People v. Patton CA2/6

CourtListener 10655888Calctapp18 août 2025

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Filed 8/18/25 P. v. Patton CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B337239
(Super. Ct. No. BA166025-01)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)

v.

PETER PATTON,

Defendant and Appellant.

Peter Patton appeals from the trial court’s order summarily
denying his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code
section 1172.6.1 He contends the trial court erred when it denied
his petition without issuing an order to show cause and holding
an evidentiary hearing. According to appellant, reversal is
required because the jury instructions given at his 1998 trial
permitted the imputation of malice. We affirm.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Factual and Procedural Background2
In 1997, appellant participated in a gang-related shooting,
in which rival gang member, Reyes Correa, was shot and killed.
In 1998, a jury convicted appellant of second degree murder and
found true the allegation that he personally used a firearm. (§§
187, subd. (a), 12022.5, subd. (a).) Appellant was sentenced to
state prison for 15 years to life for the offense plus 10 years for
personal use of a firearm.
In 2000, we affirmed appellant’s conviction in a
nonpublished opinion. (Patton, supra, B132868.)
Section 1172.6 Petition
In February 2023, appellant filed a form petition for
resentencing. He declared he could not presently be convicted of
murder “because of changes made to [sections] 188 and 189,
effective January 1, 2019.” The trial court appointed counsel and
accepted briefing. The prosecution maintained that appellant
was not entitled to resentencing because he was charged with
murder and “no other crime,” so whether he was guilty as a direct
perpetrator or an aider and abettor, he had to have malice
aforethought.
Trial Court’s Ruling
The trial court summarily denied appellant’s petition after
finding he was ineligible for relief as a matter of law. The trial
court explained: “In this case[,] the jury was not instructed on
any theory of liability that allowed them to convict on imputed
malice. They were not instructed on felony murder or natural
and probable consequences, and the aiding and abetting jury

2 We summarize these facts and procedural history from
our prior appellate opinion, People v. Patton (Feb. 17, 2000,
B132868) [nonpub. opn.] (Patton).

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instruction did not contain language that allowed conviction on
an imputed malice theory.”
The trial court further explained, “[T]he People, during
closing argument, did not argue that the defendant could be
found guilty on an imputed malice theory. Therefore, the
defendant has not made a prima facie case and is ineligible for
resentencing. The petition for resentencing is denied.”
Discussion
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill
1437) amended the felony murder rule and the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, “to ensure that murder liability
is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act
with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human
life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).)
To that end, Senate Bill 1437 amended section 188 by
adding a requirement that, when the felony-murder rule does not
apply, a principal in the crime of murder “shall act with malice
aforethought” and “[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person
based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd.
(a)(3).)
Senate Bill 1437 also enacted section 1172.6, which created
a procedural mechanism for defendants who could not be
convicted of murder or attempted murder under the amended
laws to seek retroactive relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3); People v.
Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959 (Lewis).)
Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) amended section
1172.6 to expand eligibility for resentencing to include not only
those “convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine,” but also those convicted of

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murder on any “other theory under which malice is imputed to a
person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” (§
1172.6, subd. (a), as amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.)
In deciding whether a petitioner has a made a prima facie
showing for relief, “‘“the court takes petitioner’s factual
allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment
regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his
or her factual allegations were proved. . . .”’” (Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 971.) The trial court may consider the record of
conviction, which will “necessarily inform the trial court’s prima
facie inquiry under section [1172.6], allowing the court to
distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that are
clearly meritless.” (Ibid.)
“‘However, if the record, including the court’s own
documents, “contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the
petition,” then “the court is justified in making a credibility
determination adverse to the petitioner.”’” (Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 971.) At this preliminary stage, the trial court
should not engage in factfinding, weighing the evidence, or the
exercise of discretion. (Id. at p. 972.)
We independently review a trial court’s determination on
whether a petitioner has made a prima facie showing. (People v.
Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52.)
Appellant is Ineligible for Relief as a Matter of Law
It is undisputed that the trial court did not instruct the
jury on felony murder or the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. Accordingly, appellant could not have been convicted on
either of those theories, which permitted summary denial of his
section 1172.6 petition. (See People v. Coley (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 539, 548 [defendant convicted of attempted murder
on theory of direct aiding and abetting not entitled to

