CourtListener 10654033•People v. Maldonado CA1/3
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Filed 8/14/25 P. v. Maldonado CA1/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A169943, A171243
v. (Sonoma County
BILLY RAY SHANEE MALDONADO, Super. Ct. No. SCR335781)
Defendant and Appellant.
In 2004, Billy Ray Maldonado was convicted of three crimes including
first-degree residential burglary, which was a third strike offense for him
under the Three Strikes law. He received a total prison sentence of 25 years
to life, plus a seven-year determinate term based on two prison priors and a
serious felony prior. In 2024, he moved for resentencing pursuant to Penal
Code section 1172.75.1 The trial court struck Maldonado’s prison priors and
the serious felony prior but denied his Romero2 motion to strike his strike
priors. The court resentenced Maldonado to 25 years to life and reimposed a
$10,000 restitution fine. In these consolidated appeals, Maldonado raises
three claims: (1) the trial court erroneously denied his Romero motion; (2) his
counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to object to the restitution
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero).
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fine and neglecting to ask for a Dueñas3 hearing on his ability to pay; and
(3) the trial court erred by failing to calculate his custody credits. In a
supplemental brief, Maldonado further argues the restitution fine must be
vacated under section 1465.9, subdivision (d).
We remand with directions to the trial court to vacate the restitution
fine and to calculate Maldonado’s custody credits. We affirm the judgment in
all other respects.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At a jury trial in 2004, the evidence established that Maldonado
entered the victim’s attached garage and stole her underwear. Police officers
responded to the victim’s call and apprehended Maldonado as he attempted
to flee the victim’s yard. Three pairs of the victim’s panties were found on or
near Maldonado.
The jury convicted Maldonado of first degree residential burglary
(§ 459), prowling (§ 647, subd. (h)), and resisting arrest (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)).
The trial court found he had four prior strike convictions: two 1978
convictions for assault with intent to commit murder and for assault with a
deadly weapon, and two 1989 convictions for sexual offenses against a minor
under 14 years of age (§ 288, subd. (a)).
Due to his four strike priors, Maldonado received a 25-years-to-life
indeterminate sentence for the first degree residential burglary offense and a
seven-year determinate sentence consisting of two one-year prior prison
enhancements (former § 667, subd. (b)) and five years for a serious felony
prior (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)). The court also imposed a $10,000 restitution fine
under section 1202.4, subdivision (b).
3 People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (Dueñas).
2
In November 2023, Maldonado moved for resentencing pursuant to
section 1172.75, as modified by Senate Bill 483, and made a Romero motion
to have his strike priors stricken. The People conceded that Maldonado’s two
prior prison enhancements should be stricken but opposed striking the
serious felony prior and the Romero motion to strike the strike priors. In
February 2024, the trial court struck the prison enhancements (former
§ 667.5, subd. (b)), as well as the serious felony prior (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), but
denied the Romero motion.
The trial court resentenced Maldonado to 25 years to life and ordered
“[a]ll previous fines, fees, restitution” reimposed, noting there was a $10,000
restitution fine per section 1202.4. Upon defense counsel’s request, the court
restated the custody credits as of the time of original sentencing.
In March 2024, Maldonado filed his first notice of appeal (case No.
A169943). In May 2024, Maldonado submitted a letter to the trial court
seeking a Dueñas hearing on his ability to pay the restitution fine under
section 1237.2, and for recalculation of his custody credits. By order dated
June 21, 2024, the court denied Maldonado’s request and alternatively found
it lacked jurisdiction over the matter due to the pending appeal. In August
2024, Maldonado filed a second appeal, this time from the court’s denial of his
May letter request (case No. A171243). We consolidated the two appeals.
DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Properly Denied the Romero Motion
Where, as here, a resentencing occurs pursuant to section 1172.75, the
trial court retains discretion under Romero and section 1385, subdivision (a),
to strike or dismiss strike priors for a defendant serving a Three Strikes
sentence. (People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340, 357–364.)
