People v. Wilburn CA3

CourtListener 10653128Calctapp13 août 2025

Texte intégral

Filed 8/13/25 P. v. Wilburn CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----

THE PEOPLE, C101025

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 24PA000539)

v.

TERRENCE LAMAR WILBURN,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Terrence Lamar Wilburn appeals from an order revoking his parole and
sentencing him to 180 days in jail. He contends 1) there is insufficient evidence to
support the finding that he willfully refused to comply with the condition that he
participate in Global Positioning System (GPS) monitoring, and 2) the trial court abused
its discretion by revoking his parole because any violation was de minimis. We affirm
the order.
BACKGROUND
Defendant was released from jail and placed on parole on a Sunday. Agent
Maurrio Deloney was assigned as his parole officer. The parole office provided

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defendant with notice of his parole conditions. These conditions included requirements
that defendant report to parole by 5:00 p.m. on the first business day following his release
and comply with all instructions from his parole officer. In addition, because of his prior
conviction for a sex offense, defendant was subject to special conditions of parole that
required him to register as a sex offender (Pen. Code,1 § 290) and participate in GPS
monitoring (§ 3010.10). His GPS monitoring condition specifically stated: “I
acknowledge and understand that I shall participate in continuous electronic monitoring;
e.g., GPS technology, including any approved GPS modification. The GPS device
records my location and provides data. The data is retained indefinitely and may be
shared with other law enforcement agencies.” The parole agent read the conditions aloud
to defendant. While being advised of his parole conditions, defendant was agitated and
refused to sign the form acknowledging the special conditions of his parole, but provided
“appropriate, substantive responses.”
The morning after his release from custody, defendant went to the Sacramento
County Sheriff’s Department to register as a section 290 sex offender. Defendant refused
to complete his registration until his property was returned by law enforcement.
Eventually, defendant went outside and Agent Deloney arrived at the sheriff’s
department. Although not a condition of defendant’s parole, parole officers are required
to place the GPS on the parolee during their first interaction. Accordingly, Agent
Deloney discussed placing the GPS device on defendant. Defendant refused. Defendant
understood he was required to have the GPS device placed on his ankle. Despite this
understanding, he refused to comply with Agent Deloney’s instructions three or four
times. Defendant continued to demand his property be returned and said that he wanted

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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to retrieve it from Agent Deloney’s office before the device was placed on his ankle.
Defendant “pretty much said, ‘You’re not putting it on me.’ ”
During this exchange defendant became increasingly agitated. Defendant told
Agent Deloney “You are not putting shit on me until you drive me to the office to get my
stuff.” When Agent Deloney again instructed defendant to comply with having the GPS
device placed on his ankle, defendant said, “Fuck you. You’re just going to have to take
me to jail.” Defendant was very agitated and attempted to get into Agent Deloney’s car.
Defendant remained agitated, yelling and “cussing” at Agent Deloney. Agent Deloney
did not feel safe driving defendant to another location while he was in that agitated state.
Ultimately, defendant was restrained in handcuffs and taken to the local jail.
Agent Deloney filed a petition for revocation of parole alleging that defendant
violated parole by failing to participate in GPS monitoring. The petition recommended
defendant be returned to custody for 180 days.
At the contested hearing, defendant argued he did not “flatly refuse” to allow
Agent Deloney to place the GPS on him. Rather, he said that he would not comply until
his property was returned, and because he was still within the time constraints of being
able to report, he could have complied later in the day by returning to the parole office to
be fitted for the GPS device. The trial court rejected this argument, noting defendant
said, “Quote, fuck you. You’re just going to have to take me to jail, unquote. Which is
clearly saying, I’m not wearing the monitor, because you’re not taking me to get my stuff.
He didn’t say, F you, then I’ll just come back later and register. He’s saying my day ends
here and now. I have no more interest in dealing with you . . . :”
The trial court found defendant’s statements indicated defendant was “adamant
and professe[d] his adamant position about wearing the GPS monitor as evidenced by the
two statements. I don’t find that condition 46 is anything he’s willing to abide by
without, . . . bartering for it, or as expressed by him demonstrating a willingness to go to
jail rather than cooperate with” the parole condition. The trial court concluded

