People v. Acuna CA2/6

CourtListener 10655897Calctapp18 août 2025

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Filed 8/18/25 P. v. Acuna CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B337922
(Super. Ct. No. 23F07640)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (San Luis Obispo County)

v.

EDWARD DOMINIK ALEXIS
ACUNA,

Defendant and Appellant.

Edward Dominik Alexis Acuna appeals from the judgment
after a jury convicted him of second degree robbery. (Pen. Code,1
§ 211.) The trial court sentenced him to six years in state prison.
Acuna contends there was insufficient evidence of force or fear
“motivated by the intent to steal.” He also contends the trial court
erred when it denied his motion to dismiss the prior strike
allegation pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Cal.4th 497 (Romero). We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In September 2023, an on-duty loss prevention officer (LP
officer) at a Food 4 Less grocery store was monitoring closed circuit
TV cameras. He noticed Acuna, who was wearing “very baggy
clothing,” looking up at the cameras, and eating a cookie from a
package. Acuna was with a woman and a young child. The LP
officer saw Acuna and the woman walk towards a location of the
store with baby supplies and place a container of diapers into an
empty bag. Acuna positioned his body to obscure “any possible
vision of the concealment.”
They walked to a different aisle and Acuna put a shampoo
bottle in his pants. Acuna also put other merchandise in his
sweater pocket. Acuna and the woman exited the store without
paying for these items. The LP officer followed Acuna, identified
himself, told him he had not paid for the items, and asked him to
return to the store. Acuna refused and attempted to flee. The LP
officer tried to apprehend him. Acuna swung at the officer’s head
with his left arm. The LP officer ducked, and Acuna grabbed the
LP’s officer’s hair, shoving him to the ground. A store employee saw
Acuna pushing and shoving the LP officer before the officer fell to
the ground.
Once on the ground, the LP officer tried to restrain Acuna and
told him he was under arrest. Acuna tried to bite the LP officer.
Another employee arrived to help handcuff Acuna who continued to
resist. They were able to subdue and restrain Acuna.
A Paso Robles police officer responded to the scene. He
observed the LP officer had suffered swelling on his lip. There was
also blood on the LP officer’s knuckles and wrists as a result of the
“altercation” with Acuna. The items taken from the store and

2
retrieved from Acuna amounted to approximately $30, consisting of
shower gel, shampoo, ointment, and diapers.
The jury convicted Acuna of second degree robbery (§ 211). In
a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true several factors in
aggravation. The court also found that Acuna had suffered a 2020
prior conviction for dissuading a witness (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(2)) as a
prior serious felony conviction and strike under the “Three Strikes”
law. (§§ 667, subds. (a)(1), (c)(1), (e)(1), 1170.12, subds. (a)(1),
(c)(1).) It later denied Acuna’s Romero motion and sentenced him to
the midterm of three years, doubled for the strike.
DISCUSSION
Sufficiency of the evidence
Acuna first contends the evidence was insufficient to prove
that he used force or fear “motivated by the intent to steal.” We
disagree.
“Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the
possession of another, from [their] person or immediate presence[]
and against [their] will, accomplished by means of force or fear.”
(§ 211.) A concurrent intent to steal or aid in the commission of a
theft along with the application of force or fear is required. (People
v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 688, 691.) Where the intent to steal
arises only after force is used, the offense is theft, not robbery.
(People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203, 253.) The force required
for robbery is more than “just that quantum of force which is
necessary to accomplish the mere seizing of the property.” (People
v. Morales (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 134, 139 (Morales).)
“[A] robbery can be accomplished even if the property was
peacefully or duplicitously acquired, if force or fear was used to
carry it away.” (People v. Gomez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 249, 256.) Thus,
a robbery occurs when “ ‘the perpetrator, having gained possession

3
of the property without use of force or fear, resorts to force or fear
while carrying away the loot.’ ” (Id. at p. 257.) A robbery in which
force or fear is not used until after the perpetrator has already
taken the property is “commonly referred to as [an] ‘Estes
robber[y].’ ” (Miller v. Superior Court (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 216,
223.) “[A] store employee may be a victim of robbery even though
he does not own the property taken and is not in charge or in
immediate control of the property at the time of the crime.” (People
v. Estes (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 23, 26 (Estes).)
The elements of robbery need not converge at a single
“ ‘temporal point.’ ” (People v. Hodges (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 531,
539–540.) Robbery is a continuing offense and does not end until
the perpetrator has reached a place of relative safety. (People v.
Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 989, 994–996.)
To evaluate Acuna’s claim of evidentiary insufficiency, “ ‘we
review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment
to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is,
evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from
which a reasonable [jury] could find’ ” beyond a reasonable doubt
that he committed robbery. (People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th
500, 507.) So long as “the circumstances reasonably justify the
[jury’s] findings, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply
because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with
a contrary finding.” (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27.)
Here, there is substantial evidence that Acuna’s use of force
was “motivated by the intent to steal” and exceeded the “quantum
of force” necessary to accomplish seizing of the items. (Morales,
supra, 49 Cal.App.3d at p. 139.) Before leaving the store, Acuna
concealed merchandise in his pants and sweatshirt and obstructed
the store camera’s view while placing diapers in a bag. Acuna then

