Togle v. BDO USA CA2/3

CourtListener 10654026Calctapp14 août 2025

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Filed 8/14/25 Togle v. BDO USA CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

JUAN GABRIEL CASIO TOGLE, B337729

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22SMCV02003)
v.

BDO USA, P.C.,
Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mark A. Young, Judge. Affirmed.
Juan Gabriel Casio Togle, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
McDermott Will & Emery, William P. Donovan, Jr., and
Melvin B. Wu for Defendant and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Plaintiff and appellant Juan Gabriel Casio Togle sued BDO
USA, P.C. (BDO), his former employer, alleging causes of action
for violations of his right to privacy, including under the
California Invasion of Privacy Act (CIPA) (Pen. Code, § 630 et
seq.),1 and for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
After Togle twice amended his complaint in an attempt to state a
claim, the trial court sustained BDO’s demurrer to the second
amended complaint without leave to amend. We find no error
and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
From 2017 to 2019, Togle worked for Aspiriant, LLC
(Aspiriant) as a tax associate. From 2019 to 2020, he worked for
tax firm BDO.
In October 2022, Togle filed an action against Aspiriant,
BDO, and an individual defendant. Togle claimed that while he
was employed by BDO, it conspired with Aspiriant to carry out
an “electronic stalking and harassment campaign” against him in
retaliation for his resignation from Aspiriant and the company’s
subsequent decline in revenue.2 He alleged Aspiriant and BDO
carried out this campaign by using: (1) BDO’s mobile device
management software to eavesdrop on Togle’s phone
conversations and intercept his text messages without consent;
(2) “a remote-neural-monitoring device” to access his thoughts;
and (3) an “ultra-sonic-type device” to transmit messages and
sounds “to continuously subject [Togle] to noise harassment and

1 All subsequent undesignated statutory references are to
the Penal Code.
2 The record on appeal does not contain Togle’s initial
complaint. Our summary of his claims is taken from the parties’
meet-and-confer letters.

2
severe emotional distress.” Togle also claimed BDO employees
disclosed his private information at work. He asserted eight
causes of action: (1) invasion of privacy against seclusion;
(2) violation of section 632; (3) violation of section 632.7;
(4) violation of section 634; (5) violation of section 637;
(6) violation of section 637.7; (7) intentional infliction of
emotional distress against BDO; and (8) intentional infliction of
emotional distress against Aspiriant.
During meet-and-confer discussions, BDO identified
deficiencies in the initial complaint. Togle agreed to amend his
pleading, including by clarifying that BDO’s and Aspiriant’s
alleged violations of his privacy continued from December 2019
through the present. Togle also agreed to dismiss his cause of
action under section 634 and the individual defendant.
In January 2023, Togle filed a first amended complaint
(FAC).3 BDO sent Togle another meet-and-confer letter stating
that his amended complaint did not cure the deficiencies in the
original complaint. Togle subsequently dismissed Aspiriant from
the action without prejudice, but he did not otherwise dismiss or
seek leave to amend his pleading.
In February 2023, BDO demurred to Togle’s FAC. BDO
challenged all causes of action on the grounds that they were
uncertain, Togle failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action, and all causes of action were barred by the
statute of limitations. BDO also demurred to Togle’s cause of

3 The record on appeal does not contain Togle’s FAC. Based
on meet-and-confer communications, it appears Togle’s FAC
maintained causes of action for “invasion of privacy upon
seclusion,” violations of sections 632, 632.7, 637 and 637.7, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.

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action for intentional infliction of emotional distress on the
ground that he failed to allege a basis to hold BDO liable for its
employees’ allegedly tortious conduct and failed to allege that
BDO engaged in any extreme or outrageous conduct intended to
cause emotional distress. Togle opposed the demurrer, arguing
that BDO’s conduct had interfered with his ability to timely file
his claims. He disputed BDO’s other arguments on the merits.
The court sustained BDO’s demurrer to the FAC, with leave to
amend.
In July 2023, Togle filed the operative second amended
complaint (SAC). The SAC continued to allege that BDO
targeted Togle in an “organized electronic stalking and
harassment campaign” through its use of the mobile device
management software, a remote neural monitoring device, and
an ultrasonic device. Togle asserted causes of action for
(1) invasion of privacy upon seclusion; (2) violations of
section 632; (3) violations of section 632.7; (4) violations of
section 637; and (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The SAC also alleged that Togle became aware of the
violations of his privacy due to several “specific instances” in
which he overheard his co-workers discussing the contents of his
private calls, messages, and thoughts, or making statements
revealing their ongoing surveillance of Togle’s communications
and mental processes. The earliest of these occurred in January
2020, the month after Togle began working at BDO. The SAC
also claimed that from December 2019 to November 2020, BDO
accessed his work laptop to film and photograph him without his
consent. Togle further alleged that in March 2020, he began to
notice the effects of BDO’s use of an “ultrasonic weapon” to
transmit sounds, noises, and messages directly into his brain. He

