People v. Garrett CA2/2

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Filed 8/14/25 P. v. Garrett CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B332007

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA155828)
v.

ELLIS GARRETT,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Sean D. Coen, Judge. Affirmed.

Marilee Marshall, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and David A. Voet, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________
Ellis Garrett appeals his conviction for murder and
attempted murder. He argues the trial court wrongly admitted
certain gang evidence at trial and abused its discretion in
imposing his sentence. We reject his challenges, and we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This criminal appeal arises from a shooting at the El
Ranchito Market in Los Angeles on August 28, 2021.1 The
victims, Luvon Lucas and T.G.,2 went to the market together that
day to make some purchases. T.G. was Lucas’s uncle. Another
individual entered the store while they were there. Detective
Michael Levant testified witnesses told him that individual asked
the victims, “Where you from?,” to which Lucas replied “This is
Hat Gang Watts.”
The market cashier testified she heard a sound similar to
someone pulling back the slide on top of a gun to cock it. Lucas,
T.G., and the other individual ran out of the store’s front door.
After the cashier heard an initial gunshot, she ran toward the
back of the store. She heard about four or five gunshots in total.
After the shooting stopped, the cashier went outside and
saw Lucas lying on the ground in front of the market. He had
been shot in the arm and the chest. Lucas died from his injuries.

1 In this summary, we focus on those facts relevant to the
issues raised on appeal and “ ‘construe the facts in the light most
favorable to the judgment.’ ” (People v. Curl (2009) 46 Cal.4th
339, 342, fn. 3.)
2 We refer to the surviving victim by his initials. (See
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4).)

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The cashier did not see T.G. Police later learned T.G. had been
shot in the stomach and was treated at a nearby hospital.3
At the time of the shooting, a witness was headed toward
her parked car outside the market. She saw Garrett shooting
toward the market from the vicinity of her car. He was wearing a
white shirt and black pants, and a red and white bandana
covered part of his head. Cell phone records showed Garrett’s cell
phone was in the vicinity of the market at the time of the
shooting. After the shooting, Garrett fled the scene on foot.
On July 14, 2022, Garrett was charged in an information
with the premeditated murder of Lucas (Pen. Code,4 § 187,
subd. (a); count 1), and attempted murder of T.G. (§§ 189,
subd. (a), 664; count 2.) It was further alleged that Garrett
personally used a firearm in those crimes. (See § 12022.5,
subd. (a).) He was tried by a jury during April and May 2023.
Police believed the shooting was gang related because of
the question posed to the victims in the market, and because
video surveillance showed a suspicious vehicle at the scene which
had arrived from and then returned to the territory of the Bishop
Bloods, a rival gang to the Hat Gang Watts Crips. Evidence was
introduced at trial that some witnesses were reluctant to
cooperate with the investigation and prosecution because they
feared for their safety.
In light of the prosecution’s theory of the case, Detective
Mitchell Woods, a police gang expert, testified. He explained to
the jury general aspects of gang culture in Los Angeles, such as

3 T.G. refused to speak to police at the hospital and police
were unable to serve him with a subpoena to testify at trial.
4 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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gang territory, rivalries, hierarchies, and retaliation; how an
individual joins a gang; and gang members’ use of monikers. He
also explained community members were commonly reluctant to
cooperate with police investigations of gang-related crime.
One of the gangs to which Detective Woods was assigned
was the Bebop Bloods, a gang aligned with the Bishop Bloods.
The Hat Gang Watts Crips is another gang controlling a nearby
territory and is a rival to both the Bebops and the Bishops.
Woods testified to his opinion Garrett was a Bebop Bloods
member and T.G. was a Hat Gang Watts Crips member. Woods
gave the jury context about Garrett’s social media photos and
messages, explaining how certain slang, gestures, colors, and
insignias therein were derogatory to the Crips and reflected his
membership in the Bebop Bloods.
The jury found Garrett guilty of second degree murder and
attempted murder without premeditation, and it found the
firearm allegations true. Garrett was sentenced to: 11 years in
prison on count 2 (seven years for attempted murder and four
years for the firearm enhancement); and 19 years to life in prison
on count 1 (15 years for second degree murder and four years for
the firearm enhancement), to run consecutive to the sentence on
count 2.
Judgment was entered on July 21, 2023. On October 26,
2023, our court granted Garrett’s application for relief from
default for failure to file a timely notice of appeal. (See People v.
Zarazua (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1054, 1058 [“the appellate court
may deem the notice of appeal to have been constructively filed in
a timely manner”]; see also § 1237, subd. (a).) Garrett timely filed
a notice of appeal within the period prescribed by that order.

