In re M.R. CA2/3

CourtListener 10651478Calctapp11 août 2025

Texte intégral

Filed 8/11/25 In re M.R. CA2/3
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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re M.R. et al., Persons Coming B336352
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. Nos.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN DK19402C,
AND FAMILY SERVICES, DK19402D

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

Ch.R.,

Defendant and Appellant;

K.G.,

Intervener and Respondent.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Marguerite D. Downing, Judge. Affirmed and remanded
with instructions.

Lori Siegel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Avedis Koutoujian,
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Megan Turkat Schirn, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Intervener and Respondent.
_________________________

The juvenile court took jurisdiction over M.R. and C.R.
in 2016 after finding their parents—Ch.R. (father) and M.C.
(mother)—engaged in domestic violence in their presence and
had unresolved substance abuse issues. The court removed
the children from their parents’ custody a year later, and father
moved to Las Vegas soon thereafter. The court terminated
father’s reunification services in 2018, citing his failure to
complete his case plan and visit the children. Father filed
a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 3881
seeking reinstatement of his reunification services and the
return of the children to his care. The court denied the petition
without an evidentiary hearing, citing father’s failure to maintain
consistent visitation. Father filed three more petitions seeking
the same relief, each of which the court denied without an
evidentiary hearing.
Father appeals the court’s denial of his most recent
section 388 petition. He argues the court was required to
conduct an evidentiary hearing because he made a prima facie
showing of changed circumstances and the children’s best
interest. Father also contends the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (Department)

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare
and Institutions Code.

2
failed to comply with its duty of initial inquiry under state law
(§ 224 et seq.) implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978
(ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). The Department does not
contest either issue.
We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion by
denying father’s section 388 petition without an evidentiary
hearing, as the record shows father failed to maintain
consistent visitation with the children. However, we accept
the Department’s concession that its inquiry under ICWA
was inadequate. Accordingly, we affirm the order denying
father’s petition and remand the matter for further proceedings
consistent with ICWA and related California law.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Background
Father and mother have two children together, M.R. (born
in August 2014) and C.R. (born in July 2015). Mother has two
children from other relationships—Mi.C. (born in 2006) and
T.G. (born in 2011)—whom we refer to as the “older siblings.”2
2. The Department’s petitions
a. The original petition
The Department filed a petition in September 2016
asserting the children and the older siblings are persons
described by section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1). According
to the petition, mother and father engaged in a violent altercation
in front of the children. During the altercation, father allegedly
pushed mother to the ground and punched her in the mouth with

2 This appeal concerns only M.R. and C.R. Therefore, we
summarize facts related to the older siblings only to the extent
they are relevant to the issues concerning the younger children.

3
a closed fist. The petition also alleged father was under the
influence of marijuana while caring for the children, and mother
abused amphetamine, methamphetamine, and marijuana.
The court sustained the petition and declared the children
dependents under section 300. As to disposition, the court
released the children to the parents’ custody under the
Department’s supervision. The court ordered both parents
to complete parenting classes, individual counseling, and
drug testing.
b. The first supplemental petition
In January 2017, the Department filed a supplemental
petition alleging mother had been terminated from a
rehabilitation program and failed regularly to submit to
drug testing. The court sustained the petition and removed
the children from mother’s custody. The court placed the
children and their older siblings with father.
c. The second supplemental petition
The Department filed a second supplemental petition
in April 2017. As relevant here, the petition alleged father
allowed mother to have unmonitored overnight visitation with
the children in violation of the court’s order. The court sustained
the petition and found the previous disposition had not been
effective in protecting the children. The court removed the
children and their older siblings from father’s custody and
terminated the home-of-parent order. The court granted father
visitation and ordered him to complete a full drug treatment
program, parenting classes, and individual counseling.