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claimed BDO’s “partners/shareholders” authorized employees’
violations of Togle’s privacy and harassment and participated in
the conduct themselves.
Finally, Togle alleged that BDO’s conduct was extreme and
outrageous and caused him “severe emotional distress,
depression, anxiety, frustration, fear, intimidation, humiliation,
embarrassment, and annoyance.” He alleged that BDO’s use of
the ultrasonic device to intrude on his thought processes had
subjected him to “sleep-deprivation, emotional distress, fear,
intimidation, anxiety, confusion, disorientation, and frustration”
since March 2020. According to Togle, as of the date of the SAC,
both Aspiriant and BDO “continue[d] to stalk and harass” him in
the manner alleged, and he continued to suffer harm.
BDO demurred to all causes of action in the SAC on the
same grounds it had asserted in the demurrer to the FAC. The
trial court sustained the demurrer. The court concluded Togle
failed to state facts sufficient to support his first cause of action,
and the statute of limitations barred the remaining four causes of
action. The court entered a judgment of dismissal with prejudice.
Togle timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court Properly Sustained the Demurrer
A. Standard of review
“ ‘ “A demurrer tests the sufficiency of the complaint as a
matter of law; as such, it raises only a question of law.
[Citations.]” [Citation.] Thus, the standard of review on appeal
is de novo. [Citation.] “In reviewing the sufficiency of a
complaint against a general demurrer, we are guided by long-
settled rules. ‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material
facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or

5
conclusions of fact or law. . . .’ [Citation.] Further, we give the
complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and
its parts in their context. [Citation.] When a demurrer is
sustained, we determine whether the complaint states facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action. [Citation.]” [Citations.]’
[Citation.]” (Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118,
120–121.)
“[W]e may affirm the sustaining of a demurrer only if the
complaint fails to state a cause of action under any possible legal
theory.” (Sheehan v. San Francisco 49ers, Ltd. (2009) 45 Cal.4th
992, 998.) “Whether the plaintiff will be able to prove the
pleaded facts is irrelevant to ruling upon the demurrer.” (Stevens
v. Superior Court (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 605, 609–610.)
“When a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, ‘we
decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect
can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has
abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no
abuse of discretion and we affirm.’ [Citation.]” (Hamilton v.
Greenwich Investors XXVI, LLC (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1602,
1609 (Hamilton).)
“Plaintiff has the burden to show a reasonable possibility
the complaint can be amended to state a cause of action.”
(Hamilton, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 1609.) “[T]he plaintiff
must demonstrate how the complaint can be amended.
[Citation.] While such a showing can be made for the first time
to the reviewing court [citation], it must be made.” (Smith v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th
700, 711.)

6
B. Invasion of privacy upon seclusion (first cause
of action)
In Togle’s first cause of action for “Invasion of Privacy Upon
Seclusion,” Togle alleges that BDO violated his right to privacy
by “access[ing Togle’s] BDO work laptop to secretly film and
photograph” him and by “scan[ning]” his brain activity to read his
thoughts. The trial court construed this cause of action as
alleging the common law tort of intrusion upon seclusion. The
court concluded the SAC’s allegations were insufficient to state a
cause of action because Togle “failed to identify any such
communications to which he has a protected privacy interest or
reasonable expectation of privacy.” The trial court further
concluded the allegations were conclusory and failed to allege
facts regarding BDO’s vicarious liability for its employees’
tortious conduct.
Togle’s opening brief makes no specific arguments
identifying any error in the trial court’s decision sustaining the
demurrer on this cause of action. His opening brief refers to his
first cause of action only with respect to the statute of limitations,
which was not a basis for the trial court’s ruling. Togle does not
address how the facts alleged in the SAC sufficiently allege the
elements of intrusion upon seclusion, nor does he proffer
amended allegations that would state an actionable claim.
Togle’s attempt to do so in the first instance in his reply brief
does not preserve his arguments on appeal. (Reichardt v.
Hoffman (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 754, 764 [“ ‘Points raised for the
first time in a reply brief will ordinarily not be considered,
because such consideration would deprive the respondent of an
opportunity to counter the argument.’ ”]; see Paulus v. Bob Lynch
Ford, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 659, 685 [“Courts will