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DISCUSSION
I. Gang Evidence Was Properly Admitted at Trial
Garrett argues the trial court erred in failing to exclude
evidence introduced via the testimony of Detective Woods. He
does not specifically identify the problematic evidence, but
appears to challenge Woods’s testimony in general, including
that: “[Garrett] was a gang member with many tattoos,” showing
“his desire to harm Crips”; Woods had stopped Garrett “many
times”; Crips and Bloods are rival gangs; “gangs have
hierarchies” their members rise within based on the number and
severity of crimes they commit to benefit the gang; the
community fears retaliation by gangs if they cooperate with law
enforcement; and evidence regarding “gang culture and the so-
called gang lifestyle.”
Before trial, Garrett objected to the introduction of gang
evidence in general, pursuant to Evidence Code section 352, and
asked for it to be “limit[ed] to the bare minimum that the People
need.” The trial court determined gang evidence was relevant to
“motive and/or intent” and would help “the jury as to the
background of why this may have occurred.” (See People v.
Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 193 (Williams) [“[I]n a gang-
related case, gang evidence is admissible if relevant to motive or
identity, so long as its probative value is not outweighed by its
prejudicial effect.”].) However, the trial court told the parties if
there were issues with “particular areas of the evidence,” defense
counsel should bring them to the court’s attention at that time.
Garrett does not argue the trial court erred in determining
the evidence was relevant and admissible pursuant to Evidence

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Code section 352.5 Rather, he argues the evidence violated Penal
Code section 1109 and the California Racial Justice Act of 2020
(RJA). (See Assem. Bill No. 2542 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.),
Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 1.) We disagree.
A. Garrett Forfeited His Meritless Claim of
Section 1109 Error
According to Garrett, Detective Woods’s testimony should
have been excluded pursuant to section 1109, subdivision (a). In
his view, the Legislature sought to mitigate the possible prejudice
that could result from gang evidence by allowing the bifurcation
of trials on gang enhancements. (See Assem. Bill No. 333 (2021–
2022 Reg. Sess.), Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 2, subds. (d)(6), (e), (f).)
Garrett has forfeited this claimed error because he failed to
object on this ground in the trial court. Garrett asks us to
overlook his failure to raise the issue in the trial court. We
decline to do so. (See Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist. (1979)
23 Cal.3d 180, 184, fn. 1 (Doers)[“ ‘[we] will ordinarily not
consider procedural defects or erroneous rulings . . . where an
objection could have been but was not presented to the lower
court . . . .’ ”], abrogated in part on other grounds by Quach v.
California Commerce Club, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 562, 581–582.)
Moreover, the claim of error is meritless. The bifurcation
rule of section 1109 applies only in “case[s] in which a gang
enhancement is charged under subdivision (b) or (d) of
Section 186.22.” (§ 1109, subd. (a).) Garrett concedes no gang

5 We therefore accept that ruling as correct. (See Tukes v.
Richard (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 1, 12, fn. 5 [“A contention not
appropriately raised in the opening brief under a separate
argument heading may be deemed forfeited.”].)

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enhancements were charged here. Section 1109 therefore is
inapplicable.6
To the extent Garrett argues the Legislature broadly
limited the use of gang evidence at trial, even when a gang
enhancement was not charged, we disagree. Section 1109 does
not limit the use of gang evidence in appropriate circumstances,
such as when it is “relevant to motive or identity” “in a gang-
related case, . . . so long as its probative value is not outweighed
by its prejudicial effect.” (Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 193;
see also Assem. Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), Stats. 2021,
ch. 699, § 2, subd. (e), citing Williams, supra, at p. 193; People v.
Hinojos (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 524, 551 [in a bifurcated trial,
gang evidence was properly admitted when relevant to the
defendant’s motive for murder and to understanding coded
communications].) The trial court concluded this evidence was
relevant for those purposes and not unduly prejudicial, and
Garrett has not challenged that conclusion on appeal.
B. The Testimony Did Not Violate the RJA
Garrett also argues the trial court should have excluded
Detective Woods’s testimony under the RJA. The People argue
Garrett forfeited this claim by failing to raise it in the trial court.
Although not pointed out by Garrett, there is some ambiguity
whether a defendant may make an RJA claim for the first time
on direct appeal. (See People v. Lawson (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th
990, 999–1001 (Lawson); see also § 745, subd. (b).) We decline to

6 Because Garrett’s claim of section 1109 error lacks merit,
his related claim of ineffective assistance of counsel also
necessarily fails. (See People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641,
748 (Ledesma).)

