People v. Davis CA2/3

CourtListener 10651518Calctapp11 août 2025

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Filed 8/11/25 P. v. Davis CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B337413

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA145980)
v.

AARON DAVIS et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Ricardo R. Ocampo, Judge. Affirmed.
Lenore De Vita, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant Aaron Davis.
Wayne C. Tobin, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Joshua Rene Hildreth.
Leonard J. Klaif, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Arthur Lewis.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Steven E. Mercer, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

Defendants and appellants Aaron Davis, Arthur Lewis, and
Joshua Hildreth appeal from the trial court’s orders denying
their petitions for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.1
The court found defendants ineligible for resentencing relief
because, although they were charged with murder in 2018, they
entered no contest pleas to voluntary manslaughter one year
after Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill
No. 1437) went into effect. Defendants contend that by excluding
those in their position from relief—defendants charged with
murder before the bill’s effective date but who entered pleas after
that date—section 1172.6 violates equal protection guarantees.
We find no equal protection violation and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In October 2018, the People charged Davis, Lewis, and
Hildreth with murder (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1); three counts of
attempted murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664; counts 2, 3, 5); shooting
at an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246; count 4); and shooting at an
inhabited dwelling (ibid.; count 6).2 The murder count alleged
that the murder was intentional and perpetrated by means of

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2 The information charged four other individuals along with
defendants. It alleged seven total counts; the additional count
concerned a defendant who is not a party to this appeal.

2
discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle at persons outside the
vehicle with the intent to inflict death (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(21)) and
that defendants committed the offense in furtherance of gang
activities (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)). The three counts for attempted
murder each included an allegation that defendants committed
attempted murder willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation
(§ 664, subd. (a)). The information further alleged Davis had
previously been convicted of a prior strike (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(j),
1170.12).
In January 2020, the court held a hearing on defendants’
plea agreements. The court explained that each defendant would
be pleading no contest or guilty to voluntary manslaughter and
individually confirmed defendants’ understanding of the pleas
and their respective sentences. The court granted the People’s
motion to amend the information by interlineation to add a count
for voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) as to each
defendant.
The prosecutor informed defendants that the maximum
sentence they could each receive if they went to trial on the
murder count was life without parole. The prosecutor further
asked if defendants “had enough time to talk to [their] lawyer[s],
discuss the facts of the case and [their] rights and defenses.”
Each defendant confirmed that he had. Each defendant then
pled no contest to voluntary manslaughter and admitted the gang
allegation. Davis admitted the allegation that he suffered a prior
strike conviction. Pursuant to the plea agreements, counts one
through six were dismissed as to each defendant.
The court sentenced Hildreth to the low term of three years
for voluntary manslaughter, plus a consecutive term of 10 years
for committing a violent felony for the benefit of a gang (§ 186.22,

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subd. (b)(1)(C)), for a total term of 13 years. The court sentenced
Davis to the low term of three years for voluntary manslaughter,
doubled to six for the prior strike, plus 10 years for committing a
violent felony for the benefit of a gang, for a total term of 16
years. The court sentenced Lewis to the high term of 11 years for
voluntary manslaughter, plus 10 years for committing a violent
felony for the benefit of a gang, for a total term of 21 years.
In 2022, defendants each filed form petitions alleging their
eligibility for resentencing relief under section 1172.6. The court
found the petitions facially sufficient, appointed counsel, and set
briefing schedules. The People filed oppositions to the petitions.
In March 2024, the court held a consolidated hearing on
defendants’ petitions. After hearing argument, the court denied
the petitions for failing to make a prima facie showing of
eligibility for relief under section 1172.6. Citing People v. Reyes
(2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 292 (Reyes), the court found section 1172.6
required defendants to show that they had been convicted under
a theory of murder liability later invalidated by Senate Bill
No. 1437 and therefore could not be convicted under the current
law after its amendment. The court concluded defendants could
not make this showing because they were convicted by plea after
Senate Bill No. 1437 went into effect. The court further
concluded that later amendments expanding section 1172.6 to
include attempted murder were irrelevant because defendants
were prosecuted for murder.
Defendants timely appealed.3

3 On appeal, counsel for Davis and Lewis initially filed “no
merit” briefs pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th
216. They later filed supplemental briefs joining the arguments

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DISCUSSION
I. Section 1172.6 Does Not Violate Equal Protection
Guarantees
A. Applicable legal principles and standard of
review
On January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 took effect “to
amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that
murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual
killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major
participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f);
see also People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707–708 (Strong);
People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis); People v.
Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843 (Gentile).) The bill
amended section 188 by adding the requirement that, except as
stated in section 189, subdivision (e), “in order to be convicted of
murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought.
Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her
participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).)
Senate Bill No. 1437 created a procedure, now codified at
section 1172.6, in which persons convicted of murder under the
former law may seek resentencing if they could no longer be
convicted of those offenses under amended section 188. (Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959; Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 847.)
In 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill

in Hildreth’s opening brief and moving to strike their respective
Delgadillo briefs. This court granted the motions, struck Davis’s
and Lewis’s Delgadillo briefs, and deemed their proposed
supplemental joinder briefs filed.