4
3. The reunification period
In May 2017, the Department placed the children in the
home of a non-relative caregiver, K.G. (the caregiver). That
same month, father moved to Las Vegas, Nevada. Mother moved
to Las Vegas a few months later. Father told the Department
he was willing to move back to California if necessary to reunite
with the children.
In a January 2018 status review report, the Department
recommended the court terminate both parents’ reunification
services. According to the report, father had missed drug tests
and failed to provide documentation verifying his enrollment in
parenting classes. Father said he had enrolled in an outpatient
drug program in Las Vegas, but the Department had not been
able to verify his progress.
The Department reported father’s visits had been
“sporadic” since the court removed the children from his home.
Father said his work and treatment schedules made it difficult
for him to travel to see the children in person. He asked the
court to continue his reunification services.
The court terminated both parents’ reunification services
in January 2018 and set a hearing to select a permanent plan
under section 366.26. The court found the parents had not
complied with their case plans, and “the extent of progress
toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating
placement by the parents have been non[-]existent.” The court
explained, “because the parents have relocated out of state, . . .
they have not consistently and regularly visited” the children.
Moreover, the parents have not made “significant progress in
resolving the issues that led to the removal of these children,
nor have they demonstrated the appropriateness or ability

5
to complete the objectives of treatment or to provide for the
children’s safety, protection, physical and emotional well being.”
4. Post termination of services
In April 2018, the Department placed the older siblings
in the same home as the children. The next month, the
Department reported father’s visits continued to be sporadic.
Father had not been calling the children on the phone, and his
most recent in-person visit was in November 2017. According
to the caregiver, father only requested visits “right before each
Court hearing.”
In July 2018, the Department reported the children were
“thriving” in their placement and the caregiver was meeting
all their needs. The children and their older siblings had formed
an attachment and bond with their caregiver.
In May 2019, the juvenile court selected legal guardianship
as the permanent plan. The court appointed the caregiver
as the legal guardian of the children and their older siblings.
The court granted father monitored visitation.
5. Father’s section 388 petitions
a. Father’s first petition
Father filed a section 388 petition in January 2021.
The petition asked the court to return the children to father’s
home or, alternatively, reinstate his reunification services
with unmonitored visitation.
According to the petition, father “completed a parenting
program, and an outpatient substance abuse treatment program,
and has even voluntarily chosen to remain participating in
its services. Father receives counseling. Father also submitted
to a mental health evaluation as well.” The petition asserted
father’s requested changes would be better for the children

6
because he was “ready[,] able[,] and willing to provide the
children with a safe and nurturing home. The children would
benefit from being raised by their father, who has shown
determination in bettering himself for his children.”
Father attached to the petition letters and certificates
showing he had completed parenting classes and an outpatient
substance abuse program. Father also submitted proof that he
voluntarily had chosen to continue receiving substance abuse
counseling and had been determined not to need mental health
counseling.
The Department prepared a report in response to
father’s petition. According to the report, father had not had
any in-person visits with the children in three years. The
Department had offered father bus tickets to visit the children,
but he said he was too busy with work.
The caregiver reported that father would sporadically
video chat with the children, but sometimes he would not contact
them for months at a time. Father told her he was too busy with
work and “lost his phone.” The caregiver expressed concern
that father often made promises to the children he did not keep,
such as promising to send gifts or visit in person. The children
were upset when father did not follow through, and they
eventually stopped asking to call or visit him.
Father initially contradicted the caregiver’s report, telling
the Department he contacted the children every week. However,
upon further questioning, father said he had not been able to
contact the children consistently because his “demanding work
schedule” conflicted with the times the caregiver was available.
Father said he understood the importance of visitation to