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address that issue because we conclude the claimed error fails on
its merits. (See Lawson, supra, at p. 1001.)
The RJA prohibits the state from “seek[ing] or obtain[ing] a
criminal conviction . . . on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national
origin.” (§ 745, subd. (a).) As relevant here, a defendant shows a
violation by “prov[ing], by a preponderance of the evidence,” that
“an expert witness . . . used racially discriminatory language
about the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, or
otherwise exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant
because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin.”
(§ 745, subd. (a)(2).) “ ‘ “A fact is proved by a preponderance of the
evidence if . . . it is more likely than not that the fact is true.” ’ ”
(Lawson, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 1001.)
According to Garrett, Detective Woods’s testimony
“exhibited bias or animus towards [Garrett] because of [his] race
in that the testimony dehumanized [him] by stripping him of any
aspect of his humanity that would empower jurors to empathize
with him.” Garrett has cited no authority suggesting Woods’s
testimony here “exhibited bias or animus” based on Garrett’s
race. He asserts that it “violated the RJA for the same reasons
that it violated AB33 [sic].” But, as we have already explained
above, the testimony did not violate section 1109.
Moreover, to establish a violation of the RJA, Garrett must
demonstrate “it is more likely than not [this testimony was]
motivated by racial bias or animus, whether explicit or implicit,
as opposed to some other reason.” (Lawson, supra,
108 Cal.App.5th at p. 1002.) Garrett has pointed to no evidence
suggesting Detective Woods was motivated by impermissible
racial bias or animus. Without any evidence of bias or use of
questionable language, it is at least as likely (if not more so)
Woods’s testimony was instead motivated by his obligation to

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respond truthfully, under oath, to questions posed to him by
counsel. (See ibid. [court’s evidentiary rulings were more likely
motivated by “legitimate assessments of relevance” rather than
racial bias]; see also Evid. Code, §§ 710, 766.)
To the extent Garrett means to argue Detective Woods’s
gang testimony amounted to “ ‘[r]acially discriminatory
language,’ ” we do not agree the testimony “explicitly or implicitly
appeal[ed] to racial bias.” (See § 745, subd. (h)(4).) That an expert
witness testified about gang culture, without more, does not
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence the witness used
racially discriminatory language within the meaning of the RJA.
(See Lawson, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 1001 [the defendant
failed to show challenged language met the definition of racially
discriminatory language]; see also People v. Quintero (2024)
107 Cal.App.5th 1060, 1077–1078 [use of race-neutral terms such
as “ ‘monster’ ” and “ ‘predator’ ” in closing argument did not
violate the RJA given the facts of the case].) And as we have
already explained, the evidence Woods provided regarding gang
culture and other topics was relevant to motive and intent and
was not unduly prejudicial to Garrett. (See Williams, supra,
16 Cal.4th at p. 193; see also Lawson, supra, at p. 1003 [admitted
evidence was “highly relevant” and “probative of [the defendant’s]
state of mind regarding the shooting”].)
Thus, Garrett has not shown the admission of Detective
Woods’s testimony violated the RJA.7

7 Because Garrett’s claim of RJA error fails on its merits, his
related ineffective assistance of counsel claim also necessarily
fails. (Ledesma, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 748.)

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II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Imposing Garrett’s Sentence
A. Standard of Review
“We consider a trial court’s sentencing decisions under an
abuse of discretion standard of review.” (People v. Moseley (2024)
105 Cal.App.5th 870, 874.) Garrett concedes review is for abuse of
discretion. “[A] trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its
decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person
could agree with it.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367,
377.)
B. Garrett Forfeited His Argument the Trial Court
Should Have Ordered a Postconviction
Probation Report
It is undisputed the trial court considered the probation
officer’s preconviction probation report, the People’s sentencing
memorandum, and a victim impact statement in imposing
Garrett’s sentence. Garrett argues the trial court should have
obtained a postconviction probation report before imposing his
sentence because he was not interviewed for the preconviction
report. But he has not identified anywhere in the record where he
asked the court to order the preparation of a postconviction
probation report. Therefore, he has forfeited appellate review of
that issue. (See Doers, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 184, fn. 1.)
We also note Garrett’s argument is meritless: a trial court
is not even required to order a probation report, where, as here,
the defendant is statutorily ineligible for probation. (People v.
Bullock (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 985, 987; see id. at p. 989
[“a report is not required for [probation-ineligible] defendants
upon original sentencing”]; see also § 1203, subds. (e)(2)–(3), (g);
§ 1203.06, subd. (a)(1)(A).)

