CourtListener 10655892•People v. McCray CA3
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Filed 8/18/25 P. v. McCray CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
THE PEOPLE, C100144
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 19FE017054)
v.
JOSHUA MAURICE McCRAY,
Defendant and Appellant.
A jury found defendant Joshua Maurice McCray guilty of numerous counts of
robbery and burglary and other offenses. At trial, the People introduced text message
communications among defendant and his codefendants. Defendant now argues the trial
court erred in failing to instruct with CALCRIM No. 418 that would have required the
jury to find the existence of a conspiracy before it could consider these text messages.
This claim is without merit. We affirm.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In a consolidated information, the People charged defendant with two counts of
first degree robbery (Pen. Code,1 § 211; counts one and three), eight counts of first
degree residential burglary (§ 459; counts two, four, seven, nine, eleven, thirteen,
nineteen, and twenty-five), unlawful possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count
five), attempted first degree robbery (§§ 211, 664; count six), and assault with a deadly
weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count eight). The People alleged numerous aggravating
circumstances, and that defendant suffered three prior strike convictions. The People also
alleged that: (1) defendant personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)) as to count
three; (2) the offense in count three was committed by persons who voluntarily acted in
concert and entered a specified inhabited structure (§ 213, subd. (a)(1)(A)); (3) defendant
was armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)) as to count four; and (4) another person,
other than an accomplice, was present in the residence during the commission of the
burglary (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(21)) as to counts two, four, seven, and thirteen.
The fourth amended information also charged five codefendants: Isaiah Leo
Garone, Timothy Leo Garone, Stephan Blain Gee, Anthony Jose Mosqueda, and Jose C.
Smith. Autumn Michelle King had been charged as a codefendant in an earlier
consolidated complaint. When defendant’s case proceeded to trial, all codefendants had
either pled guilty or were convicted in separate trials.
The People ultimately dismissed count eight and the firearm allegation on count
four. Defendant waived his right to a jury trial on the prior strike convictions and three of
the alleged aggravating circumstances.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
Motion in Limine Regarding Text Message Communications Among Defendant and
Codefendants
Before trial, the prosecutor moved in limine to use “PowerPoint presentations to
present summaries of the raw data collected from the downloads of the defendants’
phones,” including text messages sent among the defendants relating to each of the
offenses. The People said that “[i]n terms of any statements made in any text messages
or other written communications, all of the statements offered for the truth are either
made by the Defendant McCray or are Declarations Against Interest under Evidence
Code section 1230. Therefore, all the text message communications and other statements
contained in these exhibits are admissible and should be received in their entirety.” At
the May 15, 2023 pretrial conference, defendant objected to the way this data would be
summarized and as to foundation for the data. The trial court ruled that the summaries of
the cellphone data were admissible.
Trial Evidence
In opening argument, the prosecutor once referred to defendant and his
codefendants as “co-conspirators.” During its case-in-chief, the prosecution introduced
the text message communications among Smith, Isaiah, Timothy, King, Gee, and
defendant. Defendant raised no hearsay objection to these text messages. Evidence was
also introduced that Timothy was Isaiah’s father and that King was Smith’s girlfriend or
wife.
A detective testified that during the investigation defendant asked to speak with
him because defendant “had some information about some burglaries and robberies” and
“wanted some sort of agreement with the district attorney’s office.” Defendant told the
interviewing detectives, “I’ll tell you one name I’m associated with” and named “Jose
Smith.” Defendant provided identifying information for this person that was consistent
with codefendant Smith. Defendant said, “we kinda know the same people. But like I
said man, that’s just one name right there” before later adding that Smith was “good for”
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at least five home invasions. Defendant described Smith as “the head player” but then
indicated “I’m not sayin’ I haven’t or anything with, you know what I mean?”
Defendant then said, “[t]here’s one guy above him. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . I mean, it’s, uh,
t- two guys, one’s a dad and the other one’s his son.” Defendant named the father as
“Tim.” Tim and his son were the “mastermind[s]” of the operation. They would give
Smith “all the licks.” The detective testified that a “lick” is a street term for “an easy way
to come up on money,” such as a robbery or a burglary. According to defendant, Tim
and his son would tell Smith this “guy’s got this, this, this there, or this, this, this,” and
“let’s- go watch it and get the- you know, uh, the run down of the place.”
