CourtListener 10656757•People v. Traughber CA2/6
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Filed 8/19/25 P. v. Traughber CA2/6
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B332457
(Super. Ct. No. F240517001)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (San Luis Obispo County)
v.
TOMMY ANTHONY
TRAUGHBER,
Defendant and Appellant.
This is the second appeal from a postjudgment order
denying appellant’s petition for resentencing (Pen. Code, §
1172.6)1 after he was convicted of first degree murder and other
crimes. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied
appellant’s petition for resentencing on the basis that he was a
major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human
life. Appellant raises two issues: (1) the trial court erred in
determining double jeopardy did not attach at the outset of the
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
hearing based on the prosecutor’s agreement to “not true”
findings on the special circumstance allegations at the time of his
waiver in 1997; and (2) substantial evidence does not support the
trial court’s findings that he was a major participant and acted
with reckless indifference to human life. We affirm.
Procedural Background2
In 1997, appellant was convicted of murder (§ 187, subd.
(a)), second degree burglary (§ 459) and arson (§ 451, subd. (d))
with a firearm enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). Appellant
submitted on the preliminary hearing transcript, which showed
that appellant (age 17) and his cohort, Travis Ron Williams (age
15), were involved in a home-invasion burglary.3 The victim,
Mabel Agueda, a 75-year-old widow, was shot in the back of the
head. It was a one-gun, one-bullet killing. Appellant said
Williams was the shooter. Williams said appellant was the
shooter. Appellant, like Williams, was sentenced to 26 years to
life in state prison. We affirmed the conviction in an unpublished
opinion but modified the judgment to add a $5,000 restitution
fine pursuant to section 1202.45. (Traughber I, supra, B115844.)
2 The facts, circumstances, and history of the case are
found in People v. Traughber (Oct. 26, 1998, B115844) [nonpub.
opn.] (Traughber I).) This procedural background is summarized
from our prior appellate opinion, People v. Traughber (Nov. 17,
2020, B301557) [nonpub. opn.] (Traughber II)).
3Appellant entered a “slow plea” in which the defendant
submits on the preliminary hearing transcript and the
submission is both a plea and a trial. (Cal. Criminal Law:
Procedure and Practice (Cont. Ed. Bar (2020) § 28.20, pp. 804-
805; Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592, 605-606.)
2
In 2019, appellant filed a petition for resentencing
pursuant to section 1172.6 (former § 1170.95). The trial court
denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing. We reversed
the denial and remanded the matter with directions for the trial
court to issue an order show cause and to hold an evidentiary
hearing. (Traughber II, supra, B301557.)
Section 1172.6 Evidentiary Hearing
On remand, the trial court conducted a three-day, joint
evidentiary hearing. The Prosecution presented numerous
witnesses and exhibits, including the transcript of the joint
preliminary hearing. Appellant presented various exhibits and
relied on expert testimony of Dr. Paul Elizondo, a child
adolescent and forensic psychologist.
Prosecution Evidence
Around 2:00 a.m. on October 1, 1995, Arroyo Grande Police
Department Officer Barry Bridge discovered a car fully engulfed
in flames. The car’s license plate was traced to Agueda and her
deceased husband.
When police went to Agueda’s home, they saw the garage
door was partially open a couple of feet. The rear door of the
house was ajar, and the doorjamb was shattered as if it had been
kicked in. Officers discovered Agueda dead inside the residence.
She was seated in a recliner. Her purse was on the floor next to
her. The television was on, and her car keys were missing.
Officers discovered at least eight firearms in the home and
ammunition was scattered everywhere.
Dr. Joseph Cohen, a forensic pathologist, reviewed the
death investigation material from the autopsy conducted by Dr.
Armond Dollinger in 1995, who was deceased at the time of the
section 1176.2 hearing. Dr. Cohen opined Agueda’s cause of
3
death was a gunshot wound to the head. The size of the entrance
wound was consistent with a small caliber bullet. The areas of
discoloration indicated a “close range of fire.” In other words, the
muzzle of the gun was within inches of the scalp when the gun
was fired.
Vanessa Campbell-Andrews, an investigator with the City
of Arroyo Grande, learned that two possible suspects, appellant
and Williams, were enroute to the police station.
