CourtListener 10652376•G.G. v. Allan CA2/2
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Filed 8/12/25 G.G. v. Allan CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
G.G., B336055
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 21PDRO00146)
LESLIE STEWART ALLAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Harvey A. Silberman, Judge. Affirmed.
Decker Law, James Decker, Griffin Schindler and Chris
Jones for Defendant and Appellant.
G.G., in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
Defendant and appellant Leslie Stewart Allan (Allan)
appeals from an order renewing for a five-year period a domestic
violence restraining order (DVRO) protecting plaintiff and
respondent G.G.1 Finding no error, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Allan’s Arrest
Allan was arrested on February 3, 2021, and subsequently
criminally charged in connection with allegations that he
physically abused G.G.2
Original DVRO
On March 15, 2021, G.G. obtained a one-year DVRO
protecting her and her minor daughter from Allan.
Request to Renew the DVRO
On March 9, 2022, G.G. filed a request to renew the DVRO
for a period of five years. G.G. asserted that she was afraid of
future abuse by Allan because he had “threatened [her] in the
past, and assaulted [her] twice.” G.G. alleged that, since the
issuance of the original DVRO, she had seen Allan drive past her
work or home. On July 21, 2021, Allan “was in his car, very close
to [G.G.’s] home[.]” As he passed G.G., Allan “stretched his
middle finger” and “yelled at [G.G.] in a threatening manner.”
G.G. feared retaliation from Allan.
1 “To protect personal privacy interests,” we refer to the
“protected person[] in [this] domestic violence-prevention
proceeding[]” by her initials. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.90(b)(1).)
2 It is not clear from the record with which crime(s) Allan
was charged.
2
Diversion and Dismissal of Criminal Case
The hearing on the DVRO renewal was continued several
times because of the pending criminal case against Allan. In the
interim, Allan completed a diversion program, and, on
November 9, 2023, the criminal case was dismissed pursuant to
Penal Code section 1001.9.
DVRO Renewal Hearing
The trial court heard G.G.’s renewal request on
November 29, 2023.
Allan testified that he had completed 29 counseling
sessions as part of his diversion program, during which he had
“learned a lot about” himself and his family. When asked by the
trial court about what he had learned regarding “[his] temper
and holding it[,]” Allan responded, “more discussion[] skills, more
empathy skills, understanding skills, listening skills.”
G.G. testified that Allan had not “come near” her or
attempted to contact her since the events leading up to the
original DVRO. G.G. was “worried” about what Allan would do in
the absence of a restraining order. She “had witnessed [Allan]
hitting his ex-wife[.]” She stated, “I am grateful every day that I
live in a place with a gate. I wouldn’t be able to sleep if I didn’t
have gated housing.”
Trial Court Order
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted the
request to renew the DVRO for five years, finding G.G.’s
“apprehension to be reasonable.” The court explained: “[T]he
legal standard here is reasonable apprehension. The court
doesn’t retry. The court is not determining what happened or
didn’t happen back then. Just looks at the allegations and looks
at the fact that restraining orders were issued . . . .”
3
Appeal
Allan timely appealed from the trial court’s order renewing
the DVRO.
DISCUSSION
I. Standards of Review
Generally, “[t]he trial court’s ruling on a request to renew a
domestic violence prevention restraining order is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. [Citation.] An abuse of discretion occurs
when the ruling exceeds the bounds of reason. [Citation.]”
(Eneaji v. Ubboe (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1463.)
“‘To the extent that we are called upon to review the trial
court’s factual findings, we apply a substantial evidence standard
of review.’ [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of G. (2017)
11 Cal.App.5th 773, 780.) Under this standard, “[o]ur sole
inquiry is ‘whether, on the entire record, there is any substantial
evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,’ supporting the court’s
finding. [Citation.] ‘We must accept as true all evidence . . .
tending to establish the correctness of the trial court’s
findings . . , resolving every conflict in favor of the judgment.’
[Citation.]” (Sabbah v. Sabbah (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 818, 822–
823 (Sabbah).)
II. Relevant Law
The purpose of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act
(DVPA) (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.)3 “is to prevent acts of
domestic violence, abuse, and sexual abuse and to provide for a
separation of the persons involved in the domestic violence for a
period sufficient to enable these persons to seek a resolution of
the causes of the violence.” (§ 6220.) To effectuate this purpose,
3 All further statutory references are to the Family Code
unless otherwise indicated.