Detectives then asked if defendant knew Smith’s wife. He responded that he knew
“Autti King,” before adding “what’s real funny is this bitch acts like, she ain’t – she ain’t
part of nothin’.” Defendant identified a picture of codefendant King during the
interview. Detectives asked if King talked to “that Tim guy”; defendant answered yes.
Detectives asked if defendant knew “some of the other players that, uh, Jose enlists in
doin’ dirt?” Defendant then named “Stephan Q” and provided identifying information
for him. That information was consistent with codefendant Gee and defendant identified
a picture of codefendant Gee as “Stephan Q” during the interrogation.
Later in the interview, defendant said “Imma tell you every lick we did, or
whatever thing, you know what I mean,” including “whatever I was involved.”
Detectives asked if defendant had any blood on his hands. Defendant responded,
“nobody got killed man, but somebody got injured.”
The People introduced cellphone location data at trial. This data showed that for
some of the offenses, defendant was near the victim’s residence and near some of his
codefendants around or at the time of the offense. For example, for the robbery that
occurred on January 1, 2019, defendant, Smith, and Isaiah were all near the victim’s
apartment at the time of the robbery. The People also introduced evidence that
defendant’s DNA was found on items left behind by the offenders at two of the crime
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scenes. In one of those cases, the victim testified that multiple people had broken into his
home.
Request for Jury Instruction CALCRIM No. 418
At the May 15, 2023 pretrial conference, the trial court asked the prosecutor to
provide jury instructions “by the time the jury is selected.” Given that jury selection was
to begin the next day, the prosecutor explained he was “not going to be able to do that
within that time frame” and asked to have until May 19. Defense counsel interjected,
“Judge, if you asked me to do it, I would have gotten it done.” The court permitted the
prosecutor to provide jury instructions by May 19. The court explained, “[t]he reason
why it’s so important to have jury instructions up front is because they are often argued
about, and we only have so much time during breaks and at lunch and after the jury
leaves to talk about them.” The court then asked defense counsel if there were any jury
instructions he would like. Defense counsel responded, “I can have those for the Court
whenever it wants.” The court requested them by May 19.
On May 24, 2023, the trial court indicated it had reviewed the proposed jury
instructions. The court asked defense counsel if he wanted anything inserted. The
following exchange took place:
“[Defense counsel]: I’m not in a position to finalize jury instructions yet, so --
“THE COURT: Okay.
“[Defense counsel]: -- if that’s what we are doing in this five minutes, I’m
objecting.
“THE COURT: All right. Your objection is noted for the record, Counsel. I’m
not going to allow you to submit instructions at the last minute, to delay the trial.
“[Defense counsel]: Your Honor, if the Court is not going to let me object, not
submit jury instructions, the Court doesn’t need me in here, really.
“THE COURT: Counsel, I need you to do your -- fulfill your responsibilities.
Okay?
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“[Defense counsel]: You know what, this Court -- this Court is subjecting time
constraints on my case.
“THE COURT: All right.
“[Defense counsel]: I’ve been very cooperative, but there’s a point, too, where I
am going to submit my instructions. If the Court doesn’t want to take them, I’ll put them
on demand and object.”
On May 25, 2023, immediately before the prosecutor rested his case and delivered
his summation, defense counsel requested several jury instructions be given, including
CALCRIM No. 418, entitled “Coconspirator’s Statements.” The following exchange
took place:
“[Defense counsel]: I think there’s been a lot of evidence about co-conspirators,
not only with their phones, but with the text messages. And without some instruction to
the jury as to how to deal with that, which is what these go to – it’s some protection for
the Defendant. . . .
“THE COURT: All right. I’m going to have to take a break and do some
research. Do you have any case law that supports your position, Counsel?
“[Prosecutor]: No, because this is being brought up at the last second. This is a
complex legal issue.
“[Defense counsel]: Oh, come on now.
“[Prosecutor]: I would have looked at this if I had any indication.
“THE COURT: That’s why I asked if the Defense has any requests early, so we
could get this done.
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“[Prosecutor]: This also is inapplicable. All of the statements in this case came in
under a theory of statements against penal interest, and this is a complex legal issue that
I’m not prepared to address in the closing I’m about to give.”
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Following a break, the prosecutor further argued about the request for CALCRIM
No. 418 stating, “I did not admit any statements in this case under Evidence Code section
1223, so I don’t believe it’s applicable.” The trial court concurred and denied the request
for the instruction. After defense counsel objected but could offer no case authority to
support his position, the court stated it “finds that not only is [the request] untimely, but
unsupported by case authority.”