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resentencing because jury was not instructed on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine]; People v. Estrada (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 941, 943, 946 [jury instructions showed trial court
never instructed jury on natural and probable consequences
doctrine; summary denial of petition affirmed].)
Appellant nevertheless contends reversal is required
because he could have been convicted of second degree murder
under an “imputed malice theory” identified in People v. Powell
(2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689 (Powell) and People v. Langi (2022) 73
Cal.App.5th 972 (Langi). We disagree.
In Powell, the appellate court concluded that the standard
aiding and abetting instruction (CALCRIM No. 401) was “not
tailored” for the crime of second degree implied malice murder.
(Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 714.) For implied malice
murder liability, “[t]he mens rea, which must be personally
harbored by the direct aider and abettor, is knowledge that the
perpetrator intended to commit the act, intent to aid the
perpetrator in the commission of the act, knowledge that the act
is dangerous to human life, and acting in conscious disregard for
human life.” (Id. at p. 713, fn. omitted.) Our Supreme Court
adopted Powell’s summary of the elements of aiding and abetting
an implied malice murder in People v. Reyes (2023)14 Cal.5th
981, 990-991.
The Langi court applied Powell’s reasoning. The defendant
in Langi was part of a group that beat and robbed the victim, who
died after falling and hitting his head. (Langi, supra, 73
Cal.App.5th at p. 975.) At trial, Langi argued he did not throw
the fatal punch. (Id. at p. 977.) The jury convicted him of
robbery, battery, and second degree murder. (Ibid.)

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Langi filed a section 1172.6 petition for resentencing and
the trial court summarily denied it. (Langi, supra, 73
Cal.App.5th at pp. 976-977.) The court of appeal reversed,
concluding that Langi was entitled to an evidentiary hearing
because the instructions permitted him to be found guilty of
aiding and abetting second degree murder without finding he
personally acted with malice. (Id. at p. 984.)
At issue in Langi were CALJIC Nos. 3.01 (aiding and
abetting) and 8.31 (second degree murder).3 The Langi court
observed that because CALJIC No. 8.31 did not require the direct
perpetrator to “act with the unlawful intent of causing death,” his
“unlawful purpose,” as the term is used in CALJIC No. 3.01,
“may have been only to strike or to injure, or conceivably only to
embarrass, the victim.” (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 982.)
“Since the perpetrator’s purpose need not have been to kill the
victim, the aider and abettor’s knowledge of that purpose

3 CALJIC No. 3.01 provides: “A person aids and abets the
commission of a crime when he, [¶] (1) with knowledge of the
unlawful purpose of the perpetrator and [¶] (2) with the intent or
purpose of committing or encouraging or facilitating the
commission of the crime, and [¶] (3) by act or advice aids,
promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of the crime.”
CALJIC No. 8.31 provides: “Murder of the second degree is
also the unlawful killing of a human being when: [¶] 1. The
killing resulted from an intentional act, [¶] 2. The natural
consequences of the act are dangerous to human life, and [¶] 3.
The act was deliberately performed with knowledge of the danger
to, and with conscious disregard for, human life. [¶] When the
killing is the direct result of such an act, it is not necessary to
prove that the defendant intended that the act would result in
the death of a human being.”

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similarly need not have been knowledge that the perpetrator
aimed to kill. If the perpetrator need not have had ‘murderous
intent,’ certainly the aider and abettor need not have had such an
intent.” (Id. at pp. 982-983.) “Thus, under the instructions that
were given, the jury was entitled to conclude that, to be guilty as
an aider and abettor of second degree murder, appellant need
only have intended to encourage the perpetrator’s intentional
act—in this case, punching [the victim]—whether or not
appellant intended to aid or encourage [the victim’s] killing, and
whether or not he personally knew of and disregarded the risk of
such a killing.” (Id. at p. 983.)
But the ambiguity identified in Langi and Powell is not at
issue here because appellant was only charged with murder—
there was no non-murder offense charged, i.e., battery. Thus, the
aiding and abetting instructions here obligated the jury to find
that appellant knew the perpetrator intended to commit the
crime of murder, and that he acted with the intent or purpose of
committing, encouraging, or facilitating that murder.
Because appellant was at least convicted of aiding and
abetting implied malice second degree murder, which is still a
valid theory of murder, he is not entitled to relief as a matter of
law. As such, we need not address his further arguments that he
did not forfeit the issue of “imputed malice” by failing to raise it
on direct appeal4 or that the personal use finding does not
conclusively establish malice.

4 This issue is currently pending review by our Supreme
Court in People v. Lopez (Oct. 4, 2024, F085300), review granted
Jan. 15, 2025, S287814.

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Disposition
The order denying appellant’s section 1172.6 petition for
resentencing is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, J.
We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

CODY, J.

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Ray G. Jurado, Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
_____________________________

James S. Donnelly-Saalfield, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and David A. Voet, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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