7
establish a relationship with the children, and he agreed to
make a better effort.
The Department recommended the court deny father’s
petition. The Department noted, although father had completed
court-ordered services, “he did not follow or exercise his court[-]
ordered visitation” with the children. The Department remarked
that the caregiver had been providing the children a stable home,
and they were “growing from the love, support, and bonding”
she offered to them.
The court denied the petition without a full evidentiary
hearing on March 10, 2021. The court found—based on the
petition and the Department’s report—there had been “no real
change [in] circumstances,” but, even if there had been, it would
not be in the children’s best interest “to set a hearing or to grant
the motion.” The court noted father had not had any in-person
visits in three years, had not formed a bond with the children,
and continued to reside out of state. Moreover, the children
had been in a stable placement for years. The children’s counsel
agreed with the court’s decision.
The court told father it would be “happy to consider”
another section 388 petition, but he “need[ed] to step up” first.
The court advised father “to visit on a regular basis, even
virtually, . . . and develop some relationship” with the children.
The court asked rhetorically, if father “does not have time to visit,
how does he have time to parent?”
b. Father’s second petition
Father filed a second section 388 petition in July 2021.
Father included in the petition the information from his
first petition, plus he asserted he had “maintained consistent

8
electronic communication with his children since [March 2021].
The children have reported a desire to live with father.”
The Department prepared a report and recommended that
the court deny father’s petition. According to the report, father
consistently called the children on a weekly basis between March
and August 2021. However, he had not had any in-person visits
and could not identify any barriers preventing him from doing so.
The Department recommended that father improve visitation
and participate in therapy with the children.
The court considered the petition at a hearing in September
2021. Once again, the court found there were no changed
circumstances and father’s requested relief would not be in
the children’s best interest. Accordingly, the court denied
the petition without a full evidentiary hearing.
c. Father’s third petition
At a July 2022 permanency planning review hearing,
father told the court he had been trying to call the children more
often, but the caregiver would not answer the phone. The court
pointed to a recent status report, in which the Department stated
father had been calling at inconvenient times and did not answer
the phone when the caregiver called back. The court told father
to “work on . . . answering the phone when the kids call or setting
up a schedule . . . so that everybody knows.” The court directed
the Department to work with father and the caregiver to set up
a visitation schedule.
About a month later, in August 2022, Father filed a third
section 388 petition. Father included the same information from
his first two petitions, plus he asserted he “resides in Las Vegas
and has made best attempts to stay in contact with the children,
but the caregiver has not been cooperative in answering the

9
telephone for visits.” The court summarily denied the petition
because father did not provide new evidence or state a change
in circumstances.
d. Father’s fourth petition
Father filed a fourth section 388 petition in December
2023, again asking the court to return the children to his home
or reinstate reunification services with unmonitored visitation.
Father attached to the petition the same documents he attached
to his first three section 388 petitions.
As grounds for the proposed changes, father repeated
many of the same assertions he made in his first three petitions.
His fourth petition stated the following: “The children have
recently expressed a desire to return to father. Father had
previously completed [his] caseplan—a parenting program, and
an outpatient treatment program. Father received counseling
and submitted to a mental health evaluation as well. . . .
Father resides in Las Vegas and has made best attempts to stay
in contact with the children, and reportedly has seen the children
in person [i]n July 2023. He reports staying in contact with them
via telephone.” Father asserted his requested changes would be
better for the children because he “is able to provide a safe home
for the children, and they have expressed a desire to return home
to him.”
e. The Department’s report
The court set a hearing to consider whether to conduct an
evidentiary hearing on father’s fourth petition, and it directed
the Department to prepare a report. The Department produced
a 27-page report recommending the court reinstate father’s
reunification services. The Department included the following
information in the report:

10
Visitation. Father told the Department he moved to
Las Vegas shortly after the children were removed from his care
because he “needed to better myself to get my kids.” Father
had been living in Las Vegas with his wife and her 16-year-old
daughter from a prior relationship.
According to father, he frequently visited M.R. and C.R.
in 2017 and 2018. He would take a bus from Nevada to meet up
with the caregiver and the children. However, his finances
changed in 2019 and he could no longer afford to make the trip.3
Father planned to schedule in-person visits once he had a reliable
vehicle. His finances were tight because he has three other
children who also live in Los Angeles, and he pays child support
for two of them.
Father acknowledged he had not had regular contact with
the children since late 2021 or early 2022. According to father,
he used to call the children regularly and talk to them for hours.
At some point, the caregiver stopped answering his calls, so he
stopped calling and sought relief from the court instead.
The caregiver said father typically called the children
only on birthdays and holidays. She tried her best to answer
his phone calls. If she missed a call, she would send father
a message and try to reschedule. Father called C.R. on his
birthday, but C.R. was busy with his party and did not want
to talk on the phone.
The caregiver said father continued to make promises
to the children he did not keep. He told the children he would
“pick them up to live with him or send them presents,” but he