The trial court instructed the jury that defendant may be found guilty of a given
offense as a direct perpetrator or an aider and abettor. The jury found defendant not
guilty of count nine and guilty on all remaining counts. The jury also found true the
firearm allegation, all of the section 667.5, subdivision (c)(21) allegations, and some of
the aggravating circumstances presented to them. In a bifurcated bench trial, the court
found true defendant’s prior strike convictions and the remaining alleged aggravating
circumstances. The court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 177 years to life
plus 16 years of imprisonment.
Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury with
CALCRIM No. 418 and that this error prejudiced him.
CALCRIM No. 418 states:
“In deciding whether the People have proved that (the defendant[s]/Defendant[s]
_____<insert name[s] of defendant[s] if codefendant trial and this instruction does not
apply to all defendants; see Bench Notes>) committed [any of] the crime[s] charged, you
may not consider any statement made out of court by _____<insert name[s] of
coconspirator[s]> unless the People have proved by a preponderance of the evidence
that:
“1. Some evidence other than the statement itself establishes that a conspiracy to
commit a crime existed when the statement was made;
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“2. _____<insert name[s] of coconspirator[s]> (was/were) [a] member[s] of and
participating in the conspiracy when (he/she/they) made the statement;
“3. _____<insert name[s] of coconspirator[s]> made the statement in order to
further the goal of the conspiracy;
“AND
“4. The statement was made before or during the time that (the
defendant[s]/Defendant[s] _____<insert name[s] of defendant[s] if codefendant trial and
this instruction does not apply to all defendants>) (was/were) participating in the
conspiracy.”
The Bench Notes for CALCRIM No. 418 state: “It is an open question whether
the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the use of a coconspirator’s statement to
incriminate a defendant. [Citations.] On request, the court must give this instruction if
the statement has been admitted under Evidence Code section 1223.”
As an initial matter, we find compelling the trial court’s decision to deny
defendant’s request as untimely and unsupported by case authority. Our Supreme Court
confronted a similar set of facts in People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133. In that case,
the trial court had set a schedule to review proposed jury instructions well in advance of
summation. (Id. at pp. 1180-1181.) But “[i]mmediately prior to closing argument,
defense counsel broached the subject for the first time” of instructing the jury not to
consider the defendant’s prior death verdict. (Id. at p. 1180.) The trial court “ ‘felt it was
an untimely request and did not permit that to be done in view of the fact that we spent a
lot of time getting instructions ready and both sides were ready to argue.’ ” (Ibid.) Our
Supreme Court explained that, under section 1093.5, “ ‘all requests for instructions on
points of law must be made to the court and all proposed instructions must be delivered to
the court before commencement of argument. . . .’ Delivery presupposes a written
presentation to afford an intelligible basis and orderly manner for making these
determinations.” (Ramos, at pp. 1180-1181.) Our Supreme Court concluded that the
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11th-hour request, “[b]eing untimely and not in proper form . . . was justifiably refused.”
(Id. at p. 1181.)
The present case is analogous to Ramos. The trial court here set a schedule at the
May 15 pretrial conference for the parties to submit jury instructions. Defense counsel
agreed to this schedule, and defense counsel knew at the time that the People would seek
to admit the text messages as they were the subject of a motion in limine. Yet defense
counsel did not request the jury be instructed with CALCRIM No. 418 until right before
the prosecutor was to deliver his closing argument. Defense counsel made the request
orally and provided no case authority to support his position.
If the trial court had no sua sponte duty to instruct with CALCRIM No. 418, we
would affirm the ruling denying defendant’s request on the basis that it was untimely and
in improper form. But, as the Bench Notes for CALCRIM No. 418 indicate, it is
presently an open question whether a trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct with
CALCRIM No. 418 in appropriate cases. If the trial court had such a duty that applied in
this case, the fact that defendant’s request was untimely would be irrelevant.
But here we do not need to address whether a trial court has a sua sponte duty to
instruct with CALCRIM No. 418. This is because we conclude the trial court here
properly denied the request on the merits and that, even assuming error, defendant was
not prejudiced.
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted. (People v. Valencia (2021) 11 Cal.5th 818, 831; Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a).)
Hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible unless it falls under a recognized exception.
(Valencia, at p. 831; Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (b).) One exception, set forth in Evidence
Code section 1223, is for hearsay statements by coconspirators. Such statements may
“ ‘be admitted against a party if, at the threshold, the offering party presents “independent
evidence to establish prima facie the existence of . . . [a] conspiracy.” ’ ” (People v.