3
The Three Strikes law “ ‘was intended to restrict courts’ discretion in
sentencing repeat offenders.’ ” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377
(Carmony), quoting Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 528.) “To achieve this
end, ‘the Three Strikes law does not offer a discretionary sentencing choice,
as do other sentencing laws, but establishes a sentencing requirement to be
applied in every case where the defendant has at least one qualifying strike,
unless the sentencing court “conclud[es] that an exception to the scheme
should be made because, for articulable reasons which can withstand
scrutiny for abuse, this defendant should be treated as though he actually fell
outside the Three Strikes scheme.” ’ ” (Carmony, at p. 377.)
However, a trial court retains discretion to strike prior convictions
under the Three Strikes law in the furtherance of justice. (§ 1385, subd. (a);
Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 504, 529–530.) In exercising such
discretion, the court “ ‘must consider whether, in light of the nature and
circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony
convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects,
the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part,
and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted
of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.’ ” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th
at p. 377, quoting People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.) Thus, the
Three Strikes law “creates a strong presumption that any sentence that
conforms to these sentencing norms is both rational and proper.” (Carmony,
at p. 378.)
We review the trial court’s denial of a motion to strike a prior felony
strike conviction for abuse of discretion. (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at
p. 374.) If the record shows the court “ ‘balanced the relevant factors and
reached an impartial decision in conformity with the spirit of the law,’ ” we
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will affirm its ruling, “ ‘even if we might have ruled differently in the first
instance.’ ” (Carmony, at p. 378.) Generally, “a trial court does not abuse its
discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable
person could agree with it.” (Id. at p. 377.) The circumstances must be
“extraordinary,” such that “no reasonable people could disagree that the
criminal falls outside the spirit of the three strikes scheme.” (Id. at p. 378.)
This means a court will be found to have abused its discretion in failing to
strike a prior felony conviction allegation only in limited circumstances, such
as where the court was unaware of its discretion or considered impermissible
factors. (Ibid.) Applying these principles, we see no abuse of discretion here.
In denying the Romero motion, the trial court made a thorough record
of its reasoning. Because defendant’s claims of error focus on discrete aspects
of the court’s decision, we find it helpful for context to set forth the following
relevant portions of the court’s reasoning:
“So with respect to what is now the open Romero motion related to
defendant’s strike priors, the court does recognize that there are four strikes,
essentially two incidents of two strikes each. Either way, whether there were
two strike charges or four strike priors charged, this new offense which is the
underlying conviction offense, this case would have been a third strike under
today’s analysis just like it was at the time of sentencing as [section] 459 first
[degree] remains a serious and violent felony.
“So the consideration that this court has made as it relates to the
Romero motion is that first the trial court did hear and deny a Romero
motion at the time of sentencing; [¶] That this court has reviewed the nature
of those strike priors. And my understanding, and correct me if I’m wrong, is
it amounts to two [section] 288(a)s where the strike prior was a crime against
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a child under the age of 14 and two assaults, one of which was an attempt[ed]
murder—I’m not sure exactly how it was charged. . . . . [¶] . . . .
“So, with that clarification, I will state even if this court were to
consider this as two strike priors, one for the assault event and what’s
unclear one or two victims in the [section] 288(a) strike priors, nonetheless,
the court acknowledges the significance of those underlying crimes that are
the basis of those strike priors.
“I’ve also looked at the comparative risk assessment in the defense
exhibits. I would note that this court’s assessment of that documentation
indicate[s] a lack[ ] of remorse or acknowledgment from the defendant as it
relates to the underlying crime. He doesn’t express any insight as to the
nature of the crime, specifically the underlying conduct of the strike priors,
including neither their seriousness nor the particular nature of those
offense[s], and there seems to be a continual denial factually of the facts
underlying those convictions. There’s reference to the antisocial behavior
that continues and that there still remains a high or moderate risk of future
violence.
“The court also considered the underlying fact of the commitment
offense itself which is the [section] 459 first [degree] and the defendant’s
lifetime criminal history. I do acknowledge from my review of the defense
exhibits defendant does suffer from some major mental illness. That is not
lost on the court. Furthermore, [he] has suffered childhood trauma. What’s
lacking for the court is the sufficient nexus between that trauma and the
nature of the crimes that are committed, both the underlying offense here as
well as the sexually abusive behavior of strike priors.