3 The Department noted it offered father transportation
from Nevada to visit the children.

11
never did. Father once told the children he could not visit them
because the roads were closed. The children were confused when
they discovered other people had traveled to or from Las Vegas.
M.R. said she talked to father during holidays and once
saw him on a video call. C.R. also said he talked to father,
but he could not say how often. He recalled seeing father
on a video call three years earlier.
The caregiver said she took the children on a weekend trip
to Las Vegas in July 2023. The purpose of the trip was to visit
the children’s parents. The caregiver told father about the trip,
and father said he was going to see the children as soon as they
arrived. The children arrived on a Friday, but father said he
could not see them until Saturday. On Saturday, father said
the children were too far away for him to travel. Father finally
met up with the children on Sunday at the Circus Circus casino.
Father interacted lovingly with the children during the visit,
but the children spent most of the time on rides. Father left
after an hour.
Father said the caregiver told him about the Las Vegas
trip “last minute.” He wanted to see the children for longer, but
he had just started a new job and could not get time off work.
Father told the Department he and his wife had a two-hour
video visit with the children in January 2024. The children had
not known father was married. Father said the visit went well
and he was working with the caregiver to set up regular video
visits. However, they still had scheduling conflicts to resolve.
The Department monitored a video visit with father in
February 2024. According to the Department, father engaged
the children in conversation, the children responded well to him,
and they appeared comfortable and happy.

12
The children’s preferences. M.R. told the Department
she misses father, wants to visit him more often, and wants to
live with him in Las Vegas. She said father is “nice, he says hello
to me, and he gives me kisses. He tells me he loves me so much
and he will try to see me more when he doesn’t have to work.”
M.R. felt safe with father and was happy when they talked.
M.R. said she likes living with the caregiver and referred
to her as “mommy” and “auntie.” M.R. did not want to leave
her older siblings, and she started to cry at the thought of being
separated from them.
C.R. said he wanted to live with father “because he fries
chicken. . . . If I live with him he can give me some of his chicken.
Maybe he can take me to Circus Circus too.” C.R. was happy
when he saw father in Las Vegas, but father had to leave early
to go to work.
The children’s needs. The Department reported the
children have significant developmental and behavioral issues,
and a disruption to their care could have negative consequences
to them. Both children had been diagnosed with Autism
Spectrum Disorder (ASD) and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity
Disorder (ADHD). C.R. also had been diagnosed with a
neurodevelopmental disorder associated with fetal alcohol
exposure. The children participated in special education classes,
individual therapy, mental health services, and tutoring.
According to the Department, the caregiver consistently
met the children’s needs. She provided a stable and safe living
environment for the children, and they were thriving under her
care. The caregiver was committed to providing a permanent
home for the children and their older siblings. She had recently

13
discussed adoption with the children, and they were excited by
the idea.
Mother told the Department she would love for the children
to live closer to her in Las Vegas, but their home is with the
caregiver. She said the caregiver is a good person who taught
the children respect and values. Mother did not want the
children to be separated from the older siblings.
The Department’s recommendation. The Department
recommended the court grant father’s petition in part.
The Department noted it was concerned about father’s lack
of visitation and ability to care for the children. However,
he had taken steps towards addressing his case plan and
had been “persistent in regaining custody” of the children.
The Department recommended the court reinstate father’s
reunification services for six months. It recommended against
returning the children to his home.
f. The hearing
The court denied father’s petition at a hearing on March 26,
2024. The court stated, “having read and reviewed the [section]
388 [petition], the Department’s documents[,] and hearing
from minors’ counsel, the court, at this time, is going to deny
the [petition] without a[n evidentiary] hearing, finding there
is no change in circumstances. Assuming arguendo, there was
a change in circumstance[s], the court finds that it’s not in the
best interest of these children to provide reunification services to
their father.” The court asked, “Does anybody wish to be heard?”
Father “object[ed] to the summary denial” of his petition, but
he did not offer substantive argument.