7
ordinarily treat the appellant’s failure to raise an issue in his or
her opening brief as a waiver of that challenge.”].)
By failing to identify any error in the trial court’s ruling
and failing to propose curative amendments in his opening brief,
Togle has abandoned this cause of action. (See Alborzi v.
University of Southern California (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 155, 184
[where “a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, the
appellant’s failure to address certain causes of action in the
complaint is deemed an abandonment of those causes of action”];
Moore v. Centrelake Medical Group, Inc. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th
515, 538 [plaintiffs forfeited any argument of error by failing to
explain how a proposed amendment would cure the pleading
defect].)
C. CIPA claims (§§ 632, 632.7, and 637)
CIPA imposes civil and criminal penalties on persons who
electronically intercept, record, or eavesdrop on private
communications without the consent of the parties to the
communication. CIPA permits any person injured by a violation
of the act to bring a civil action for damages and injunctive relief.
(§ 637.2, subds. (a), (b).) To recover a civil penalty for violations
of CIPA, a plaintiff must file suit within one year of when the
plaintiff knew or should have known of the defendant’s unlawful
acts. (Montalti v. Catanzariti (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 96, 98 [one
year limitations period applied to § 631 cause of action]; Code
Civ. Proc., § 340, subd. (a).)
1. Statute of limitations
The SAC alleges that Togle discovered BDO’s purportedly
unlawful conduct due to “specific instances” when his BDO co-
workers made statements admitting to, or indicating their
knowledge of, illicit surveillance of and interference with Togle’s

8
recent private calls, messages, and thoughts. The SAC alleges
that all but one of these instances occurred in 2020; one allegedly
occurred in mid-September 2021. However, Togle did not file his
initial complaint in this action until October 26, 2022.
Togle does not dispute that he filed his CIPA claims outside
the applicable one-year limitations period. Instead, Togle
contends that BDO’s use of the “ ‘remote-neural-monitoring
device’ ” to continuously interfere, manipulate, and interrupt his
thought processes prevented him from timely filing a complaint
against BDO within the limitations period.
Togle’s argument on appeal is inadequate. Togle provides
neither citations to authority nor substantive argument to
support his claim that BDO’s alleged conduct in manipulating or
disturbing his thoughts permits him to prosecute claims falling
outside the relevant limitations period. On appeal, we review
only issues adequately raised and briefed. We are not required to
develop parties’ arguments for them on appeal. (Meridian
Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657, 684
(Meridian).) Togle’s failure to provide reasoned legal argument
or authorities forfeits the argument on appeal. (Holden v. City of
San Diego (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 404, 418 (Holden) [points
asserted on appeal but unsupported by argument and authority
do not require discussion by reviewing court].)
2. The proposed amendments would not
state viable CIPA claims
Togle also fails to demonstrate that the trial court erred in
denying him leave to amend his CIPA causes of action. Although
he now contends he could include in his complaint allegations
about incidents in 2022 and 2023 in which BDO purportedly
surveilled and recorded his phone conversations and interfered