Thompson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1043, 1108.) “Pursuant to Evidence Code section 1223,
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‘[o]nce independent proof of a conspiracy has been shown, three preliminary facts must
be established: “(1) that the declarant was participating in a conspiracy at the time of the
declaration; (2) that the declaration was in furtherance of the objective of that conspiracy;
and (3) that at the time of the declaration the party against whom the evidence is offered
was participating or would later participate in the conspiracy.” ’ ” (Ibid., fn. omitted.)
“[T]he proponent must offer evidence sufficient for the trier of fact to determine that the
preliminary fact, the conspiracy, is more likely than not to have existed.” (People v.
Herrera (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 46, 61.)
CALCRIM No. 418 instructs the jury on the foundational requirements for the
coconspirator exception under Evidence Code section 1223. It explains that, before the
jury may consider out-of-court statements by coconspirators, the jury must find: (1) that
“[s]ome evidence other than the statement[s]” establishes the conspiracy; and (2) the
existence of the three preliminary facts detailed by Evidence Code section 1223.
But, as the People pointed out below, the text messages here were not admitted
pursuant to Evidence Code section 1223. Defendant raised no hearsay objection to the
text messages at trial, so the trial court never ruled on their admissibility pursuant to a
specific hearsay exception. Even now, defendant does not contend the text messages
would have been inadmissible but for the application of Evidence Code section 1223.
The jury thus did not need to determine any foundational facts to support the
coconspirator exception, as the exception was never invoked. Accordingly, the jury did
not need to be instructed with CALCRIM No. 418.
In any event, even if the omission of the instruction was error, it did not prejudice
defendant. Defendant insists the failure to instruct with CALCRIM No. 418 violated his
federal constitutional rights and thus the judgment must be reversed unless the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18.
In his view, the omission of the instruction was “analogous” to the omission of an
element of the offense. We disagree. Defendant was not charged with conspiracy, and
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conspiracy is not an element of robbery, burglary, or any of the charged offenses. The
jury was not instructed on derivative liability through an uncharged conspiracy under
CALCRIM No. 416 and, despite one errant use of the word “co-conspirator” during
opening argument, the prosecution did not attempt to prove derivative liability under a
conspiracy theory. Rather, the jury was instructed only as to theories of direct liability
and aiding and abetting liability.
The failure to instruct jurors regarding coconspirator statements is governed by the
state law harmless error standard and is deemed harmless unless it is reasonably probable
that a result more favorable to the defendant would have been achieved in the absence of
the error. (People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 251-252; People v. Sully (1991)
53 Cal.3d 1195, 1231; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) The defendant
bears the burden of demonstrating prejudice under this standard. (People v. Gonzalez
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 201.)
Defendant fails to satisfy that burden here. Defendant argues there was
insufficient independent evidence of a conspiracy to permit the jury to consider the text
messages. We disagree. “A conspiracy exists when one or more persons have the
specific intent to agree or conspire to commit an offense, as well as the specific intent to
commit the elements of that offense, together with proof of the commission of an overt
act by one or more of the parties to such agreement in furtherance of the conspiracy.”
(People v. Herrera, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 64.) “It is frequently necessary to infer
the existence of a conspiracy through circumstantial evidence.” (Munoz v. Superior
Court (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 774, 780.) Here, defendant’s own statements in the
interrogation implicated himself, as well as Smith, Timothy, Isaiah, Gee, and King, in
orchestrating a series of robberies and home invasions. The existence of a conspiracy
could readily be inferred from these statements. The cellphone location data placing
defendant in the vicinity of some of the victims’ homes and some of his codefendants
around or at the time of the offenses further supports the finding of a conspiracy, as does
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the DNA evidence linking defendant to two of the crime scenes. Defendant characterizes
his admissions during the interrogation as “cryptic,” arguing he never expressly
“admitted participating in the conspiracy.” We are unpersuaded.
Even if the trial court had instructed the jury on CALCRIM No. 418, it is
reasonably probable the jury would have found the existence of a conspiracy, by a
preponderance of the evidence, based on evidence independent of the text messages. So
the jury still would have been permitted to consider the text messages among defendant
and his codefendants when considering the question of defendant’s guilt.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/
MESIWALA, J.
We concur:
/s/
EARL, P. J.
/s/
KRAUSE, J.
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