14
After denying father’s petition, the court directed the
Department to give notice that the caregiver had asked to change
the permanent plan to adoption.
Father timely appealed the denial of his petition.
DISCUSSION
1. The court did not abuse its discretion by denying
father’s petition without an evidentiary hearing
Father argues the juvenile court erred by summarily
denying his fourth section 388 petition. According to father,
his petition established a prima facie showing of changed
circumstances and that his requested relief would be in the
children’s best interest. Therefore, father argues, the court
should have conducted a full evidentiary hearing before ruling
on the petition.
a. Standard of review and relevant law
Section 388 allows a parent of a dependent child to petition
the juvenile court to change, modify, or set aside its prior orders.
(§ 388, subd. (a)(1).) The parent has the burden to prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, (1) the existence of new evidence
or changed circumstances justifying a change in the juvenile
court’s prior orders, and (2) the proposed change would promote
the best interests of the child. (In re A.A. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th
597, 611; In re Priscilla D. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1216–
1217.)
Under rule 5.570 of the California Rules of Court, a court
has four options upon receiving a petition under section 388.
The court may (1) deny the petition ex parte (id., rule 5.570(d));
(2) grant the petition without a hearing if all parties stipulate
(id., rule 5.570(f)); (3) “order a hearing for the parties to argue
whether an evidentiary hearing on the petition should be granted

15
or denied” (id., rule 5.570(f)(2)); or (4) order an evidentiary
hearing (id., rule 5.570(f)(1)). At an evidentiary hearing,
“proof may be by declaration and other documentary evidence,
or by testimony, or both, at the discretion of the court.” (Id.,
rule 5.570(h)(2).)
The court must order an evidentiary hearing only
“ ‘if the liberally construed allegations of the petition . . .
make a prima facie showing of changed circumstances and
that the proposed change would promote the best interests of
the child . . . . The prima facie requirement is not met unless
the facts alleged, if supported by evidence given credit at the
hearing, would sustain a favorable decision on the petition.’ ”
(In re Daniel C. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1445.) The juvenile
court may consider the entire factual and procedural history
of the case in deciding whether a petition makes the required
prima facie showing. (In re K.L. (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 52, 62.)
We review a juvenile court’s decision to deny a section 388
petition without a full evidentiary hearing for an abuse
of discretion. (Ibid.)
b. Father did not make a prima facie showing of
changed circumstances
“Not every change in circumstance can justify modification
of a prior order. The change in circumstances must relate to
the purpose of the order and be such that the modification of the
prior order is appropriate.” (In re S.R. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th
864, 870.) A “showing of changing circumstances is not sufficient
to require a hearing on the merits of [a] section 388 petition.”
(In re A.S. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 351, 358.)
Contrary to father’s contentions, the juvenile court did not
abuse its discretion by concluding he failed to make a prima facie