While appellant and Williams were at the police station,
police went to Williams’s residence with a search warrant. They
found a Smith and Wesson .22-caliber semiautomatic firearm
located on top of a sofa in the backyard. The registered owner of
the firearm was Williams’s stepfather, who usually stored the
firearm inside a gun safe in his wife’s locked bedroom. The sofa
was positioned over a hole in the ground, which contained a
backpack and duffel bag. The backpack contained several items,
including 13 boxes of ammunition, approximately 200 rounds of
loose ammunition, a flashlight, two sets of gloves, and a knife.
The duffel bag contained several items, including about 50 boxes
of ammunition.
At the residence, Investigator William Hanley spoke to
Williams’s brother Todd Williams. Todd told Hanley that
Williams and appellant had been in the garage earlier that
evening and were gone between 9:00 p.m. and 9:30 p.m.
Sometime between 10:00 p.m. and 10:30 p.m., Todd went outside
and saw Williams and appellant. The sofa had been moved to
cover the hole in the yard. Todd saw a .22-caliber handgun on
the sofa and immediately recognized it as his mother’s gun. Todd
told Hanley that appellant stated in a matter-of-fact manner that
he and Williams had just returned from a lady’s house, they stole
4
her car, and shot her twice in the head. Todd told Hanley that
his mother always kept the gun in the locked gun cabinet, and it
was obvious Williams had gone into it and retrieved the gun.
Todd also said appellant admitted setting the car on fire.4
Appellant provided several statements to police. He
initially told police he borrowed a friend’s car, picked up some
girls, and stopped at a few liquor stores. As they cruised around
looking to buy alcohol, they were stopped by Grover Beach Police.
After a brief detention, appellant, Williams, and one of the girls
who was with them was released.
Appellant later admitted that he and Williams went to the
victim’s house to get bullets from the garage but claimed he did
not shoot the victim. He said after they got the bullets out of the
garage, he told Williams to “Come on. Let’s go.” But Williams
wanted to go inside. Appellant said it was still early, that
[Agueda] was still awake and probably called the cops. Williams
ignored appellant so he walked to the front of the house and sat
on the curb. Appellant heard a bang a few minutes later and
Williams came running out. Williams had the keys to the
victim’s car. Appellant admitted they cruised around in the car,
but said it was Williams who drove to Los Berros Road and set
the car on fire.
Defense Evidence
Appellant challenged the lack of gunshot residue from the
test kits of both appellant and Williams and footwear impressions
4 At the evidentiary hearing, Todd testified that he did not
remember making the statements attributed to him by
Investigator Hanley. He also denied observing or handling a
firearm on the night of the murder, and denied having a
conversation with Williams about hiding the gun.
5
taken from inside the home that did not match appellant’s foot
size.
Dr. Elizondo testified about the brain development of
juveniles and the hallmark features of youth, which include
immaturity, impulsivity, and failure to appreciate risks and
consequences.
Appellant also presented the reporter’s transcript from the
bench trial conducted in 1997. The transcript included the
prosecutor’s statements advising appellant of the terms and
consequences of the slow plea agreement as follows: “Now, has
anyone made any promises or representation to you other than
what’s been stated in order to get you to enter these waivers,
other than the fact that you’ll be found guilty of Count I, murder,
enhancement 2, the arming, the second-degree burglary of the
garage, and the arson of the car, that the remaining charges and
enhancements will be found not true, that at the time of
sentencing, you would be sentenced to 26 years to life in state
prison, and that you will have preserved your right to appeal the
trial court’s ruling in the [section] 402 hearings that we’ve had
concerning your statements to Detective Campbell, Investigator
Hanley, and the next day to Sergeant Wolfing?” Appellant
answered, “Yes.” The trial prosecutor clarified, “Okay. So . . .
what I’ve just outlined are all the promises that have been made
to you?” Appellant again answered, “Yes.” (Italics added.)
Referring to the reporter’s transcript, counsel for appellant
argued that “pursuant to the plea bargain . . . in order to get his
waivers[,] [the prosecutor] promised the special circumstances
would be found not true.” Counsel stated, “I’ve got to be candid
with the Court, the trial judge at the time never struck the
special circumstances, never did anything . . . .” Counsel
6
explained, “technically, it wasn’t a dismissal.” Counsel argued,
“There is legally a huge difference between not true and
dismissed. The case law says not true means the People can’t
win a 1437,” except under certain exceptions.