9
with his private internal thought processes, we disagree that
these proposed allegations would state viable causes of action
under sections 632 and 632.7.
To the extent Togle proposes adding allegations that BDO
“transmitted” messages to him via a remote neural monitoring
device, he has not met his burden to show these claims would
cure the deficiencies in his pleading. Specifically, Togle has not
established that BDO’s purported “interference” with his internal
thoughts is the type of privacy intrusion for which CIPA provides
a remedy. The legislature enacted CIPA to protect the privacy of
communications from advanced technological intrusions. (§ 630.)
Communications refers to “the exchange of thoughts, messages or
information,” and CIPA protects such communications to the
extent “any party to the communication desires it to be confined
to the parties thereto.” (People v. Gibbons (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d
1204, 1208, 1209, italics added (Gibbons).) Togle asks this court
to recognize his “thoughts and other internal brain
communications in the absence of another person” as
communications protected under CIPA. Yet, he proffers no legal
analysis or authority to support extending CIPA to apply when
no exchange between parties, orally or otherwise, has taken
place. The argument is forfeited. (Meridian, supra, 67
Cal.App.5th at p. 684; Holden, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 418.)
Togle also contends that he should be granted leave to
amend his pleading to allege BDO violated his privacy under
sections 632 and 632.7 with respect to two phone calls he had
with third parties during the limitations period. Specifically,
Togle states that in 2022, he had a phone consultation with an
attorney and, in 2023, he had a phone call with an employee at
the Santa Monica courthouse, regarding BDO’s conduct and

10
Togle’s lawsuit. Togle asserts that immediately following each
conversation, he heard the voices of unnamed BDO employees
“inside of [his] brain” making threatening or intimidating
statements specific to the legal issues he discussed with each
person. Togle contends these facts are sufficient to allege that
BDO was unlawfully listening to his conversations using the
“remote-neural-monitoring device” during the limitations period,
in violation of sections 632 and 632.7.
However, even if these facts were sufficient to allege that
BDO was unlawfully listening to Togle’s conversations, they
would still fail to state a claim under section 632.7. Section 632.7
prohibits intercepting or receiving and intentionally recording
telephonic communications without the consent of all parties to
the communication. (Id., subd. (a).) Section 632.7 requires an
intentional recording of a communication without consent for
liability to attach. (See Smith v. LoanMe, Inc. (2021) 11 Cal.5th
183, 191, fn. 2 [§ 632.7 concerns “the intentional recording of an
intercepted or received communication”].) An intentional
recording requires that a person use “ ‘ “recording equipment . . .
with the purpose or desire of recording a confidential
conversation, or with the knowledge to a substantial certainty
that his use of the equipment will result in the recordation of a
confidential conversation.” ’ [Citations.]” (Rojas v. HSBC Card
Services Inc. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 860, 876.) Togle’s proposed
allegations at most allege BDO used a device to listen to his
conversations in 2022 and 2023. He does not claim that BDO
was recording the conversations. Togle has failed to meet his
burden to show a reasonable possibility that any proposed
amendments would state a viable cause of action under
section 632.7.

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We further conclude that Togle’s new proposed allegations
do not demonstrate a reasonable possibility of stating a cause of
action under section 632. Section 632 penalizes using “an
electronic amplifying or recording device to eavesdrop or record” a
confidential communication without all parties’ consent. (Id.,
subd. (a).) The statute “does not prohibit eavesdropping in
general; it applies only to the use of ‘any electronic amplifying or
recording device’ to eavesdrop upon or record a confidential
communication.” (People v. Soles (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 418, 420,
disapproved of on another ground by Ribas v. Clark (1985) 38
Cal.3d 355; People v. Ratekin (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1165, 1168
[eavesdropping is “the interception of communications by the use
of equipment which is not connected to any transmission line”];
see also § 632, subd. (f) [exempting “hearing aids and similar
devices” from statute’s application]; Gibbons, supra, 215
Cal.App.3d at p. 1208 [video recorder is “recording device” under
§ 632].)
Togle’s SAC alleges the “remote-neural-monitoring device”
uses “neuroimaging” to “extract[ ]” and “decode” data “from the
human brain.” Assuming at the demurrer stage that this
technology exists and is accessible to BDO, as we must, Togle has
not proffered any facts or argument to demonstrate that this type
of technology is contemplated by section 632. Togle alleges that
BDO’s device allowed it to “watch” and “read” his thoughts; he
does not allege that the purported technology amplified or
recorded his communications with others. Togle fails to present
any reasoned argument to support the conclusion that the
“remote neural monitoring” device’s alleged mind-reading
capability falls within the ambit of section 632. (Meridian, supra,