16
showing of changed circumstances. Father identified five
changed circumstances in his fourth petition: (1) father
completed all the services required under his case plan; (2) he
visited the children in person in July 2023; (3) he “stay[ed]
in contact with [the children] via telephone”; (4) he made his
“best attempts” to stay in contact with the children; and
(5) the children expressed a desire to live with him.
Father’s completion of services was the most significant
changed circumstance he identified, but the court reasonably
could have determined it was not sufficient to warrant the relief
he sought. The court gave two primary reasons for terminating
father’s services and removing the children from his care:
(1) father failed to complete the services required under his
case plan; and (2) father failed consistently to visit the children.
Father’s completion of services addressed only one of those
concerns, which the court made clear when it denied father’s
first section 388 petition in March 2021. The court plainly
stated it would not change its prior orders unless father “visit[ed]
on a regular basis, even virtually, . . . and develop[ed] some
relationship” with the children.
The juvenile court reasonably could have concluded none
of the other changed circumstances father identified resolved the
visitation issue. Father asserted he visited the children in person
in July 2023 and “stay[ed] in contact with them via telephone.”
However, it is undisputed that the July 2023 visit lasted one
hour, and it was father’s only in-person visit with the children
in at least five years. Although father talked to the children
over the phone more often, he admitted he had not called them
regularly since late 2021 or early 2022. The court did not abuse
its discretion to the extent it concluded a one-hour in-person visit

17
and sporadic phone calls did not constitute sufficiently changed
circumstances.
The same is true of father’s assertion that he made his
“best attempts” to stay in contact with the children. Father has
given various explanations for his lack of consistent visitation
over the years, including his work schedule, a lack of
transportation, his physical distance from the children, and the
caregiver’s refusal to answer his calls. There is ample evidence
in the record refuting many of those assertions. However, even
assuming they were true, it does not change the fact that father
had not established or maintained consistent visitation with
the children. In other words, father’s “best attempts” to stay
in contact with the children had not resolved one of the primary
reasons the court terminated his reunification services and
removed the children from his care.
Nor was it sufficient for father to assert the children had
“recently expressed a desire to return to” his home. The court
did not rely on the children’s preferences when it terminated
father’s reunification services and removed them from his care.
Nor did the children’s desire to live with father otherwise resolve
the issues that led the court to issue those orders. Thus, the
court could have reasonably concluded the children’s desire to
live with father—even if true—did not warrant granting father’s
requested relief. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its
discretion by concluding father failed to establish a prima facie
showing of changed circumstances and denying his petition
without an evidentiary hearing.

18
c. Father did not make a prima facie showing of
the children’s best interest
Even if father had made a prima facie showing of changed
circumstances, the court reasonably could have determined he
failed to demonstrate his proposed changes were in the children’s
best interest.
Where, as here, reunification services have been
terminated, “the parents’ interest in the care, custody and
companionship of the child are no longer paramount. Rather,
at this point ‘the focus shifts to the needs of the child for
permanency and stability’ [citation], and in fact, there is a
rebuttable presumption that continued foster care is in the
best interests of the child.” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th
295, 317.) Thus, “after reunification services have terminated,
a parent’s [section 388] petition for either an order returning
custody or reopening reunification efforts must establish how
such a change will advance the child’s need for permanency
and stability.” (In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 527.)
Here, father’s proposed changes threatened to upend the
permanency and stability the caregiver had provided the children
for the majority of their lives. When the court considered father’s
fourth petition, the children had been living with the caregiver
for more than six years. The children had formed a deep bond
to the caregiver during that time, referring to her as “mommy”
and “auntie.”
According to the Department, the caregiver provided the
children a safe and stable environment, and they were thriving
under her care. The children had significant needs, including
diagnoses for ASD, ADHD, and a disorder related to fetal alcohol
exposure. The Department reported the caregiver ensured the

19
children received services to address all of their needs, and a
disruption to those services could have negative consequences.
The caregiver also was committed to providing the children
a permanent home and family unit. She was the legal guardian
for the children and their older siblings. She also was working
towards adopting the children, a prospect they seemed to
welcome.
Father suggested two reasons why his requested relief
would be in the children’s best interest, but the juvenile court
reasonably could have found neither warranted the disruption
to the children’s current placement. First, father asserted he
was “able to provide a safe home.” However, it was undisputed
the caregiver was already providing the children a safe home.
Therefore, the fact that father also could provide a safe home
was not enough to overcome the presumption in favor of the
children’s current placement.
The only other reason father gave for granting his petition
was that the children had “expressed a desire to return home
to him.” “While a child’s wishes are not determinative of her
best interests, the child’s testimony that she wants to live with
her [parent] constitutes powerful demonstrative evidence that
it would be in her best interest to allow her to do so.” (In re
Aljamie D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 424, 432.)
The Department’s report supports father’s assertion that
the children wanted to live with him. However, the court could
have reasonably discounted the children’s wishes given their ages
and extremely limited contact with father. The court removed
C.R. and M.R. from father in 2017, when they were approaching
two and three years old, respectively. The children visited father
a handful of times over the next two years. In the five years after