6
“This court does find that the dismissal of any or all of defendant’s
strike priors would be outside the interest of justice. And so the Romero
motion is denied for all of those reasons.”
As recounted, the trial court considered the nature of the prior strike
offenses and Maldonado’s background, character, and prospects, and it
balanced these relevant factors in reasonably concluding that Maldonado fell
within the spirit of the Three Strikes law. On this record, we cannot say
Maldonado’s circumstances are “extraordinary,” such that “no reasonable
people could disagree that the criminal falls outside the spirit of the three
strikes scheme.” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.) As we explain
below, Maldonado’s arguments to the contrary are not persuasive.
Maldonado argues his current offense did not amount to a violent
felony. There is no dispute, however, that “[a]ny burglary of the first degree
. . . wherein it is charged and proved that another person, other than an
accomplice, was present in the residence during the commission of the
burglary” is statutorily defined as a violent felony. (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(21).)
Here, the first amended information alleged that Maldonado entered “an
inhabited dwelling house and trailer coach” and “inhabited portion of a
building occupied by [the victim], with the intent to commit larceny and any
felony.” The information also explicitly alleged that the offense is a violent
felony within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (c).
Maldonado attempts to counter the violent nature of his offense by
arguing the amended information’s use of the word “occupied” is ambiguous
because it does not necessarily mean the victim was present in the residence
at the time of the offense. We find this argument unavailing. Not only did
the amended information specify that the charged offense is considered a
violent felony, but Maldonado points to nothing undermining the evidence
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that the victim was inside her home when she saw Maldonado in her yard
and called the police. Moreover, having received instructions on the elements
of first degree residential burglary, the jury was evidently satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt that the victim was present at the residence at the time of
the offense. We reject Maldonado’s attempt to argue otherwise.
Maldonado also contends that the trial court’s factual findings are not
supported by the evidence and that it relied on a faulty determination of his
“moderate (higher moderate)” risk for future violence based on a
comprehensive risk assessment performed by forensic psychologist Jennifer
Soares, Ph.D., dated May 30, 2023. At the outset, Maldonado claims Dr.
Soares “failed to provide diagnostic support for her assessment of
Maldonado’s risk of future violence” due to her failure to follow mandated
diagnostic protocols in violation of title 15, section 2240 of the California
Code of Regulations.
Though “[a] trial court abuses its discretion when the factual findings
critical to its decision find no support in the evidence” (People v. Cluff (2001)
87 Cal.App.4th 991, 998), that is not the case here.
Title 15, section 2240 of the California Code of Regulations provides in
relevant part: “Licensed psychologists employed by the Board of Parole
Hearings shall prepare comprehensive risk assessments for use by hearing
panels. Psychologists shall consider factors impacting an inmate’s risk of
violence . . . . The psychologists shall incorporate structured risk assessment
instruments . . . that are commonly used by mental health professionals who
assess risk of violence of incarcerated individuals.” (Cal. Code of Regs, tit. 15,
§ 2240, subd. (a).) “A risk assessment shall not be finalized until the Chief
Psychologist or a Senior Psychologist has reviewed the risk assessment to
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ensure that the psychologist’s opinions are based upon adequate scientific
foundation.” (Id., subd. (c)(1).)
Contrary to Maldonado’s allegations, the record reflects that Dr.
Soares’s risk assessment was reviewed by a Senior Psychologist whose
signature at the end of the assessment implicitly verified that it was based
upon adequate scientific foundation. Maldonado also points out the risk
assessment evaluated him as being at a “moderate (higher moderate)” risk
for future violence, but the resentencing transcript shows the court
referencing Maldonado’s “high or moderate” risk for future violence. This
could simply be an error in transcribing “higher moderate,” but even if not,
Maldonado fails to show how the court’s characterization of the risk
assessment materially altered the relevant analysis given all the factors the
court considered.4
Finally, relying on People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134 (Avila),
Maldonado claims a reversal is mandated because the trial court failed to
consider four “highly probative factors” as part of the Romero motion: (1) his
prior strike convictions were remote; (2) his current crime did not involve
actual or threatened violence; (3) his age of 72 at the time of resentencing;
and (4) the lack of discipline for any violent conduct in prison since 2012. We
are not persuaded.