12
67 Cal.App.5th at p. 684; Holden, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at
p. 418.)
D. Intentional infliction of emotional distress
“Intentional infliction of emotional distress requires
(1) ‘outrageous’ conduct by the defendant, (2) that the defendant
intend to cause (or recklessly disregard the probability of
causing) emotional distress, (3) severe emotional distress and
(4) causation.” (Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th
1217, 1225–1226.) “Intentional infliction of emotional distress
has a two-year statute of limitations. (Code Civ. Proc., § 335.1;
[citation].) ‘A cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress accrues, and the statute of limitations begins
to run, once the plaintiff suffers severe emotional distress as a
result of outrageous conduct on the part of the defendant.’
[Citation.]” (Wassmann v. South Orange County Community
College Dist. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 825, 852–853.)
As with the SAC’s other causes of action, the claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress is untimely. Togle
alleges that his emotional distress arose from BDO employees
taunting, harassing, and mocking him about his private
messages and thoughts and BDO’s continuous intrusion into his
private thoughts via an “ultrasonic-type device.” Togle claims he
first discovered BDO’s alleged misconduct in January 2020 after
hearing colleagues at work discuss his confidential
communications with each other. He began suffering severe
emotional distress from BDO’s purported use of the ultrasonic
device in March 2020. Togle did not file his initial complaint in
this action until October 2022, more than a year and a half after
the limitations period ended. All but one incident alleged in the
SAC falls outside of the limitations period.

13
On appeal, Togle contends the SAC alleged one incident of
harassing voices occurred in July 2022 and was within the
limitations period. He further asserts he can amend his
complaint to allege timely claims because BDO continued to
transmit electromagnetic waves into his brain within the
limitations period, causing him to hear harassing voices,
experience horrific nightmares, and suffer emotional distress.
Yet, Togle does not identify material facts to support his
conclusory allegation that BDO was responsible for the purported
conduct, which occurred years after Togle resigned from BDO in
November 2020. Togle merely asserts the conclusion that the
voices he has heard belong to unnamed BDO employees. He
additionally concludes, without corresponding factual allegations,
that BDO “managers and partners continue to monitor and alter
[Togle’s] brain waves and brain electrical activity . . . to prevent
[him] from successfully suing BDO.” Togle has not established he
can properly plead material facts to support his claims, rather
than conclusions of fact or law. (State Dept. of State Hospitals v.
Superior Court (2015) 61 Cal.4th 339, 346 [“On demurrer review,
we accept the truth of material facts properly pleaded, but not
contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law.”]; Doe v.
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles (2016) 247
Cal.App.4th 953, 960 [the court “need not accept allegations
containing ‘legal conclusions[ ]’ . . . or ‘unsupported speculation’ ”
on demurrer].)
We further note an additional reason to reject any attempt
by Togle to amend the complaint to allege the incidents of
harassing transmissions he has identified for the first time on
appeal. These alleged July 2023 incidents occurred just weeks
before Togle filed the SAC, but he did not include the allegations

14
in his amended pleading, even though BDO had argued his
claims were untimely. Togle fails to explain why he did not
assert these allegations in the SAC. (Colapinto v. County of
Riverside (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 147, 151 [“If a party files an
amended complaint and attempts to avoid the defects of the
original complaint by either omitting facts which made the
previous complaint defective or by adding facts inconsistent with
those of previous pleadings, the court may take judicial notice of
prior pleadings and may disregard any inconsistent allegations.”];
cf. Deveny v. Entropin, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 408, 426 [trial
court erred in disregarding amended allegations where plaintiffs
explained new information was uncovered through “further
discovery and consultation with experts”]; Dones v. Life Ins. Co. of
North America (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 665, 688 [pleading
plausibly explained that prior allegation was determined to be
mistaken after further review of documents].) In the absence of
any explanation from Togle concerning his failure to allege these
incidents in his SAC, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial
court’s denial of leave to amend. (Cf. McGee v. McNally (1981)
119 Cal.App.3d 891, 896 [leave to amend appropriate “where ‘the
defect, . . . may possibly be cured by supplying omitted [and
essential] allegations, and the plaintiff has not had a fair
opportunity to do so . . . .’ ” (italics added)].)
As with the CIPA claims, Togle fails to demonstrate a
reasonable possibility that the complaint can be amended to state
a viable claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment of dismissal is affirmed. Respondent to
recover its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

ADAMS, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

EGERTON, J.

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