4
a trial court may issue a DVRO upon a showing “to the
satisfaction of the court, [of] reasonable proof of a past act or acts
of abuse.” (§ 6300, subd. (a).) The duration of an initial DVRO
may not exceed five years, but it “may be renewed, upon the
request of a party, either for five or more years, or permanently,
at the discretion of the court, without a showing of further abuse
since the issuance of the original order.” (§ 6345, subd. (a).)
“The legal standard for renewal of a DVRO is whether the
protected party entertains a reasonable apprehension of future
abuse. [Citation.] ‘[T]his does not mean the court must find it is
more likely than not that abuse will occur if the protective order
is not renewed. It only means the evidence demonstrates it is
more probable than not there is a sufficient risk of future abuse
to find the protected party’s apprehension genuine and
reasonable.’ [Citation.] An imminent and present danger of
abuse is not required; there must only be a reasonable
apprehension that ‘abuse will occur at some time in the future if
the protective order is allowed to expire.’ [Citation.]”
(Michael M. v. Robin J. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 170, 179
(Michael M.).)
“In evaluating whether the requesting party has a
reasonable apprehension of future abuse, the trial court
ordinarily should consider the evidence and findings on which the
initial DVRO was based. [Citation.] ‘[T]he underlying findings
and facts supporting that order often will be enough in
themselves to provide the necessary proof to satisfy that test.’
[Citation.] ‘Also potentially relevant are any significant changes
in the circumstances surrounding the events justifying the initial
protective order. For instance, have the restrained and protected
parties moved on with their lives so far that the opportunity and
5
likelihood of future abuse has diminished to the degree they no
longer support a renewal of the order?’ [Citation.] ‘Also relevant
are the seriousness and degree of risk, such as whether it
involves potential physical abuse, and the burdens the protective
order imposes on the restrained person, such as interference with
job opportunities.’ [Citation.]” (Michael M., supra,
92 Cal.App.5th at p. 180.)
It is “unnecessary for the protected party to introduce or
the court to consider actual acts of abuse the restrained party
committed after the original order went into effect.” (Ritchie v.
Konrad (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1284.)
III. Analysis
Applying these legal principles, we conclude that the trial
court acted well within its discretion in renewing the DVRO. The
record reflects that the court was aware of and applied the proper
legal standards and that substantial evidence supports its finding
that G.G. “entertain[ed] a reasonable apprehension of future
abuse.” (Michael M., supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 179.)
G.G. testified that she was presently afraid of Allan and of
what he would do in the future in the absence of a restraining
order. In addition to her own experiences of abuse, G.G. testified
that she “had witnessed [Allan] hitting his ex-wife[.]” The court
was entitled to believe and rely on this testimony, which by itself
constitutes substantial evidence to support the ruling. (See
Sabbah, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 823 [“‘“‘it is the exclusive
province of the [trier of fact] to determine the credibility of a
witness . . . .’”’”]; see also ibid. [“The testimony of a single witness
may provide sufficient evidence”].)
Allan urges reversal with two arguments. Each is
meritless.
6
First, Allan contends that the trial court misapplied the
reasonable apprehension test by “repeatedly indicat[ing] that
[G.G.]’s apprehension was not reasonable before deferring to her
subjective state of mind when deciding to extend the DVRO.” In
support, Allan relies on various statements made by the court as
it was questioning G.G. For example, the court noted that years
had passed since Allan’s acts of domestic violence and told G.G.,
“It’s concerning to me separate and apart from anything other
than the domestic violence. It’s concerning to me that these
incidents are still impacting you.” The court also suggested that
G.G. seek psychological assistance and not just rely on the
DVRO.
None of these statements are “irreconcilable,” as Allan
argues, with the trial court’s finding that G.G. entertained a
reasonable apprehension of future abuse. The court merely
adopted various questioning techniques to draw testimony from
G.G. with which to assess her credibility and to evaluate the
propriety of renewing the DVRO. We detect no abdication of the
court’s responsibility to determine the objective reasonableness of
G.G.’s fear.
Second, Allan claims that, even if the trial court properly
applied the reasonable apprehension test, it improperly “weighed
the evidence” or simply “disregarded” it. This argument invites
us to reweigh the evidence and to substitute our judgment for
that of the trial court. We are precluded from doing so. (M.S. v.
A.S. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1139, 1145.) Having identified
substantial evidence to support the finding of reasonable
apprehension “it is of no consequence” that other evidence or
inferences drawn from the evidence might have supported a
7
contrary finding. (Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870,
874, italics omitted.)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. G.G. is entitled to her costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
_____________________, Acting P. J.
ASHMANN-GERST
We concur:
________________________, J.
CHAVEZ
________________________, J.
RICHARDSON
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