The trial court replied, “I’m not accepting your argument
applies here,” but indicated it would permit the parties to present
further argument on that issue.
After the hearing, the parties submitted additional briefing
addressing the evidence presented. Appellant reraised the
argument that he was entitled to relief pursuant to section
1172.6, subdivision (d)(2) and asserted that the evidence did not
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was a major participant
who acted with reckless indifference to human life. The People
filed supplemental briefing in opposition.
The Trial Court’s Ruling
At the close of the evidentiary hearing, defense counsel
asked the trial court to enforce the representation made by the
People in 1997, that the special circumstance allegations would
be found “not true,” pursuant to “law of the case” and “contract
law.”
The trial court rejected appellant’s assertion that it was
foreclosed from concluding that he was a major participant who
acted with reckless indifference to human life based on the
prosecutor’s comments that the felony murder special
circumstance allegations would be found not true. The trial court
explained, “In the end, these matters, as I have already
mentioned, were not subject to the crucible of a true trial, a jury
trial or court trial. That court trial that occurred, occurred in a
way—in an effort to effectuate a negotiated disposition. It was
not the result of a fact finder reaching conclusions based on a
7
fulsome presentation of [the] evidence. We now have that, albeit
it’s an effort that’s being made 28 years later.”
Thereafter, the trial court denied the petitions for
resentencing.5 It explained that even if appellant was not the
actual shooter, he was a major participant who acted with
reckless indifference to human life based on his own statements
and the overall circumstances of the crimes, including: actively
planning and executing the crimes; going to the victim’s house at
night, the lights were on and the victim’s car was there, which
indicated someone was present in the home; entering the victim’s
garage and stealing ammunition; appellant was also armed with
a hunting knife and knew Williams had taken possession of the
firearm.
The trial court did not find appellant’s statement that he
was at the curb when the shooting occurred to be the “least bit
credible.” Rather, it determined that appellant “actively
participated in the crime[s]” and knew the victim was at least
shot, if not killed. He proceeded to drive the car, along with the
stolen property, and help Williams hide the ammunition.
Appellant and Williams drove the victim’s vehicle, picked up
girls, and tried to get alcohol. Appellant later took an active role
in burning the car based on his singed eyelashes and eyebrows.
The trial court considered appellant’s youth at the time of
the crimes but found it did not negate his reckless indifference.
As the trial court explained, “[e]ven a 17-year-old would and
should know that taking deadly weapons to a residence at night
to steal ammunition is dangerous and could lead to loss of life.”
5 We affirmed the denial of codefendant Williams’s petition
for resentencing in an unpublished opinion. (People v. Williams
(Apr. 14, 2025, B332652) [nonpub. opn.].)
8
Section 1172.6
Section 1172.6 “provides a procedure for convicted
murderers who could not be convicted under the law as amended
to retroactively seek relief.” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th
952, 957, 959 (Lewis).) “In most cases where the petitioner has
made a prima facie case for relief, the trial court must issue an
order to show cause and hold a hearing to determine whether the
petitioner is entitled to resentencing.” (People v. Flint (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 607, 613 (Flint).)
However, section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(2) sets out two
scenarios when a hearing is not necessary: (1) where the parties
“waive a resentencing hearing and stipulate that the petitioner is
eligible” for resentencing, or (2) if “there was a prior finding by a
court or jury that the petitioner did not act with reckless
indifference to human life or was not a major participant in the
felony.” (Ibid.) “‘In the latter case, the [trial] court must bypass
a hearing pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) and
proceed directly to vacatur and resentencing.’” (People v. Garcia
(2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 416, 422 (Garcia); People v. Guillory (2022)
82 Cal.App.5th 326, 332 (Guillory).)
There Was No Prior Finding that The Felony-Murder Special
Circumstance Allegations Were Not True
Appellant contends the trial court’s failure to vacate his
murder conviction and resentence him pursuant to the
streamlined process described in section 1172.6, subdivision
(d)(2) violated his double jeopardy rights. He contends that the
waiver of his constitutional rights was premised on the trial
prosecutor’s assertion that the special circumstance allegations
pursuant to section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17) would be found “not
true,” which was equivalent to an “acquittal.”
9
Appellant relies on the majority opinion in People v.
Clayton (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 145 (Clayton), which held that
“the jury’s unanimous rejection of the special-circumstance
allegation establishes the petitioner’s entitlement to relief under
section [1172.6] as a matter of law.” (Id. at pp. 149, 154-159.)