4 Relying on People v. Clancey (2013) 56 Cal.4th 562 (Clancey),
Maldonado urges that we remand for the trial court to clarify which risk level
it relied upon as the basis for its denial of the Romero motion. We decline to
do so. Clancey is inapposite because the remand order there had been
necessitated due to a record that was “fatally ambiguous” as to whether an
indicated sentence represented the trial court’s “considered judgment as to
the appropriate punishment” or was instead the product of an improper plea
bargain. (Clancey, at pp. 577–578.)
9
In Avila, the defendant had demanded money on different occasions
from two different persons selling oranges near a freeway off-ramp, telling
one of the vendors he had to pay rent to sell at the location. (Avila, supra, 57
Cal.App.5th at p. 1139.) When the vendors refused, the defendant squashed
or stomped on bags of their oranges and left. (Ibid.) The defendant, who had
two strike priors, was convicted of attempted second degree robbery and
attempted extortion. (Ibid.) The defendant made a Romero motion to strike
his prior convictions, which the trial court denied. In finding the trial court
abused its discretion, the Avila court included the following conclusions in its
analysis. First, the trial court appeared to agree the strike priors were
remote in time (preceding his current convictions by 28 and 26 years) but
seemingly questioned whether such remoteness could be considered. (Id. at
p. 1141.) Second, though noting the defendant had committed his two strike
priors when he was 18 and 20 years old, the trial court mistakenly believed it
could not consider his youth as a mitigating factor. (Id. at pp. 1141–1142.)
Third, the trial court went beyond consideration of appropriate factors when
it speculated about what might have happened to the two orange vendors had
the police not been called, and it erred in mischaracterizing the attempted
robbery and attempted extortion offenses as violent crimes. (Id. at pp. 1142–
1143.) Fourth, because the defendant was 47 when sentenced, the appellate
court observed his Three Strikes sentence, coupled with the determinate term
he received, meant “he will likely die in prison,” which was an “unjust”
consequence the trial court appeared not to consider. (Id. at p. 1144.) In the
words of the Avila court, “no reasonable person could agree that the sentence
imposed on Avila was just.” (Id. at p. 1145.)
Avila is amply distinguishable. Here, the issue of youth was not a
factor in mitigation, as Maldonado was 27 and 38 years old when he
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committed his strike priors, and was 52 years old at the time of the
commitment offense. Nor does the instant record reflect any
misunderstanding by the trial court regarding its discretion. The court
acknowledged the significant nature of the four strike priors—two offenses
for sex crimes against a minor under the age of 14 and two assault offenses,
one of which was attempted murder—and Maldonado’s continuing lack of
insight as to the seriousness and nature of those offenses and his ongoing
denial of their underlying facts. The court also considered the circumstance
that the commitment offense was for first degree residential burglary which,
as discussed, qualifies as a violent felony unlike the commitment offenses at
issue in Avila. The court additionally observed that the comparative risk
assessment indicated Maldonado’s lack of any remorse or acknowledgment
for that offense, as well as his antisocial behavior and moderate to high risk
of future violence. Though the court acknowledged that Maldonado lived
with “some major mental illness” and had suffered childhood trauma, the
court found such matters lacking a nexus to his crimes.5
5 Maldonado highlights the circumstance that, contrary to the trial
court’s assessment, Dr. Soares concluded his traumatic experiences “play[ed]
a significant role in his criminal behavior.” But the trial court concluded
Maldonado fell within the spirit of the Three Strikes law after considering
the nature and circumstances of the sentencing offense and the strike priors,
as well as all the identified particulars of his background, character, and
prospects. The single circumstance that the court was not convinced of a
nexus was of no moment. Indeed, a court is not required to accept an expert’s
findings at face value, and the weight given to the Romero factors is part of
the trial court’s discretionary assessment. (See In re M.V. (2025) 109
Cal.App.5th 486, 509 [admission or rejection of expert testimony is largely
within the court’s discretion].) In any event, to the extent Maldonado
suggests Dr. Soares’s conclusion on the point was in some way mitigating, we
note she did not view it that way and had listed Maldonado’s “early exposure
to instability, physical, emotional, and sexual abuse” among the “[m]ost
relevant” and “[s]alient” violence risk considerations.