5
No. 775) further expanded the remedy to include defendants
convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. (People v. Montes (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th
1001, 1004.) The bill also clarified that defendants who could
have been convicted of murder on an invalid theory, but who
were ultimately convicted only of manslaughter either at trial or
by plea, are eligible to seek resentencing. (People v. Lezama
(2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 583, 590 (Lezama).)
A defendant seeking resentencing relief under
section 1172.6 must file a petition declaring the defendant’s
eligibility under the statute. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 708.) To make a prima facie showing of eligibility, a defendant
must attest that: (1) “[a] complaint, information, or indictment
was filed against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to
proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory
under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime, or attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine”; (2) the defendant
“was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter
following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which
the [defendant] could have been convicted of murder or attempted
murder”; and (3) the defendant “could not presently be convicted
of murder or attempted murder because of changes to Section 188
or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)–
(3).)
At the prima facie stage, “ ‘ “the court takes petitioner’s
factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment
regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his
or her factual allegations were proved.” ’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11

6
Cal.5th at p. 971.) The trial court’s denial of a resentencing
petition at the prima facie stage “ ‘is a purely legal conclusion,’ ”
which appellate courts review de novo. (People v. Ervin (2021) 72
Cal.App.5th 90, 101.)
B. Discussion
Section 1172.6 does not afford resentencing relief to
defendants charged with murder who were convicted of voluntary
manslaughter after Senate Bill No. 1437’s effective date of
January 1, 2019. In Reyes, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at page 298,
the court held that a defendant who pled no contest to second
degree murder after Senate Bill No. 1437’s effective date could
not show he could no longer be convicted “ ‘because of changes’ ”
Senate Bill No. 1437 made to the law. Other courts have come to
the same conclusion. (Lezama, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 588–590 [legislative intent of Sen. Bill No. 1437 was to
provide relief for defendants who entered pleas when imputed
malice theories were still valid].) Courts have also expressly
concluded that defendants charged with murder before Senate
Bill No. 1437’s effective date are ineligible for resentencing relief
if they entered pleas to voluntary manslaughter after Senate Bill
No. 1437 took effect. (People v. Hickman (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th
1262, 1264–1265; People v. Gallegos (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 434,
439–443 (Gallegos); Lezama, at pp. 585–589.)
Defendants concede their ineligibility for resentencing
under the statute and acknowledge that the trial court was
required to apply Reyes and deny their petitions. However,
defendants assert section 1172.6 “raises serious equal protection
concerns” by excluding from eligibility defendants who were
charged with murder before, but were convicted of voluntary

7
manslaughter after, Senate Bill No. 1437’s effective date. This
argument lacks merit.
“The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution provides that no state may
‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.’ This provision is ‘essentially a direction that all
persons similarly situated should be treated alike.’ [Citation.]
‘At core, the requirement of equal protection ensures that the
government does not treat a group of people unequally without
some justification.’ [Citations.]”4 (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 847, fn. omitted.)
“The degree of justification required to satisfy equal
protection depends on the type of unequal treatment at issue.
Courts apply heightened scrutiny when a challenged statute or
other regulation involves a suspect classification such as race, or
a fundamental right such as the right to vote, and accordingly
will demand greater justification for the differential treatment.
[Citations.] But when a statute involves neither a suspect
classification nor a fundamental right, the ‘general rule is that
legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the
classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a

4 The California Constitution also guarantees equal
protection of the law. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a).)
Defendants do not specify whether they rely on the U.S.
Constitution or the California Constitution for their argument.
However, “we see ‘ “no reason to suppose” that federal equal
protection analysis would yield a result different from what
would emerge from analysis of the state Constitution.’
[Citation.]” (People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 847, fn. 2
(Hardin).)