Appellant urges this court to interpret the prosecutor’s statement
regarding the “not true” findings “no different[ly] than such a
finding by either a jury or the court in a court trial” as required
by the statute. The prosecutor’s statement is not the equivalent
of a jury’s factual finding.
Appellate courts have construed a “not true” finding of a
felony-murder special circumstance allegation following a court
or jury trial as a “finding” pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision
(d)(2). (See Flint, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 613-614; People v.
Harrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 429, 439-442; Clayton, supra, 66
Cal.App.5th at pp. 149, 154-159.) However, “[a] negative finding
on a special circumstance allegation does not entitle a petitioner
to resentencing where the petitioner ‘could be convicted under
other, still valid theories of murder.’” (Garcia, supra, 93
Cal.App.5th at p. 425, quoting Guillory, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at
p. 333.) That is the case here.
We conclude there was no prior finding sufficient to trigger
the application of section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(2), and we
decline to construe the prosecutor’s statements to that effect.
Appellant disagrees and contends the prosecutor should be
bound by her agreement because “‘[a] plea agreement is, in
essence, a contract between the defendant and the prosecutor to
which the court consents to be bound.’” (Citing People v. Stamps
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 700.) He reasons that the “‘not true’
language used by the prosecutor, rather than ‘dismissal,’ implied
10
her belief in the inability to resolve the factual elements of the
special circumstance allegations, and thus, an acquittal of those
allegations.”
But “‘[t]he court should accord an interpretation which is
reasonable [citation] and which gives effect to the intent of the
parties as it may be interpretated from their entire
agreement . . . . ’” (People v. Haney (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1034,
1039; People v. Shelton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 767.)
Here, defense counsel indicated his understanding of the
slow plea agreement on the record, stating that: “All the special
circumstances will be dismissed, leaving count I as a felony
murder, which will make it only possible for [appellant] to receive
25 to life on that count.” Counsel also informed the trial court
that, “You won’t have to make a determination pursuant to
. . . 190.5.”6 Counsel further stated that while the second degree
burglary and arson counts would be “maintained,” the auto theft
count and the “[personal] use allegation” both would be
“dismissed.” Counsel stated, “[I]n the end . . . [appellant] would
stand convicted of a first-degree felony murder, second-degree
burglary, arson, and [an armed principal] allegation.”
Based on the entire record of the slow plea agreement, and
given the absence of any findings by the trial court on the special
circumstance allegations, the more reasonable interpretation of
the trial prosecutor’s statement in this case is that the
enhancements that were not the subject of the bench trial would
be “dismissed.”
6 Section 109.5, subdivision (c) provides: “The trier of fact
shall determine the existence of any special circumstance
pursuant to the procedure set forth in Section 190.4.”
11
Finally, courts have uniformly concluded that the sentence
modification procedure pursuant to section 1172.6 does not
implicate double jeopardy concerns. (See People v. Hernandez
(2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 94, 111, abrogated on other grounds by
Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 961-965; accord, People v. Harris
(2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 623, 643 & fn. 9; People v. Hill (2024) 100
Cal.App.5th 1055, 1067-1068; People v. Schell (2022) 84
Cal.App.5th 437, 444-445; People v. Perez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th
192, 205; People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, 588; Flint,
supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 618; People v. Myles (2021) 69
Cal.App.5th 688, 704.)
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in determining that
double jeopardy did not attach at the evidentiary hearing.
Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s
Major Participant/Reckless Indifference Findings
Appellant next contends substantial evidence does not
support the trial court’s findings that he was a major participant
who acted with reckless indifference.
Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) provides that at the
evidentiary hearing on a petition for resentencing, the
prosecution bears the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the petitioner is not entitled to resentencing. (Ibid.)
The admission of evidence in the hearing shall be governed by the
Evidence Code, except that the trial court may consider evidence
previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is
admissible pursuant to current law, including witness testimony,
stipulated evidence, and matters judicially noticed. The parties
may offer new or additional evidence to meet their respective
burdens. (Ibid.)
At the evidentiary hearing, the trial court acts as an
independent fact finder in determining whether the prosecution
12
has met its burden. (People v. Owens (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1015,
1022 (Owens).) We review the trial court’s factual findings for
substantial evidence. (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981,
988.) “Under this standard, we review the record ‘“‘in the light
most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it
discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable
trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.’”’” (Ibid.) In conducting this review, “‘“[w]e resolve
neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts . . . .”