11
True, the trial court did not explicitly address the remoteness of
Maldonado’s strike priors. But their dates were known to the court and part
of its review of Maldonado’s extensive criminal history. And unlike the
situation in Avila, there is no indication the court believed it could not
consider remoteness as a mitigating factor.
Nor are we persuaded by Maldonado’s suggestion that the trial court
abused its discretion by ignoring the supposedly mitigating value of his
advanced age at the time of resentencing and his violence-free conduct in
prison since 2012. Unlike the defendant in Avila, Maldonado is not likely to
die in prison simply due to the resentencing that was imposed. Indeed,
Maldonado’s appellate opening brief indicates he was denied parole in 2023
and will again be eligible for parole in 2026. That he has not yet been found
deserving of parole despite his eligibility presents no parallel to the
defendant’s situation in Avila. Likewise, the circumstance that Maldonado
has not been violent in the prison’s controlled environment since 2012 does
not undermine the court’s reliance on the risk assessment’s reasons for
deeming him a “moderate (higher moderate)” risk for future violence.
In sum, we cannot conclude that “no reasonable people could disagree
that [Maldonado] falls outside the spirit of the three strikes scheme.”
(Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.) As discussed, the trial court’s denial
of the Romero motion finds substantial support in the record, including the
determination in the comprehensive risk assessment that Maldonado “has
the potential to act out impulsively,” “has a history of instability,” and is
“unable to fully identify triggers for violence,” and also that he currently
exhibits “antisocial behaviors,” “lack of remorse,” and an “inability to take
responsibility for his actions.”
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B. Maldonado’s Restitution Fine Must Be Vacated, Rendering his
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim Moot
In July 2025, we granted Maldonado’s application for leave to file a
supplemental brief addressing whether Assembly Bill No. 1186 (2023–2024
Reg. Sess.) requires that his restitution fine be vacated under newly added
section 1465.9, subdivision (d). The People’s responsive letter brief concedes
the fine should be vacated. We agree.
Effective January 1, 2025, Assembly Bill No. 1186 amended the Penal
Code to provide: “Upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition
of a restitution fine pursuant to Section 1202.4, the balance, including any
collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectable and any portion of a
judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.” (§ 1465.9, subd. (d).)
Maldanado was originally ordered to pay the $10,000 restitution fine when he
was sentenced in 2004. At the February 2024 resentencing hearing, the trial
court reimposed the fine. This restitution fine, imposed under section 1202.4,
is over 10 years old. Therefore, section 1465.9, subdivision (d), requires that
the trial court’s 2024 order reimposing the fine be vacated.
Our determination that the fine must be vacated renders moot
Maldonado’s claim that his counsel performed ineffectively by failing to object
to the reimposition of the restitution fine.
C. The Trial Court Must Calculate Maldonado’s Custody Credits
Maldonado claims the trial court erred in denying his request to correct
the custody credits on the abstract of judgment. The People contend the
court did not have jurisdiction to correct the custody credits because
Maldonado made his request after he filed his first appeal. Nonetheless, the
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People concede the court failed to calculate the days Maldonado spent in
actual custody.6
Upon modifying a defendant’s sentence, a trial court is obligated to
determine all actual days the defendant has spent in custody—up to the time
of resentencing—and to award those credits in the new abstract of judgment.
(People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37, 41.) Here, the trial court did
not calculate the actual time Maldonado spent in custody, and the amended
abstract of judgment reflects the same custody credits identified in the 2004
abstract of judgment. Therefore, we remand for a calculation of Maldonado’s
actual custody credits and direct that such credits be reflected in an amended
abstract of judgment.
DISPOSITION
We remand with directions to the trial court to vacate the $10,000
restitution fine and to calculate Maldonado’s actual custody credits. An
amended abstract of judgment should be filed and a copy forwarded to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The judgment is otherwise
affirmed.
_________________________
Fujisaki, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Tucher, P. J.
_________________________
Rodríguez, J.
People v. Maldonado (A169943 & A171243)
6 Because the parties agree the matter should be remanded for correction
of the custody credits, we decline to address the jurisdiction issue.
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