defendant’s right to be
represented by counsel of his choice “unless to accommodate him
would result in a disruption of the ordinary process of justice to
an unreasonable degree.” (People v. Trapps, supra, 158
Cal.App.3d at p. 271.) The trial court did not err by finding
defendant’s last-minute request unreasonable under the
circumstances of this case.
V. Lack of representation/ineffective assistance
Defendant advances two ineffective assistance of counsel
claims. He first contends he was completely deprived of counsel
because of Ojo’s failure to prepare for the evidentiary hearing or
advocate on his behalf at the hearing. Alternatively, defendant
contends even if Ojo represented him, her representation was
prejudicially defective under Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466
U.S. 668, 688 (Strickland).) As set forth below, we reject
defendant’s claims.

21
A. Applicable law
“[T]he adversarial process protected by the Sixth
Amendment requires that the accused have ‘counsel acting in the
role of an advocate.’” (United States v. Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at
p. 656.) “The right to the effective assistance of counsel is thus
the right of the accused to require the prosecution’s case to
survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.” (Ibid.)
Under the standard set forth in Cronic, no showing of prejudice is
required. (Id. at p. 659; Bell v. Cone (2002) 535 U.S. 685, 696.)
As noted, section 1172.6 does not implicate defendant’s Sixth
Amendment rights. Thus, defendant’s claim that he was totally
denied counsel within the meaning of Cronic, and that he is
entitled to automatic reversal, are misplaced.9
However, defendant had a due process right to effective
assistance of counsel at the evidentiary hearing. (Foley, supra,
97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 659–660.) “The standard for showing
ineffective assistance of counsel is well settled. ‘In assessing
claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, we consider
whether counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and
whether the defendant suffered prejudice to a reasonable
probability, that is, a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.’” (People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th
168, 206–207.)
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are subject to a
harmless error analysis. (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 695.)
“In making this determination, a court hearing an ineffectiveness

9 King v. Superior Court (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 929 involved
pretrial proceedings, thus it is distinguishable from the present
matter.

22
claim must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge
or jury.” (Ibid.) “[A] court need not determine whether counsel’s
performance was deficient before examining the prejudice
suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.”
(Id. at p. 697.) “If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness
claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we
expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” (Ibid.)
B. Complete lack of representation
Although the standard under Cronic is inapplicable, we
briefly address defendant’s argument he suffered a complete lack
of representation. Defendant argues Ojo knew at least two
months before the hearing that he wanted to replace her with
private counsel. However, defendant argues, until such time as
she was replaced, Ojo had a Sixth Amendment duty to advocate
on his behalf, including to advocate for his constitutional right to
counsel of his choosing. Defendant claims Ojo failed to effectively
advocate for his right to counsel of his choosing and failed to
argue the right should be respected short of unreasonable
disruption of the court process. Defendant argues Ojo should
have pointed out the court was mistaken that the matter was
thoroughly briefed and should have explained she gave Ramirez
the wrong date for the hearing.
The record shows Ojo did advocate for defendant. The trial
court indicated the matter was thoroughly briefed.10 About two
months before the hearing, defendant spoke with Ojo and told her
not to do anything on the case, as he intended to obtain private

10 As noted above, the briefs or motions filed in February 2023
are not in the record on appeal, nor could the trial court locate
them.

23
counsel.11 Ojo informed the court defendant wanted to be present
in court for the hearing and had him ordered to court. In
addition, at the time of the hearing, Ojo immediately
communicated defendant’s desire to be represented by private
counsel. Following the court’s determination that defendant was
liable for murder as a direct aider and abettor who possessed the
intent to kill, Ojo asked to be heard. She informed the court it
must be satisfied defendant had acted with reckless disregard for
human life. At that point, she was interrupted by defendant who
apparently prevented her from completing her argument. As to
defendant’s insistence that Ojo provided him with the wrong date
for the hearing, there is no indication defendant intended to
notify the court or substitute counsel in the next five days. Thus,
defendant cannot articulate any detriment from this alleged error
on Ojo’s part.
C. Ineffective assistance under Strickland
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel under
Strickland, defendant must show Ojo’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness. (Strickland, supra, 466
U.S. at p. 688.) Ojo’s performance did not fall below this
standard. Defendant cannot fault Ojo with respect to her failure
to address defendant’s right to retained counsel. At the hearing,

11 Defendant may not fault Ojo for failing to submit any
motions or evidence to the trial court after he told her to do
nothing. “[A] defendant who insists that mitigating evidence not
be presented . . . is estopped from later claiming ineffective
assistance based on counsel’s acquiescence in his wishes.”
(People v. Deere (1991) 53 Cal.3d 705, 717 (Deere).) The invited
error doctrine estops such a defendant from claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel “‘based on counsel’s acts or omissions in
conformance with the defendant’s own requests.’” (Ibid.)

24
Ojo twice informed the trial court of defendant’s desire to obtain
private counsel. Defendant had failed to name any such counsel
or attempt to substitute in any such counsel, therefore Ojo could
only request a continuance to give defendant the opportunity to
find such counsel. Defendant admits the court understood Ojo
was requesting a continuance on his behalf. The court denied the
request as untimely, therefore there was no reason for Ojo to
detail defendant’s right to counsel.
Defendant faults Ojo for failing to submit written
arguments in support of his petition. According to the court, she
did file a written motion or motions in support of defendant’s
petition in February 2023, although such motions are not in the
record. After that time, defendant instructed her not to do
anything further. Defendant’s claim that she should have done
more is foreclosed. (Deere, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 717.)
Similarly, defendant’s claim that Ojo was unprepared for
the hearing is foreclosed. (Deere, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 717.)
Based on defendant’s representations, Ojo was led to believe she
would not be representing defendant at the hearing. Despite
this, she appeared and argued for a continuance. She attempted
to make a substantive argument on defendant’s behalf, but was
interrupted by defendant and was not able to complete her
argument. Defendant made it clear by his words and actions that
he did not want Ojo to make any arguments, so he cannot now be
heard to complain that she failed to do so.12

12 We decline to credit defendant’s protests that Ojo stated
the wrong standard to the trial court. Defendant interjected and
did not allow her to speak, so it is impossible to know how her
argument would have progressed.

25
Finally, defendant cannot show prejudice, as required by
Strickland. As the trial court found, the evidence was “far
beyond a reasonable doubt based upon the evidence presented at
trial” that defendant was guilty of murder under a still valid
theory of aiding and abetting murder with intent to kill. As set
forth above, there was ample evidence defendant had a motive to
aid and abet the murder with intent to kill. Defendant’s
reference to speculative new evidence does not fulfill his
obligation to show prejudice. “[T]o be entitled to reversal of a
judgment on grounds that counsel did not provide
constitutionally adequate assistance, the petitioner must carry
his burden of proving prejudice as a ‘demonstrable reality,’ not
simply speculation as to the effect of the errors or omissions of
counsel.’” (People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 937.)
Defendant has failed to show Ojo’s performance fell below
an objectively reasonable standard, and he has failed to show
prejudice.

DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.

CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

LUI, P. J.

ASHMANN-GERST, J.

26

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