4
carried these items away when he exited the store without paying
for them. Before reaching a point of safety, Acuna was confronted
by the LP officer and refused his requests to return to the store and
pay for the items. Acuna forcibly resisted the officer’s attempt to
take back the merchandise by swinging at his head, grabbing his
hair, shoving him to the ground, and attempting to bite him. Acuna
did not relinquish the items during his use of force. Except for the
diapers that were found in a shopping cart, the stolen items were
found on Acuna’s person once he was arrested. We conclude
substantial evidence supports the robbery conviction because
Acuna’s use of force against the LP officer while attempting to carry
the items away and before reaching a place of safety was motivated
by an intent to steal. (Estes, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at pp. 27–28.)
For these reasons, we reject Acuna’s contentions that an Estes
robbery requires the use of a weapon and there was insufficient
evidence of force because the LP officer attempted to subdue him.
We also reject Acuna’s contention that this “was essentially a
non-violent petty theft case.” The LP officer suffered injuries to his
lip and knuckles and wrists due to Acuna forcibly resisting the
officer’s attempts to regain the merchandise. While Acuna initially
committed a theft, it became a robbery when he used force to retain
the stolen items and flee.
Romero motion
Acuna also contends the court abused its discretion when it
denied his Romero motion to dismiss his prior strike offense for
dissuading a witness committed in 2020. We again disagree.
A trial court has the discretion to dismiss a prior violent or
serious felony conviction. (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 504.) We
review its ruling for abuse of discretion. (People v. Carmony (2004)
33 Cal.4th 367, 374 (Carmony).) “[A] trial court does not abuse its

5
discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no
reasonable person could agree with it.” (Id. at p. 377.)
Dismissal of a strike is warranted if “in light of the nature
and circumstances of [the] present felonies and prior serious and/or
violent felony convictions, and the particulars of [their] background,
character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the
scheme’s spirit.” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.)
The court may consider the age of the prior offenses in exercising its
discretion. (People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1141.) We
conclude these factors did not require dismissal of the strike here.
From 2012 to 2018, Acuna was twice convicted of driving
under the influence, convicted of three drug sale related charges,
and theft. Acuna’s prior strike offense was for dissuading a witness
in 2020. In the same case, Acuna was convicted of being a felon in
possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)) and violating a
protective order (§ 273.6, subd. (a)), a misdemeanor. In 2022, after
his first strike, Acuna was convicted of two additional felonies:
being a felon in possession of ammunition (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1))
and evading the police while recklessly driving (Veh. Code,
§ 2800.2, subd. (a)). He was on postrelease community supervision
when he committed the current offense.
In his Romero motion, Acuna acknowledged that his 2020
strike prior was “recent, suffered less than four years ago.” As to
the instant offense, he argued that he “believed he was somewhat
justified in stealing” the merchandise to provide for his infant
daughter. He also believed that he would not be convicted because
the LP officer initiated contact. Thus, Acuna asked the court to
“strike” his 2020 prior conviction.
We are not tone-deaf to Acuna’s claim that a six-year prison
sentence may be disproportionate to “stealing” $30 worth of

6
merchandise to provide for his daughter. But the value of the items
and Acuna’s desire to provide for his daughter does not, as a matter
of law, place him outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law
compelling the trial court to dismiss his prior strike. In our view,
dismissal was not warranted given the recency and extent of
Acuna’s criminal history and use of violence here. Acuna suffered a
strike conviction in 2020, and was later convicted of two additional
felonies in 2022. And before these recent felony convictions, Acuna
was convicted of several felonies and misdemeanors from 2012 to
2018. He was on postrelease community supervision when he
committed the current offense involving the use of force on a
grocery store employee.
Acuna also contends the court did not consider appropriate
factors. But the court stated it read and considered Acuna’s Romero
motion and probation report. These materials shed light on the
nature and circumstances of Acuna’s prior and current offenses, his
background, character, and prospects. Acuna also contends the
trial court improperly denied the Romero motion because it stated
Acuna had not “suffered the consequences for his two additional
felonies” because his 2022 felony convictions were not doubled on
account of his 2020 strike conviction. We are not persuaded. We
consider the correctness of the trial court’s ruling, not the
correctness of the trial court’s reasons in reaching its decision.
(People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 976 [if the trial court’s ruling
is correct “ ‘ “upon any theory of the law applicable to the case, it
must be sustained regardless of the considerations which may have
moved the trial court to its conclusion” ’ ”].) And here, the court
reasonably concluded Acuna did not have “a crime-free cleansing
period of rehabilitation” that would justify dismissing the strike.
(People v. Humphrey (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 809, 813 [reversing

7
dismissal of 20-year-old strike]; People v. Pearson (2008) 165
Cal.App.4th 740, 749–750 [strikes 24, 15, and 10 years old properly
imposed].)
People v. Avila, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th 1134, does not compel a
different result. The defendant there committed his prior strike
offenses 26 to 28 years earlier, and “did not use violence against
either of his victims” during the current offenses. (Id. at pp. 1141,
1146.) But here, Acuna committed two more felonies after his
recent 2020 strike conviction for dissuading a victim. He also used
violence against the LP officer. In our view, this is not one of the
“ ‘extraordinary [cases] . . . by which a career criminal can be
deemed to fall outside the spirit’ ” of the Three Strikes law.
(Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.) There was no abuse of
discretion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

CODY, J.

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Matthew G. Guerrero, Judge

Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo

______________________________

Kernkamp Law and Christian E. Kernkamp for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Jonathan J. Kline and Herbert S. Tetef,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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