20
that, however, they had a single in-person visit with father,
which lasted one hour. As of March 2024—when the court
considered father’s fourth petition—the children had never
been to father’s home in Las Vegas, let alone spent meaningful
time in it. Nor had they met in-person father’s wife and step-
daughter, with whom he lived. In fact, until January 2024,
the children did not even know father was married. Under
these circumstances, it would have been impossible for the
children to make an informed decision about whether to
return to father’s care.
On this record, the court reasonably could have concluded
the children’s stated desire to live with father did not warrant
disrupting the stability and permanency they had in their
current placement. The court did not abuse its discretion in
determining father failed to establish a prima facie showing that
granting his petition would serve the children’s best interest.
Accordingly, it did not err by denying father’s petition without
conducting a full evidentiary hearing.
Father suggests the court should have deferred to
the Department’s conclusion that granting his petition would
serve the children’s best interest. According to father, the
Department “engaged in [a] thorough analysis and agreed it
was in the children’s best interest to increase [his] visitation
with the children and to reinstate [his] reunification services.”
Contrary to father’s contentions, the court could have
reasonably rejected the Department’s analysis and conclusion.
As father notes, the Department conducted a thorough
and detailed analysis in its report. However, the analysis
it performed concerned the parental-benefit exception to the
termination of parental rights, an issue that was not before

21
the court. Therefore, many of the factors the Department
considered were simply not relevant to father’s petitions.4
On the issues that were before the court—whether to reinstate
father’s reunification services or return the children to his care—
the court did not abuse its discretion in determining father failed
to make a prima facie showing that his proposed changes would
serve the children’s best interest.
d. Father has not shown prejudice
Even if father had established a prima facie case for relief,
he has not shown the court’s failure to hold an evidentiary
hearing was prejudicial. A failure to conduct an evidentiary
hearing on a section 388 petition is prejudicial if “ ‘ “ ‘there
is a reasonable probability that in the absence of the error,
a result more favorable to the appealing party would have
been reached.’ ” ’ ” (In re J.P. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 108, 128.)
Although the court did not conduct a full evidentiary
hearing, it is somewhat misleading to characterize its denial of
father’s petition as “summary.” After reviewing father’s petition,
the court set a hearing to decide whether to conduct a full
evidentiary hearing. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(f)(2).)
At the same time, the court ordered the Department to submit
a report responding to the petition. To prepare the report,
the Department interviewed father, mother, the caregiver,
the children, and several social workers who had worked with
the family. The Department summarized those interviews—
along with other relevant information it had collected over
the course of eight years—in a 27-page report. After reviewing

4 As one example, the Department considered “[w]hether
the harm of severing the parent-child relationship . . . outweighs
the security and finality adoption would confer.”

22
the Department’s report and giving the parties an opportunity
to present argument, the court declined to set an evidentiary
hearing and denied father’s petition.
In re C.J.W. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1075 (C.J.W.) involved
a similar procedure. In that case, the parents argued the
juvenile court violated due process by summarily denying their
section 388 petitions without a full evidentiary hearing. (See
id. at pp. 1079–1081.) The appellate court rejected the parents’
arguments—including their assertion that the court summarily
denied their petitions—explaining, “[w]hat ultimately occurred
is the [juvenile] court did conduct a hearing but did not allow
testimony from the parents on the section 388 petitions.
The court, however, did receive written evidence and heard
substantial argument from counsel for the parties.” (Id. at
pp. 1080–1081.) The appellate court held this procedure
comported with due process, noting the parents did not
“identify what further evidence they wanted to present” at
a full evidentiary hearing. (Id. at p. 1081.) The court also
suggested any error was harmless because it was “not reasonably
likely additional testimony would have persuaded the court to
grant the section 388 petitions.” (Ibid., citing In re Edward H.
(1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 584, 594 (Edward H.))
Here, as in C.J.W., the court denied father’s petition
after conducting a limited hearing, receiving written evidence,
and allowing the parties to present argument. Like the parents
in C.J.W., father does not identify any additional evidence he
could have produced at a full evidentiary hearing. Nor does he
challenge any of the information in the Department’s report or
identify significant contested issues of fact in it. To the contrary,
father relies heavily on the Department’s report to support his