[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Owens, at p. 1022.)
Major Participant and Reckless Indifference
The requirements of being a major participant and acting
with reckless indifference are related and “‘often overlap.’”
(People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 615 (Clark).) In reviewing
the trial court’s findings, we analyze the totality of the
circumstances. (In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677
(Scoggins).)
Major Participant
In People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks), our
Supreme Court enumerated several factors for courts to consider
in determining whether a defendant is a major participant in the
underlying felony, including: “What role did the defendant have
in planning the criminal enterprise that led to one or more
deaths? What role did the defendant have in supplying or using
lethal weapons? What awareness did the defendant have of
particular dangers posed by the nature of the crime, weapons
used, or past experience or conduct of the other participants?
Was the defendant present at the scene of the killing, in a
position to facilitate or prevent the actual murder, and did his or
13
her own actions or inaction play a particular role in the death?
What did the defendant do after lethal force was used?” (Id. at p.
803, fn. omitted; accord, Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 611.)
Here, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
finding that appellant was a major participant. The trial court
found appellant was “actively involved in the planning” of the
burglary. He admitted that he and Williams went to the victim’s
house “to get the bullets.” The gun was obtained shortly before
they left Williams’s house. Appellant was also armed with a
hunting knife. They walked together to the victim’s home to
carry out that plan. They were both active participants.
After the shooting, appellant and Williams took the car, hid
the property and the firearm, then drove around and picked up
girls. As the trial court explained, “[t]hese actions support the
notion they were major participants.”
Although the trial court “stopped short” of finding
appellant was the “actual shooter,” it opined it was “close based
on the evidence . . . presented.” Regardless, the trial court found
appellant intended to commit the “incredibly dangerous act” of
burglarizing a residence that is “well known” to have hordes of
ammunition, at night, where it is foreseeable that deadly force
would be used to protect that ammunition.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, substantial
evidence supports the trial court’s finding that appellant was a
major participant in the burglary that led to the victim’s death.
Reckless Indifference
“Reckless indifference to human life has a subjective and
an objective element. [Citation.] As to the subjective element,
‘[t]he defendant must be aware of and willingly involved in the
violent manner in which the particular offense is committed,’ and
14
he or she must consciously disregard ‘the significant risk of death
his or her actions create.’ [Citations.] As to the objective
element, “‘[t]he risk [of death] must be of such a nature and
degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s
conduct and the circumstances known to him [or her], its
disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct
that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.”’
[Citations].” (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677.)
“Relevant factors include: Did the defendant use or know
that a gun would be used during the felony? How many weapons
were ultimately used? Was the defendant physically present at
the crime? Did he or she have the opportunity to restrain the
crime or aid the victim? What was the duration of the interaction
between the perpetrators of the felony and the victims? What
was the defendant’s knowledge of his or her confederate’s
propensity for violence or likelihood of using lethal force? What
efforts did the defendant make to minimize the risks of violence
during the felony? [Citation.]” (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p.
677; accord, Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618-623.) “‘“[N]o one
of these considerations is necessary, nor is any one of them
necessarily sufficient.”’” (Scoggins, at p. 677, quoting Banks,
supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803.) The defendant’s youth may also be a
relevant consideration in determining whether a juvenile
defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life. (People
v. Ramirez (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970, 990-991.)
Here, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding
that appellant acted with reckless indifference to human life. As
discussed above, even if appellant was not the actual shooter, he
should have known his actions were “extremely dangerous to
human life.” He knew Williams had a firearm, was present when
15
the victim was shot, and made no effort to intervene or render
aid.
Additionally, the trial court explicitly considered
appellant’s youth in making its determination, noting that
applying the principle was “a difficult task.” The trial court
nevertheless found appellant’s youth did not negate the reckless
indifference to human life factor.
At bottom, appellant asks us to reweigh the evidence
differently than the trial court but that is beyond our purview on
substantial evidence review. (Owens, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p.
1022.)
Disposition
The judgment (order denying petition for resentencing) is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
YEGAN, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
CODY, J.
16
Jesse J. Marino, Judge
Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo
_____________________________
Susan S. Bauguess, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Allison H. Chung, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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