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legitimate state interest.’ [Citations.]” (Hardin, supra, 15
Cal.5th at p. 847.)
Relying on People v. Olivas (1976) 17 Cal.3d 236, and
People v. Nguyen (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 705, defendants argue
that heightened scrutiny should apply here because
section 1172.6’s resentencing scheme implicates their
fundamental personal liberty interests. However, neither Olivas
nor Nguyen supports defendants’ argument. These decisions
imposed heightened scrutiny after concluding that statutes
imposing different initial sentences of incarceration for
comparable crimes implicated the defendants’ personal liberty
interests. (Olivas, at pp. 242–243 [statute granted discretion to
commit juvenile convicted in adult criminal court to a longer term
than if sentenced as adult]; Nguyen, at p. 713 [statute subjected
petty thieves with prior theft conviction to 25 years to life, but
petty thieves with no prior theft conviction to misdemeanor].)
Olivas does not stand for the proposition that a defendant has “ ‘a
fundamental interest in a specific term of imprisonment or in the
designation a particular crime receives.’ [Citations.]” (People v.
Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 838 (Wilkinson); People v.
Turnage (2012) 55 Cal.4th 62, 74 (Turnage).)5

5 Defendants contend they are similarly situated to other
defendants seeking resentencing who were charged with murder
prior to January 2019, but were deemed eligible for
section 1172.6 resentencing relief because they were convicted
before Senate Bill No. 1437’s effective date. We do not address
whether the two groups are similarly situated and instead
consider only “whether the challenged difference in treatment is
adequately justified under the applicable standard of review.”
(Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 851.)

9
“Classifying defendants by sentencing date is not made on
the basis of race, alienage, national origin, gender or legitimacy,
which requires a greater level of scrutiny. [Citations.] Generally,
if the classification does not involve a suspect class, legislation is
presumed to be valid under the equal protection clause if the
statutory classification is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.” (People v. Mora (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1477, 1483,
citing Wilkinson, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 836.) Rational basis
review, “[c]oupled with a rebuttable presumption that legislation
is constitutional,” “sets a high bar before a law is deemed to lack
even the minimal rationality necessary for it to survive
constitutional scrutiny.” (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th
277, 289.) “Under this deferential standard, we presume that a
given statutory classification is valid ‘until the challenger shows
that no rational basis for the unequal treatment is reasonably
conceivable.’ [Citation.] The underlying rationale for a statutory
classification need not have been ‘ever actually articulated’ by
lawmakers, nor ‘be empirically substantiated.’ [Citation.] . . . ‘If a
plausible basis exists for the disparity, courts may not second-
guess its “ ‘wisdom, fairness, or logic.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Hardin,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 852.)
As other courts have concluded, and defendants here
acknowledge, section 1172.6’s purpose was “to provide retroactive
relief to defendants who were, or who could have been, convicted
of murder” under a theory of imputed malice before Senate Bill
No. 1437 eliminated these theories as a basis for liability. (Reyes,
supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 299; see also Gallegos, supra, 105
Cal.App.5th at p. 443; Lezama, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 590.)
In other words, the Legislature intended to provide a remedy to
those defendants who would otherwise be unable to benefit from

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Senate Bill No. 1437’s changes to the law. (See People v. Patton
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 558 [“The Legislature, to provide relief to
those with existing murder convictions dependent on theories of
the crime it had rejected, devised a path to resentencing.”].)
It was therefore indisputably rational for the Legislature to
exclude from section 1172.6’s provisions defendants who were
convicted after Senate Bill No. 1437 took effect, since those
defendants would, by virtue of the date of their convictions,
receive the benefit of the changes to the law. Plea agreements in
California are “ ‘deemed to incorporate and contemplate . . .
existing law . . . .’ ” (People v. Gipson (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th
1065, 1070.) Moreover, the Legislature could rationally
anticipate that once Senate Bill No. 1437 went into effect,
defendants would not agree to, and the trial court would not
accept, negotiated dispositions that were no longer reasonable or
lacked a factual basis because the previously charged murder or
attempted murder was being prosecuted on an invalid theory.
(Gallegos, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 443, fn. 4 [defendant
whose plea was negotiated, but not yet entered, before effective
date of Sen. Bill No. 1437 could have withdrawn from plea after
that date instead of accepting it].) And, to the extent a
defendant’s conviction after January 1, 2019, resulted from a
prosecution based on an invalid theory of murder or attempted
murder, the Legislature could reasonably determine that such a
defendant would already have a remedy by way of, for example, a
direct appeal.
The Legislature, therefore, plainly had a rational basis for
limiting the retroactive relief set forth in section 1172.6 to only
those convicted of voluntary manslaughter before Senate Bill
No. 1437 made ameliorative changes to the law. “[T]he practical