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C. Garrett Forfeited His Argument the Trial Court
Should Have Considered Potential Mitigating
Circumstances
Garrett argues the trial court should have considered
potential mitigating circumstances in imposing his sentence. He
claims he may have been willing “to discuss his childhood, why he
became involved with a gang, whether he had substance abuse
issues, physical or mental disabilities, etc.,” and that information
could have informed the court’s sentencing decision. (See §§ 1170,
subd. (b)(6), 1385, subd. (c)(1)–(2).) However, Garrett essentially
concedes his counsel did not ask the trial court to consider any
mitigating circumstances at sentencing. We thus conclude he has
forfeited appellate review of that issue. (See Doers, supra,
23 Cal.3d at p. 184, fn. 1.)
D. Garrett Did Not Demonstrate Defense Counsel
Rendered Ineffective Assistance at Sentencing
Finally, Garrett argues defense counsel rendered him
ineffective assistance at sentencing because counsel failed: (1) to
request preparation of a new probation report; (2) to ensure the
court understood the potential impact of mitigating
circumstances in his case; and (3) to know the correct length of
sentence Garrett was exposed to on the gun enhancement.
A defendant has a right to effective assistance of counsel at
trial and sentencing. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S.
668, 684, 686; Ledesma, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 745–746.) “In
order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
defendant bears the burden of demonstrating, first, that counsel’s
performance was deficient because it ‘fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness . . . under prevailing professional
norms.’ ” (Ledesma, supra, at pp. 745–746.) “[U]nless the record
reflects the reason for counsel’s actions or omissions, or precludes

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the possibility of a satisfactory explanation, we must reject a
claim of ineffective assistance raised on appeal.” (Id. at p. 746.)
Once the defendant meets his burden to show counsel’s
performance was deficient, “he or she also must show that
counsel’s deficiencies resulted in prejudice, that is, a ‘reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” (Ibid.)
Here, Garrett has not shown defense counsel’s performance
was deficient in failing to request a probation report or failing to
argue for various mitigating factors under section 1170 or
section 1385. On this record, counsel reasonably could have
determined no new probation report was warranted because
there were no relevant mitigating circumstances in Garrett’s
background. While Garrett posits he may have been willing to
discuss his background, he does not assert, let alone point to any
evidence in this record, that mitigating circumstances were
actually present and not discovered. Thus, the record does not
“preclude the possibility that defense counsel’s actions were
based upon reasonable strategic decisions.” (Ledesma, supra,
39 Cal.4th at p. 746; see also People v. Jasso (2025) 17 Cal.5th
646, 676 [factual record did not allow ineffective assistance claim
to be resolved on direct appeal].)
Garrett also argues defense counsel rendered ineffective
assistance because counsel mistakenly said the gun enhancement
he faced was “an additional 25 to life.” (See § 12022.53, subd. (d).)
Garrett actually faced an enhancement under section 12022.5,
subdivision (a), which adds “an additional and consecutive term
of imprisonment . . . for 3, 4, or 10 years.” (§ 12022.5, subd. (a).)
But that minor mistake does not amount to ineffective assistance.
Defense counsel requested the trial court find the gun
enhancement not to be true, and the court recognized its

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discretion to strike the gun allegations pursuant to
section 12022.5, subdivision (a), but concluded that was not “in
the interest of justice because of the . . . facts of the case and the
defendant was on post release community supervision at the time
the offense was committed.” The court did not impose the
sentence erroneously mentioned by defense counsel. We see no
reasonable probability the sentencing outcome would have been
different in the absence of counsel’s minor mistake. (See
Ledesma, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 746 [showing of prejudice
required].) Garrett does not argue otherwise.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

RICHARDSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

LUI, P. J.

GOORVITCH, J.*

* Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.

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