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defendant’s attempts to barter his compliance in exchange for his property and his
willingness to go to jail rather than cooperate with the GPS device condition
demonstrated he was out of compliance with the terms of his parole. Accordingly, the
trial court found defendant violated parole and sentenced defendant to 180 days in jail,
with credit for 136 days of time served.
DISCUSSION
I
Substantial Evidence of Parole Violation
Defendant claims there is insufficient evidence that he violated the terms of his
parole. Specifically, he contends there is not substantial evidence he willfully refused to
be fitted with the GPS device. He claims Agent Deloney gave conflicting testimony as to
the timing requirements for defendant to comply with the reporting and GPS conditions
pointing out that Agent Deloney testified that defendant had until the close of business to
report to parole but also testified that he was required to put the GPS device on defendant
at their first meeting. Defendant then argues since there was no evidence he knew that he
was required to have the GPS device put on him during the first contact with his parole
agent, he did not willfully violate probation.
We review the trial court’s factual findings of a parole violation for substantial
evidence. (People v. Butcher (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 310, 318 [probation revocation].)
Although Butcher involved probation revocation proceedings, parole and probation
revocation hearings are equivalent for the purpose of our review. (People v. Rodriguez
(1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 441.) Under the substantial evidence “standard, our review is
limited to the determination of whether, upon review of the entire record, there is
substantial evidence of solid value, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the
trial court’s decision. In that regard, we give great deference to the trial court and resolve
all inferences and intendments in favor of the judgment. Similarly, all conflicting
evidence will be resolved in favor of the decision.” (People v. Kurey (2001) 88

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Cal.App.4th 840, 848-849.) The facts supporting revocation of parole must be proven by
a preponderance of the evidence. (§ 3044, subd. (a)(5).)
Defendant cites People v. Cervantes (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 291 to support the
proposition that a court cannot revoke probation unless the defendant’s conduct is a
willful violation of the terms and conditions of probation. Defendant does not offer any
authority or argument that the same standard applies to parole revocation hearings.
Because as noted, parole revocation is indistinguishable from probation revocation in
terms of due process, we will assume a willful violation is required.
A willful violation requires “ ‘simply a purpose or willingness to commit the
act . . . ,’ without regard to motive, intent to injure, or knowledge of the act’s prohibited
character. [Citation.] The terms imply that the person knows what he is doing, intends to
do what he is doing, and is a free agent. [Citation.] Stated another way, the term ‘willful’
requires only that the prohibited act occur intentionally.” (In re Jerry R. (1994) 29
Cal.App.4th 1432, 1438.) Willful in this context also includes the failure to fulfill the
condition as “the result of irresponsibility, contumacious behavior or disrespect for the
orders and expectations of the court. . . .” (People v. Zaring (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 362,
379.) In the case of an alleged omission, the term “ ‘willfulness’ ” requires proof that the
person knew of his or her duty to act, as a failure to act cannot be intentional unless the
person knew he or she was under such a duty. (People v. Davis (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th
1416, 1436.)
Initially, we do not agree that Agent Deloney’s testimony regarding his obligation
to place the GPS device on defendant during his first encounter with defendant created an
additional condition of parole of which defendant was unaware. Defendant knew he was
required to submit to GPS monitoring and to follow Agent Deloney’s instructions. He
did neither. Defendant’s repeated refusals to allow Agent Deloney to fit the GPS monitor
were unequivocal. Nothing in his words or actions indicated he thought he could come
back later to be fitted for the GPS device or that he was willing to do so. To the contrary,

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his refusals escalated as the exchange continued. By the end, he made clear he would
rather Agent Deloney take him to jail than submit to having the GPS device fitted. His
parole conditions did not permit him to make demands of Agent Deloney to secure his
compliance nor did they suggest that once he was instructed to comply, he could refuse
for any reason and comply later.
The timing of Agent Deloney’s instructions and defendant’s refusals does not
render his refusals to comply with the conditions any less willful. As the trial court
found, defendant was adamant in his refusals and his adamance demonstrated his
unwillingness to comply with the GPS condition, irrespective of whether there was
additional time in which he could comply. Defendant made clear that he would rather go
to jail than comply. Defendant knew of his obligation to comply, intentionally did not
comply, and his failure to comply with the parole condition was the result of his
“contumacious behavior or disrespect for the orders and expectations of the court.”
(People v. Zaring, supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 379.) We conclude there was substantial
evidence to support the trial court’s finding that defendant willfully violated his parole
conditions.
II
De Minimis Violation
Defendant next claims that even if there is substantial evidence of a willful
violation, the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his parole, because the parole
violation was de minimis.
The Legislature has concluded continuous electronic monitoring is an effective
tool for supervising high-risk persons, including sex offenders like defendant. (§ 3010,
subd. (e).) Unless the court finds it is in the interests of justice in a particular case, the
court must revoke parole and impose a jail sentence of 180 days when a registered sex
offender (§ 290) fails to have a GPS device affixed to his person as instructed by a parole
officer. (§ 3010.10, subd. (d).) Defendant made no argument in the trial court or on

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appeal that it would be in the interests of justice in this case to not revoke his parole and
incarcerate him for 180 days. Defendant’s refusal to comply with Agent Deloney’s
instructions to be fitted for the GPS device posed a risk to public safety because it
prevented the government from monitoring his compliance with other parole conditions.
Consequently, defendant’s claim that his parole violation was de minimis fails.
DISPOSITION
The order revoking parole is affirmed.

/s/
WISEMAN, J.*

We concur:

/s/
MAURO, Acting P. J.

/s/
KRAUSE, J.

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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