11
necessity that a statutory change have a beginning provides a
rational basis for classifications that fall on either side of the
statute’s effective date.” (People v. Verba (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th
991, 996.) “ ‘[T]he 14th Amendment does not forbid statutes and
statutory changes to have a beginning, and thus to discriminate
between the rights of an earlier and later time.’ ” (People v. Floyd
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 179, 191, quoting Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v.
Rhodes (1911) 220 U.S. 502, 505.)
On appeal, defendants do not contend that section 1172.6’s
eligibility requirements have no rational relationship to the
state’s legitimate interest in creating a retroactive remedy.
Instead, defendants contend that other rational bases exist to
deem defendants charged before Senate Bill No. 1437’s effective
date eligible for resentencing even if they entered pleas after that
date. That alternative reasons may exist to include defendants in
the scope of the statutory remedy does not satisfy defendants’
rigorous burden on rational basis review to “negate[ ] ‘ “every
conceivable basis” ’ ” for the Legislature’s decision not to do so.
(Turnage, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 79, quoting Heller v. Doe (1993)
509 U.S. 312, 320.)
Even considering defendants’ proposed justifications for
expanding eligibility for relief under section 1172.6, their
arguments find no support in the law. For instance, defendants
argue that they should be deemed eligible for resentencing
because their 2020 plea convictions to voluntary manslaughter
“may have derived from an initial murder charge that could have
been based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine.”
However, even assuming the People charged defendants with
murder under an invalid theory in 2018, defendants fail to
explain how this creates the logical inference that they could

12
have entered pleas under those same theories in 2020, a year
after Senate Bill No. 1437 eliminated them. As the court
explained in Lezama, section 1172.6 requires “that at the time of
conviction—i.e., the time the plea was entered—the only way to a
murder conviction was through an imputed malice theory. As a
matter of law, this cannot be true for a person, like defendant, who
pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter at a time when imputed
malice theories had already been statutorily eliminated.”
(Lezama, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 590, italics added, fn.
omitted.)
Defendants do not contend otherwise. They do not proffer
facts or citations to authority to support their assertion that their
pleas preserved the People’s ability to pursue murder convictions
based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine,
notwithstanding the changes Senate Bill No. 1437 made to the
law a year prior. “[W]e may disregard conclusory arguments that
are not supported by pertinent legal authority or fail to disclose
the reasoning by which the appellant reached the conclusions he
wants us to adopt.” (City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211
Cal.App.4th 266, 287.)
As we understand their argument, defendants additionally
contend that Senate Bill No. 775 eliminated accomplice liability
for voluntary manslaughter based on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, thus raising equal protection concerns for
defendants who may have been convicted of voluntary
manslaughter on a natural and probable consequences theory
before 2022. Defendants argue that this legislative intent is
consistent with the overall purpose of section 1172.6 and “follows”
from its other provisions. However, neither the legislative
history nor the statutory language supports defendants’ position.

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Senate Bill No. 1437 addressed accomplice liability only for
murder and amended only the statutory provisions related to
murder. (Sen. Bill No. 1437, §§ 2, 3.) The corresponding
resentencing scheme in section 1172.6 is similarly limited in
scope. “[S]ection 1172.6 applies to those who pled guilty to
manslaughter after being charged with murder and who would
have been subject to prosecution for murder under a felony-
murder theory, the natural and probable consequences doctrine,
or any other theory of imputed malice. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)”
(People v. Gaillard (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1206, 1211, italics
added.) Thus, the resentencing scheme applies “to those
petitioners who entered a plea to manslaughter only if, at the
time the plea was entered, the only way to a charged murder
conviction was through an imputed malice theory eliminated by
Senate Bill No. 1437.” (Gallegos, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at
p. 445.)
Senate Bill No. 775’s expansion of the section 1172.6
remedy similarly had no bearing on the validity of imputed
theories of liability used to secure voluntary manslaughter
convictions. (Lezama, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 590 [Sen. Bill
No. 775’s reference to manslaughter made relief available to
defendants convicted by plea or trial when prosecution could
secure conviction for murder only through imputed malice
theory].) We have no basis to conclude that the Legislature
enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 to eliminate any theories of
voluntary manslaughter liability beyond those expressly
articulated in the legislation.
Finally, defendants contend that the People could have
proceeded on invalid theories to convict them on the attempted
murder charges, since the Legislature did not amend

14
section 1172.6 to include attempted murder until two years after
defendants entered their pleas. (Sen. Bill No. 775.) This
argument also fails. Section 1172.6 provides relief only if the
prosecution could have relied on a theory invalidated by Senate
Bill No. 1437 to pursue a conviction, not for “dismissed charges
separate and apart from the conviction at issue.” (Gallegos,
supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 444.) Defendants’ three attempted
murder counts were unrelated to their eventual voluntary
manslaughter convictions. Later legislation expanding
section 1172.6 to include attempted murder convictions is
irrelevant to the determination of whether defendants
established a prima facie showing of eligibility in this case.6

6 Because we conclude defendants failed to show that
section 1172.6 raises equal protection concerns, we do not reach
defendants’ contentions about the application of the canon of
constitutional doubt.

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DISPOSITION
The orders denying defendants’ petitions for resentencing
under section 1172.6 are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

ADAMS, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

EGERTON, J.

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