23
arguments on appeal. The court, however, already considered
the report and determined it does not warrant reinstating
father’s services or returning the children to his care. Apart
from a conclusory assertion that he could have addressed the
court’s questions and concerns, father suggests no reason why
a full evidentiary hearing might have caused the court to reach
a different conclusion.
Under these circumstances, there is not a reasonable
probability that a full evidentiary hearing would have resulted
in a different outcome. Accordingly, father has not shown the
court’s denial of his petition without a full evidentiary hearing
was prejudicial. (See In re G.B. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1147,
1164–1165 [failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing on a
section 388 petition was harmless where the mother “wholly
fail[ed] to identify additional evidence she would have presented
at an evidentiary hearing that would have established a right
to reunification services”]; Edward H., supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at
p. 594 [failure to hold an evidentiary hearing on a section 388
petition was harmless where “nothing would have been gained
had the cause gone to a full hearing”]; C.J.W., supra, 157
Cal.App.4th at p. 1081.)
2. Limited remand is warranted for the Department
and the court to comply with ICWA
Father contends the case must be remanded for the
Department and the court to conduct a more thorough ICWA
inquiry.
Under California law implementing ICWA, the juvenile
court and the Department “have ‘an affirmative and continuing
duty’ in every dependency proceeding to determine whether
ICWA applies by inquiring whether a child is or may be an

24
Indian child.” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1131–1132,
quoting § 224.2, subd. (a).) The duty “includes, but is not limited
to, asking the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian,
extended family members, others who have an interest in the
child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether
the child is, or may be, an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(2).)
Extended family members include adults who are the child’s
“grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law
or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or
stepparent.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); former § 224.1, subd. (c)
[adopting federal definition].) Once the juvenile court or the
Department has a “reason to know” an Indian child is involved,
formal notice under ICWA must be given to the child’s “parents
or legal guardian, Indian custodian, if any, and the child’s tribe.”
(§ 224.3, subd. (a); 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).)
In September 2016, the juvenile court found ICWA
does not apply based on the parents’ reports. The Department
performed a more thorough ICWA inquiry in January 2024.
During that investigation, mother, father’s wife, a paternal aunt,
and the caregiver denied having relevant information about the
children’s Indian ancestry. Father also denied that he has any
Indian ancestry. However, he told the Department he believed
mother may have Indian ancestry from the Louisiana area.
Father contends the Department’s ICWA inquiry
was inadequate. He notes the Department did not specifically
question mother about possible Indian ancestry from Louisiana.
Father also notes the Department asked only one of his
11 siblings, and none of mother’s relatives, about possible
Indian Ancestry.

25
The Department filed a letter brief conceding “a more
thorough inquiry of available relatives is warranted.” We accept
the Department’s concession and remand the case with directions
to conduct a more thorough ICWA inquiry.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the order denying father’s section 388 petition.
We remand the matter to the juvenile court to ensure the
Department complies with the inquiry and—if applicable—notice
provisions of sections 224.2 and 224.3, and properly documents
its efforts. If the juvenile court determines ICWA applies,
then it shall proceed in conformity with ICWA and California
implementing provisions. (See 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a); §§ 224.2,
subd. (i)(1), 224.3, 224.4.)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EGERTON, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

ADAMS, J.

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